El Area de Libre Comercio de las Americas (ALCA) tiene como objetivo unir en un solo mercado a las 34 economias del hemisferio. Las negociaciones deberan concluir en el ano 2005. Sin embargo, el ano 2000 es crucial dado que los temas a ser negociados seran fijados en la "agenda de negociacion". Inicialmente se establecieron doce grupos de trabajo y luego fueron transformados en nueve grupos de negociacion. Uno de estos se dedica a politicas de competencia, y probablemente sus resultados tendran los efectos mas duraderos en cuanto el control de las practicas de las empresas entre las economias del ALCA. En este trabajo se discute la razon por la cual se incluye en las negociaciones el tema de las politicas de competencia. (Apuntes/DÜI)
Implementation of competition policies is one of the most recommended strategies to developing countries as a tool for achieving economic development. Using a panel dataset of over 100 countries and 7 years (from 2005-2011), I estimate the effect of competition on economic development, and also determine which of the comprehensive policy factors are the most relevant for increasing competition. A fixed effects instrumental variable approach is used.I find that competition intensity positively impacts economic development. The estimate is highly significant when effectiveness of antimonopoly policy and squared years of experience handling competition law are used as instruments for competition intensity. Political stability is shown to be a determinant for higher achievement in development. Macroeconomic environment and financial market development are also significant factors that contribute to higher economic development. Less developed countries should work intensively to improve their institutional quality and implement pro-competitive policies that are not only related to competition laws. ; La implementación de políticas de competencia es una de las estrategias más recomendadas para países en desarrollo para conseguir el desarrollo económico. Usando un conjunto de datos panel de más de cien países durante siete años (desde 2005-2011), estimo el efecto de la competencia en el desarrollo económico. También determino cuáles de los factores de política integral son los más relevantes para incrementar la competencia. Se usa un enfoque con variables instrumentales de efectos fijos.Encuentro que la intensidad de la competencia impacta positivamente sobre el desarrollo económico. La estimación es altamente significativa cuando se usan como instrumentos de la intensidad de competencia: la efectividad de la política antimonopolio y los años de experiencia manejando leyes de competencia al cuadrado. Se demuestra que la estabilidad política es un determinante de mayor éxito y desarrollo. El entorno macroeconómico y el desarrollo del mercado financiero también son factores significativos que contribuyen a un mayor desarrollo económico. Los países menos desarrollados deben trabajar intensamente para mejorar su calidad institucional e implemente políticas pro-competencia que no solo estén relacionadas a las leyes de competencia.
The object of the present work, inside a monographic number dedicated to the Social Community Politicy, is to offer a different vision from the one that traditionally has been assigned to the relations between the Social and Employment Policy and that of the Competition, which traditionally have been seen like antagonistic. Opposite to this consideration perceived by many economic operators, we will try to put in evidence the complementarily of both, since the Competition Policy has a fundamental social dimension in the measure in which it promotes the efficiency of the companies and the best assignment of public resources, stimulating the economic progress and the well-being of workers and consumers. ; El objeto del presente trabajo, dentro de un número monográfico dedicado a la Política Social Comunitaria, es ofrecer una visión diferente de la que se ha asignado a las relaciones entre la Política Social y de Empleo y la de la Competencia, que tradicionalmente han sido vistas como antagónicas. Frente a esta consideración, percibida por muchos operadores económicos, trataremos de poner en evidencia la complementariedad de ambas, pues la Política de la Competencia, tiene una fundamental dimensión social en la medida en que promueve la eficiencia de las empresas y la mejor asignación de recursos públicos, estimulando el progreso económico y el bienestar de trabajadores y consumidores.
El objetivo de este artículo es identificar los posibles desafíos que tendrá que enfrentar la Alianza del Pacífico en materia de políticas de competencia económica. Para ello se toma el caso del modelo de política de competencia de la Unión Europea, donde se consolida un mercado único dentro de un Acuerdo de Comercio Regional analizado a partir de la teoría de la integración regional. Entre las conclusiones del artículo se destaca que la Alianza del Pacífico no solo es un esfuerzo de integración comercial, sino que también aborda objetivos sociales y políticos. Sin embargo, la Alianza del Pacífico se encuentra en una etapa inicial con respecto a su estructura institucional y se espera que se produzcan mayores avances que le permitan hacer frente a las diferentes problemáticas de la integración regional, así como en el área de la competencia. Los países miembros deberán ajustar sus normas y disposiciones sociopolíticas y legales teniendo en cuenta la etapa actual de desarrollo en la que se encuentran sus economías. ; The objective of this article is to identify possible challenges the Pacific Alliance will have to face in terms of economic competition policy. To this end, the case of the competition policy model of the European Union, which consolidates a single market within a Regional Trade Agreement analyzed from the regional integration theory, is taken. Among the conclusions in the article it is important ot highlight that the Pacific Alliance is not only a trade integration efffort, but also addresses social and political objectives. However, the Pacific Alliance is still in its initial stages in terms of its institutional structure and greater progress is expected for it to be able to face the diverse problems of regionalism, as well as in the competition area. Member countries will need to adjust their sociopolitical and legal regulations and stipulations taking into account the current developmental stage of their economies.
20 páginas ; El objetivo de este artículo es identificar los posibles desafíos que tendrá que enfrentar la Alianza del Pacífico en materia de políticas de competencia económica. Para ello se toma el caso del modelo de política de competencia de la Unión Europea, donde se consolida un mercado único dentro de un Acuerdo de Comercio Regional analizado a partir de la teoría de la integración regional. Entre las conclusiones del artículo se destaca que la Alianza del Pacífico no solo es un esfuerzo de integración comercial, sino que también aborda objetivos sociales y políticos. Sin embargo, la Alianza del Pacífico se encuentra en una etapa inicial con respecto a su estructura institucional y se espera que se produzcan mayores avances que le permitan hacer frente a las diferentes problemáticas de la integración regional, así como en el área de la competencia ; The objective of this article is to identify possible challenges the Pacific Alliance will have to face in terms of economic competition policy. To this end, the case of the competition policy model of the European Union, which consolidates a single market within a Regional Trade Agreement analyzed from the regional integration theory, is taken. Among the conclusions in the article it is important ot highlight that the Pacific Alliance is not only a trade integration efffort, but also addresses social and political objectives. However, the Pacific Alliance is still in its initial stages in terms of its institutional structure and greater progress is expected for it to be able to face the diverse problems of regionalism, as well as in the competition area. Member countries will need to adjust their sociopolitical and legal regulations and stipulations taking into account the current developmental stage of their economies.
20 páginas ; The objective of this article is to identify possible challenges the Pacific Alliance will have to face in terms of economic competition policy. To this end, the case of the competition policy model of the European Union, which consolidates a single market within a Regional Trade Agreement analyzed from the regional integration theory, is taken. Among the conclusions in the article it is important ot highlight that the Pacific Alliance is not only a trade integration efffort, but also addresses social and political objectives. However, the Pacific Alliance is still in its initial stages in terms of its institutional structure and greater progress is expected for it to be able to face the diverse problems of regionalism, as well as in the competition area. Member countries will need to adjust their sociopolitical and legal regulations and stipulations taking into account the current developmental stage of their economies. ; El objetivo de este artículo es identificar los posibles desafíos que tendrá que enfrentar la Alianza del Pacífico en materia de políticas de competencia económica. Para ello se toma el caso del modelo de política de competencia de la Unión Europea, donde se consolida un mercado único dentro de un Acuerdo de Comercio Regional analizado a partir de la teoría de la integración regional. Entre las conclusiones del artículo se destaca que la Alianza del Pacífico no solo es un esfuerzo de integración comercial, sino que también aborda objetivos sociales y políticos. Sin embargo, la Alianza del Pacífico se encuentra en una etapa inicial con respecto a su estructura institucional y se espera que se produzcan mayores avances que le permitan hacer frente a las diferentes problemáticas de la integración regional, así como en el área de la competencia
The interaction between competition and environmental policy is quite complex, particularly before state aids, whose control level reflects the emergingopportunity cost between both policies. In order to illustrate the potential efficiency losses orthe imbalances on level playing field of competition, this article analyzes the legal, economic andpolitical dimensions of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) free allocation of allowances mechanism for the power generation sector. ; La interacción entre la política de competencia y la medio ambientales bastante compleja, especialmente en el caso de las ayudas estatales, cuyo nivel de controlrefleja el coste de oportunidad emergente entre ambas. Con el fin de ilustrar las potencialespérdidas de eficiencia o los desequilibrios en la equidad de condiciones de competencia, esteartículo analiza las dimensiones legal, económica y política del mecanismo de asignación gratuitade permisos de emisión del Régimen Comunitario de Comercio de Derechos de Emisión (RCCDE) de la Unión Europea para el sector de la generación eléctrica.
The exemptions to the Competition rules have been one of the main points of discussion of the 2013's CAP reform. The analysis of the Commission proposal and the debates at the European Parliament show one of the legislator's goals, which consist on strengthening the bargain power of the producers in order to guarantee a fair competition and a better distribution of the added value throughout the food chain. ; Las excepciones a las normas de la competencia han sido uno de los puntos principales de debate de la reforma de la PAC 2013. El análisis de las propuestas de la Comisión y de los debates en el Parlamento ponen de manifiesto uno de los retos sectoriales del legislador: el fortalecimiento del poder de negociación de la oferta para lograr unas mejores condiciones de competencia en el sector y una mejor distribución de la renta.The exemptions to the Competition rules have been one of the main points of discussion of the 2013's CAP reform. The analysis of the Commission proposal and the debates at the European Parliament show one of the legislator's goals, which consist on strengthening the bargain power of the producers in order to guarantee a fair competition and a better distribution of the added value throughout the food chain.
Beyond the trade agreement among the three countries of North America, behind the scenes, their financial systems are restructuring based on changes in legislation and monetary policy in which the U.S. Federal Reserve (fed) has played a preponderate role in repositioning the big conglomerates. The strengthening of the financial system, currently dominated by international financing, created financial fragility and bank failures, and repositioned institutional investors, which then led to a huge financial crisis. ; Más allá de un acuerdo comercial entre los tres países de América del Norte, detrás del escenario se encuentra la recomposición del sistema financiero de estos países, a partir de cambios en la legislación bancaria y en materia de política monetaria, en los cuales la Reserva Federal de Estados Unidos (fed) ha jugado un papel preponderante para el reposicionamiento de los grandes conglomerados. El fortalecimiento del sistema financiero, cuyo dominio actual descansa en el proceso de financiarización en el nivel internacional, sembró la fragilidad financiera y quiebras bancarias, y generó el reposicionamiento de los inversionistas institucionales, lo que desembocó en una crisis financiera de gran magnitud.
Competition policy is a dynamic process in which two questions arise: the configuration of the institutional framework and, on the other hand, the potential negative effects of the reforms processes. Based on surveys to employers (International Institute for Management Development, IMD), this paper evaluates the evolution of the effectiveness of competition policy at international level and how some countries' competition policy (or authority) reforms change this perceived effectiveness: United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Finland and Spain. Results show that the last Spanish competition policy reform (creation of the CNMC), was non-positive, despite some improvements in recent years.
The current article constitutes a part of the broader research project "Endogenous and exogenousdynamics of privatization in education: the establishment of the quasi-market model in Spain",funded by the Spanish Ministry of Education. One of the main line of research is being developed inthe Autonomous region of Madrid, and its main aim is to track and state explicitly endogenous andexogenous privatization dynamics within the local educational system, in order to detect andanalyze their educational effects and consequences. The local educational government has as maingoal the promotion of families' right to choose the school for their children. The promotion of thisright will have as consequence, as the local government argues, the promotion of the competitionbetween schools, which in turn will improve the quality of education. In order to achieve this aim,the local government is carrying out two main approaches: promoting the autonomy of schools andpublicizing rankings of schools. This article is based on the analysis of the effectiveness of thesepolicies in relation with the quality of education from three perspectives: the implementation ofthese policies by the regional government, which constitutes an analysis of internal consistency;the real effectiveness of these policies, that is to say, their influence on the quality of theeducational system as a whole, and finally, the reception of these policies from the families andfrom the schools, as they both constitute the supply and demand of education. ; The current article constitutes a part of the broader research project "Endogenous and exogenousdynamics of privatization in education: the establishment of the quasi-market model in Spain",funded by the Spanish Ministry of Education. One of the main line of research is being developed inthe Autonomous region of Madrid, and its main aim is to track and state explicitly endogenous andexogenous privatization dynamics within the local educational system, in order to detect andanalyze their educational effects and consequences. The local educational government has as maingoal the promotion of families' right to choose the school for their children. The promotion of thisright will have as consequence, as the local government argues, the promotion of the competitionbetween schools, which in turn will improve the quality of education. In order to achieve this aim,the local government is carrying out two main approaches: promoting the autonomy of schools andpublicizing rankings of schools. This article is based on the analysis of the effectiveness of thesepolicies in relation with the quality of education from three perspectives: the implementation ofthese policies by the regional government, which constitutes an analysis of internal consistency;the real effectiveness of these policies, that is to say, their influence on the quality of theeducational system as a whole, and finally, the reception of these policies from the families andfrom the schools, as they both constitute the supply and demand of education.
We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model¿s implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that affected local state capacity across Mexican municipalities and over time. Our difference-in-differences and instrumental variable identification strategies exploit a national shock that threatened the Mexican government¿s hegemony in the early 1960s. The intensity of this shock, which varied across municipalities, was partly explained by severe droughts that occurred during the 1950s.
This article explains the causes and effects of institutional change in political contexts where there is no guarantee of strict compliance with the rules. Analyzing the political reform of 2005 that made it possible for prefects or governors to be elected for the first time in Bolivia by popular vote, evidence was found that when there is a crisis of legitimacy, declining coalitions push for inclussive changes that reduce future electoral losses and cannot be reversed by the rising coalitions that come to power. These coalitions, nonetheless, attempt to limit the degree of inclusion of rules through lowerlevel policy changes that reduce political competition. ; El presente artículo explica las causas y efectos del cambio institucional en contextos políticos en los que no hay garantía sobre el cumplimiento estricto de las reglas. Analizando la reforma política de 2005 que posibilitó (por primera vez) que en Bolivia los prefectos o gobernadores puedan ser elegidos por voto popular, se halla evidencia que indica que cuando hay crisis de legitimidad, las coaliciones declinantes impulsan cambios incluyentes que reducen sus futuras pérdidas electorales y no pueden ser revertidos por las coaliciones ascendentes que llegan al poder. No obstante, éstas intentan limitar el grado de inclusión de las reglas a través de cambios normativos de menor nivel que disminuyen la competencia política.
