Suchergebnisse

Data for the yrs 1946-1959 on 13 variables measuring various kinds of violent & nonviolent, soc & pol'al conflict within 113 countries were inter-r'ed & factor analyzed through oblique rotation. Comparison of the results with that of other studies suggests that: (1) intra-nation conflict behavior is highly structured in terms of independent clusters of activities; (2) a spontaneous kind of conflict behavior reflected in riots & demonstrations, ie, turnoil, is a major dimension of intra-nation conflict behavior; (3) independently of a turmoil dimension, intra-nation conflict behavior also involves planned behavior represented by revolution & subversion dimensions, or their combination into one internal war dimension. AA.

Examines influence of behavior of domestic and international rival leaders on their foreign policy decision making; 1975-92, chiefly.

A replication of an earlier work (R. J. Rummel, 'The Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations,' General Systems Yrbk, 1963, 8, 1-50) to obtain additional evidence relative to the dimensions of conflict behavior (CB) & the relationship between domestic & foreign CB. Data were collected across 83 nations on 9 domestic & 13 foreign measures of CB for 1958, 1959, & 1960. From a factor analysis of these data there emerged 2 domestic dimensions: turmoil, & internal war-& 3 foreign dimensions-war, diplomatic, & belligerency. The turmoil dimension compares favorably with a similar dimension derived from the 1955-57 data, while the internal war dimension subsumes the revolutionary & subversive dimensions from the 1955-57 study. The 3 1958-60 foreign dimensions are quite similar to the 3 derived from the 1955-57 foreign measures. From a factor analysis of domestic & foreign CB, the domestic measures separated themselves from the foreign variables, implying only a small relationship between the 2. This relationship was investigated still further with multiple regression. Representative variables were selected on the basis of high r with the dimensions, & those which indexed domestic & foreign dimensions were regressed upon each other to discover the relationship between domestic & foreign CB. The regression yielded a small relationship that increased with a time lag. 3 error variables were used to discover the extent to which systematic bias might distort the conclusions. 2 of these, N of cards per nation in Deadline Data & N of embassies or legations in a country, were found to r highly with the protest variable & also to have high pattern values on the diplomatic dimension. It was concluded that the level of world interest in a nation is related to the tendency for a nation's protests & (to a lesser extent) its expulsion of ambassadors to be reported. Hence, propositions about these 2 conflict measures should be qualified to the extent that the data of nations in which little interest is expressed may not be included in the is from which the propositions are inferred. Modified AA.

Studies of power parity and conflict implicitly assume all balanced dyads are created equal. However, variation exists within the capabilities of the states in these particular dyads. I address the question of what affects the likelihood of conflict onset within relatively balanced dyads. I argue uncertainty-in particular the uncertainty of the expected costs of conflict-determines the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. More uncertainty of costs means a greater likelihood of miscalculation leading to bargaining errors. First, I argue as an opponent's capabilities increase, uncertainty of costs increase and the likelihood of conflict increases. Second, military action serves a purpose in bargaining and can help reduce uncertainty by signaling a state's willingness to inflict and endure costs in order to gain a better settlement. Third, information transmission is likely to be effective only when states have the capability to inflict significant costs. As such, while greater capabilities will lead to a high likelihood of conflict onset, they also lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict escalation. The testing of nondirected dyads from 1946 to 2001 supports the theory's implications. ( International Interactions (London)/ FUB)