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The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices and summarise them so as to allow crosscountry and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been calculated for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period 1995-2005. ; Ziel dieses Beitrag ist die umfassende Beschreibung von neu entwickelten Indikatoren über die Qualität von wettbewerbspolitischen Systemen: die so genannten "Competition Policy Indexes" (CPIs). Die CPIs messen die Abschreckungsmerkmale der Wettbewerbspolitik in einem Staat oder, genauer gesagt, in einer Gebietskörperschaft. Unter Wettbewerbspolitik ist hierbei sowohl das Kartellrecht als auch seine Vollstreckung definiert, wobei auch die Fusionskontrolle einbezogen ist. Die CPIs bauen auf "harten" Daten über die zentralen Merkmale eines wettbewerbspolitischen Regimes auf. Diese werden mit Orientierungswerten verglichen, welche anhand von in der Literatur und Praxis allgemein bewährten Verfahren definiert sind. Schließlich werden sie in Indikatoren zusammengefasst, welche einen internationalen Vergleich über die Zeit erlauben. Diese Indikatoren wurden für eine Stichprobe von 13 OECD Gebietskörperschaften (12 OECD Länder und die Europäische Union) für die Zeitspanne 1995-2005 berechnet.

The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices and summarise them so as to allow cross-country and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been calculated for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period 1995-2005.

The Indonesian economy was dominated by the government in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s through its control of major mining, manufacturing and agricultural activities. Hill (2000) estimates that as much as 40% of non-agricultural GDP was accounted for by government entities in the late 1980s There were still a lot of government corporations up until the late 1980s and early 1990s and governmental control over the banking system was still substantial.

Although justification for competition policies is well founded in the economic literature, there is a need to understand their implications more fully, brought about not just by what is happening in the global arena but even more importantly by various comprehensive policy reforms that have been implemented in recent years. And while there may be a general consensus that "competition is good," there is vagueness in the minds of many and uncertainty about the need for competition policy and how competition should be enforced. This paper aims to contribute to the growing discussion on how to proceed from here. Towards this end, the paper first outlines the framework for competition policy in the Philippine setting. It then attempts to assess the state of competition in the Philippines. What has the Philippines done along the framework of competition policy and what has been the impact on the state of competition in the different sectors of the Philippine economy? A general assessment is made across the different sectors of the economy by looking at what major factors are present that could determine the state of competition in the different sectors. It also looks at policy reforms that have been implemented to improve the state of competition in these sectors. Finally, in conclusion, the paper addresses the issues that confront competition policy and suggests possible approaches towards formulating and implementing a workable competition policy for the Philippines.

We examine the setting of national competition policy in a two-country setting,emphasizing the relationship of trade to the goals of competition policy (suchas the degree and nature of competition). The issues we address involve thegeneral equilibrium distributional effects of competition policy, therelationship of national competition policy to terms-of-trade gains and losses,the implications of distinct national markets linked through trade (thestarting point for all trade theorists) for the analysis of national competitionpolicy, and the characteristics of the Nash equilibrium policy sets.

Competition policy and law, appropriately implemented and enforced, are essential to the optimal functioning of a market-orientated economy. International organizations, including the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and regional groupings such as the European Union (EU), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), all emphasize, to a greater or lesser extent, the need for a pro-competition policy to be adopted, to promote industrial efficiency and economic growth. The unspoken, but implicit, precondition for an effective competition policy is that the national government is ideologically committed to markets as the primary economic regulator, rather than to state-centred planning, or excessive public sector intervention to promote 'national champions'. For markets to function, there must be competition. The intriguing question is whether the Chinese authorities now accept this ideological position, and the need for a competition law to enhance domestic competition, after almost 30 years of economic reform. This brief will go on to explore the validity of the assertion that the adoption of a Chinese competition law, in present conditions, may be inappropriate, and might, in fact, impede the creation of a more economically efficient market.