Suchergebnisse

Why do nuclear weapons spread? Using new data on sensitive nuclear transfers, this article analyzes the determinants of nuclear proliferation. The author first describes a simple logic of the technical and strategic advantages that potential nuclear proliferators can gain by importing nuclear materials and technology from more advanced nuclear states. The author then shows that sensitive nuclear transfers are an important determinant of nuclear proliferation. In broader terms, the author find strong support for a supply-side approach to nuclear proliferation. States that are better able to produce nuclear weapons, due to either international assistance or domestic capacity, are more likely to do so.

Does exposure to terrorism lead to hostility toward minorities? Drawing on theories from clinical and social psychology, we propose a stress-based model of political extremism in which psychological distress—which is largely overlooked in political scholarship—and threat perceptions mediate the relationship between exposure to terrorism and attitudes toward minorities. To test the model, a representative sample of 469 Israeli Jewish respondents was interviewed on three occasions at six-month intervals. Structural Equation Modeling indicated that exposure to terrorism predicted psychological distress (t1), which predicted perceived threat from Palestinian citizens of Israel (t2), which, in turn, predicted exclusionist attitudes toward Palestinian citizens of Israel (t3). These findings provide solid evidence and a mechanism for the hypothesis that terrorism introduces nondemocratic attitudes threatening minority rights. It suggests that psychological distress plays an important role in political decision making and should be incorporated in models drawing upon political psychology.

Studies of nuclear proliferation share five serious problems. First, nuclear programs' initiation and completion dates are ambiguous and difficult to code, but findings are rarely subjected to sufficient robustness tests using alternative codings. Second, independent variables overlook important factors such as prestige and bureaucratic power and often use poor proxies for concepts such as the nonproliferation regime. Third, methodologies and data sets should be tightly coupled to empirical questions but are instead often chosen for convenience. Fourth, some findings provide insights already known or believed to be true. Fifth, findings can ignore or gloss over data crucial for policy making and wider debates. This article reviews new quantitative research on nuclear proliferation, noting improved analysis and lingering problems. It highlights the 1999 Kargil war to explore dangers of relying on stock data sets and the need for research on statistical outliers. It concludes with a future research agenda aimed at correcting problems and a cautionary note regarding hasty application of quantitative results to policy making.

In public-good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of their members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, the inherent asymmetric nature of these groups may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish. In this article, the authors experimentally investigate public-good provision in normal and privileged groups with and without decentralized punishment. The authors find that compared to normal groups, privileged groups are relatively ineffective in using costly sanctions to increase everyone's contributions. Punishment is less targeted toward strong free riders, and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. Thus, the authors show that privileged groups are not as privileged as they initially seem. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright.]

A recent wave of scholarly literature has argued forcibly that the European Union's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represents an attempt on the part of the EU to "balance" against the United States. According to such analyses, the EU is reacting to American global preeminence by building up its military capacities to enhance its own ability to play a significant, autonomous role in international affairs. This article takes issue with such claims. It points, first, to significant theoretical and methodological shortcomings inherent in the work of the "soft balancers." Second, and more fundamentally, it subjects this work to careful empirical scrutiny and illustrates how the soft balancers have fundamentally misunderstood ESDP. Finally, it illustrates how such misinterpretations result from a failure to appreciate the profound impact that institutional structures wield over substantive outcomes in international security affairs.

Nations are politically heterogeneous and which group is in political ascendency shapes the nature of interstate cooperation through two mechanisms. First, groups differ in the benefits they receive from cooperation. This affects which groups can commit to cooperate. Second, a nation may selectively withhold cooperation from one group to influence the domestic political competition between groups in another nation. By integrating political competition between leaders of different groups under different institutional rules into a prisoner's dilemma model of international cooperation, the theory generates hypotheses relating leader turnover, group membership, and patterns of cooperation.

This study examines the influence of 9/11, the Iraq War, the economy, and the coalition-of-minorities on presidential approval of G. W. Bush across partisan subgroups and aggregate popularity. The analysis considers the effect of underlying partisan preferences on overall approval. A partisan divide occurs for war and the economy on Bush popularity. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War affect Democratic opinions of Bush more than Republican opinions, whereas the economy impacts Republicans more than Democrats. An in-party/out-party rally effect occurs. Democrats show stronger rallies than Republicans for 9/11 and the Iraq War, but also faster and deeper popularity decay of the rallies. All economic and war-related effects significantly influence Independents and aggregate Bush popularity. The coalition-of-minorities pattern of declining presidential approval is caused by the 9/11 rally decay effect, the war casualties effect, and the slowing economy during Bush's second term in office.

When and why do states transfer nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge to other states for peaceful purposes? This question is important given the recent finding that countries receiving nuclear aid are more likely to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons. I argue that countries provide civil nuclear assistance for three strategic reasons: to strengthen their allies and alliances, to strengthen their relationship with enemies of enemies, and to strengthen existing democracies and bilateral relationships with these countries (if the supplier is also a democracy). I test these arguments using statistical analysis and a new data set on more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed between 1950 and 2000. The findings offer robust empirical support for my argument and very little support for the competing explanation rooted in norms and nonproliferation. This article enhances scholarly understanding of how and why nuclear weapons spread and encourages further research on the supply side of nuclear proliferation. It also has broad implications for the literatures on norms and international cooperation.

Do nuclear weapons reduce the probability of war? This article quantitatively evaluates the nuclear peace hypothesis. The results indicate that the impact of nuclear weapons is more complicated than is conventionally appreciated. Both proliferation optimists and pessimists find confirmation of some of their key claims. When a nuclear asymmetry exists between two states, there is a greater chance of militarized disputes and war. In contrast, when there is symmetry and both states possess nuclear weapons, then the odds of war precipitously drop. When combined, these findings provide support for the existence of the stability—instability paradox. Evidence suggests that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, they simultaneously allow for more risk-taking in lower intensity disputes.