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Clientelism and ethnic favoritism appear to go hand in hand in many diverse societies in the developing world. But, while some ethnic communities receive generous material rewards for their political support, others receive very modest payoffs. The Price of a Vote in the Middle East examines this key - and often overlooked - component of clientelism. The author draws on elite interviews and original survey data collected during his years of field research in Lebanon and Yemen; two Arab countries in which political constituencies follow sectarian, regional, and tribal divisions. He demonstrates that voters in internally-competitive communal groups receive more, and better, payoffs for their political support than voters trapped in uncompetitive groups dominated by a single, hegemonic leader. Ultimately, politicians provide services when compelled by competitive pressures to do so, whereas leaders sheltered from competition can, and do, take their supporters for granted.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface / Maxfield, Sylvia / Schneider, Ben Ross -- Part I: Concepts And Arguments -- 1. Business, the State, and Economic Performance in Developing Countries / Schneider, Ben Ross / Maxfield, Sylvia -- 2. Theories of Business and Business-State Relations / Haggard, Stephan / Maxfield, Sylvia / Schneider, Ben Ross -- Part II: Business Organization, Firm Structure, And Strong States -- 3. State Structures, Government-Business Relations, and Economic Transformation / Evans, Peter -- 4. The Political Economy of Sectors and Sectoral Change: Korea Then and Now / Shafer, Michael -- 5. Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan / Fields, Karl -- 6. Business Elites, the State, and Economic Change in Chile / Silva, Eduardo -- Part III: Collective Business Action And Weak States -- 7. Big Business and the Politics of Economic Reform: Confidence and Concertation in Brazil and Mexico / Schneider, Ben Ross -- 8. A Historical View of Business-State Relations: Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela Compared / Thorp, Rosemary / Durand, Francisco -- 9. Competitive Clientelism and Economic Governance: The Case of Thailand / Doner, Richard F. / Ramsay, Ansil -- 10. Economic Governance in Turkey: Bureaucratic Capacity, Policy Networks, and Business Associations / Biddle, Jesse / Milor, Vedat -- References -- Index

How have African rulers responded to the introduction of democratic electoral competition? Despite the broadly negative picture painted by the prevailing focus on electoral fraud, clientelism, and ethnic conflict, the book argues that the full story is somewhat more promising. While these unfortunate practices may be widespread, African rulers also seek to win votes through the provision and distribution of public goods and services. The author's central argument is that in predominantly rural countries the introduction of competitive elections leads governments to implement pro-rural policies, in order to win the votes of the rural majority. As a result, across much of Africa the benefits of democratic electoral competition have accrued primarily in terms of rural development. This broad claim is supported by cross-national evidence, both from public opinion surveys and from individual level data on health and education outcomes. The argument's core assumptions about voting behavior are supported with quantitative evidence from Ghana, and qualitative historical evidence from Botswana presents further evidence for the underlying theoretical mechanism. Taken together, this body of evidence provides reasons to be optimistic about the operation of electoral accountability in Africa. African governments are responding to the accountability structures provided by electoral competition; in that sense, democracy in Africa is working.-- Back cover