Suchergebnisse

In this doctoral thesis, I am assessing competition trends in the banking sector in the European Union. In recent years, market power and market concentration have increased in the European banking markets. I argue that competition policy needs to play a strong role to protect economic prosperity in the European Union. The doctoral thesis contains three chapters covering the main instruments of European competition policy: antitrust, merger control and state aid control. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects on retail interest rates of the merger between ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank NL in the Dutch banking market. Using a structural model, I simulate decreases in interest rates of up to 30 basis points for the merging banks. Depending on the measure for the change in consumer welfare, the model suggests that the merger caused annual losses of up to 50 euros for customers of the merging banks and between two and seven euros for the average consumer. Accounting for efficiency gains partially offsets the anti-competitive effects for consumers. In the second chapter, I quantify the potential effects of common ownership on retail interest rates in the Dutch banking market. Using a structural model combining ownership data and survey data on consumers' choice of savings accounts, I simulate interest rates under different assumptions on common ownership. Conditional on a common ownership mechanism, I simulate substantial decreases in interest rates of up to 50 basis points. These results suggest that antitrust authorities should cautiously observe trends in common ownership and assess its potential anti-competitive effects on consumers. In the third chapter, I investigate the impact of bank bailout during the financial crisis on competition in the European Union. Combining information on individual bank rescues with bank-level measures of market power, I find a substantial decrease of six percentage points in the Lerner index for rescued banks. The estimated effects are heterogeneous and only driven by banks rescued in the first two years of the financial crisis before the European sovereign debt crisis started in 2010. This finding casts a positive light on state aid control in the European Union as beneficiaries of state aid did not abuse public funds to distort competition in their favor. Protecting competition in banking remains a pertinent task in light of possible further public interventions triggered by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Advances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical methods have offered the scope for the employment of merger simulation models in merger control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is, nevertheless, still a very young and innovative instrument of antitrust and, therefore, its 'technical' potential is far from being comprehensively exploited and teething problems in its practical use in the antitrust environment prevail. We provide a classification of state-of-the-art merger simulation models and review their previous employment in merger cases as well as the problems and limitations currently associated with their use in merger control. In summary, merger simulation models represent an important and valuable extension of the toolbox of merger policy. However, they do not qualify as a magic bullet and must be combined with other, more traditional instruments of competition policy in order to comprehensively unfold its beneficial effects.

This paper seeks to provide a critical assessment of the efforts made by the EC to stimulate the development of competition laws in the Mediterranean countries with which it is engaged in partnership agreements. It reviews the content of the competition provisions of the association agreements, as well as their effectiveness. In then examines the regular calls for convergence on the EC competition law model to which Mediterranean countries are object. There is indeed room for debate regarding the opportunity, as well as the nature of such convergence. The paper concludes that a deep convergence approach, whereby the non-candidate Partner countries would transpose EC competition rules in their domestic legal order, would provide many benefits for both the EC and these countries.

Purpose: In this paper, we lay out the analysis and provide an overview of the functions carried out by the national competition authorities in the Western Balkan countries and demonstrate their compliance with EU rules. We deal with the level of implementation of competition rules on prohibited agreements, abuse of dominant position, notification of concentration and state aid. Design/Methodology/Approach: We provide an overview of the stage these countries have arrived at in fulfilling their obligation on competition issues based on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which is a step forward for EU integration. We do this by carrying out a comparative analysis of the data collected from both primary and secondary sources, in order to demonstrate the current situation on competition in the Western Balkan countries and determine the most appropriate means to build strong and efficient National Competition Authorities. Findings: Findings show that competition in Balkan countries is still in a phase of development and more needs to be done in order to create an adequate competition regime. Practical Implications: We propose measures in order to ensure the effective implementation of the law on the protection of competition and the market economy. Originality/Value: When going through a phase of transformation, political change and integration, it is important to refer to other experiences, especially when trying to form part of the EU integration. ; peer-reviewed

This paper analyzes the institutional design of the European competition policy system. Besides the multi-level public enforcement, the paper describes other two fundamental dimensions of the European competition policy system: the relationship between public and private enforcement and that between competition law enforcement and sector specific regulation, with particular regards with the Electronic Communications sector. The main effort of the paper consists in representing the EU Competition policy system as a web of vertical and horizontal relationships among a large set of actors, sometimes coordinated by formal or informal mechanisms but still characterized by competence overlaps and strategic interdependencies. Finally the paper aims at assessing the relevant economic trade-offs associated to these overlaps and interactions in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of the system, giving some policy suggestions for the future evolution of its overall design. ; Florence School of Regulation

During the past half century many nations have adopted policies whose function is to discourage cartels and other restrictive practices. Industrialized nations led the movement toward pro-competition policies, but more recently, developing nations have begun to join the parade. Initial steps have also been taken toward the implementation of competition policies spanning national borders, and proposals for their extension have been made. This paper analyzes the consequences national and international competition policies would have for developing nations. Topics covered include the dependence of LDCs on cartelized commodity exports, the terms on which intermediate goods and technology are imported by LDCs, access to the markets of industrialized nations, the consequences of substituting predatory pricing standards for the criteria traditionally used to combat dumping in international trade, and the links between domestic and international market structure and the absorption of advanced technology.

European Union Antitrust Laws have been successfully applied to anti-competitive behaviour, which can take place abroad, but have an effect within the EU. Under Antitrust Laws, not only abuse of dominant position practices but also mergers that restrain competition are regarded as illegal and subject to severe remedies. This paper accesses both Microsoft-WMP and Volvo-Scania cases in the light of the EU Competition Policy and identifies the circumstances involved, final decisions made as well as the suggested remedies and the consequences from the consumers' perspective. The issues considered are per se controversial and these are clear examples of the long path to go through, in order to make the competition law regime uniformly applicable in all member states. The lack of international consensus on competition law and enforcement requires huge efforts in co-operation between countries and organisations, because in combination with economic liberalisation, nations have come to recognise competition as a powerful instrument for stimulating innovation and economic growth. This paper focus on the past, i.e., already assessed anticompetitive cases; the present - the current EU Competition Policy rules - and finally on the future of Antitrust jurisdiction, in which part I will briefly describe the major actual concerns in the long course towards a common and homogeneously valid system of International Competition Policy. ; N/A

We develop a macroeconomic framework in which firms are large and have market power with respect to both products and labor. Each firm maximizes a share-weighted average of shareholder utilities, which makes the equilibrium independent of price normalization. In a one-sector economy, if returns to scale are non-increasing, then an increase in "effective" market concentration (which accounts for overlapping ownership) leads to declines in employment, real wages, and the labor share. Moreover, if the goal is to foster employment then (i) controlling common ownership and reducing concentration are complements and (ii) government jobs are a substitute for either policy. Yet when there are multiple sectors, due to an intersectoral pecuniary externality, an increase in common ownership can stimulate the economy when the elasticity of labor supply is high relative to the elasticity of substitution in product markets. We find that neither the monopolistically competitive limit of Dixit and Stiglitz nor the oligopolistic one of Neary (when firms become small relative to the economy) are attained unless there is incomplete portfolio diversification with no intra-industry common ownership.

Measures to support Competition Policy and enhance the efficiency of Public Procurement can enhance the impact of regional integration agreements. The first part addresses Competition Policy - measures employed by government to ensure a fair competitive market environment. Competition policy aims to ensure that markets remain competitive (through anti-trust or anti-cartel enforcement) or become competitive (through liberalisation). For a variety of reasons, competition is often restricted in developing countries and there are benefits from establishing some level of competition policy. Although the literature does not provide a blueprint, it provides guidance on the most useful ways to incorporate Competition Policy in regional agreements. The second part addresses issues in opening up public procurement and outlines the main potential sources of welfare gains. Open and transparent procurement can bring gains in terms of price reduction, competition and reduced corruption. While developing countries recognize these benefits for domestic policy, they appear opposed to including procurement commitments in international agreements.

peer-reviewed ; When extending the bailout facility availed of by Ireland , the IMF, ECB and Commission of the EU ("the troika") insisted that a number of measures be taken in respect of the Irish economy. While many of these related to reducing the costs of the public sector and the reduction of the country's social welfare costs, some related directly to Irish competition law. ; ACCEPTED ; peer reviewed

This paper empirically investigates the effectiveness of competition policy by estimating its impact on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth for 22 industries in 12 OECD countries over the period 1995-2005. We ?nd a robust positive and signi?cant effect of competition policy asmeasured by newly created indexes. We provide several arguments and results based on instrumental variables estimators as well as non-linearities to support the claim that the established link can be interpreted in a causal way. At a disaggregated level, the effect on TFP growth is particularly strong for speci?c aspects of competition policy related to its institutional setup and antitrust activities (rather than merger control). The effect is strengthened by good legal systems, suggesting complementarities between competition policy and the ef?ciency of law enforcement institutions.

Contemporary public sector reforms in Australia have been dominated by efficiency, productivity and contestability considerations captured in National Competition Policy (NCP). Both in the reform process in general and in the NCP processes in particular, the lack of priority attributed to non-economic concerns such as coordination, equity, representation, political accountability, consultation and distributive outcomes has been a serious omission. The idea of public interst, once central to democratic public administration, has re-emerged to challenge the perceived excesses of economic rationalism as the unifying idea of reform. Although public interest stands in a long tradition in public administration, it is a complex and contested idea which requires significiant development if it is to have policy utility in the reform process. Nonetheless public interest may be viewed as an analytical frame which enables a rebalancing of the ideas which influence policymaking. In this paper it is argued that substantive situational manifestations of public interest can be used to complement rather than undermine the efficiency, productivity and contestability objectives of public sector reform.

Contemporary public sector reforms in Australia have been dominated by efficiency, productivity and contestability considerations captured in National Competition Policy (NCP). Both in the reform process in general and in the NCP processes in particular, the lack of priority attributed to non-economic concerns such as coordination, equity, representation, political accountability, consultation and distributive outcomes has been a serious omission. The idea of public interst, once central to democratic public administration, has re-emerged to challenge the perceived excesses of economic rationalism as the unifying idea of reform. Although public interest stands in a long tradition in public administration, it is a complex and contested idea which requires significiant development if it is to have policy utility in the reform process. Nonetheless public interest may be viewed as an analytical frame which enables a rebalancing of the ideas which influence policymaking. In this paper it is argued that substantive situational manifestations of public interest can be used to complement rather than undermine the efficiency, productivity and contestability objectives of public sector reform.

This paper empirically investigates the effectiveness of competition policy by estimating its impact on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth for 22 industries in 12 OECD countries over the period 1995-2005. We find a robust positive and significant effect of competition policy as measured by newly created indexes. We provide several arguments and results based on instrumental variables estimators as well as non-linearities, to support the claim that the established link can be interpreted in a causal way. At a disaggregated level, the effect on TFP growth is particularly strong for specific aspects of competition policy related to its institutional set up and antitrust activities (rather than merger control). The effect is strengthened by a good legal system, suggesting complementarities between competition policy and the efficiency of law enforcement institutions. ; In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir die Effektivität von Wettbewerbspolitik anhand der empirischen Schätzung ihrer Auswirkung auf das totale Faktorproduktivitätswachstum (TFP) für 22 Branchen in 12 OECD-Ländern über den Zeitraum 1995-2005. Wir finden eine robuste positive und statistisch signifikante Wirkung der Wettbewerbspolitik, welche von neu erstellten Indizes gemessen wird. Wir präsentieren unterschiedliche Argumente und Ergebnisse basierend auf Instrumental-Variablen Schätzern sowie Nichtlinearitäten, um den geschätzten Zusammenhang als kausal interpretieren zu können. Auf einer disaggregierten Ebene aufgeschlüsselt ist die Auswirkung auf das TFPWachstum besonders stark für spezifische Aspekte der Wettbewerbspolitik, welche eher mit deren institutionellen Aufbau und kartellrechtlichen Tätigkeiten in Zusammenhang stehen als mit der Fusionskontrolle. Wir zeigen, dass der gemessene Effekt durch gute Rechtssysteme gestärkt wird, was auf Komplementaritäten zwischen Wettbewerbspolitik und der Effizienz der Justiz hindeutet.

For over a hundred years, competition policy has been a central part of a market economy's legal framework. Over the past third of a century, however, the scope and effectiveness of competition policy has been narrowed under the influence of certain ideas about the functioning of the market economy, sometimes referred to as the Chicago School of Law and Economics—ideas which have subsequently been widely discredited within the economics profession, but whose influence within antitrust law remains significant. This paper argues that, to the contrary, changes in our economy and our understandings of the interplay between economics and politics necessitates a broader reach for competition policy even than envisaged by the original advocates of antitrust law. This takes on particular significance with recent reports, such of that of the Council of Economic Advisers of President Obama, highlighting the increase in market power across many important sectors of the US economy and persistent higher rates of return to capital than seem consistent with competition. These monopoly rents may, in turn, play an important role in the country's growing inequality.