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The new social-psychology area of collective memory utilizes models from both sociology & psychology. In this synthesis, memory operates from three perspectives -- those of the present directed to the past, of the past directed to the present, & of the conflict between the past & present. Mass catastrophes produce mass memories that operate under these perspectives. The recent trial of Klaus Barbie, the German commander at Lyon, France, 1942-1944, brought into focus mass memory, the conflict between history & memory, the educative goals of the memory process & its place in practice, & the ethical aspect of the defense of a memory (remembering injustice so that lessons can be transmitted to the next generation). A set of mechanisms unique to a psychology of the masses, used appropriately, permits the defense of moral conscience & the maintenance of collective memory of oppression. 21 References. Adapted from the source document.

The framework of linguistic intergroup bias is used to understand the interplay language use & cognitive biases in political conflicts. The hypothesis that desirable ingroup & undesirable outgroup behaviors are described in more abstract terms than undesirable ingroup behavior & desirable outgroup behavior was tested using G. Semin & K. Fiedler's (1988) categorical linguistic model in two studies of political conflict. In the first, 123 subjects from two opposing social movements -- 63 from Coordination de Gesto por la Paz(Coordinated Action for Peace [CGP]) & 60 from Herri Batasuna (supporting Basque independence) -- described the behaviors of models pictured wearing either CGP or Basque independence symbols. In the second study, the descriptions of victim & aggressor in a nationalist & nonnationalist murder in editorials of two nationalist -- Elgin & Deia -- & two nonnationalist -- Diario Vasco & ABC -- newspapers were analyzed. In both cases, with ANOVAs & qualitative analysis, respectively, the hypothesis was confirmed. 4 Tables, 22 References. Adapted from the source document.

Drawing from identity theory & the frustration-aggression hypothesis, the intrapsychic, interpersonal, & collective levels of social thresholds at the outbreak & end of wartime are analyzed, introducing the concept of "wargasm," a phenomenon characterized by socially sanctioned & politically violent emotions directed against internal & external enemies. At the outbreak of war, psychopaths, sociopaths, & other social outcasts experience happiness as the focus shifts away from their personal problems. Formal rhetoric creates a different mental state in the population. At the end of war, in the transition to peace, boredom & unfulfilled expectations may trigger a snowball effect threatening public order. The success of those wishing to maintain the wartime status quo depends on the political management of intergroup conflicts, distress, & economic circumstances. The British-Argentinian conflict over the Falkland Islands in 1982 illustrates the wargasm process. 47 References. Adapted from the source document.

Analyses of Colombia's internal conflict have focused upon armed actors, the state, the political and economic implications ofthe war, and its international projection, while prívate actors and non-combatants have received scant attention. This article not only refers to the behavior ofthe prívate sector and the ways in which it has been affected by the conflict, but also discusses this sector as a definitive agent of conflict resolution. However, the author also highlights the heterogeneity of both the prívate sector and its reactions to conflict, leading her to discuss the dijficulties of conceptualizing il as a unitary, proactive participant in the construction of peace.

This article studies the relationship between political violence and liberal principles in Peru during the first decades of Republican government, 1827-1845. The logic of behavior of caudillos was immersed in a discourse of salvation of the Republic from corruption. This was the end in founding a stable government that looked over the national interest. In this way, the caudillos did not expect to build a de facto administration. They had as a goal to legitimize their administration through elections after a coup d'etat. In sum, this article analyzes the logic of behavior of the caudillos, and does not pretend to examine internal motives nor regional or class conflicts in each revolution. ; El presente artículo estudia la relación entre la violencia política y los principios liberales en el Perú durante las primeras décadas de la República, 1827-1845. La lógica del comportamiento de los caudillos estaba inmersa en un discurso de salvación de la República de la corrupción. El ideal era fundar un gobierno estable que velara por los intereses de la nación. De este modo, los caudillos no pretendían establecer gobiernos de facto; sino, más bien, tenían como meta legitimarse a través de las elecciones post-golpe de Estado. En conclusión, el artículo analiza la lógica de comportamiento de los caudillos, y no pretende examinar los motivos internos de cada revolución ni tampoco los conflictos regionales o de clase.

This article studies the relationship between political violence and liberal principles in Peru during the first decades of Republican government, 1827-1845. The logic of behavior of caudillos was immersed in a discourse of salvation of the Republic from corruption. This was the end in founding a stable government that looked over the national interest. In this way, the caudillos did not expect to build a de facto administration. They had as a goal to legitimize their administration through elections after a coup d'etat. In sum, this article analyzes the logic of behavior of the caudillos, and does not pretend to examine internal motives nor regional or class conflicts in each revolution. ; El presente artículo estudia la relación entre la violencia política y los principios liberales en el Perú durante las primeras décadas de la República, 1827-1845. La lógica del comportamiento de los caudillos estaba inmersa en un discurso de salvación de la República de la corrupción. El ideal era fundar un gobierno estable que velara por los intereses de la nación. De este modo, los caudillos no pretendían establecer gobiernos de facto; sino, más bien, tenían como meta legitimarse a través de las elecciones post-golpe de Estado. En conclusión, el artículo analiza la lógica de comportamiento de los caudillos, y no pretende examinar los motivos internos de cada revolución ni tampoco los conflictos regionales o de clase.

Este artículo estudia el comportamiento de los actores del conflicto armado colombiano (Fuerzas Armadas, guerrilla y paramilitares) con el enfoque dinamico, no tradicional, de la teoría de juegos, según el cual el punto de partida para cada juego es un estado temporal que, a su vez, es resultado de la historia anterior al conflicto. Está historia involucra no sólo la formación de un conjunto de estrategias, sino la percepción que creada del enemigo, la identificación de sus debilidades, y de su capacidad de amenaza, y el desarrollo de tecnologías para atacarlo eficientemente. En el caso colombiano, de acuerdo a la percepción mutua de los contendientes y a la explotación que hacen de la economía civil para mantener su esfuerzo militar, encontramos que el escalamiento del conflicto es el curso de accipon más probable. La irrupción de los paramilitares y su estrategia de control de la población mediante el terror contribuyen, también, al escalamiento del conflicto y a hacer más complejo el camino hacia una solución negociada del mismo. ; This article studies the behavior of the actors in Colombia's armed conflict (armed forces, guerrillas and paramilitaries) with the dynamic, non-traditional approach of game theory, according to which the starting point of each game is a temporal state which, in turn, is the result of the earlier history of the conflict. This history involves not only the formation of a set of strategies, but also the perceptioncreated of the enemy, the identification of his weaknesses and of his threat capacity, and the development of technologies to attack him efficiently. In the Colombian case, in accordance wi th the mutual perception of the contenders and their exp10itation of the civil economy to support their military effort, we find that escalation of the conflict is the most probable course of action. The irruption of the paramilitaries and their strategy of controlling the populationthrough terror also contribute to the escalation of the conflict and to making the path to a negotiated settlement more complex.

The democracy that existed in Chile in a slightly stable way between 1932 and 1973, this last one in which was interrupted, it was featured mainly by the existence of a polypartisan political system, whose mainly political parties were all joined both in the left, center and right wings, received an electoral variable response in time and space, which had about a third part of the preference of the electorate for every of them. After 15 years, in which all type of electoral activity was interrupted, in 1988 a plebiscite was carried out, whose goal was pronounced itself about either the continuity or ending of the prevailing militar system, in a moment when the country became politically polarized. When the electoral conflicts were beginning because of the election of the president of the republic and the parliamentary in 1989, in the same way like the councillors in 1992, it establishes, analysing the obtained results by the political parties that represent the wings said before, that the effect of the electoral recession years have had a poor incidence in the electoral behavior of the Chilean people, i.e., it shows a political tendency towards the recomposition of the traditional third parts. ; No disponible.

¿Cuál será el comportamiento de equilibrio de los agentes de más altos ante las amenzas de la subversión a sus vidas y a su patrimonio? En el contexto de un modelo de teoría de juegos, una de las dos estrategias que se discuten, pagar el "contrato de seguridad" que la guerrilla ofrece bajo la forma de extorsión, es un equilibrio de Nash, tanto en su forma convencional como en su forma evolutiva estable. El artículo también discute la plausibilidad de la conducta asociada a dicha estrategia y demuestra que está seguirá dominando en la situación colombiana mientras no cambien las expectativas de los agentes acerca de la intesidad y durabilidad del conflicto. ; What will be the equilibrium behavior of the agents with the highest incomes in the face of the threats by subversives to their lives and patrimony? In the context of a game theory model, one of the strategies which has been discussed, paying the "security contract "the guerrillas offer in the form of extorsion, is a Nash equilibrium, both in its conventional form and in its stable evolution form The article also discusses the plausibility of the conduct associated with such a strategy, and demonstrates that this will continue to dominate the Colombian situation as long as the expectations of the agents regarding the intensity and durability of the conflict don't change