Suchergebnisse

Croatia remains largely left out of comparative studies of post-communism even though its political development after 2000 places it firmly within the group of European post-communist consolidated democracies. In this paper I analyse the case of Croatia by combining comparative frameworks that focus on concepts of democratisation and Europeanization. The analysis shows that Croatia in the 1990s belonged to the group of illiberal democracies with Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. They were characterised by postponed economic and political reforms, clientelism and corruption in government. This is primarily attributed to the absence of a competitive party system with alternations of parties in power. The concept of political party competition as developed by Grzymala Busse (2002, 2007) and Vachudova (2005) is however not sufficient on its own to explain democratisation trajectories, so it is complemented with Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel' s (2006) concept of political party constellation. According to their argument, in countries where both liberal and illiberal parties structure the party space, the tipping point for democratisation happens when all main parties adopt a liberal political practice. Croatia' s ' democratic turn' elections happened in 2000, after which the CDU initiated an internal reform into a pro-European Christian Democratic party. As a result, after 2000 Croatian political party space became dominantly liberal-oriented and pro-EU, jump-starting EU accession. Finally, the analysis suggests that post-communist countries need to democratize first in order for Europeanization of domestic political space to start taking place.

Defense Date: 05/06/2009 ; Examining Board: Sergio Fabbrini (University of Trento), Jonathan Hopkin (LSE), Michael Keating (EUI) (Supervisor), Peter Mair (EUI) ; This thesis undertakes an empirical exploration of multi-level party politics in Italy and Spain since the 1990s, with a particular focus on the regional level of party organisation and electoral competition. It finds that statewide parties have adopted different territorial strategies to confront the common challenge of multi-level coordination in a decentralised political system. Regional branches of statewide parties increasingly respond to the competitive pressures emerging from sub-national party systems, rather than the preferences of the national leadership, although the interests of national and regional elites may often coincide. Regional party systems in both countries are diverging in their structures of competition, not only from the national level but also from each other. This is closely related to the different types of electoral challenge posed by the main non-statewide parties in these regions. The methodological design consists of two national frameworks and four regional case studies, two in Italy (Campania, Lombardia) and two in Spain (Andalusia, Galicia). These are linked through the use of comparable empirical indicators over a similar timeframe. The national frameworks required the compilation of a new data-set on regional elections in Italy and Spain, a detailed analysis of party statutes and their evolution, and a full exploration of the secondary literature in different languages. The regional case studies required extensive archival analysis of the main national newspapers and their regional editions, reinforced by a series of in-depth interviews with political actors in all four regions. The case studies found strong empirical evidence concerning the distinctive character of presidentialism at regional level; the continued importance of clientelism in shaping political relations at subnational levels; the pursuit of autonomist strategies by regional branches of statewide parties; the variety of competitive strategies adopted by non-statewide parties; the role of regional arenas as battlegrounds for national factional disputes; and the importance of local coalition testing for subsequent coalitional choices at regional level. The comparative conclusions serve to consolidate these findings, as well as to reflect on further avenues for research in this rapidly developing field.

Unilateral liberalisation of trade in goods and services has been considered an important policy objective. Most trade in services liberalisation in the developing world has taken place unilaterally; but it is not common among Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Among LDCs Bangladesh is a forerunner in pursuing unilateral liberalisation of mobile telephone services. There is a dearth of empirical studies on Bangladesh's unilateral liberalisation of mobile phone services and its impact on users. Furthermore, no scholarly studies are known on the influence of unilateral liberalisation on undertaking binding liberalisation obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) framework of the World Trade Organisation. This study examined factors that motivated Bangladesh's unilateral liberalisation of mobile phone service and its impact on users. It also investigated how unilateral liberalisation influenced Bangladesh to undertake binding liberalisation commitments under the GATS. The study applied a qualitative research design to address the research questions. Primary data were obtained from three different sources: informants from mobile phone firms, senior managers across the six mobile phone firms, trade experts, telecommunications analysts, policy makers, the telecommunications regulator, public officials and private sector representatives. Focus group discussions with different mobile phone users were conducted to determine the impact of unilateral liberalisation of mobile services. In the first 6-7 years after unilateral liberalisation of the sector, there was a lack of competition, mobile phone tariffs were high, quality of service was unsatisfactory, and the diversity of services was limited, which affected the growth of the sector. The competitive landscape of the sector changed dramatically after the state-owned firm and another large private operator commenced mobile phone service operations in 2005. Stiff competition took hold, which resulted in cheap and easy accessibility, a drastic reduction in mobile phone tariffs, and improved quality and variety of services. The main implications of the study are: (1) An unfettered market is detrimental to consumer benefits. A powerful independent regulatory body, which is held accountable for its actions, is needed for a free market to operate in the broader public interest; (2) Unilateral liberalisation is a 'necessary condition' and provided a foundation for the government of Bangladesh to undertake binding liberalisation commitments under WTO GATS.