Suchergebnisse

En este trabajo se exponen las reflexiones del abate Sieyès sobre la necesidad
de configurar un órgano de defensa de la Constitución. Sieyès ¿creador intelectual
de la distinción entre Poder Constituyente y poderes constituidos, y uno de los fundadores,
por tanto, del constitucionalismo contemporáneo¿ no sólo defendió siempre la necesidad
de establecer un procedimiento especial de reforma de la Constitución ¿aspecto este que
fue destacado por otros autores¿ sino que llevó a cabo también el diseño de un órgano
de defensa de la Constitución. En el contexto revolucionario francés, el abate de Frejús fue
el único en advertirlo. El órgano de defensa de la Constitución se configura como la clave
de bóveda de su modelo político y el corolario lógico del concepto de Poder Constituyente,
como fundamento del Estado Constitucional, por él alumbrado. Esta necesidad la advirtió
por vez primera en un importante discurso pronunciado el 2 de Termidor. Dos semanas
después desarrolló su idea en otro discurso proferido en la Convención Nacional, concretamente
el 18 de Thermidor del año III. En él, Sieyès se plantea la necesidad de crear un
«guardián de la Constitución» para que esta pueda configurarse como una norma jurídica
vinculante, y de obligatorio cumplimiento. Sieyès fue el primero en establecer con gran rigor
técnico, y con un muy elevado nivel de detalle, el diseño básico de esa magistratura,
tanto en lo que se refiere a su composición como a sus funciones. Y lo hizo anticipándose
a muchas ideas que son hoy patrimonio común del Derecho Constitucional europeo. Entre
ellas cabe destacar la configuración de la Justicia Constitucional como una institución protectora
de las minorías, como un órgano de integración política, como la suprema instancia
jurídico-política para la resolución de los conflictos constitucionales, y como una jurisdicción
de la libertad.
Lan honetan, Konstituzioa defendatzeko organo bat osatzearen beharrari
buruz Sieyès apaizak egindako hausnarketak azaldu dira. Sieyès botere eratzailearen
eta botere eratuen arteko bereizketaren ¿hortaz, konstituzionalismo garaikidearen¿ sortzaile
intelektuala izan zen. Konstituzioa aldatzeko prozedura berezia ezartzeko beharra defendatzeaz
gain ¿alderdi hori nabarmendu zuten beste idazle batzuek¿, Konstituzioa defendatzeko
organoa ere diseinatu zuen. Frantziako Iraultzan, Frejúsko apaizak soilik eman
zuen horren berri. Konstituzioa defendatzeko organoa bere eredu politikoaren giltzarria da,
baita botere eratzailea kontzeptuaren ondorio logikoa ere, botere horrek sortutako estatu
konstituzionalaren oinarria delako. Behar hori Thermidorren 2an esandako hitzaldi garrantzitsu
batean azaldu zuen lehen aldiz. Handik bi astera, III. urteko Thermidorren 18an, ideia
bera garatu zuen Konbentzio Nazionalean eman zuen beste hitzaldi batean. Sieyèsek Konstituzioa
nahitaez bete beharreko arau juridiko loteslea izateko «Konstituzioaren zaindari»
bat sortu behar zela planteatu zuen. Sieyès izan zen magistratura horren oinarrizko diseinua
egiten lehena, zehaztasun tekniko eta xehetasun maila handiekin, bai osaerari bai funtzioei
zegokienez. Eta egun Europako Zuzenbide Konstituzionalaren ondare diren ideia asko aurreratu
zituen. Nabarmentzekoa da Justizia Konstituzionala sortu zuela, hainbat helbururekin:
gutxiengoak babesteko instituzioa, politika integratzeko organoa, konstituzioarekin lotutako
gatazkak ebazteko instantzia gorena eta askatasun jurisdikzioa izatea.
This work sets forth the critical thoughts of the Abate Sièyes regarding
the need to set up a body for the protection of the Constitution. Sièyes ¿the intelectual
author of the distinction between constituent power and constituted power, and one
of the fathers of the contemporary constitutionalism¿, did not only stand up for the
need to establish a special procedure for the reform of the Constitution ¿a facet which
was emphasyzed by another authors¿ but also he carried out the design of a body for
the defense of the Constitution. In the framework of the revolutionary french context,
the Abate from Frejús was the only one to notice it. The body for the defense of the
Constitution was envisaged as the cornerstone of his political model and the logic corollary
of the notion of constituent power, as the basis for the Constitutional state figured out by
him. This necessity was notized for the first time in an important speech pronounced the 2
of Thermidor. Two weeks later, he developed his idea in another speech issued before the
National Convention, specifically the 18 of Thermidor of the third year. Sièyes sets the need
to establish a «guardian for the Constitution» in order to become a binding legal rule of
compulsory observance. Sièyes is the firt one to establish with great technical rigour and
with a high level of details, the basic design of that court both regarding its membership
and its tasks. And he did it so foreseeing many ideas which are nowadays common ground
for the European Constitutional law. Among them it can be emphasyzed the configuration
of constitutional justice as a protective institution for minorities, as a body of political
integration, as the supreme instance for the resolution of constitutional conflicts and as a
jurisdicition for freedom.

Anlage VI zu den Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes des Europäischen Rates in Nizza vom 07., 08. und 09. Dezember 2000: Bericht über die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik

1International Court of Justice — Jurisdiction — Whether Cameroon's Application fulfilling requirements of Statute of Court — Cameroon invoking declarations made by two States under Article 36(2) of Statute of Court as basis for jurisdiction — Nigeria raising eight preliminary objections to jurisdiction of Court — Whether Court having jurisdiction to adjudicate on merits of dispute — Whether Parties bound to settle all boundary disputes through existing bilateral machinery — Whether settlement of boundaries within Lake Chad region within exclusive competence of Lake Chad Basin Commission — Whether Court should determine boundary in Lake Chad to extent that boundary constituted or was constituted by the tripoint in the Lake — Whether any dispute concerning boundary delimitation as such throughout whole length of boundary from tripoint in Lake Chad to sea — Whether any basis for judicial determination that Nigeria bearing international responsibility for alleged frontier incursions — Whether any legal dispute concerning delimitation of maritime boundary between two Parties appropriate for resolution by Court — Whether question of maritime delimitation inadmissible where necessarily involving rights and interests of third States — Admissibility of Cameroon's Application — Judgment on Preliminary ObjectionsInternational Court of Justice — Judgment — Res judicata — Request for Interpretation — Nigeria requesting Court to interpret Judgment on Preliminary Objections — Whether Court having jurisdiction to entertain Nigeria's request — Article 60 of Statute of Court — Admissibility of Nigeria's request — Article 60 of Statute of CourtInternational Court of Justice — Intervention — Equatorial Guinea requesting permission to intervene in maritime aspects of case — Whether Equatorial Guinea sufficiently establishing interest of legal nature which could be affected by Court judgment — Admissibility of Equatorial Guinea's request — Article 62 of Statute of CourtInternational Court of Justice — Merits — Boundary dispute — Delimitation of land and maritime boundaries between Parties — Title to territory — Cameroon claiming legal title — Nigeria's submissions based on historical consolidation and effectivités — Long-standing land boundary dispute — Sector of land boundary in Lake Chad area — Sector of land boundary from Lake Chad 2to Bakassi Peninsula — Sector of land boundary in Bakassi and sovereignty over Bakassi Peninsula — Boundary of maritime areas — Issues of State responsibilityTerritory — Sovereignty — Delimitation of land boundary between Parties — Land boundary sector in Lake Chad area — 1919 Milner — Simon Declaration — 1929-30 Thomson — Marchand Declaration — 1931 Henderson — Fleuriau Exchange of Notes — Whether instruments having international agreement status — Whether delimiting boundary in Lake Chad area — Role of work of Lake Chad Basin Commission — Theory of historical consolidation of title — Whether valid mode of acquisition of title under international law — Role of effectivités — Whether Cameroon acquiescingTerritory — Sovereignty — Delimitation of land boundary between Parties — Land boundary sector from Lake Chad to Bakassi Peninsula — Delimited by 1929-30 Thomson — Marchand Declaration as incorporated in 1931 Henderson — Fleuriau Exchange of Notes — 1946 British Order in Council — Anglo-German Agreements of 11 March and 12 April 1913 — Court's task — Whether instruments binding and applicable — Interpretation and application of provisionsTerritory — Sovereignty — Delimitation of land boundary between Parties — Sector of land boundary in Bakassi and sovereignty over Bakassi Peninsula — Colonial history — League of Nations Mandate — United Nations Trusteeship — Independence — Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 — Whether defective — Whether effective — Whether Great Britain having legal capacity to transfer sovereignty over Bakassi Peninsula under Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 — 1884 "Treaty of Protection" between Great Britain and Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar — Status — Agreements with local rulers — Inter-temporal law principle — Pacta sunt servanda rule — Whether Nigeria recognizing Cameroonian sovereigntySea — Delimitation of maritime boundary between Parties — Whether Court having jurisdiction over maritime delimitation — Whether Cameroon's claims admissible — Rights and interests of third States — Whether rights of Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Principe affected — Role of negotiations — Articles 74 and 83 of3United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 — Applicability of Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 — Whether Maroua Declaration 1975 a treaty — Whether Yaounde II Declaration 1971 binding upon Parties — Cameroon and Nigeria both parties to United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 — Articles 74(1) and 83(1) — Applicable law — Delimitation of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone between States with adjacent coasts — Whether equidistance line achieving equitable resultTreaties — Land boundary delimitation — 1919 Milner — Simon Declaration — 1929-30 Thomson — Marchand Declaration — 1931 Henderson — Fleuriau Exchange of Notes — Whether instruments having international agreement status — Whether instruments delimiting boundary in Lake Chad areaTreaties — Land boundary delimitation — 1929-30 Thomson — Marchand Declaration — 1946 British Order in Council — Anglo-German Agreements of 11 March and 12 April 1913 — Whether instruments binding and applicable in delimitation of land boundary sector from Lake Chad to Bakassi Peninsula — Interpretation and application of provisionsTreaties — Land boundary delimitation — Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 — Whether defective — Whether effective — Whether Great Britain having legal capacity to transfer sovereignty over Bakassi Peninsula under Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 — 1884 "Treaty of Protection" between Great Britain and Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar — Status — Agreements with local rulers — Inter-temporal law principle — Pacta sunt servanda ruleTreaties — Maritime boundary delimitation — Articles 74 and 83 of Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 — Applicability of Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 — Whether Maroua Declaration 1975 constituting a treaty under Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 — Whether Yaounde II Declaration 1971 binding upon Parties — Cameroon and Nigeria both parties to United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 — Articles 74(1) and 83(1) — Applicable lawState responsibility — Cameroon accusing Nigeria of invading and occupying its territory — Whether Nigeria violating obligations 4under conventional and customary international law — Principle of non-use of force — Principle of non-intervention — Territorial sovereignty — Whether guarantees of non-repetition necessary — Whether necessary to ascertain whether and to what extent Nigeria's international responsibility engaged by its occupation — Whether reparation due for material and moral injury — Compliance with Provisional Measures Order — Whether Nigeria responsible for repeated incursions along boundary length 1970-2001War and armed conflict — Cameroon's Application accusing Nigeria of acts of aggression — Allegations that Nigerian forces occupying Cameroonian territory since 1993 — Armed clashes in Bakassi Peninsula between Cameroonian and Nigerian forces in 1996 — Court indicating provisional measures of protection in 1996 at Cameroon's request

In the context of research into the relationship between secularism and multiculturalism in contemporary India, this paper points to their specific interrelatedness and the distinctive Indian approach to secularism through the idea of a principled distance as a way to adjust to religious pluralism that has a close affinity with multiculturalism. Contrary to opinions that secularism is alien to the Indian civilisation, by a selection of instances through Indian history, the paper illustrates the broader meaning of "Indian" religious and secular thinking and also points to the significance of interaction among various religious cultures and subcultures, particularly between Hinduism and Islam/Sufism. However, the paper focuses on the analysis of Indian constitutional secularism and legally warranted multiculturalism. Debates on multiculturalism follow two distinct directions: the first examines multiculturalism as a state policy in the form of federalisation of its political system, whereas the second is concerned with the meaning of multiculturalism and its implications for the issues of individual and group rights, culture, religion, and secularism. It also touches upon the influence of the British colonial rule on the shaping of interreligious relations in independent India. The last section questions the ascendancy of Hindu nationalism, particularly in view of the rise to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2014, its appropriation of the new "idea" of India, especially the Hindu nationalist narrative, which endangers India's official ideology of secularism, as well as the position of the minorities, in particular of the Muslim minority. The article is divided into seven sections. The Introduction outlines, in general, the main distinction between secularism and multiculturalism and their relationship, referring to the two principal approaches to secularism: (1) neutrality between different religions, and (2) prohibition of religious associations in state activities. Indian secularism tends to emphasise neutrality in particular rather than prohibition in general. The second section, Traces of the Indian Secular Thought through History, examines the view, particularly pervasive among Hindutva supporters, that secularism is alien to the Indian civilisation from the perspectives of history and philosophy, which both provide evidence that "the constituents of secularism which make up the concept are not alien to Indian thought" (Thapar, 2013: 4). In this context, the most evoked name in connection with religious tolerance is that of Ashoka Maurya, who in his edicts called not only for the co-existence of all religious sects but also for equal respect for those who represented them. Many centuries later, Moghul Emperor Akbar supported dialogue across adherents of different religions, including atheists. He laid the formal foundations of a secular legal structure and religious neutrality of the state. The paper here also points to the significance of interaction among various religious cultures and subcultures, the more so between Hinduism and Islam/Sufism. It focuses on extending the meaning of "Indian" religion in the sense that it includes multiple religions, such as Brahmanism, Buddhism, Jainism, Bhakti, Shakta, Islam/ Sufism, Guru-Pir tradition, which, but for Brahmanism, challenge orthodoxy by giving greater weight to social ethics rather than to prescriptive religious texts. The third section, Multiculturalism in Indian Context, refers to the Indian legally warranted multiculturalism and relating debates followed by two distinct directions. The first examines multiculturalism as a state policy in the form of federalisation of its political system; a process which involves the political accommodation of ethnic identities, which remains the most effective method of management and resolution of conflicts. The second direction is concerned with the meaning of multiculturalism and its implications for the issues of individual and group rights, culture, religion, secularism. According to Rajeev Bhargava (1999: 35, 2007), cultural particularity might undermine the "common foundation for a viable society", and might also lessen individual freedom, thus invalidating the values of liberal democracy. From there follows the question of constitutional protection of personal laws of religious communities, which is, in a way, in collision with the primary secular identity, that of a citizen (Thapar, 2010, 2013). The fourth section, Characteristics of Indian Secularism, analyses in some detail the Articles of the Indian Constitution concerned with the basic understanding of secularism, i.e., that religion must be separated from the state "for the sake of religious liberty and equality of citizenship." The analysis indicates that, while some Articles (Indian Constitution, Articles 25–26) depart from the mainstream western secularism, others are close to the Western liberal leanings, like those stipulating that the state will have no official religion (constitutional amendment 42) or that no religious instruction will be allowed in educational institutions maintained wholly out of state funds, as well as that no person attending any educational institution receiving financial aid from state funds shall be required to take part in compulsory attendance at religious instruction or worship (Articles 27–28/1/). But, more specifically, the idea of a principled distance from religious pluralism points to India's highly contextual, thus distinctively Indian, version of secularism. The fifth section, The Question of Indian Identity, argues that, with the inauguration of democracy in India, multiculturalism was adopted as a policy of recognising and respecting diversity, guaranteeing the protection and rights of minorities and positive discrimination for the historically marginalised, and emphasising intergroup equality, while leaving the issue of intragroup equality somewhat aside. In the last section, Challenges of Hindu Nationalistic Ideology, the author points to some manifestations of the current ascendency of Hindu nationalism, particularly resulting from the Bharatiya Janata Party coming to power in 2014, such as the increasing identification of state leaders with Hindu cultural symbols and, at the same time, decreasing official support for the public festivals of minorities, Mus lims and Christians in the first place. According to Hindu nationalists, most Muslims and Christians are converts from Hinduism and should therefore recognise the precedence of the Hindu culture in India. Anti-Muslim prejudice in India stems not from the ideas of their racial or cultural differences but, above all, from questioning their loyalty to India. Here emerges the question of the "secular nationalism" of the Congress Party as opposed to the "Hindu nationalism" of the Bharatiya Janata Party, which insists on Hinduism as the essential token of the Indian national identity, implying cultural and political pre-eminence of Hindus in India. The Conclusion summarises some of the main points regarding the relationship between secularism and multiculturalism in the Indian context, indicating that despite the present challenges that Hindu nationalism poses to both, "…the Indian experience suggests that some form of moderate secularism will continue to remain necessary as a state framework to check the advance of religious majoritarianism" (Bajpai, 2017: 224). The author assumes that the article offers some constructive avenues for future studies on secularism and multiculturalism, which should not only provide further insights into the Indian case but also enhance the understanding of the varieties of secular trajectories worldwide, as well as their implications for democracy.