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Internat'l relations & primitive societies organized through.

A discussion of intrapersonal conflict resolution at the belief level, which deals with internal affective & cognitive processes. 3 possible pairs of cases of belief dilemmas are differentiated in each of which the first possibility is balanced & the 2nd is unbalanced: (1) 2 positively valued objects, related associatively or dissociatively, (2) one positively valued object & one negatively valued object related dissociatively or associatively, & (3) 2 negatively valued objects, related associatively or dissociatively. 4 possible modes of resolution are discussed: (a) denial, (b) bolstering, (c) differentiation, & (d) transcendence. 8 propositions re the choice among the modes of resolution are delineated. I. Taviss.

A model of org as a system is outlined as the basis for a theory of org & conflict. Elements in the description of an org are: the static structure of parts; description of the org as a machine, or energy transformer; description in terms of a growth system or dynamic open system; control processes involving information inputs & outputs & knowledge structures; the value dimensions of the org image; &the establishment & development of the image. 3 conflict situations are then distinguished &analyzed: econ conflict, interaction conflict, & internal conflict. The most important avenue of conflict resolution is simple avoidance. If this is impossible, resolution depends on the reduction in the intensity of the conflict &the development of over-riding org's which include both parties. I. Taviss.

A discussion of intrapersonal conflicts arising from competitions among incompatible tendencies to act, based on the assumption that ambivalent & unambivalent behavior are not diff in kind but fall at diff points on the same continuum. 3 assumptions re prediction of conflict resolutions are presented: (1) the 2 tendencies summate algebraically, (2) one tendency does not weaken the alternative response will be elicited by the stimulus, & (3) the 2 tendencies, in competing with each other, generate an emotional state having certain of the functional properties of drives, & thus behavior will be determined by new variables. The variables affecting the strengths of competitiory tendencies are considered with respect to the 3 major groups of conflicts: spatial, discrimination-induced, & temporal conflicts. A brief review is then offered of the attempts made to extend this type of conflict theory to the behavior of individuals in soc situations. I. Taviss.

Whenever shared interests among the parties to a dispute make any reasonable sort of settlement mutually advantageous over stalemate or violence, yet emotional commitments render the conflict seemingly 'hopeless,' a suitably-chosen random settlement mechanism may be invoked. The presence of a neutral 3rd party, whose interests are also served by any peaceable settlement, but who wishes to avoid the onus of 'compulsory arbitration,' can facilitate operation of such a mechanism. The threat of invoking a random settlement need not preclude normal bargaining. Indeed, the probability distribution governing random settlement processes can be manipulated to encourage bargaining convergence, by rewarding concessions & penalizing unilateral intransigence. AA.

A theoretical analysis of the causes of fam conflict & of means of preventing & resolving conflicts is presented. Causes include: (1) 'compulsion'--eg, the inability of hostile fam members to withdraw from the field, (2) 'intimacy' of contact between fam members, (3) the small size of the group which facilitates the polarization of factions, & (4) the rapidity of developmental alterations in whatever equilibria may be established. 'Normative mechanisms' for preventing fam conflict include: (1) avoiding probable sources of conflict by discouraging incompatible marriages & minimizing contact between 'dangerous' fam members, (2) allocating rights & duties to particular roles. according to prescribed cultural patterns which narrow the area open for debate, & (3) culturally prescribed rules for fair treatment of fam members, esp those calling for equal treatment of children when they arrive at the same age. 'Instrumental mechanisms' for resolving fam conflicts include: (1) providing increased facilities for fam living (such as a 2nd car), (2) enacting priority systems for the use of limited facilities (eg, establishing a budget or TV schedule), (3) enlarging areas of autonomous decision-making within the fam as by giving the marriage partners financial allowances to spend as they see fit, & (4) providing opportunities for tension-reduction as by temporary vacations from the fam. Processes of resolving fam conflict include: (1) discussion leading to consensus, compromise, or concession, (2) mediation by a 3rd party, & (3) accommodation. In the event of failure to achieve any of these, more drastic withdrawal from the field may be the only remaining means of ending open conflict. AA.

A presentation of 'a set of theoretical constructs developed for the purpose of analyzing the psychol'al causes & consequences of decisional conflicts.' Decisional conflict (DC) is defined as the 'opposing tendencies within an individual which interfere with the formulation, acceptance, or execution of a decision.' The problem of the DC's of any leader who is in the role of negotiator & has the power to use his own judgment in his attempts to arrive at a peaceful settlement with a rival nation through arbitration in a face-to-face conference is considered; the roles of President Wilson &. Count Bernstorff during the events immediately preceding the entry of the US into WWI are examined. Through delineation of the anticipated consequences & sources of motivation re decisional conflict a 3 (mean - average) 3 schema for representing the main factors that enter into decisional conflicts is constructed of the following components: (1) type of anticipation - (a) utilitarian gains or losses, (b) soc approval or disapproval, & (c) self-approval or disapproval; & (2) sources of motivation - (a) verbally mediated incentive value (conscious goals), (b) preconscious affective charge, & (c) unconscious affective charge. Cognitive restructuring, persuasive efforts, compensating actions, private condemnation of disapproved decision & of other persons who support it, substitute-seeking orientation, & disaffiliation from the disapproving group are considered as modes of conflict resolution. The following general factors are seen as determining the mode of resolution: personality factors, perceived status & vulnerability, energy-consumption, & availability of pertinent information. Hyp's re the influence of these factors are offered. It is suggested that for each of the 9 primary types of DC presented in the schema, the following res questions can be posed: (i) 'what antecedent conditions determine the probability that a high conflict of this type will arise?' (ii) 'what is the repertoire of resolutions for this type of conflict?' (iii) 'how & to what extent is each mode of resolution in the repertoire likely to have a disruptive effect?' & (iv) 'what types of information & what forms of psychol'al preparation have the effect of reducing the occurrence of the most disruptive modes of resolution for this type of conflict?' I. Taviss.

An analysis of the following 5 propositions & their interrelationships, employing data from industrial relations: (1) the soc structure of complex industrial societies is continuously changing, (2) conflict between groups is a fundamental soc process, (3) conflict between groups becomes institutionalized, (4) resolutions of group conflict determine the direction of soc change, & (5) soc welfare depends upon the outcome of group conflict. I. Taviss.

As distinct from many other soc processes which are finite contain within themselves instit'ly prescribed termination points, soc conflicts (C's) follow a law of soc inertia, ie, they continue to operate unless specific provisions for stopping their course be made by the participants. The termination of C hence presents peculiar problems not encountered in finite processes. To end a C the parties must agree upon rules & norms allowing them to assess their respective power position. The more restricted the object of contention & the more visible for both parties the clues to victory, the higher the chance that the C be limited in time & extension. But no matter how the activities of the potential winner may facilitate an early termination, the final decision to end the C remains with the potential loser. Hence the importance of symbols of defeat. The availability of such symbols facilitates resolution of C's. The structure of the opposing camps furnishes clues as to symbols of defeat. In centralized nations the fall of the capital may symbolize defeat, in a decentralized , Ru nation the capture of a charismatic war leader or the exhaustion of agri'al resources may serve as a symbol of defeat. Acceptance of defeat, as well as willingness to compromise, further depend on the ability of leaders to make the led within their camp accept their definition of the situation. To make defeat palatable may require as much effort as to make war desirable. Here symbols are again of central importance. Clear symbolizations of outcomes & relative strength when readily available & highly instit'ed help to shorten conflicts & limit their intensity. An understanding of the symbols which move men to accept compromise or even defeat might be as valuable as the attempt to uncover symbols which incite to war. AA.

An examination of the taxicab rate war waged in Hawthorne, Calif in 1949, on the assumption that it is an interesting case stduy for students of conflict, since it included many of the elements of armed conflict: 'enemy' moves in the form of price reductions, ultimata followed by countermoves by firms which are adversely affected, the use of stratagems to mislead the enemy, additional hostile activity in the form of further. reductions or threatened reductions, the dissemination of propaganda to influence PO, the `signing' of peace treaties, & postwar problems. The war was won not by those firms which outdid their competitor in rate-cutting but by the firm which maneuvered its opponents into a losing operation & the philosophy of the victors.' I. Taviss.