Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in promoting competition. They now encourage firms to use it. They reason that comparative advertising, if fair and not misleading, increases consumers' information about alternative brands. For this to work, comparative claims must be credible. Competition policy and legal practice are essential in making comparative advertising (directly and indirectly) informative. In this paper, first we provide a legal background of comparative advertising in in Europe and the US. Second, we provide an economic analysis of comparative advertising. Here, we discuss the ways comparative advertising can affect market outcomes. Third, we provide an analysis of some recent legal cases in Europe and the US. Overall, we focus on the scope of information transmission through comparative advertising and on the way antitrust laws affect it.
Only recently, competition authorities tend to agree on comparative advertising being helpful in promoting competition. They now encourage firms to use it. They reason that comparative advertising, if fair and not misleading, increases consumers' information about alternative brands. For this to work, comparative claims must be credible. Competition policy and legal practice are essential in making comparative advertising (directly and indirectly) informative. In this paper, first we provide a legal background of comparative advertising in in Europe and the US. Second, we provide an economic analysis of comparative advertising. Here, we discuss the ways comparative advertising can affect market outcomes. Third, we provide an analysis of some recent legal cases in Europe and the US. Overall, we focus on the scope of information transmission through comparative advertising and on the way antitrust laws affect it.
Die Regierungen in der Europäischen Union retten Unternehmen in Schwierigkeiten durch staatliche Rettungs- und Umstrukturierungsbeihilfen. Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Kapiteln, die solche Beihilfen analysieren. Im ersten Kapitel nutze ich Daten von 86 Fällen aus den Jahren 1995-2003 um zu prüfen, wie wirksam die Beihilfen bei der Konkursprävention sind. Es gibt drei Ergebnisse. Erstens steigt die geschätzte diskrete hazard rate in den ersten vier Jahren nach der Subvention und sinkt danach, was nahelegt, dass einige Sanierungen den Konkurs eher verzögern als verhindern. Zweitens, Regierungen favorisieren staatliche Unternehmen bei Beihilfeentscheidungen, obwohl diese keine besseren Überlebenschancen haben. Drittens, die Wahl, ob Rettungs- oder Umstrukturierungsbeihilfe gewärt wird, ist eine endogene Variable in der Analyse. Wenn man sie als exogen betrachtet, unterschätzt man die Auswirkungen auf die Konkurswahrscheinlichkeit. Das zweite Kapitel ist eine Studie über die Auswirkungen von Bailouts auf Marktstruktur und Wohlfahrt in einem internationalen, asymmetrischen Cournot -- Duopol. Es wird gezeigt, dass die optimale Beihilfe positiv ist, auch wenn der Marktaustritt einer Firma nicht verhindert werden kann. Der Grund hierfür ist ein strategischer Effekt, der die effizientere Firma zu einer zusätzlichen kostenreduzierenden Maßnahme veranlasst. Wird der Marktaustritt verhindert, ist Effizienz geringer. Das dritte Kapitel enthält empirische Belege der politischen, institutionellen und wirtschaftlichen Determinanten der Sanierungsubventionspolitik. Ich nutze einen neuen Datensatz über Entscheidungen über Rettungs- und Umstrukturierungsbeihilfen während der Jahre 1995-2003 zusammen mit Informationen über Wahlergebnisse in den Europäischen Ländern. Das wichtigste Ergebnis ist, dass die Beihilfen in Ländern mit Mehrheitswahlsystem wahrscheinlicher sind, insbesondere während der Jahre vor Wahlen. ; Governments in the European Union bail out firms in distress by granting Rescue and Restructuring Subsidies. This thesis consists of three chapters analyzing European bailouts. In the first chapter, I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine the effectiveness of bailouts in preventing bankruptcy. The results are threefold. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate increases during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. Second, governments'' bailout decisions favored state-owned firms, even though state-owned firms did not outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an endogenous variable and treating it as exogenous underestimates its impact on the bankruptcy probability. Policy implications are discussed in the chapter. The second chapter is a study of the effects of bailouts on market structure and welfare in an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly. I show that the subsidy is positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a strategic effect, which forces the more efficient firm to make additional cost-reducing effort. When the exit is prevented, allocative and productive efficiencies are lower than in case of exit. The third chapter provides evidence of political, institutional and economic determinants of bailout policies. I use a new data set based on rescue and restructuring aid decisions during the years 1995-2003 merged with information about electoral outcomes in European countries. The main finding is that in countries with majoritarian democratic institutions bailouts are more likely, in particular during years preceding elections. Since bailouts are a targeted fiscal policy, the evidence supports the theory of Persson and Tabellini (2000) predicting that electoral systems shape incentives for fiscal policy choices.
Competition policy starts by shaping a legislative framework. This is aimed to establish boundaries for conducting competition and also sets limits of licit and illicit demarcation, for competitive and anticompetitive practices. The Romanian Competition Law has a divalent approach and it aims to provide specific behavioral conditions in order to stimulate and protect free-market competition, with the ultimate goal of developing a balanced, efficient and competitive economy. Our country's Competition policy is based on punishing the behavior. There are three such types of anti-competitive behavior, namely: agreements between undertakings, abuse of dominant position and mergers and other concentrations between undertakings. Recent Practice proved that this "enforcement-conduct-punishment" structure is not necessary the best way to address competition and it is high time for authorities to switch both regulation and enforcement of competition from the "classical perspective" towards concepts like "competition advocacy" and "soft power" and give competition policy a new, reshaped face.
With the completion of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations, attention turns to plausible next steps. One question on the agenda of possibilities is the adoption of competition policies that complement or substitute for the remedies traditionally used to deal with international trade distortions. This paper examines three cases
In this thesis I analyse the impact of the European Union (EU) on domestic policies in Poland when it was a candidate country for EU membership. The impact of the European Union on domestic policies is called Europeanisation. I examined how Poland complied with EU accession criteria and responded to Europeanisation. EU membership and technical pre-accession assistance depended upon compliance with accession criteria, i.e. political, economic and acquis criteria as laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993. In particular, the acquis criterion was important as it implied the transposition of the entire Community law, called acquis communautaire, into national law. ; TARA (Trinity's Access to Research Archive) has a robust takedown policy. Please contact us if you have any concerns: rssadmin@tcd.ie
This paper reviews the evolution of competition policy during the 20th century. It identifies the major principles underlying these policies and shows that two major challenges will have to be faced in the near future. On one hand, the technological changes introduced by the so-called 'new economy' are rapidly replacing some old rules, by reshaping the concepts of monopoly power and market dominance. On the other hand, internationalisation of economic boundaries is creating a greater need of policy coordination, not only between the US and the EU, but a global level as well. These ideas will define the evolution of competition policy in the next decades. ; Este artículo revisa la evolución de la política de defensa de la competencia durante el siglo veinte. Su objetivo es presentar los principios básicos de dicha política e identificar los principales desafíos que deberán ser abordados en el futuro. Por un lado, el cambio tecnológico introducido en la denominada "nueva economía" obliga a reemplazar algunas reglas tradicionales, redefiniendo los conceptos de monopolio y poder de mercado. Por otro, la internacionalización de la economía genera la necesidad de una coordinación global de las actuaciones de las agencias de la competencia y no sólo entre EE.UU. y la Unión Europea. Estas dos ideas definirán la evolución de la política de defensa de la competencia en las próximas décadas.
This paper reviews the evolution of competition policy during the 20th century. It identifies the major principles underlying these policies and shows that two major challenges will have to be faced in the near future. On one hand, the technological changes introduced by the so-called 'new economy' are rapidly replacing some old rules, by reshaping the concepts of monopoly power and market dominance. On the other hand, internationalisation of economic boundaries is creating a greater need of policy coordination, not only between the US and the EU, but a global level as well. These ideas will define the evolution of competition policy in the next decades. ; Este artículo revisa la evolución de la política de defensa de la competencia durante el siglo veinte. Su objetivo es presentar los principios básicos de dicha política e identificar los principales desafíos que deberán ser abordados en el futuro. Por un lado, el cambio tecnológico introducido en la denominada "nueva economía" obliga a reemplazar algunas reglas tradicionales, redefiniendo los conceptos de monopolio y poder de mercado. Por otro, la internacionalización de la economía genera la necesidad de una coordinación global de las actuaciones de las agencias de la competencia y no sólo entre EE.UU. y la Unión Europea. Estas dos ideas definirán la evolución de la política de defensa de la competencia en las próximas décadas.
Intellectual property rights and competition policy are intimately related. In this paper I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in practice. Recognizing that intellectual property rights and competition law can interact in many different ways, the presentation focuses on several key issues. The economic literature on the interaction between competition law and intellectual property rights shows that these regulatory systems are consistent in terms of basic principles. Significant tensions exist, however, and it is difficult to balance IPR and competition law in practice. The significant differences in approach between the United States and the European Union simply reflect the underlying reality that efforts to achieve a sensible balance do not result in policy harmonization.
The paper analyses firms' motivations and the competitive effects of digital conglomerates with the relevant industrial organisation and strategic management literature. On that basis, it makes recommendations to improve the methodologies and modes of operation of EU competition policy in the digital sector. The paper first shows that some of the characteristics of the digital economy may explain digital conglomerates. On the supply-side, those include the important economies of scope in product development as product innovation and development are often modular and based on shared inputs (such as data, hardware and software). On the demand-side, those include the consumer synergies generated by product ecosystems. The paper then shows that the pro- and anti-competitive effects of conglomerates are amplified in the digital economy. Regarding the anti-competitive effects, bundling may allow big platforms to envelop their smaller competitors in adjacent markets, raise entry barriers for innovating entrants or soften competition by increasing differentiation. The control of key sharable inputs may increase the incentives to refuse access or decrease the costs of an anti-competitive product proliferation strategy. Those effects are even stronger when the digital conglomerate has achieved the position of gatekeeper for access to customers or to specific products. Those anti-competitive effects should always be balanced with the positive welfare effects of digital conglomerates that are equally amplified. Moreover, conglomerate acquisitions of innovative start-ups may in some circumstances lead to a decrease in innovation, which is detrimental to welfare. The paper finally recommends some improvements in the enforcement of EU competition policy in digital markets. (i) Dynamic efficiency should be prioritised over static efficiencies; (ii) Market power should be assessed dynamically by focusing more on potential competition and by defining markets for sharable inputs and innovation capabilities; (iii) The theories of harms should be adapted to the firms' incentives in the digital economy, in particular the anti-competitive bundling theories need to be extended, the threshold to impose access under the essential facilities doctrine needs to be adapted to the characteristics of data and the effects of a merger on innovation need to be directly taken into account; (iv) Antitrust intervention should be quicker and more agile and the standard of proof should not only take into account the risk of type I and type II errors but also the cost of those errors.
I model optimal product-market competition policy when industriesdiffer inthe potential for quality-improving technological advance. In a two-periodmodel, a competition authority with limited resources administers adeterrence-based competition policy toward two industries. In one oftheindustries, an incumbent firm chooses the level of resources toinvest in aquality-improving R&D project. In the other industry, product qualityisconstant. The competition authority cannot commit in advance to thetoughness of competition policy in the post-discovery world. Optimalpolicy requires the competition authority to administer a toughercompetition policy before innovation, all else equal, the greater thepotential quality improvement; patent protection may increase R&Dintensity, but worsens market performance.
This paper analyses the conduct of competition policy in Ireland between 2000 and 2011. Attention is paid to the policies and actions of those persons and institutions responsible for competition policy: the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation; the Competition Authority; the Courts; and, since 2010, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Competition policy after some initial setbacks at the beginning of the recession, has enjoyed strong support since 2010.
Defence date: 03 October 2018 ; Examining Board: Prof. David K. Levine, EUI (Supervisor); Prof. Giacomo Calzolari, EUI; Prof. Juan-José Ganuza, UPF and Barcelona GSE; Prof. Gerard Llobet, CEMFI ; The aim of this thesis is to investigate cartels and the impact of competition policy from various angles. Chapter 1, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro and Juan Luis Jiménez, analyzes the relationship between cartel life cycles and business cycles. We analyze the relationship between cartel startups/breakups and economic cycles using a dataset of cartels sanctioned by the European Commission. Results show that cartels are more likely to be formed when the business has evolved positively in the previous months and managers expect prices to decline, but that cartels also tend to breakup when the business has evolved positively. Upturns in firm-specific business cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels die while new ones are set up. Chapter 2 aims at obtaining a precise measure of how much firms benefit from collusion. I evaluate the causal effect of being a cartel member on the revenues and profits of cartelized firms, using comparable non-collusive firms as control group. A dataset of discovered cartel cases in Spain from 1990 to 2014 and an alternative dataset of firms' balance sheets are used. Results show that firms increase their revenues, on average, between 19% and 26% due to the collusive agreement, while no significant effect is found on profits. Estimations by cartel duration demonstrate that the members of long-lasting cartels not only increase their revenues (29%−50%), but also their profits more than two times. Further analysis shows that cartels that are profitable from the beginning tend to last longer and do not apply for Leniency Programs. Chapter 3, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, Juan Luis Jiménez and José Manuel Ordóñezde-Haro, investigates how Leniency Programs destabilize cartels. We study the effect of the Leniency Program on cartel duration, cartel fines and on the years of investigation using a difference-in-differences program evaluation approach. Cartel cases discovered by the European Commission and the Spanish Competition Authority are analyzed. Results show a short-run effect of the Leniency Program: the detected cartels have longer duration than the ones in the control group. In the long-run, the program decreases cartel duration. On the other hand, no significant effect is found on fines, while the duration of the investigation decreases significantly around 0.8-1.3 years.
The competition policy pursued by the European Commission has a direct impact on the daily life of the citizens of the European Union. The reduction of telephone charges, wideraccess to air transport and the possibility of buying a car in the EU country in which prices are lowest are tangible results. Other, less visible, areas of Community competition policy also produce positive effects for the public. For example, merger control ensures a diversity of mass-market consumer goods and low prices for the final consumer. Likewise, by contributing to economic and social cohesion, the monitoring of state aid helps to promote viable and durable jobs throughout the Union. Whether they be consumers, savers, users of public services, employees or taxpayers, the Union's citizens enjoy the fruits of competition policy in the various aspects of their everyday life.
The Caribbean Community (Caricom), established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973, was largely modelled on the European Community Common Market and had as its final objective the creation of a Caricom Single Market and Economy (CSME), like the European Union. In March 2000, protocols amending the Treaty of Chaguaramas (Protocols III, VIII) were signed by Heads of Government thereby establishing the CSME. A critical tool for advancing the integration of Caricom markets is the Caricom Competition Policy (Protocol VIII), but this is part of a larger package that includes the free movement of labour and capital.
