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AbstractHow does the presence of a mediator change the dynamics of a dispute and help move disputants toward agreement?

In this article, the authors develop and empirically evaluate a general model of the linkages between domestic and international conflict behavior. Much of the literature on domestic international interactions has focused on the structural constraints of the international and domestic systems on leaders' foreign policy decisions. Rather than focusing on structural constraints, the present authors model the influence of the behavior of domestic and international rivals on leader decision making. The impact of rivals' behavior on conflict across the domestic-international nexus has been neglected relative to the role of structural factors. This study helps redress that imbalance. The authors test their model with a statistical analysis of Zaire during the period 1975 to 1992 and find substantial support for the model.

Prior research suggests that there is enough residual uncertainty in conflict situations so that a person's attitude towards risk may influence his or her conflict behavior. This paper explores the level of dyadic conflict arising from negotiation between partners having different combinations of risk propensities. Dyadic conflict was measured as the sum of each dyadic partner's conflict score using the Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory‐I. Risk propensities of negotiators were induced The results from the experiment provide clear evidence in support of the research hypothesis that in a dyad, the greater the disparity between the negotiating partners in their risk‐taking propensities, the greater will be the levels of dyadic conflict. The result suggests that conflict models of negotiating under uncertainty need to include risk propensities of the players to expand their descriptive power.

It has been speculated that the conflict behaviors of Chinese and Japanese managers are more or less the same since both cultures are considered as collectivistic and high-contextual; and they inherit Confucian teachings as the cornerstone of their social and moral codes. The purposes
of this study were to investigate whether there was a difference between the way that the managers of these two countries handle conflicts and whether the conflict behavior of these managers was influenced by traditional Confucian values. The results indicated that there was little difference
found between them in terms of value orientations even though Japanese managers tended to employ more assertive styles than the PRC Chinese managers do in dealing with conflict situations.

Most previous treatments of conflict style have focused upon five strategies: avoiding (withdrawing), forcing (competing), smoothing (accommodating), compromising, and confronting (collaborating), purported to lie in a two-dimensional (assertion and cooperation) space. The factor structure of conflict style in self-reports by 158 public-and private-sector managers and in reports by their subordinates (total N = 927) on Howat and London's (1980) 25 behavioral statements was determined. These data indicate a three-dimensional structure which was essentially the same for self-and subordinate reports, i.e., openness, distribution, and control, although self-and subor-dinate reports were correlated at only a very low level. Concern for the interest of both parties was a component of both openness and distribution. The implications for conflict management were discussed.

The question of cooperation is examined in terms of both the theory of rational choice and the theory of social norms. Is it possible for rational individuals to bring about cooperation, or is normative behavior needed to maintain cooperation? Through the development of the Learning-Bayesian PD game, the following propositions are obtained. First, cooperation is maintained by farsighted and perfectly rational individuals who have the expectations of reciprocity. Second, however, this cooperation is not stable; disturbance or deviant behavior overthrows cooperation. Third, even under the existence of disturbance, if individuals behave normatively, they can maintain cooperation; normative behavior works as a stabilizer. Finally, if they behave not only normatively but morally (i.e., according to a categorical imperative), they can even transform noncooperation into cooperation; moral behavior works as a catalyzer of the transformation.

The Collectivism-Individualism literature argues that there is a difference in the way that Americans and Chinese handle conflict based on differences in culture. It has also been speculated that these differences have been influenced by Chinese values. However, these positions have
not been conclusively supported by empirical findings. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether styles of conflict handling behavior were partially affected by the presence of the influence of Chinese values. The results of the finding indicated that there was a strong relationship
between Chinese values and the choice of conflict-handling styles.

Organizational buying decisions are characterized by conflict which can be studied through the use of coalition theory. It appears, however, that conceptual and methodological problems with coalition theory based on game theory and social psychology have limited its usefulness in helping us understand how such conflict can be managed. This paper proposes the group influence approach to conflict management in organizational buying. The main contribution of this approach is that by treating individuals as representatives of coalitions, sellers and buyers can focus on coalition leaders rather than focus on individuals who, in any case, have to conform to group expectations. Theoretically, the group influence approach recognizes that power and politics are basic forces that affect most spheres of organizational activity. Within such a framework purchase decisions are shown to be politically negotiated settlements between those coalitions involved in making the buying decision.

This investigation examines manifest needs (affiliation, dominance, achievement, and autonomy) as personality predispositions to conflict-handling behavior. The design of the research represents an improvement over previous studies by utilizing a large heterogeneous sample within a controlled context of conflict introduced via a computerized business simulation. The research findings reveal a relationship between the need for dominance and affiliation and conflict-handling mode preference. These findings have implications for personnel placement and selection, conflict management, and organizational interventions.

Knudsen, O.F. and Underdal, A. Patterns of Norwegian Foreign Policy Behavior: An Exploratory Analysis. Cooperation and Conflict, XX, 1985, 229-251. In this article the authors use events data for a 7-month period in 1978-9 to explore the following question: Who (in Norway's governmental apparatus) does what to whom (meaning to other states, societies, or inter- and trans-national organizations)? The findings reported indicate support for some of the 'conventional wisdom' propositions on small state behavior, such as a leaning towards cautiousness and instruments of international law and order, but Norway emerges as more of a concerned, perhaps officious, 'citizen' of the world community than 'small state realism' would suggest. The patterns of behavior revealed by this 'snapshot' clearly reflect a relationship of complex interdependence to neighbors in northwestern Europe, expressed in inter alia, a high level of attention, a concentration on matters of 'economic wealth', and a prominent role for 'domestic' sectors of government. By contrast, despite receiving a fair amount of attention, the Third World countries appear essentially as 'faraway strangers', left to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Norway's relationship to the USSR seems to be rather heavily loaded with issues concerning inter-state norms, rights, and duties, and is also characterized by a significantly higher proportion of conflict behavior than is interaction with the West.