Foreign conflict behavior data covering long periods of time are urgently needed for the scientific investigation of international conflict. Except in the case of the most violent behavior, war, such data in aggregate form generally are not available to researchers.
Thanks to Emily Broeckling and Dan Reiter for their help with this paper. This paper is a How do authoritarian institutions affect the conflict propensity of these states? This paper examines this question using a new institutional typology of authoritarian states, which separates authoritarian states on two axes (organization and procedures). This paper hypothesizes that autocracies using party organizations are likely to be more domestically constrained than those that use military organizations. Similarly, autocracies using collective decision making procedures are likely to be more constrained than those using individual decision making procedures. These constraints should lead to a decreased likelihood of dispute involvement with other similarly constrained states. These hypotheses are tested on all dyads from 1950-1992. Party based autocracies were found to be less likely to have disputes with other party based states and democracies, providing evidence for the autocratic constraints argument. Some evidence was found that collective decision-making autocracies were more peaceful towards each other only. Generally, this paper finds that the organizational aspect of an autocracy imposes domestic constraints and affects an autocracies likelihood of being involved in a militarized dispute.