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How do ethnic group divisions affect parties' linkage strategies? The provision of private or local club goods favoring co-ethnics by politicians has been well documented in the literature. However, whether clientelism tends to be more widespread in ethnically highly fragmented societies has not been systematically examined. Utilizing a dataset that includes information on more than 450 parties in eighty competitive party systems, we show that the mere presence of multiple ethnic groups does not lead to more clientelistic exchange. Nevertheless, in countries characterized by high levels of economic inequality between politically relevant ethnic groups, parties are more likely to rely on clientelistic strategies to attract votes. In addition, this positive relationship between ethnic income inequality and clientelism is contingent on parties' ties to ethnic social networks. Specifically, in ethnically unequal societies, parties that can rely on existing ethnic organizations particularly engage in clientelistic modes of electoral mobilization.

ABSTRACTWhy does electoral clientelism persist when ballots are secret and elections are competitive? The provision of material rewards during campaigns is seen as the standard way politicians secure votes in 'patronage democracies'. Yet monitoring clientelistic bargains is difficult when voting is secret, several competitors may provide material inducements simultaneously, voters view such inducements as gifts and not obligations, and candidates' records are more credible signals of future performance. I argue that where elections are competitive and voters expect gifts, candidates engage in a two-pronged strategy: affirm their own status through public displays of wealth, and undermine opponents' rewards by matching inducements or encouraging voters to break reciprocity norms. In result, neither side's gifts are sufficient for a win, and parties are forced to pursue different linkage mechanisms to voters. One such mechanism involves defining and targeting broader constituencies through policy proposals. Micro-level data from Ghana confirm these expectations. The theory is better suited to environments where candidates' past records are known to constituents than existing explanations, and accounts for the apparent contradiction between the ubiquity of campaign clientelism in Sub-Saharan Africa and recent empirical findings that performance evaluations and non-contingent incentives matter most to voters.

Although aggregate data on party competition in Brazil seem hopeful, unsettling trends appear in state-level party systems in the years of the consolidation of Brazilian democracy (the period this article examines extends through the 2002 elections), such as instability and fragmentation, which exceed the extent of problems apparent at the national level. These hamper the informational role parties can play for voters picking from a large number of candidates. While other possible explanations shed little light on these problems, a hypothesis about clientelistic party-building strategies may explain the patterns in party competition across states. Such strategies depend on the distribution of selective benefits, such as patronage or vote-buying, to attract candidates, elicit votes and gain office for the party. Clientelistic party-building strategies provide no extra-material incentive for party cohesion, and may stymie the development of a stable competitive system. Furthermore, it is through clientelism that party clans exercise hegemony over the local political system in some states, promoting an undemocratic monopoly on power.

Abstract: Uruguay improved its levels of universalism in the last fifteen years. This improvement is due to a prolonged process of transformation in Uruguayan politics from competitive particularism to an open access regime. We claim that the change in the way that parties compete for votes - from clientelistic to programmatic strategy – is the cause of this transformation. In order to provide descriptive evidence of the main features of this governance regime transformation, this paper traces the process of institutional reforms and elite behavioral changes that lead to that outcome, and proposes an analytic framework to explain it.

Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania share a past and present as authoritarian states. Dominant parties are in power in Tanzania and Kazakhstan, while elections are competitive but not democratic in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. Returns for political support (clientelism), and persecution of political adversaries and the electorate (repression), are key components in all four states. This dissertation provides an account of these features, and how and when dynamics of clientelism and repression have changed. Clientelism and repression are widely used to explain why states transition to a different regime type, suggesting that their presence or absence, degree or form, informs seminal changes. This dissertation turns such arguments around, instead investigating how changes in regime affect clientelism and repression, allowing an investigation of change within elites, society and the state. It looks at changes in clientelism and repression that did not lead to regime change, and at cases when clientelism and repression continue despite turnovers. Patterns where a more diverse set of actors than the incumbent are involved in repressive and clientelistic practices are investigated, and sub-concepts are developed in order to speak of these changes in more specific terms. This is investigated through careful empirical study and field work carried out in all four states. More than 300 people were interviewed during the course of several years. The perspective is historical, from the late Soviet era in Central Asia, and independence in East Africa. It tracks clientelism both within the elites (intra-elite clientelism), and aimed towards the general public (mass-elite clientelism). Changes in repression are also investigated, using an actor-centered approach regarding resources and operation.

Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania share a past and present as authoritarian states. Dominant parties are in power in Tanzania and Kazakhstan, while elections are competitive but not democratic in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. Returns for political support (clientelism), and persecution of political adversaries and the electorate (repression), are key components in all four states. This dissertation provides an account of these features, and how and when dynamics of clientelism and repression have changed. Clientelism and repression are widely used to explain why states transition to a different regime type, suggesting that their presence or absence, degree or form, informs seminal changes. This dissertation turns such arguments around, instead investigating how changes in regime affect clientelism and repression, allowing an investigation of change within elites, society and the state. It looks at changes in clientelism and repression that did not lead to regime change, and at cases when clientelism and repression continue despite turnovers. Patterns where a more diverse set of actors than the incumbent are involved in repressive and clientelistic practices are investigated, and sub-concepts are developed in order to speak of these changes in more specific terms. This is investigated through careful empirical study and field work carried out in all four states. More than 300 people were interviewed during the course of several years. The perspective is historical, from the late Soviet era in Central Asia, and independence in East Africa. It tracks clientelism both within the elites (intra-elite clientelism), and aimed towards the general public (mass-elite clientelism). Changes in repression are also investigated, using an actor-centered approach regarding resources and operation.

In a developing country like Bangladesh, the devolved local government system is widely recognized as one of the key institutional forms for the citizen-centric public service delivery system and ensuring democratic governance at the grassroots level. However, the democratic nature of local governments and their effective role in rendering services are contingent upon the political and institutional environments of the country. Competitive electoral process is key to local democratic governance. The purpose of this article is to analyze the implications of contemporary political order and institutional environments for the proper functioning of the Union Parishad (council), the lowest tier of the local government system in Bangladesh. More specifically, this study will reflect on how political clientelism, partyarchy and institutional environments have stymied competitive electoral politics at the local level which may result in democratic backsliding.

AbstractDrawing on studies from across the social sciences, this study explores a possibility that brokers affect vote choices via a psychological channel. Given that the information a broker utilizes for the efficient delivery of private transfers affects voters' expectations of receiving those transfers, neglected voters may defect from voting for the broker's boss out of anger resulting from frustrated expectations, and this is likely to be the case particularly in a competitive election and among indifferent voters. Results from a lab experiment are consistent with the proposed possibility.

AbstractTo what extent, if any, do the issue priorities of elites overlap with that of the public under competitive authoritarianism? While previous studies examined the overlap of the priorities of elites and ordinary citizens in democracies, our knowledge is still limited when we move beyond these contexts. This article aims to contribute to the democratisation and legislative politics literature by testing congruence of issue priorities under competitive authoritarianism. Analysing more than 10,000 legislative texts from the 2012 Moroccan parliament, we found high levels of congruence between the issue priorities of legislators and citizens, especially in non-legislative activities (i.e. parliamentary questions). Moreover, contrary to earlier studies on clientelism and citizen-elite linkage in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, our results demonstrate a higher correlation between the priorities of the two largest political parties and the mass public, when compared with those parties' core supporters.

Clientelism and ethnic favoritism appear to go hand in hand in many diverse societies in the developing world. But, while some ethnic communities receive generous material rewards for their political support, others receive very modest payoffs. The Price of a Vote in the Middle East examines this key - and often overlooked - component of clientelism. The author draws on elite interviews and original survey data collected during his years of field research in Lebanon and Yemen; two Arab countries in which political constituencies follow sectarian, regional, and tribal divisions. He demonstrates that voters in internally-competitive communal groups receive more, and better, payoffs for their political support than voters trapped in uncompetitive groups dominated by a single, hegemonic leader. Ultimately, politicians provide services when compelled by competitive pressures to do so, whereas leaders sheltered from competition can, and do, take their supporters for granted.

Contributing to the growing discourse on political parties in Asia, this book looks at parties in Southeast Asia's most competitive electoral democracies of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. It highlights the diverse dynamics of party politics in the region and provides new insights into organizational structures, mobilizational strategies and the multiple dimensions of linkages between political parties and their voters. The book focuses on the prominence of clientelistic practices and strategies, both within parties as well as between parties and their voters. It demonstrates that cli.

Contributing to the growing discourse on political parties in Asia, this book looks at parties in Southeast Asia's most competitive electoral democracies of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. It highlights the diverse dynamics of party politics in the region and provides new insights into organizational structures, mobilizational strategies and the multiple dimensions of linkages between political parties and their voters. The book focuses on the prominence of clientelistic practices and strategies, both within parties as well as between parties and their voters. It demonstrates that cli

Presenting Belize as an illustrative and critical case of clientelist democracy in the Commonwealth Caribbean, this thesis explores the origins of clientelist politics alongside the pre-independence birth of political parties, analyses its rapid expansion after independence in 1981 and assesses its implications for democratic governance. Based on qualitative research, including interviews with major political leaders, the thesis contends that, despite Belize's positive post-colonial reputation for consolidating formal democracy, the concurrent expansion of clientelism, as both an electoral strategy and a mode of participation, ranks high among the worrying challenges affecting the quality of its democracy. Although intense party competition in a context of persistent poverty is central to explaining the trajectory of clientelism in Belize, the Westminster model of governance, the disappearance of substantive policy distinctions among parties and the embrace of neoliberal economic policies fuelled its expansion. Small-state size and multi-ethnicity have also been contributing factors. Even though the thousands of monthly dyadic transactions in constituencies are largely rational individual choices with short-term distributive benefits, the thesis concludes that, collectively, these practices lead to irrational governance behaviour and damaging macro-political consequences. Political participation is devalued, public resources are wasted, governance reform becomes more difficult and political corruption is facilitated. As a parallel informal welfare system has become embedded, politicians and citizens alike have become trapped in a 'big game' of mutual clientelist dependency. A comparative analysis of post-independence political developments in other Commonwealth Caribbean states shows that the expansion of political clientelism in the context of competitive party politics is significantly path dependent. Besides contributing to the political historiography of modern Belize, this thesis demonstrates that national studies of small clientelist democracies can provide valuable insights into the ways in which informal political practices interact with a state's formal institutions to shape the quality of democracy itself.

Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced great oscillations in democratic progress and retreat. Authoritarian modernization has taken root, notably in Ethiopia and Rwanda. No paradigm captures the complexity and volatility. Some argue that autocratic governance produces development outcomes while competitive clientelism encourages corruption and social distress. Nigeria presents a paradox of reform and dysfunction, of growth and discordant development, of minority affluence and mass poverty. The northern region has undergone economic and political decline. The failure to defeat Boko Haram reflects the prebendalist corrosion of state institutions. The February 2015 election is a dismaying hurdle for the Nigerian system of conglomerate governance.