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This tenth edition of Doing Business sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in regulations affecting eleven areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency and employing workers. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 185 economies, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, over time. The indicators are used to analyze economic outcomes and identify what reforms have worked, where and why. This economy profile presents the Doing Business indicators for Nigeria. To allow useful comparison, it also provides data for other selected economies (comparator economies) for each indicator. The data in this report are current as of June 1, 2012 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period January - December 2011).

Doing business sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in regulations affecting 10 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. In a series of annual reports doing business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 183 economies, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, over time. This economy profile presents the doing business indicators for Zimbabwe. To allow useful comparison, it also provides data for other selected economies (comparator economies) for each indicator. The data in this report are current as of June 1, 2011 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period January-December 2010).

Doing business sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in regulations affecting 10 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. In a series of annual reports doing business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 183 economies, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, over time. This economy profile presents the doing business indicators for Montenegro. To allow useful comparison, it also provides data for other selected economies (comparator economies) for each indicator. The data in this report are current as of June 1, 2011 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period January December 2010).

Doing business sheds light on how easy or difficult it is for a local entrepreneur to open and run a small to medium-size business when complying with relevant regulations. It measures and tracks changes in regulations affecting 10 areas in the life cycle of a business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. In a series of annual reports doing business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 183 economies, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, over time. This economy profile presents the doing business indicators for Hungary. To allow useful comparison, it also provides data for other selected economies (comparator economies) for each indicator. The data in this report are current as of June 1, 2011 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period January December 2010).

What happened to poverty in India in the 1990s has been fiercely debated, both politically and statistically. The debate has run parallel to the wider debate about globalization and poverty in the 1990s and is also an important part of that debate. The economic reforms of the early 1990s in India were followed by rates of economic growth that were high by historical standards. The effects on poverty remain controversial, however. The official numbers published by the government of India, showing acceleration in the rate of poverty reduction from 36 percent of the population in 1993 to 1994 to 26 percent in 1999 to 2000, have been challenged for showing both too little and too much poverty reduction. The various claims have often been frankly political, but there are also many important statistical issues. The debate, reviewed in this article, provides an excellent example of how politics and statistics interact in an important, largely domestic debate. Although there is no consensus on what happened to poverty in India in the 1990s, there is good evidence both that poverty fell and that the official estimates of poverty reduction are too optimistic, particularly for rural India. The issues covered in this article, although concerned with the measurement of poverty in India, have wide international relevance discrepancies between surveys and national accounts, the effects of questionnaire design, reporting periods, survey nonresponse, repair of imperfect data, choice of poverty lines, and interplay between statistics and politics.

In its military campaign in Gaza, Israel faces a seemingly endless list of alleged human rights violations. International monitors argue the Israel Defense Forces have starved Gazans, targeted journalists attempting to cover the carnage, tortured detainees, and attacked hospitals full of wounded civilians.
The U.S. — a passionate backer of civilian protections in Ukraine — has struggled to find the right way to address these claims while still standing by its long-time partner. The bombing has been "indiscriminate," says President Joe Biden, but perhaps it will improve tomorrow. Killing more than 10,000 women and children in two months is not "genocide," argues White House spokesperson John Kirby, but Hamas' brutal Oct. 7 attacks were.
If human rights are fundamentally a matter of world consensus, then what does it tell us that the United States threatens to cast a second veto against a United Nations Security Council resolution begging for a humanitarian suspension of fighting? What does it mean when a supposed champion of human rights seems to jettison them when it becomes inconvenient? For that matter, why should Israel care about human rights when it perceives its fight as existential?
Kenneth Roth has a unique perspective on these questions. Roth, considered by many to be a dean of the human rights movement, spent nearly three decades as the executive director of Human Rights Watch before stepping down last year to become a visiting professor at Princeton University. Under his leadership, HRW drew flak for, among other things, declaring Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories to be apartheid, all while documenting in meticulous detail abuses committed by Palestinian groups, including Hamas.
RS spoke with Roth to get his thoughts on human rights at a time of crisis. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
RS: How would you rate the Biden administration's handling of the Gaza crisis from a human rights perspective?
Roth: The Biden administration has been far too deferential to the Israeli Government, despite the pretty clear commission of war crimes in Gaza. And while the administration has pushed to ameliorate some of those war crimes — by pressing for humanitarian access, by urging greater attention to avoiding civilian casualties — that rhetorical push has not been backed by the use of the leverage that the administration has that might have really put pressure on the Israeli government to stop, whether that would be withholding or conditioning ongoing arm sales or military assistance, or even allowing a Security Council resolution to go forward.RS: What would a better approach look like?Roth: The initial problem was that Biden pretty unconditionally wrapped himself in the Israeli government's response to the horrible October 7 attacks by Hamas. If you look at his initial comments, while there were caveats written in about the need to respect humanitarian law, there was no emotional punch behind them. It was pretty clear that Biden simply stood with Israel and was giving it a green light to proceed with its military response to Hamas without much effort, at least during the first few weeks, to ensure that that response really did comply with humanitarian law. So I think the Israeli government got the message that the references to humanitarian law were necessary for certain audiences, but that the administration's heart was not in them.
RS: Would a more forceful form of messaging at the start have led to different results?
Roth: Obviously, it's hard to know the counterfactual. But the U.S. government, which has the greatest leverage of any external actor, didn't really use that leverage to ensure that its periodic rhetorical commitment to the need to respect humanitarian law was matched by its much more forceful embrace of the Israeli military response to Hamas.
RS: I've seen some reporting that the State Department has done internal inquiries as to whether U.S. officials could be legally complicit if Israel is found to have committed war crimes in Gaza. Do you have any thoughts on that question?
Roth: Well, they could be. Biden's references to the Israeli military conducting indiscriminate bombing were clearly not just a verbal slip. It probably reflected the internal conversations that the administration has. The second one even seems to have been somewhat deliberate. And the significance of that is that indiscriminate bombardment is a war crime. As any administration lawyer would know, continuing to provide weapons to a force that is engaged in war crimes can make the sender guilty of aiding and abetting war crimes.
That is not some crazy, wacko theory. That was the basis on which former Liberian President Charles Taylor was convicted by an internationally backed tribunal, the so-called Special Court for Sierra Leone, for providing weapons to the Sierra Leonean rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front, a group that was notorious for chopping off the limbs of its victims. Because Taylor kept providing arms in return for the RUF's diamonds while he knew the RUF was committing these war crimes, this internationally-backed tribunal found him guilty of aiding and abetting, convicted him, and sentenced him to 50 years in prison, which he is currently serving in a British prison.
RS: My next question is a little tricky, but I'm curious how you approach it. Israel claims that this war is a fight for its very survival. Why should a country that views itself as being in that position care about respecting human rights?Roth: Well, I think the question is why should it care about adhering to international humanitarian law and protocols. It's worth noting that humanitarian law was not drafted by a bunch of human rights activists and peaceniks. This was drafted by the world's leading militaries. It was designed for war, for situations where governments often feel that they are existentially at risk, and these were the limits that the world's leading militaries imposed on themselves. Israel has signed on to these standards, and it claims to abide by them. It has many capable lawyers who could be applying them. It just isn't applying them.
It probably requires a certain psychological analysis to figure out why, but some of the signals being sent from the top indicate a willingness to disregard the requirements of humanitarian law. When you have Defense Minister [Yoav] Galant referring to the residents of Gaza as "human animals," when you have [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu invoking the biblical story of Amalek in which there's a divine injunction to not spare the men, women, children, or animals, these are not-so-subtle signals that the top political and military leadership in Israel doesn't care that much about civilian casualties. This has seemed to have manifested itself in the indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks that the Israeli military has carried out in Gaza.
RS: It seems to me that focusing on war crimes or potential war crimes can sometimes lead to really bad policy outcomes. In this case, Israel is really spotlighting Hamas' alleged war crimes. You think back to the war in Iraq, where there was a lot of highlighting of Saddam's alleged war crimes. How can advocacy for human rights avoid supporting unfettered militarism?
Roth: First, I think it's important to note that war crimes by one side do not justify war crimes by the other. If a warring party could cite the other side's war crimes, you would quickly have no more Geneva Conventions because allegations of war crimes are often made in the passions of conflict. The fact that some people have committed war crimes — in this case, both sides — doesn't justify that others resort to criminal conduct. Now, in terms of military action, few people contest that Israel had every right to respond to Hamas' military attack. It was an extraordinarily lethal military attack. It was ruthless, with widespread murder, rape, abduction, and indiscriminate bombardment. So with an attack of that sort, no one should be surprised that the Israeli government responds. The only real question was, will it respond consistent with humanitarian law? Or would it flout that law?RS: What does all this mean — especially the fact of the U.S. seemingly taking a step back in advocacy for the protection of human rights — what does all this mean for the state of human rights today?
Roth: It is harmful because the U.S. government is such a powerful voice, and when it does seem to make an exception in its human rights advocacy for a close ally like Israel, it discredits the U.S. as a voice for human rights around the world. Now, I should say this is not the only instance of inconsistency on the part of Washington. We're seeing it as well as the Biden administration tries to build alliances to oppose Russia's invasion of Ukraine or to contain China. So while the administration has spoken numerous times about its fundamental commitment to human rights, it's been a very inconsistent commitment. And that inconsistency is probably most visible in the Middle East, which has been essentially a black hole in the administration's human rights policy. It's very difficult to be so permissive of human rights violations in one region of the world and have a whole lot of credibility on human rights in other parts of the world.
This means that one of those powerful voices we have has weakened itself. It's not the first time that has happened. Under [former President Donald] Trump, the U.S. essentially abandoned any pretense of enforcing human rights. Prior administrations have had comparable inconsistencies. The U.S. still has been able to be a useful voice for human rights, despite these inconsistencies, in some cases, but it is a much weaker voice than if it had really been principled and consistent.
RS: How do you see the future of the push to get states to protect human rights? Are we in a moment of crisis that galvanizes change?
Roth: If you look at the various efforts to uphold human rights, they've been quite vigorous in certain cases. There has been a very strong response to Russian war crimes in Ukraine, complete with multiple General Assembly resolutions, the Human Rights Council standing up a commission of inquiry, the International Criminal Court launching an immediate investigation and actually charging Putin and one of his aides with war crimes.
A place where it's been weaker has been, say, China's crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, where we came within two votes of putting on the agenda a discussion of then-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet's very strong report on what she called possible crimes against humanity. But we didn't even get that agenda item, so that's a place where the world has been much weaker.
But there's been greater mobilization, greater willingness to speak out on a range of other situations, whether that be Myanmar or Iran, Saudi abuses in Yemen for a time, Sudan, Ethiopia for a time, Venezuela, Nicaragua. So the idea that because there's this black hole in U.S. human rights policy, therefore nothing can get done, that's just not true. A lot gets done, but the defense of human rights is weaker because the U.S. has been an inconsistent supporter of the effort.

The issue of the regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the significant challenges faced by the EU at present. Most researchers focus on the substantive scope of AI regulation, including state law, ethical norms and soft law. In addition to the substantive and legal scope of the regulation, it is worthwhile considering the manner of such regulation.1 Since AI is an algorithmic code, it seems correct to regulate (restrict) AI not so much with traditional law established in natural (human) language as with one implemented into algorithms. They may operate as a tool supporting traditional legislation (RegTech), but it is possible to go further with the issue and create regulation algorithms which implement the law as the effective law. 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The TransAID project defines, develops and evaluates traffic management measures based on V2X equipped road infrastructure, primarily via simulations,to eliminate or mitigate the negative effects of Transition of Control (ToC) along Transition Areas in future mixed traffic scenarios where automated, cooperative, and conventional vehicles will coexist.This document aggregates, integrates, and analyses the results of the TransAID work packages. For each aspect of TransAID the major findings are presented and discussed.As a basis for the simulation studies several vehicle models were implemented successfully to create the right behaviour for lane changing(including cooperative versions), car following (including (C)ACC)and ToC/MRM algorithms. These models were created using a solid theoretical background, however, the availability of real-world data for input and calibration was very limited. From the baseline simulation runs we found that ToCs do not significantly disrupt traffic flow performance unless CAVs establish increased car-following headways during the ToC preparation phase. Disruptions escalate in case of CACC driving, increased share of CAVs in the fleet mix, and the occurrence of multiple ToCs within a narrow temporal window and spatial domain. Furthermore, in the case that a ToC is unsuccessful or not possible, unmanaged MRMs (taking place in lane and not being guided towards safe spots) can induce significant traffic disruption as well. On the other hand, simulation results indicated that cooperative lane changes minimize the frequency of ToC/MRM and their consequent adverse impacts on trafficflow operations. The benefits of cooperative lane changing are amplified with increasing share of CAVs and especially upstream of lanedrop locations.Building upon the vehicle models, simulations and the defined use cases, specific traffic measureswere developed to mitigate the effects of ToC events in transition areas. The traffic measures were implemented to study their effectiveness. Specifically, for each of the selected use cases the effects of the TransAID measures are evaluated regarding emissions, safety and efficiency. There is a trade-off between traffic safety versus traffic efficiency (as measured via throughput and travel times). It is often inherently difficult or even impossible to optimise both in the same context. Hence, typically a policy choice needs to be made, as to which of the two will have to be prioritised. Otherwise, results either improved or remained similar for all use cases and KPIs, with the exception of use case 3.1 (see Section 2.2.2 for details and Table 1at the end of Chapter 6). All use cases have in common that a reduction of MRMs is possible by providing infrastructure advice. Such advice, and the availability of safe spots, clearly reduces the number of stopped vehicles blocking the road.There is also a heavy dependence of the results on the mixture of vehicle types, in addition to the observation that less efficient traffic management performance is obtained for a higher LOS. The latter is in part logical, as for higher LOS there is more prominent congestion and the physical limits of the infrastructure remain a hard obstacle. By itself this is not a problem for TransAID, as the focus of the traffic management schemes is to prevent/postpone traffic breakdowns before they occur. While implementing and testing the traffic measures TransAIDalso identified or created the needed message sets and protocols to implement the measures using V2X communications. To that end, no new message sets wereneeded, but (minor) extensions to CAM, DENM, MCM and MAPEM were necessary. Especially MCM from the Manoeuvre Coordination Service (MCS) is key to multiple types of use case. Therefore, it is necessary to define a MCS that is valid for all types of scenarios. Aligned with the work of ETSI and by actively contributing, TransAID has proposed a MCS where the infrastructure takes an active role to facilitate the manoeuvres of vehicles and to increase the overall traffic flow and safety. The traffic management measures designed in TransAID also require that CAVs and road infrastructure units have an accurate perception of the environment. In addition to the MCS, TransAID has contributed to the evaluation and evolution of ETSI's Collective Perception Service (CPS) for cooperative perception. We have demonstrated that cooperative perception can improve CAVs perception capabilities when the trade-off between the perception capabilities and communications performance is balanced. Furthermore, the reliability of V2X communications has been addressed in TransAID using different and complementary techniques: compression, congestion control and acknowledgements.Besides the V2X communication, the communication to unequipped vehicles was of importanceand consisted of two parts. On the one hand, infrastructure needs to inform unequipped vehicles about issues on the road. On the other, automated vehicles themselves should provide information about their actual state to their surroundings, to avoid negative impacts.With regards to the infrastructure information, it needs to be mentioned that visual information on signs, variable or static, will never be as precise as V2X communication could be, esp. when looking to individual advices. Nevertheless, infrastructure can provide valuable information also to unequipped vehicles by signage, e.g., in terms of speed limits, distance (gap) advice or dynamic lane assignments.It will be required to create additional road signs dealing with automated vehicles, at least showing that, e.g.,an area is prohibited for automated vehicles or an area where only automated vehicles are allowed.Regarding signals from automated vehicles, TransAID's solution of having LED light strips at the back of AVswill be beneficial in any case, but the exact content of such lights needs to be defined by performing more detailed analyses of such components. This goes to all external and dynamic HMI components of automated vehicles. In this light, it will be crucial to have an intuitive way of understanding the automation related additional information. One key question in this area is if driving with enabled automation should be indicated by an additional external light, and if so, where should this light be and whatcolour?Combining the work on the traffic measures and communications, the iTETRIS framework was used to evaluate the selected use cases while deploying the traffic measures using V2X. The goal was to see if the V2X communications impacted the effectiveness of the measures in any way.After adding V2X, the simulation results forthe project's first and second iteration use cases showed very similar results to the previous evaluation. All traffic measures were found robust enough to show the same results as with idealV2X, even in light of increased traffic demand and thus more V2X enabled vehicles.There were some minor differences between the realistic V2X and ideal V2X implementations, but those could be traced back to easily fixed technical aspects (see Section 2.4 for details). As a final step in our use case assessment,the feasibility of measures and communications introduced were implemented in real-world demonstrators. The real-world implementation was done by performing three different feasibility assessments. Two of them have been performed on test tracks in Germany, and one on public roads in The Netherlands. On the test tracks, several detailed tests of all scenarios have been performed, revealing that all traffic management measures could be successfully integratedand applied to automated vehicles in all use cases and scenarios. This includes the successful setup of the RSI and the automated vehicles. It has to be mentioned, though, that the implementation was done in a prototypic way.The development of related series products would require much more testing under real world conditions, which will be challenging at the current time since no highly automated vehicles are present on the roads. Nevertheless, it is very important to start the investigations at present times. As already described in Section 3.3, standardisation of messages is happening already now, and it was very important to include the role of the infrastructure at this stage. The detailed results of the real-world implementations per use case can be found in Section 2.5.In addition to the design and technical implementation of traffic measures in simulation and the real-world, TransAID gained some insights on issues of a less technical nature. For example, it was determined a close collaboration between OEMs and (N)RAs would be beneficial in the identification and managing of TAs. To facilitate such a collaboration TransAID proposes a traffic management frameworkin the form of an intermediary service provider, acting as a trusted (and possibly mandated) third party. The framework allows TransAID to be scaled up and generalised. We approached this from both a technical and a business-oriented perspective. For TransAID to become part of a complete traffic management system, we focused on the technical side on how to detect transition areas, select (and possibly combine) services, and then detect when they are most appropriately timed for deployment. To this end, detection can be done via the infrastructure (e.g. road sensors or even digital communication infrastructure), via the OEMs, or by comparing an infrastructure's newly-defined ISAD level (Infrastructure Support levels for Automated Driving; see Section 1.4.2) to theoperational design domain (ODD, see Section 1.4.1) of the vehicle.Considering the mentioned technical challenges (detecting TAs, selecting services, and timing their deployment), the intermediary service bridges all these parties in such a way that the detection of TAs is performed in a centralised way, and OEMs and (national) road authorities ((N)RAs) have a single point of contact for providing and receiving information about TAs.Another point where OEMs and (national) authorities could collaborate,is the legislation related to automated driving since an important gap in current modelling and legalisation is how (C)AVs would/should react when (given) advice and/or actions conflict with traffic laws. With the real-time coordinated instructions of a TMC, (C)AVs should drive adequately during their journeys. However, it is necessary to concern to what extent such instructions should/can be made, especially when considering legal issues.In addition, legal aspects like the definition of special signage for automated vehicles and their handlingalso need to be considered, as those aspects will take time. This also means signage at the roadside, including VMS content, and signage from automated vehicles to surrounding traffic.Collaboration is also required regarding the definition and standardisation of V2X messages and protocols. The mechanisms proposed in TransAID to improve the reliability of V2X messages can be key in the near future. In general, V2X communications solutions require to be incorporated into standards to be effectively deployed. That is the case for, for example, collective perception solutions, message generation rules for manoeuvre coordination, V2X message compression or broadcast acknowledgement mechanisms. In TransAID we have been intensively working to promote and disseminate all the proposed solutions in top-tier journals and international conferences, as well as in organisations like ETSI and C2C-CC. The above shows a broad range of aspects studied by TransAID in the very dynamic and rapidly evolving field of automated driving.To provide links to additional information and to place the work of TransAID into context, Chapter 5 provides an overview or close related initiatives.

학위논문 (박사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 국제대학원 국제학과(국제통상전공), 2020. 8. 안덕근. ; Over the past 25 years, the WTO has brought considerable achievements as the principal institution of the world trading system. However, it now faces an unprecedented challenge to its fundamental reform since the paralysis of the Appellate Body (AB) function in December 2019. Among many other topics, the area for imperative reforms includes the existing rules associated with "unfair" trade. This study considers two main backgrounds underlying the need for newly refined rules on trade remedies in legal and economic contexts. The first one relates to widening the discrepancies among nation-states' trade policies, which is largely attributable to substantial discretion to Member states rendered by the ambiguity of the WTO legal texts. Furthermore, along with the criticism for "judicial activism", the conflicts between the panels and the Appellate Body in understanding and interpreting the trade remedy laws of the WTO have certainly aggravated the integrity of the dispute settlement system expected to provide "security and predictability" to the multilateral trading system. The other aspect to understanding the discussion for the refinement on trade remedies is that the existing trade remedy rules have not reflected adequately the profound changes to the degree of the economic integration across the world. Indeed, multilateral rules on unfair trade practices such as dumping and subsidization are regarded as one of the most long-standing trade norms. Anti-dumping and countervailing rules made more than one hundred years ago are still the core framework at the WTO, but already conceptually outdated as national economies are inextricably interdependent with each other. Especially, proliferation of global value chains (GVCs) in the twenty first century calls for new thinking on invocation of traditional trade defense instruments and on reform of all disciplines, rules, and decisions governing trade remedies to incorporate such economic changes into the relevant regime. In all this respect, this study aims to assess legal adequacy and economic reasonableness of existing WTO disciplines on unfair trade and to suggest possible areas for improvement and refinement. This study particularly examines two specific topics, namely, targeted dumping and input subsidies, which have many economic and legal problems in its national operation, but the WTO provides little disciplines regarding these matters. Although this study attempts to analyze the possibility of the WTO to embrace more reasonable disciplines on such specific issues legally and economically, the study lastly addresses the area of retaliation when it comes to non-compliance with WTO rulings in anti-dumping or countervailing disputes. The present study in conjunction with an examination of two contentious dumping and subsidies ultimately aims to contribute to effective function of the WTO's dispute settlement system. ; 세계무역기구(WTO)는 출범 이후 지난 25년 여간 다자통상기구로서 큰 성과를 거두어 왔지만 2019년 12월부터 상소기구 기능이 마비되면서 분쟁해결제도와 국제통상규범에 대한 근본적인 개혁의 필요성에 직면해 있다. 특히 불공정 무역과 관련된 무역구제 규범은 가장 빈번하게 WTO 분쟁 대상이 되었을 뿐 아니라 현재 WTO 개혁 논의 중 가장 핵심 이슈로 부각되고 있어 규범의 정비와 개정이 시급해 보인다. 이는 WTO 무역구제규범이 이미 태생부터 법적 모호성을 내포하고 있었을 뿐 아니라, 과거 전형적인 국가간 무역형태를 기반으로 만들어져 급변하는 경제적 현실과의 괴리가 커져갔기 때문이다. 먼저, WTO 반덤핑 협정과 보조금 및 상계조치에 관한 협정 문언의 모호성으로 인해 각 회원국이 시행하는 반덤핑 및 상계조치 정책 간에는 상당한 불일치 및 재량권 남용이 발생해왔다. 또한 '무역구제'와 관련된 분쟁에서 협정문의 모호성을 보완하기 위한 상소기구의 해석은 사법 적극주의로 종종 비판받으며, 일부 쟁점에 대해서는 패널과 해석 상의 갈등이 지속되어 WTO 분쟁해결제도 기능의 약화에도 공히 기여했다. 이러한 문제를 근본적으로 해결하기 위해 그동안 국내 정책상의 무역구제제도 활용과 WTO 분쟁해결절차의 판정 과정에서 WTO 무역구제 협정문이 어떻게 남용되거나 확대 해석되었는지를 면밀히 검토할 필요가 있다. 무역구제 규범의 재정비가 필요한 또 다른 배경은 WTO 무역구제 규범이 국가간 투자 확대, 초국경 기업들의 성장, 글로벌 공급망의 발전이라는 세계 통상환경의 변화를 적절히 반영하지 못하고 있다는 점이다. 현재 무역구제 규범의 기본 틀은 원재료 조달에서 상품의 생산이 모두 한 국가 내에서 일어난 뒤 다른 국가에서 소비되는, 이른바 '국가 영역' 개념에 기반한 전통적 형태의 상품무역 구조를 전제하고 있다. 현행 무역구제 규범이 지속되는 한 변화된 통상환경을 적절히 고려하지 못 해 개별 국가 차원의 무역구제 제도가 무차별적으로 제정, 적용될 수 있으며, 이로 인한 국가간 분쟁이 증가할 소지가 크다. 무역구제 규범과 관련된 상기 두 가지 과제를 염두에 두고, 동 연구는 현재 WTO 무역구제 규범의 법적 충분성과 경제적 타당성을 평가하고자 한다. 동 연구는 특히 WTO 법 상 구체적인 규율은 없는 반면 미국에서 별도의 규정을 두고 적용해 온 '표적 덤핑'과 '원재료 보조금' 문제를 법적 측면과 경제적 측면에서 검토하고 WTO하에서 보다 타당한 규범의 정비 가능성에 대해 고찰하였다. 먼저, '표적 덤핑'은 WTO 무역구제 분쟁 역사 상 가장 큰 논쟁 대상이었던 제로잉이 허용될 수 있는 마지막 영역으로서 그동안 여겨져 왔던 반면, 반덤핑 협정문 자체는 표적 덤핑 하에서 예외적 가격 비교 방법을 허용하는 것 외에 이 문제를 다루는 별도의 규범을 두고 있지 않아, 각국의 관련 정책에 많은 차이와 남용을 야기하였다. 동 연구에서는 '표적 덤핑'이 일반적 덤핑의 개념과 구별되는 경제학적 근거가 있는지 살펴보고, '표적 덤핑' 조항의 발생 배경과 이 문제를 처음 다룬 US-Washing Machine 상소기구 판정을 비판적으로 검토하였다. 그 결과, 상소 기구의 판정이 표적 덤핑 조항인 반덤핑협정 제2.4.2조 제2문의 실질적 기능을 가능케 하기는 어렵다는 점을 사례 연구를 통해 확인하였으며, 제로잉에 대한 문제도 근본적으로 남아있다는 점에 비추어 동 항에 대한 재정비 필요성에 대해 모색하였다. 두 번째 연구에서는 WTO하에서 원재료 보조금의 규율가능성을 검토하였다. 원재료 보조금은 지속적으로 국가간 통상분쟁을 야기해 왔는데, 이에 대한 구체적인 규율은 보조금 협정상 마련되어 있지 않다. 동 연구는 이미 1984년 국내법 상 원재료 보조금 규정을 도입한 미국에서 해당 조항을 어떻게 적용해 왔는지 사례와 법규를 분석하며, WTO하에서는 원재료 보조금 규율에 대한 법적 논의와 발전이 어떻게 있었는지 검토하였다. 그리고 간접 보조금으로서의 원재료 보조금을 규율할 경우 원재료의 범위를 정의하는 문제와 보조금 혜택의 크기 측정 문제에 대해 경제학적 측면에서 분석하고 원재료 보조금 규율 가능성의 한계를 분석하였다. 마지막으로, WTO 분쟁해결제도의 마지막 구제절차인 양허 또는 기타 의무의 정지, 소위 보복 조치와 관련하여, WTO법 위반인 반덤핑, 상계관세 조치에 대한 불이행에 대해 보복조치 수준 계산 시 발생되는 방법론적 문제점을 분석하였다. 이 연구에서는 US-Washing Machines (Art. 22.6)에서 보복조치 수준을 산정한 방법론을 중심으로, '반덤핑 조치'와 관련된 보복조치 수준의 산정 방식은 중재 패널이 여타 수입 제한적 조치에 대해 산정해 온 전통적 방식과 유사하면서도 고유의 구별되는 시장 환경적 특징으로 인해 특별히 신중한 고려가 필요하다는 점을 분석한다. 특히 기업의 전략적 경영활동과 반덤핑 조치 간의 불명확한 인과관계, 기업과 국가에 귀속되는 무역흐름의 불일치를 고려할 때 기존에 '이행기간 종료일'에 근접한 최근 기간을 분석 기간으로 삼았던 관행을 수정하는 것은 다소 불가피한 측면이 있음을 확인하였다. 또한, 방법론 측면에서 경제학적 모델을 사용하여 무역효과를 산출할 때 사용되는 가정과 변수에 따라 무역효과가 얼마나 크게 변하는지 살펴보았다. 특히 세탁기 사건에 사용된 Armington가정과 대체탄력성의 문제점을 검토함으로써 보다 정교한 무역효과를 산출할 것으로 기대되는 경제학적 모델이 '동등한' 수준의 이익의 무효화 또는 침해수준을 산정함에 있어 가정적, 데이터 측면에서의 취약성을 가지고 있으며, 상당히 제한된 수준의 분석을 제공한다는 점을 비판적으로 고찰하였다. 상기와 같이 '표적 덤핑' 과 '원재료 보조금', 그리고 반덤핑, 상계관세 조치 불이행시 '보복조치 수준의 산정'을 통해 본 연구가 추후 WTO 무역구제 규범 재정비와 관련된 논의에 도움이 되고, 궁극적으로 분쟁해결제도의 기능이 개선되는데 기여하고자 한다. ; Chapter I. General Introduction 1 1. Purpose of the Study 1 2. Historical and Policy Background of Unfair Trade Rules 4 3. Contemporary Challenges to WTO Trade Remedy Rules 7 4. Structure of Contents 9 Chapter II. Disciplines for Targeted Dumping in the WTO Anti-Dumping Law 11 1. Introduction 11 1.1. Research Background 11 1.2. Research Purpose and Structure of Contents 14 2. Economic Rationale of Targeted Dumping 15 3. History of Legal Development of Targeted Dumping 20 3.1. Historical Development of Targeted Dumping in GATT/WTO 20 3.2. Evolution of US Laws and Regulations for Targeted Dumping 23 4. US DOC's Analysis of Targeted Dumping 28 4.1. Targeted Dumping Analysis in the Washers AD Investigation 28 4.2. The DOC's Current Analytic Framework for Targeted Dumping 31 5. WTO Decisions on Targeted Dumping Before US – Washing Machines 35 5.1. US – Softwood Lumber V (Art. 21.5) Case 35 5.2. US – Zeroing (EC) Case 37 5.3. US – Zeroing (Japan) Case 39 5.4. Summary Remarks 40 6. Structural Issues of Targeted Dumping from US-Washing Machines 41 6.1. Interpretation of What Constitutes a "Pattern" 42 6.2. Interpretation of the Assessment Criteria for a "Pattern" 45 6.3. Obligation of Investigating Authorities in the Explanation Clause 47 6.4. Limiting the Calculation of Dumping Margins to "Targeted" Sales 53 6.4.1. New Issues Arising from the AB's Findings 57 6.4.2. Rethinking "Zeroing" Under the W-T Comparison Methodology 61 7. Concluding Remarks 62 Chapter III. Disciplines for Input Subsidies in the WTO Countervailing Duty Law 70 1. Introduction 70 1.1. Research Background 70 1.2. Research Purpose and Structure of Contents 74 2. Rules on Upstream Subsidies in the United States 75 2.1. Legislative History and the Framework of the Statue and the Regulation 75 2.1.1. Prior to the Omnibus Tariff and Trade Act of 1984 75 2.1.2. The Omnibus Tariff and Trade Act of 1984 and Afterwards 79 2.1.3. Changes in Regulations Governing Upstream Subsidies 81 2.2. Application of the Upstream Subsidy Provision since 1994 85 2.2.1. Delineating the Scope of Input 86 2.2.2. Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Products 89 2.2.3. Consistency of the Cross-Ownership Regulation with The Upstream Subsidy Provision of the Act 90 2.2.4. Absence of a Competitive Benefit 93 3. The GATT and the WTO Jurisprudence on Input Subsidies 94 3.1. Discussions on Input Subsidies during the GATT 94 3.2. GATT Case Law 100 3.3. WTO Case Law 102 3.3.1. US – Softwood Lumber III and IV (DS 236, DS257) 102 3.3.2. Mexico – Olive Oil (DS341) 106 4. Should Something Be Done About Input Subsidies? 108 4.1. Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy 108 4.2. Conceptual Viability of the Scope of Input Subsidies 114 4.3. Countervailing "Cross-National Input Subsidies" 116 5. Concluding Remarks 118 Chapter IV. Retaliatory Level against Anti-Dumping /Countervailing Measures in the WTO 141 1. Introduction 141 1.1. Research Background 141 1.2. Research Purpose and Structure of Contents 143 2. Measurement of NOI in GATT Practices and the Negotiating History 146 2.1. From GATT 1947 to 1986 Post Tokyo Round Dispute Settlement 146 2.2. Uruguay Round Negotiation 151 3. Legal and Economic Grounds Governing the Measurement of Equivalence 154 4. WTO Decisions on a Retaliatory Level before US – Washing Machines (Art.22.6) 159 4.1. The Relevant Time-Frame for Analysis of Counterfactual 161 4.2. Methodology for Quantification of NOI 165 4.2.1. Conventional Approach to Estimating Direct Trade Effects 165 4.2.2. Approach to Beyond-Trade Effects 171 4.3. Causation, Quantification, and Non-Trade Effects 171 4.3.1. Causation 172 4.3.2. Quantifiability or Non-Trade Effects 173 5. Findings in the US – Washing Machines 22.6 Arbitration 175 5.1. Counterfactual and Timeframe in "As Applied" Measures on Washing Machines 175 5.2. Economic Model and Data Used in 'As Applied' Measures on Washing Machines 178 5.3. Findings Associated with 'As Such' Measures on Other Products 179 6. Issues Arising from the Calculation of NOI Concerning Non-Compliant AD/CVD Actions 181 6.1. Determination of Actual and Counterfactual Level of Export Value 181 6.2. Limitations of Using an Economic Model 187 7. Concluding Remarks 194 Chapter V. Conclusion 197 BIBLIOGRAPHY 201 국 문 초 록 220 ; Doctor

As Andrzej Mencwel observed, "as a result of fundamental historical changes" the need arises for "restructuring of the whole present memory and tradition system" (Rodzinna Europa po raz pierwszy). Changes of such significance took place in Poland during the Second World War and several following decades. Collective experience of that time was made up of – apart from political antagonisms – social and cultural phenomena such as change of elites, reinterpretation of their grand narratives (or symbolic world), the ultimate inclusion of the masses into the national project based on the post-gentry tradition and national history, the intensive development of urban lifestyle and the expansion of popular culture, industrialization and the process of forming a single-nationality state that diverted from the politics of domination over eastern neighbors and, instead, focused on developing the so-called Polish Western and Northern Lands. Tadeusz Różewicz's work referred to these experiences on both the intellectual and biographical level. Comparing Juliusz Mieroszewski's political journalism with Tadeusz Różewicz's works, Andrzej Mencwel stressed its unique relationship of the author of Niepokój. According to him, both writers were writing as though "they had truly experienced the end of the world" (Przedwiośnie czy potop. Studium postaw polskich w XX wieku). In the afterword to the German anthology of Różewicz's works, Karl Dedecius mentioned "Stunde Null" ("hour zero") as the founding experience of his writing. It was this experience that induced him to undertake the challenge of attempting a new collective and national as well as individual self-identification, searching for a radically new way of thinking and writing about man, and verifying the essential components of his identity. Andrzej Walicki called this urge "the catastrophism after a catastrophe", explaining that "once the catastrophe took place, a ca- tastrophist acknowledging its inevitability must think about 'a new beginning', about determining his own place in a new world" (Zniewolony umysł po latach). Hanna Gosk specifies that "it gave rise to situations when the necessity of discovering one's place in new geographical, social, axiological and world-view-related environment urged self-identification" (Bohater swoich czasów. Postać literacka w powojennej prozie polskiej o tematyce współczesnej). It must be stressed that the need for re-establishing the sense of identity, resulting from a major crisis, was by no means limited to the postwar artistic and political elites. On the contrary, due to social changes and democratization of the access to national culture, it concerned more than ever in the past the "everyman" who did not belong to one class solely: the intelligentsia, bourgeoisie, peasantry, or proletariat but, most often, represented multiple social rooting. Tadeusz Różewicz, alongside with writers such as Tadeusz Borowski, Marek Hłasko or Miron Białoszewski, made the "Polish everyman" (Tadeusz Drewnowski) the central figure of his work. This study discusses the modern identity of an individual in Poland in two variants: a cultured man with traditions and an ordinary, transitional, temporal, or "new", man. By adopting the narrativist approach, identity can be described through its articulations in culture, for example in literary texts. Analyzing methods of modern identification and self-awareness throughout this book, I try to prove that prose works of the author of Śmierć w starych dekoracjach present an extensive, interesting and diverse material in the matter. When necessary, I refer also to his dramatic works and poetry, especially to some longer poems published after 1989. The author's most important prose works have so far been written in the first 30-year period starting from his debut volume of partisan novellas, notes and humorous sketches Echa leśne mimeographed in 1944. While focusing on this period, I also analyze later works published in collections Nasz starszy brat and Matka odchodzi published in the last decade of the 20th century, although written at an earlier date. Różewicz's prose works analyzed here were published predominantly in the threevolume edition of Utwory zebrane in 2003/2004, in the reportage collection entitled Kartki z Węgier (1953) as well as in the collection of newspapers features, letters and notes – written in the 60s. and 70s. in most cases – entitled Margines, ale… (2010). I also make use of the earlier editions of his works, containing prose works not included in Utwory zebrane, for example, from the volume Opadły liście z drzew, as well as of some narratives published in journals and anthologies. Conversations with the writer published in Wbrew sobie. Rozmowy z Tadeuszem Różewiczem (2011) and his letters to Jerzy and Zofia Nowosielscy included in Korespondencja comprise an auxiliary material. What specifically draws my attention in Tadeusz Różewicz's prose? I read his works in the context of identity narratives manifest in culture and historical-biographical stories. The questions then arise about their formative influence on an individual: what within them presents a reference for the "self " seeking identification? When and how does individual experience take on an intersubjective meaning? Under what circumstances is it expressed in the public sphere? Have new identification patterns emerged in the Polish modernity, and if so, then what fields and phenomena of the 20th century culture or history have taken on such model significance? How and where were boundaries drawn be tween what is individual in an identity of a person speaking and thinking in Polish on the one hand, and, on the other, what is collective? What has been considered native in this identity, and what alien – for exam¬ple Western, bourgeois, communist, German, Jewish, non-normative in terms of religion or sexuality – and in what way has cultural "otherness" been constructed at that time? Trying to answer these questions, I refer to categories of cultural anthropology such as symbolic universe, collective memory, autobiographical identity, body and space in culture, as well as to notions from the social sciences – interpersonal relationship, public discourse and communicative community. To put it simply, using these categories I try to describe the most important narrative forms and topics of Różewicz's prose that allow the writer to address and express in a liter¬ary form identity problems faced by an individual and the community. I also attempt to analyze the very proces through which Różewicz devel¬ops his own unique identity narratives as well as the evolution of narra¬tive conventions of his literary work. Reading Różewicz's works in this manner and organizing chapters of this book from the ones presenting public identity (displayed publicly and codified in ideology or aesthetic) to the ones presenting private identity, I put an especial emphasis on some issues related to cultural studies and social communication. Ac¬cording to the reconstruction model, I assume that even private experi¬ences shape one's identity through culture and language. In Różewicz's narratives I describe and compare both more collective and more indi-vidual premises for constructing identity. The criterion for differentiating between these premises is determined by the narrativist approach adopt¬ed in this book. An individual's identity (even autobiographical one) is created and expressed within the existing culture and public sphere, and for this reason I am interested in history of ideas, in social relationships, symbols and role models, changes of customs and everyday life which left a distinct impression on literary, political or historical narratives. Reading these narratives, I make use of the following authors: Jan Assmann, Jean Baudrillard, Zygmunt Bauman, Ernst Cassirer, Michel Foucault, Marc Fumaroli, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jerzy Jedlicki, Anthony Giddens, Iz¬abela Kowalczyk, Philippe Lejeune, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Stanisław Ossowski, Ewa Rewers, Paul Ricoeur, Richard Rorty, Elżbieta Rybicka, Richard Shusterman, Georg Simmel, Jerzy Szacki, Magdalena Środa, Charles Taylor, Nikodem Bończa Tomaszewski, Christian Vandendorpe, Anna Wieczorkiewicz. I rely on their reconstruction of social-historical background of modern identity presented by these authors as well as on language used by them. The book structure results from the overlapping, or even conflict, of two research objectives. My task is to analyze the most important prem¬ises and forms of identity in Różewicz's prose, and I describe them in separate chapters as problems of culture, literature and history of ideas as well as models and social projects. It is my wish that all these perspectives make up a coherent identity narrative of man of the second half of the 20th century – a "biographical" case study. The study covers the pro¬cess of political empowerment of an individual; his/her participation in democratized mass culture; his/her attitude towards collective memory, towards Polish and European cultural community; experiencing of body, sexuality and everyday existence; emotional and social relationship with space; and, finally, an autobiographical identity which I reconstruct as a transitional and provisional "whole". One of the most significant issues covered in the book is the western orientation of Polish collective identity in the 20th century, related to the modernization of Central Europe and the postwar division of the continent by the Iron Curtain, which created in Poland a phantom idea of the West, as well as to the shifted borders of the Polish state to the territories by the Odra river and the Baltic Sea, to polonization of former German lands, and, finally, to historical and polit¬ical discourse legitimizing this transfer of territories. Tadeusz Różewicz as a travelling writer and journalist has relentlessly problematized the relationship between Europe and its Polish idea; as a resident in Gliwice and Wrocław, not only has he described – since the trip down the Odra river on a fishing boat from Koźle to Szczecin in 1947 – symbolic colonization of the post- German Nadodrze, but also artistically diagnosed the birth of the new individual and social identity of the inhabitants of this border area, with its clashing narratives of history, biography and national literature alongside the overlapping traces of different cultures and traditions. Writing about Różewicz's man in this book, I clearly do not mean the writer himself. It is obvious that among many convictions and attitudes that the author of Sobowtór manifests, there are some of which he is fond, and there are others of which he is not. I do not disregard his views voiced in non-fiction narratives and public speeches, yet I am mostly interested in experience, world view and self-comprehension of his literary persona and literary hero presented or partially derived from an idea of man and of community in his texts. Analyzing Różewicz's works, I therefore distinguish between his self-evident journalistic approach and his humanistic reflection which is a result of a philosophical or literary presentation of identity problems an individual faces. I read his prose as an element of a public discourse and at the same time as an indirect – formulated in fictional, intimate or notebook narratives – criticism of social reality and European culture in the 20th century. In most cases, I leave open questions such as whether or not Różewicz was or is committed to a specific political project; whether or not he is a modern man in different meanings of this notion; whether or not his personal identity coincides with identity narratives in his books. Finding an answer to these questions is not a purpose of this book. It is, distinctively, the problem of Tadeusz Różewicz's intellectual commitment to modern culture, literature and history and a problem of the writer's role in creative and critical understanding of them that I find more interesting and important. ; MNiSW

One of the factors shaping and continuing the relationship between nations on the international stage is power. Power can be defined as the use of various facilities, ways and means to influence the mind and behavior of others in order to achieve the goals. The nations and, consequently, the states seek their own interests and desires in the international area, and the achievement of these interests is a function of the level and degree of national power, especially in comparison with other countries. If a country has a high national power, it can meet its demands unhindered. Governments seek to pursue and achieve their interests through cooperation, competition and conflict. But it is clear that national interests are not achieved on their own and in a vacuum, in order to achieve it, it is necessary for governments to enjoy national power at an acceptable level. The more a country can increase its power, the more it can ensure its survival and security and, on the other hand, the more it can pursue and fulfil its goals at the regional and international levels.There are several ways to influence the behavior of others: they can be forced into an action by threats or by the use of force; the use of economic resources may force others to follow; or they can be attracted and made to accompany by taking advantage of the software components of power (Harsij and Tuyserkani, 2009: 172). The formation of relations between countries and the social order at the regional and international levels and the continuity of relations, as well as the role of each country in the international events are under the influence of power. Therefore, some consider the power as the most important component of the relationships andstatus of countries in the field of international relations (Pishgahifard et al., 2011: 192).During the last decades, especially with the start of the 21st century, and the rule of globalization in international relations, the sources of exercising power have also been altered, and the governing equations of societies have been undergoing profound transformations, so that the intangible forms of power have become important. So that the means of power and achievement of interests and goals in international politics have changed, and the origins and methods of exercising power have changed from hard power to soft power. In other words, however the military and economic power that may have been formed on the basis of a lure or threat, often forces others to change positions, is called hard power. On the other hand, societies and governments peruse their powerfulness, not depending on the merely material resources of power, but also on the ability to change the behavior of other states, and this aspect of power is called soft power which is the product and outcome of an international credit gain and indirect effect coupled with satisfaction on others. Currently, most of countries have made significant investments, even at regional levels, to improve their soft power resources. Undoubtedly, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been not immune from the effects of this spin to the manifestations of soft power globally. With its geopolitical position, ideology, Islamic religious culture, the Islamic Republic of Iran has considerable resources for exercising the soft power, which are well achievable in the case of accurate knowledge and appropriate investment. In this paper, we first attempt to identify the sources of soft power from different perspectives, and will further examine the effects of soft power on the sources of power for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the developments of these resources. ; Uno de los factores que configura y continúa la relación entre las naciones en el escenario internacional es poder. El poder se puede definir como el uso de varias instalaciones, formas y medios para influir en la mente y el comportamiento de los demás a fin de lograr los objetivos. Las naciones y, en consecuencia, los estados buscan sus propios intereses y deseos en el área internacional, y el logro de estos intereses es una función del nivel y el grado de poder nacional, especialmente en comparación con otros países. Si un país tiene un alto poder nacional, puede satisfacer sus demandas sin obstáculos. Los gobiernos buscan perseguir y alcanzar sus intereses a través de la cooperación, la competencia y el conflicto. Pero está claro que los intereses nacionales no se alcanzan por sí mismos y, en el vacío, para lograrlo, es necesario que los gobiernos disfruten del poder nacional a un nivel aceptable. Cuanto más pueda un país aumentar su poder, más podrá garantizar su supervivencia y seguridad y, por otro lado, podrá perseguir y cumplir sus objetivos a nivel regional e internacional.Hay varias formas de influir en el comportamiento de los demás: pueden verse forzados a una acción mediante amenazas o mediante el uso de la fuerza; el uso de recursos económicos puede obligar a otros a seguir; o pueden ser atraídos y hechos para que los acompañen aprovechando los componentes de software del poder (Harsij y Tuyserkani, 2009: 172). La formación de relaciones entre los países y el orden social a nivel regional e internacional y la continuidad de las relaciones, así como el papel de cada país en los eventos internacionales, están bajo la influencia del poder. Por lo tanto, algunos consideran el poder como el componente másimportante de las relaciones y el estatus de los países en el campo de las relaciones internacionales (Pishgahifard et al., 2011: 192).Durante las últimas décadas, especialmente con el comienzo del siglo XXI, y la regla de la globalización en las relaciones internacionales, las fuentes de ejercicio del poder también han sido alteradas, y las ecuaciones gobernantes de las sociedades han experimentado profundas transformaciones, de modo que las formas intangibles del poder se han vuelto importantes. De modo que los medios de poder y el logro de los intereses y metas en la política internacional han cambiado, y los orígenes y los métodos del ejercicio del poder han cambiado del poder duro al poder blando. En otras palabras, sin embargo, el poder militar y económico que puede haberse formado sobre la base de un atractivo o amenaza, a menudo obliga a otros a cambiar de posición, se l lama poder duro. Por otro lado, las sociedades y los gobiernos analizan detenidamente su poder, no dependiendo de los recursos meramente materiales del poder, sino también de la capacidad de cambiar el comportamiento de otros estados, y este aspecto del poder se llama poder blando, que es el producto y resultado de una ganancia de crédito internacional y efecto indirecto junto con la satisfacción de los demás.Actualmente, la mayoría de los países han realizado importantes inversiones, incluso a nivel regional, para mejorar sus recursos de poder blando. Sin lugar a dudas, la República Islámica de Irán no ha sido inmune a los efectos de este giro en las manifestaciones del poder blando a nivel mundial. Con su posición geopolítica, ideología, cultura religiosa islámica, la República Islámica de Irán tiene considerables recursos para ejercer el poder blando, que son muy alcanzables en el caso del conocimiento preciso y la inversión adecuada. En este documento, primero intentamos identificar las fuentes de poder blando desde diferentes perspectivas, y examinaremos más a fondo los efectos del poder blando en las fuentes de poder para la República Islámica de Irán y el desarrollo de estos recursos. ; Um dos fatores que moldam e dão continuidade à relação entre as nações no palco internacional é poder. O poder pode ser definido como o uso de várias facilidades, maneiras e meios para influenciar a mente e o comportamento dos outros, a fim de alcançar os objetivos. As nações e, conseqüentemente, os estadosbuscam seus próprios interesses e desejos na área internacional, e a conquista desses interesses é função do nível e do grau de poder nacional, especialmente em comparação com outros países. Se um país tem um alto poder nacional, ele pode atender suas demandas sem obstáculos. Os governos buscam perseguir e alcançar seus interesses através da cooperação, competição e conflito. Mas é claro que os interesses nacionais não são alcançados sozinhos e no vácuo; para alcançá-lo, é necessário que os governos desfrutem do poder nacional em um nível aceitável. Quanto mais um país pode aumentar seu poder, mais ele pode garantir sua sobrevivência e segurança e, por outro lado, mais ele pode perseguir e cumprir suas metas nos níveis regional e internacional.Existem várias maneiras de influenciar o comportamento dos outros: elas podem ser forçadas a uma ação por ameaças ou pelo uso da força; o uso de recursos econômicos pode forçar outros a seguir; ou podem ser atraídos e acompanhados aproveitando os componentes de software do poder (Harsij e Tuyserkani, 2009: 172). A formação das relações entre os países e a ordem social nos níveis regional e internacional e a continuidade das relações, bem como o papel de cada país nos eventos internacionais estão sob a influência do poder. Portanto, alguns consideram o poder como o componente mais importante das relações e status dos países no campo das relações internacionais (Pishgahifard et al., 2011: 192).Durante as últimas décadas, especialmente com o início do século XXI e a regra da globalização nas relações internacionais, as fontes de exercício do poder também foram alteradas, e as equações governantes das sociedades vêm passando por profundas transformações, de modo que as formas intangíveis de poder tornaram-se importantes. De modo que os meios de poder e realização de interesses e objetivos na política internacional mudaram, e as origens e métodos de exercer o poder mudaram do poder duro para o poder brando. Em outras palavras, no entanto, o poder militar e econômico que pode ter sido formado com base em uma atração ou ameaça, muitas vezes força outros a mudar de posição, é chamado de poder duro. Por outro lado, as sociedades e os governos examinam seu poder, não dependendo dos recursos meramente materiais do poder, mas também da capacidade de mudar o comportamento de outros estados, e esse aspecto do poder é chamado poder brando, que é o produto e o resultado. de um ganho de crédito internacional e efeito indireto, juntamente com a satisfação de outros.Atualmente, a maioria dos países fez investimentos significativos, mesmo em níveis regionais, para melhorar seus recursos de energia branda. Sem dúvida, a República Islâmica do Irã não está imune aos efeitos desse giro para as manifestações do soft power globalmente. Com sua posição geopolítica, ideologia, cultura religiosa islâmica, a República Islâmica do Irã possui recursos consideráveis para exercer o poder brando, que são bem alcançáveis no caso de conhecimento preciso e investimento apropriado. Neste artigo, primeiro tentamos identificar as fontes de soft power sob diferentes perspectivas e examinaremos mais detalhadamente os efeitos do soft power nas fontes de energia da República Islâmica do Irã e os desenvolvimentos desses recursos.

Il lavoro analizza l'evoluzione del concetto di beni comuni e i problemi sollevati dalla governance delle risorse comuni prima di tutto nella prospettiva della storia del pensiero economico, per giungere a una narrazione delle interpretazioni e delle pratiche sociali collegate a questo concetto nel contesto della profonda trasformazione delle "istituzioni", principalmente dovuto alla crisi economica. Il primo capitolo è dedicato a descrivere l'evoluzione del concetto di beni comuni e le criticità legate alla loro governance attraverso le chiavi interpretative fornite dagli economisti nel tempo. In particolare si sottolinea come l'assenza di una definizione univoca dei commons consenta di porre l'attenzione sulle prospettive che ne determinano le differenti interpretazioni. A partire da queste riflessioni, la tesi ripercorre l'evoluzione di questo concetto, soffermandosi sia sulla sua relazione con i beni collettivi, sia su Autori e concettualizzazioni che hanno preceduto e preparato il terreno per gli studi di Elinor Ostrom. Si evidenzia così come le elaborazioni di Musgrave, Tiebout e Ostrom siano più in generale rappresentative di un'evoluzione della visione del ruolo dell'autorità pubblica e delle istituzioni nella storia. Il primo capitolo conclude con uno sguardo sulle innovazioni e prospettive apportate dal lavoro di Ostrom e gli interrogativi posti dalle diverse forme di organizzazione dei sistemi di governance dei beni comuni. Poiché oggi il tema dei beni comuni e delle risorse condivise è interpretato sovente nell'ottica di un'organizzazione federale del governo e della governance, nell'ultima parte vengono accennate alcune problematiche sollevate da differenti prospettive sull'organizzazione federale delle istituzioni e la redistribuzione delle risorse. A partire da queste premesse, la seconda parte della tesi è impostata sull'analisi del concetto di beni comuni e delle sue interpretazioni da parte della società civile e di specifiche comunità, alla luce delle più recenti trasformazioni istituzionali collegate alla crisi economica. Ci si sofferma sul caso di studio della gestione dei beni comuni urbani a Roma e sull'emersione di alcune specifiche realtà, quelle dei centri sociali, analizzando l'evoluzione dei processi di autorganizzazione attorno alle risorse urbane da parte di comunità di cittadini. Attraverso un'analisi storica si evidenzia in questa parte come tali forme di gestione siano il risultato di specifici fattori di contesto, di trasformazioni economiche e della regolamentazione, nonché di meccanismi operativi di gestione e applicazione delle regole a livello locale, che hanno fortemente impattato sulla distribuzione delle risorse urbane e sullo sviluppo socio-economico della città. Si mostra come lo scostamento fra le regole formali e le regole operative in uso abbia sostenuto la formazione dei processi di autorganizzazione attorno a tali beni comuni urbani e come questo passaggio sia stato catalizzato dall'impatto della crisi economica sul livello di qualità della vita ed accesso ai servizi per i cittadini, motivando forme radicali di appropriazione di spazi vuoti e inutilizzati della città. L'ultima parte di questa sezione tenta di estendere lo schema interpretativo di Ostrom dei sistemi socio-ecologici al caso di studio della città di Roma, mostrando i motivi per cui il fallimento nella gestione delle risorse urbane a Roma sia rappresentativo di un fallimento istituzionale attorno alla gestione delle "risorse comuni" caratterizzato dalla presenza di attori molto differenti fra loro in grado di condizionare la formazione e applicazione delle regole, generando ampi squilibri e un iper-sfruttamento del territorio urbano. Le variabili che hanno influenzato tale risultato sembrano qui fortemente collegate dunque alla mancanza dell'autorità pubblica nel sostenere le necessità delle comunità locali, e in questo senso si collegano all'analisi della trasformazione del ruolo del settore pubblico di fronte ai vincoli imposti dalla crisi economica. In questi termini l'enfasi sui beni comuni e le forme di autorganizzazione delle comunità risulta dalla retrocessione del settore pubblico dal suo compito di sostengo al welfare, di equa redistribuzione delle risorse e bilanciamento degli squilibri del mercato. L'ultimo capitolo è dedicato all'analisi di uno specifico caso di bene comune urbano, il centro polifunzionale S.Cu.P., esaminato attraverso la ricerca-azione e la somministrazione di una survey (questionario). Il caso di studio esemplifica il meccanismo di autorganizzazione da parte delle comunità locali attorno alla gestione delle risorse urbane lasciate abbandonate. Si evidenzia qui la relazione fra i meccanismi di valorizzazione economica del patrimonio pubblico nel particolare contesto di Roma e i tentativi di autorganizzazione attorno all'uso di queste risorse per l'accesso a dimensioni importanti del benessere sociale e ambientale. L'attuale regressione della sfera pubblica, divenuta ormai "semi-impotente" nella garanzia dei diritti e allo stesso tempo "semi-autoritaria" nell'imposizione delle regole della governance economica, imposta il discorso sulle risorse pubbliche e condivise negli stessi termini del discorso sulla governance delle risorse comuni di gruppo (common-pool-resources), al di fuori del governo. È in questo senso che il tema dei beni comuni si colloca all'interno delle trasformazioni istituzionali come quelle del diritto. Se i confini delle istituzioni e del loro potere si fanno labili sulla base del vincolo economico e gli Stati si muovono su meccanismi di accentramento del potere nel derogare per ragioni di urgenza norme sociali e Costituzionali, favorendo la crescita di potere delle élites private, il risultato è una governance senza governo in cui gli attori dotati di maggiori mezzi possono definire regole operative che sono ben lontane da quelle collettivamente concordate di livello superiore (ad esempio quelle costituzionali – sugli obiettivi – o quelle di scelta collettiva – sulle modalità di scelta e gli attori coinvolti nel processo). ; The work analyzes the evolution of the concept of the commons and the problems raised by the governance of common resources. It starts from the perspective of the history of economic thought to reach a narration of the interpretations and social practices linked to this concept in the context of a profound transformation of the "institutions" mainly due to the economic crisis. The first chapter describes the evolution of the concept of the commons and the critical issues related to their governance through the interpretative keys provided by the economists over time. In particular, it is stressed that the absence of a clear definition of the commons enables to focus on the perspectives that determine their different interpretations. From these considerations, the thesis traces the development of this concept, focusing both on its relationship with collective goods, and on authors and conceptualizations which preceded and prepared the ground for Elinor Ostrom studies. It highlights as well how the elaboration by Musgrave, Tiebout and Ostrom are more generally representative of an evolution of the envision of the role of public authorities and institutions in history. The first chapter concludes with a look on the insights and innovations provided by the work of Ostrom and the questions posed by different forms of organization of the systems of governance of the commons. Since today the theme of the commons is often interpreted in view of a federal organization of government and governance, in the last part are mentioned some of the issues raised by different perspectives on the organization of federal institutions and the redistribution of resources. From these perceptions, the second part of the thesis is set on the analysis of the concept of the commons and its interpretations by civil society and specific community actors, in light of the most recent institutional changes linked to the economic crisis. It focuses on the case study of the management of urban commons in Rome and on the emergence of some specific reality, those of the "social centers", analyzing the evolution of self-organization processes around urban resources by the community of citizens. An historical analysis highlights in this part how such forms of management are the result of specific contextual factors - economic transformations and regulations; operating mechanisms of management and implementation of rules at the local level - which had a significant impact on distribution of urban resources, and on the socio-economic development of the city. This part shows how the deviation between the formal rules and operational rules in use supported the formation of self-organizing processes around such urban commons: it underlines how this passage has been catalyzed by the impact of the economic crisis on the level of quality of life and access to services for citizens, motivating radical forms of appropriation of empty and abandoned spaces of the city. The last part of this section attempts to extend the interpretative scheme of Ostrom's framework to analyze the socio-ecological systems to the case study of the city of Rome. This application highlights that the failure in urban resource management in Rome is representative of an institutional failure around the management of "common resources" characterized by the presence of very different actors who influence the formation and application of the rules, leading to large imbalances and over-exploitation of urban land. The variables that affected these outcomes seem here strongly connected to the lack of public authorities in supporting the needs of local communities: in this sense the issue of the Commons is connected to the analysis of the transformation of the public sector's role in facing the constraints imposed by the economic crisis. In these terms, the emphasis on common goods and the forms of self-organization of the community comes from the reverting of the public sector from its role of support to welfare, equitable redistribution of resources and of balancing the market imbalances. The last chapter is devoted to the analysis of a specific case study of urban commons, the occupied social multipurpose center S.Cu.P., examined through action research through the administration of a survey (questionnaire). The case study exemplifies the mechanism of self-organization by local communities around the management of an abandoned premise. This case-study emphasize the conflict between the mechanisms of economic valorization of public property in the particular context of Rome and the attempts of self-organization around the use of these resources by community actors in order to access important dimensions of social and environmental wellbeing. The current regression of the public sphere, which has become "semi-helpless" in the warranty of the rights and at the same time "semi-authoritarian" in the imposition of economic governance rules, sets the discourse on public shared resources in the same terms of the governance of common-pool-resources, outside of the government. It is in this sense that the issue of common property lies within the institutional transformations such as those of the right. When the boundaries of the institutions and their power become labile on the basis of economic constraints and they acts through mechanisms of centralization of power in waiving social and constitutional rules for reasons of urgency, the growth of power of private and public élites is likely to increase: the result is a governance without government in which actors with greater means can define operational rules which are far from those collectively agreed at higher levels (constitutional and collective choice rules).

La tesis ofrece una nueva base de datos de gasto militar en España desde mediados del siglo diecinueve hasta la actualidad, así como tres análisis de los condicionantes y las consecuencias económicas y políticas del gasto militar en el largo plazo. En concreto, el primer capítulo presenta nuevas estimaciones de los recursos públicos destinados al ámbito militar en España desde 1850 hasta 2009, así como la desagregación económica, administrativa y funcional de dicho gasto. La nueva base de datos ha sido elaborada siguiendo el criterio metodológico de la OTAN, que es uno de los criterios más utilizados por parte de las instituciones internacionales dedicadas a la compilación de datos de gasto militar a nivel mundial. Dicho criterio permite obtener una nueva base de datos homologable a lo largo del tiempo y comparable con otros países del entorno europeo e internacional. El segundo capítulo de la tesis analiza la influencia de los regímenes políticos en la evolución del gasto militar en España desde principios de la Restauración Española hasta la actualidad. En contraste con los análisis cuantitativos anteriores, que generalmente destacan la influencia negativa de los regímenes democráticos en la evolución del gasto militar, el capítulo sugiere que las instituciones democráticas pueden estar asociadas a mayores niveles de gasto militar en determinados contextos históricos. En concreto, el análisis de puntos de ruptura de las series de gasto militar, así como los análisis econométricos subsiguientes y la revisión de la historiografía militar española, muestra que los primeros gobiernos democráticos establecidos después de la dictadura Franquista aumentaron significativamente el gasto militar en relación con las décadas anteriores. Ese aumento, que fue debido a los esfuerzos de dichos gobiernos para reorientar el ejército hacia misiones internacionales y para facilitar su adaptación a las nuevas instituciones democráticas, dio lugar al único punto de ruptura positivo de la serie histórica de gasto militar total que no guarda relación con el inicio o el final de un conflicto bélico. A su vez, el análisis sugiere que la nueva orientación de las políticas militares democráticas conllevó un esfuerzo financiero en pro de un ejército intensivo en capital que pudiera participar en nuevas misiones internacionales. El tercer capítulo analiza más a fondo los condicionantes políticos del gasto militar y su potencial impacto en términos de estabilidad institucional. Como es bien sabido, los ejércitos han intervenido recurrentemente en política mediante golpes de estado. Diversos autores sugieren que los gobiernos autocráticos o parcialmente democráticos han usado eventualmente el gasto militar como estrategia para contentar a las fuerzas armadas y evitar así su insubordinación. Aún así, y a pesar de la solidez del argumento, los análisis cuantitativos recientes basados en amplias bases de datos internacionales no han encontrado una relación significativa y concluyente entre la evolución del gasto militar y la frecuencia y el éxito de los golpes de estado. En ese tercer capítulo sugiero que el gasto militar total – medida comúnmente utilizada por parte de dicha literatura cuantitativa – puede no ser un buen indicador del esfuerzo financiero realizado por parte de los gobiernos para conseguir la lealtad del ejército. Aunque el gasto militar total no refleje ninguna relación con la frecuencia y el éxito de los golpes de estado, puede que los cambios en la composición del gasto sí que guarden una relación significativa con dicho fenómeno. El capítulo pretende abrir esa 'caja negra' del gasto militar estudiando el impacto de la evolución de la remuneración salarial de los oficiales en España desde mediados del siglo diecinueve hasta finales de la Restauración Española. En línea con la hipótesis apuntada, el análisis sugiere que los aumentos en la remuneración de los oficiales durante la segunda mitad del siglo diecinueve y principios del siglo veinte – junto con otras estrategias políticas y militares – están relacionados con una menor frecuencia de golpes de estado, mientras que el gasto militar total no parece mostrar ninguna relación al respecto. Finalmente, el cuarto capítulo examina el impacto de la guerra y el gasto militar en la evolución de los sistemas fiscales de una muestra de trece países europeos y norteamericanos en el largo plazo. La guerra y la competición militar han sido a menudo definidas como fuerzas motoras relevantes de la expansión de la capacidad fiscal de los estados durante la época contemporánea. Aún así, la evidencia empírica no ha sido concluyente, y aún se carece de una narrativa histórica que explique cómo los cambios en la naturaleza de la guerra han afectado a la evolución de los sistemas fiscales contemporáneos. El cuarto capítulo tiene como objetivo rellenar ese vacío mediante el análisis del impacto de la guerra en la evolución de la capacidad fiscal contemporánea a la luz de las llamadas 'Revoluciones de los Asuntos Militares' que tuvieron lugar en occidente desde mediados del siglo diecinueve hasta la actualidad. Los resultados sugieren que la relación entre la guerra y la expansión fiscal ha seguido una curva de U invertida, según la cual los cambios en las tácticas y la tecnología militar presionaron los recursos públicos al alza hasta que la capacidad destructiva de los ejércitos sobrepasó el umbral nuclear. Adicionalmente, los resultados sugieren que los sistemas políticos han sido relevantes para completar esa narrativa histórica, aunque hayan sido en ocasiones olvidados en ese tipo de análisis. ; The thesis offers a new database of military expense in Spain from middle of the century nineteen up to the current importance, as well as three analyses of the determining ones and the economic and political consequences of the military expense in the long term. In I make concrete, the first chapter presents new estimations of the public resources destined for the military area in Spain from 1850 until 2009, as well as the economic, administrative and functional disaggregation of the above mentioned expense. The new database has been elaborated following the methodological criterion of the OTAN, which is one of the criteria most used on the part of the international institutions dedicated to the compilation of information of military expense worldwide. The above mentioned criterion allows to obtain a new database throughout the time and comparably with other countries of the European and international environment. The second chapter of the thesis analyzes the influence of the political rate in the evolution of the military expense in Spain from beginning of the Spanish Restoration up to the current importance. In contrast with the previous quantitative analyses, which generally emphasize the negative influence of the democratic rate in the evolution of the military expense, the chapter suggests that the democratic institutions can be associated with major levels of military expense in certain historical contexts. In I make concrete, the analysis of points of break of the series of military expense, as well as the analyses econometrics subsequent and the review of the military Spanish historiography, it shows that the first democratic governments established after the Pro-Franco dictatorship increased significantly the military expense in relation with the previous decades. This increase, which was due to the efforts of the above mentioned governments to re-orientate the army towards international missions and to facilitate his adjustment to the new democratic institutions, gave place to the only positive point of break of the historical series of military total expense that does not guard relation with the beginning or the end of a warlike conflict. In turn, the analysis suggests that the new orientation of the military democratic policies carried a financial effort in favor of an intensive army in the capital that could take part in new missions international. The third chapter analyzes more thoroughly the determining politicians of the military expense and his potential I affect terms of institutional stability. Since it is known well, the armies have intervened suddenly in politics coups d'état. Diverse authors suggest that the autocratic or partially democratic governments have used eventually the military expense as strategy to satisfy to the armed forces and to avoid this way his insubordination. Nonetheless, and in spite of the solidity of the argument, the quantitative recent analyses based on wide international databases have not found a significant and conclusive relation between the evolution of the military expense and the frequency and the success of the coups d'état. In this third chapter I suggest that the military total expense - measured commonly used on the part of the above mentioned quantitative literature - cannot be a good indicator of the financial effort realized on the part of the governments to obtain the loyalty of the army. Though the military total expense does not reflect any relation with the frequency and the success of the coups d'état, it is possible that the changes in the composition of the expense yes that guard a significant relation with the above mentioned phenomenon. The chapter tries to open this ' black box ' of the military expense studying the impact of the evolution of the wage remuneration of the officials in Spain from middle of the century nineteen until ends of the Spanish Restoration. On line with the pointed hypothesis, the analysis suggests that the increases in the remuneration of the officials during the second half of the century nineteen and beginning of the century twenty - together with other political and military strategies - they are related to a minor frequency of coups d'état, whereas the military total expense does not seem to show any relation in the matter. Finally, the fourth chapter examines the impact of the war and the military expense in the evolution of the fiscal systems of a sample of thirteen European and North American countries in the long term. The war and the military competition have been defined often as forces relevant motorboats of the expansion of the fiscal capacity of the conditions during the contemporary epoch. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence has not been conclusive, and still one lacks a historical narrative that explains how the changes in the nature of the war they have concerned the evolution of the fiscal contemporary systems. The fourth chapter has as aim refill this emptiness by means of the analysis of the impact of the war in the evolution of the fiscal contemporary capacity in the light of so called ' Revolutions of the Military Matters ' that took place in west from middle of the century nineteen up to the current importance. The results suggest that the relation between the war and the fiscal expansion has followed a curve of Or invested, according to which the changes in the tactics and the military technology pressed the public resources to the rise until the destructive capacity of the armies exceeded the nuclear threshold. Additional, the results suggest that the political systems have been relevant to complete this historical narrative, though they have been in occasions forgotten in this type of analysis.

Dottorato di ricerca in Ecologia forestale ; Climate change is perhaps the greatest environmental challenge emerged in the twenty-first century. It can be considered a source of the major global threats, such as hunger, poverty, armed conflict, displacement, air pollution, soil degradation, desertification and deforestation. These global issues are intricately intertwined and all contribute to climate change, necessitating a comprehensive approach to a solution (Stone and Chacón León, 2010). The role of the African continent in the global carbon cycle, and therefore in climate change, is increasingly recognized (Houghton and Hackler, 2006; Williams et al., 2007). Of all the region in the world, Africa has contributed less than any other region to the greenhouse gas emissions, which are widely held responsible for global warming and consequently for climate change. But the continent is also the most vulnerable to the consequences and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the least well equipped to face the issues related to climate change (Justice et al., 2005). In Sub-Saharan Africa the role of land use change in controlling CO2 emissions and annual C budgets at regional and global scale may be more critical than in any other regions (Houghton and Hackler, 2006). According to the IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report, reducing and/or preventing deforestation is the mitigation option with the largest and most immediate carbon stock impact in the short term (UNFCCC, 2010). International community decided to face climate change problems related to deforestation, through specific policies to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (referred as REDD+). Deforestation and other land-cover changes typically release carbon from the terrestrial biosphere to the atmosphere as CO2 (carbon dioxide), while recovering vegetation in abandoned agricultural or logged land removes CO2 from the atmosphere and sequesters it in vegetation biomass and soil carbon. Emissions from land-use and land-cover change are perhaps the most uncertain component of the global carbon cycle, with enormous implications for balancing the present-day carbon budget and predicting the future evolution of climate change (Ramankutty et al., 2007). A common paradigm about the reduction of emissions from deforestations estimated for the purpose of promoting it as a mitigation option in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the high uncertainties in input data - i.e., area change and C stock change/area - that may seriously undermine the credibility of the estimates and therefore of reduced deforestation as a mitigation option. It is likely that the most typical and important example of incomplete estimates will arise from the lack of reliable data for a carbon pool (Grassi et al., 2008). Uncertain rates of tropical deforestation, account for more than half of the range in estimates of the global carbon flux. Three other factors account for much of the rest of the uncertainty: (1) the initial stocks of carbon in ecosystems affected by land-use change, (2) per hectare changes in carbon stocks in response to different types of land-use change, and (3) legacy effects; that is, the time it takes for carbon stocks to equilibrate following a change in land use (Houghton and Goodale, 2004). Considering the source of uncertainty and the lack of field data for sub-Saharan Africa, it has been decided to place the study in the Ghana (Jomoro district, Western Region) where for more than 20 million Ghanaians, particularly people living in the rural areas, the forest is the only source of wood that is used locally as fuel wood, and for construction and furniture (Blay et al., 2007) and where deforestation annual rate reaches 2.19% for the period 2005-2010 (FAO, 2010). The study will analyze the above mentioned gaps related to deforestation and land use change, by assessing: 1) initial carbon stocks (tropical rain forest), 2) per hectare changes in carbon stocks as consequence of deforestation followed by six different main land uses [tree plantations (rubber, coconut, cocoa, oil palm, mixed) and secondary forest], 3) dynamics of soil carbon stocks through the time considering chronosequences. Moreover some specific carbon pool issue has been taken into consideration. When accounting changes in carbon stocks in the UNFCCC framework, it is required to consider 5 carbon pools that are: aboveground biomass, belowground biomass, litter, dead wood and soil. Within REDD+ mechanism there are not official methodologies but some guidelines developed for the voluntary standards (e.g. BioCarbon Fund- Methodology for Estimating Reduction of GHG Emission from Mosaic Deforestation, Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) - Tool for AFOLU Methodological Issues, etc.) and it is clear that only aboveground pool has to be always considered, belowground biomass is recommended and the others are facultative. Evidence from official reports (e.g., UNFCCC 2005a, UNFCCC 2005b, FAO 2006) suggests that only a very small fraction of developing countries currently reports data on soil carbon, even though emissions from soils following deforestation are likely to be significant in many cases (Grassi et al., 2008). Despite the common understanding about the effects of deforestation on different compartment in terms of carbon variation - an increase or disappearance of biomass relatively visible, variations in soil carbon much less perceptible, even after a radical change in land use (Calmel et al., 2010) - this study brings in the spotlight the soil reaction to radical land use change in the long run demonstrating that it is not so trifle as commonly believed. Importance of considering soil carbon stock for accounting the land use change dynamics is not properly recognize in the international deforestation policies and its influence and role in mitigating climate change is nowadays neglected but it is really not negligible. ; I cambiamenti climatici sono forse la più grande sfida che il genere umano si trova a dover affrontare nel ventunesimo secolo e la risoluzione delle complesse conseguenze che questi cambiamenti hanno sulla vita di tutti noi, necessita un approccio globale e uno sforzo unanime (Stone and Chacón León, 2010). Di tutte le regioni del mondo, il continente africano è quello che contribuisce meno alle emissioni di gas serra ma allo stesso tempo è il più vulnerabile alle loro conseguenze. E' infatti ormani ampiamente riconosciuto il ruolo delle emissioni di gas serra nel riscaldamento globale e quinid dei cambiamenti climatici (Houghton and Hackler, 2006; Williams et al., 2007). In particolare l'Africa Sub-Sahariana è la regione meno preparata ad affrontare le problematiche legate ai cambiamenti climatici (Justice et al., 2005) e soprattutto è la regione in cui i cambiamenti di uso del suolo possono avere implicazioni particolarmente negative nel controllo delle emissioni di CO2 e sul bilancio annuale di carbonio (Houghton and Hackler, 2006). In base a quanto riportato ne Fourth Assessment Report dell'IPCC, ridurre e prevenire la deforestazione è l'opzione migliore per la mitigazione dei cambiamenti climatici dato il suo immediato impatto sugli stock di carbonio nel breve periodo (UNFCCC, 2010). La comunità internazionale ha deciso quindi di affrontare il problema della deforestazione attraverso specifiche politiche per ridurre le emissioni dovute alla deforestazione e alla degradazione delle foreste valorizzando il ruolo dellla conservazione, della gestione sostenibile e aumentando gli stock di carbonio delle foreste, tale meccanismo è conosciuto come REDD+ dal suo acronimo inglese (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks). Le emissioni legate ai cambiamenti di uso e copertura del suolo sono forse la componente più incerta all'interno del ciclo globale del carbonio, con enormi implicazioni per il bilancio attuale e per le previsioni di evoluzioni future dei cambiamenti climatici (Ramankutty et al., 2007). Questo condiziona perciò la credibilità delle stime che attestano la valità della riduzione della deforestazione come miglior opzione per la mitigazione dei cambiamenti climatici. La mancanza di dati affidabili sulle stime dei pool di carbonio ne è l'esempio più tipico (Grassi et al., 2008). I tassi incerti della deforestazione tropicale rappresentano più della metà delle stime globali del flusso di carbonio. Tre altri fattori rappresentano più della restante parte di incertezza e questi sono: 1) gli stock iniziali di carbonio nell'ecosistema soggetto al cambiamento di uso del suolo, 2) cambiamenti ad ettaro degli stock di carbonio come risposta a differenti tipi di cambiamento di uso del suolo e 3) gli effetti a lungo termine considerati come il tempo necessario agli stock di carbonio per tornare ad una situazione di equilibrio dopo il cambiamento di uso del suolo (Houghton and Goodale, 2004). Considerando le fonti di incertezza e la mancanza di dati per l'Africa sub-Sahariana, il presente studio è stato ha avuto come oggetto la realtà del Ghana (Jomoro district, Western Region) dove una popolazione di più di 20 milioni di persone e in particolar modo nelle aree rurali, dipende dalla foresta come unica fonte di legno usato come legna da ardere, per costruzioni e mobili (Blay et al., 2007) e dove il tasso annuo di deforestazione ha raggiunto il 2.19% nel periodo 2005-2010 (FAO, 2010). Il presente studio analizzerà quindi gli aspetti legati alla deforestazione e al cambiamento di uso del suolo stimando: 1) lo stock iniziale di carbonio della foresta pluviale, 2) i cambiamenti ad ettaro degli stock di carbonio come conseguenza della deforestazione seguita da sei diversi usi del suolo in particolare piantagioni di gomme, cocco, palma da olio, piantagioni miste e infine la foresta secondaria generata dall'abbandono di terre prima destinate all'agricoltura, 3) la dinamica degli stock di carbonio nel tempo tramite l'analisi di cronosequenze. Alcuni specifici pool di carbonio sono stati presi in esame. Stimado i cambiamenti di stock di carbonio nel contesto dell'UNFCCC vengono richiesti 5 pools che sono: la biomassa epigea, la biomassa ipogea, la lettiera, la necromassa e il suolo. All'interno del meccanismo REDD+ non sono ancora state previste metodologie specifiche per la stima di questi pools ma sono state sviluppate alcune linee guida di carattere insicativo a cui poter far riferimento (es. BioCarbon Fund- Methodology for Estimating Reduction of GHG Emission from Mosaic Deforestation, Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS)- Tool for AFOLU Methodological Issues, etc.) ed è chiaro che il pool che deve sempre incluso nelle stime rimanga la biomassa epigea mentre quella ipogea è raccomandata e gli altri pool sono facoltativi e discrezionali. Da report ufficiali (es., UNFCCC 2005a, UNFCCC 2005b, FAO 2006) emerge che solo una piccola parte dei paesi in via di sviluppo ad oggi include il pool del suolo nelle stime anche se le emissioni dal suolo a seguito di un processo di deforestazione risultano essere in molti casi significative (Grassi et al., 2008). A dispetto di quanto comunemente si crede riguardo gli effetti della deforestaizone sui differenti comparti in termini di variazione di carbonio, (un aumento o scomparsa della biomassa risultano relativamente visibili, mentre variazioni del suolo molto meno percettibili anche dopo cambi radicali nell'uso del suolo (Calmel et al., 2010), questo studio porta alla luce la reazione del comparto suolo a cambi radicali legati a processo di deforestazione nel lungo periodo dimostrando che il cambiamento non è così irrilevante come comunemente creduto. L'importanza del considerare il suolo nelle dinamiche post deforestazione, non è adeguatamente riconosciuta nelle politiche internazionali e questo influenza il ruolo che il comparto suolo può avere nella mitigazione dei cambiamenti climatici oggi forse trascurato ma non certo trascurabile.

Sanjay Banerjee (" Prior Alliances with Targets and Acquisition Performance in Knowledge-Intensive Industries ") is a Ph.D. student in accounting at the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. His research primarily focuses on the economic modeling of analysts' forecasts, reputation effects, and capital market. Address: 321 19th Ave. S., Carlson School, Room 3-122, Minneapolis, MN 55455; e-mail: bane0032@umn.edu . Paul W. Beamish (" The Trap of Continual Ownership Change in International Equity Joint Ventures ") holds the Canada Research Chair in International Business at the Ivey Business School, University of Western Ontario, where he serves as director for the Engaging Emerging Markets Research Centre. He is a past editor-in-chief of the Journal of International Business Studies and a fellow of the Academy of International Business. Address: Richard Ivey School of Business, University of Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada; e-mail: pbeamish@ivey.uwo.ca . Justin M. Berg (" When Callings Are Calling: Crafting Work and Leisure in Pursuit of Unanswered Occupational Callings ") is a doctoral student in management at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He received his B.A. from the University of Michigan in organizational studies and psychology. His research on job crafting has also appeared in the Journal of Organizational Behavior. Address: 3620 Locust Walk, Suite 2000 SH/DH, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370; e-mail: bergj@wharton.upenn.edu . Mark Bergen (" When Truces Collapse: A Longitudinal Study of Price-Adjustment Routines ") is the James D. Watkins Chair in Marketing at the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. He holds a B.S. and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison and the University of Minnesota, respectively. His research focuses on pricing and channels of distribution, where he has studied issues such as pricing as a strategic capability, price wars, price pass-through, branded variants, dual distribution, gray markets, co-op advertising, and quick response. Address: Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, 321 19th Ave. S., Minneapolis, MN 55455; e-mail: mbergen@csom.umn.edu . Matthew Bidwell (" The Dynamics of Interorganizational Careers ") is an assistant professor in the management department at The Wharton School. He received his Ph.D. in management from the MIT Sloan School. His research examines careers and firm boundaries, encompassing such topics as contingent work, outsourcing, and the nature of interorganizational careers. Address: 2031 Steinberg-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19014; e-mail: mbidwell@wharton.upenn.edu . Forrest Briscoe (" The Dynamics of Interorganizational Careers ") is an assistant professor in the management and organization department at Pennsylvania State University. He received his Ph.D. in management from MIT Sloan. His research interests include the institutionalization and diffusion of new organizational employment practices, as well as the consequences of those new practices for workers, careers, and labor markets. Address: 450 Business Building, University Park, PA 16802; e-mail: fbriscoe@psu.edu . Chris Changwha Chung (" The Trap of Continual Ownership Change in International Equity Joint Ventures ") is an assistant professor of International Business and Strategy at the Korea University Business School in Seoul. He received his Ph.D. from the Ivey Business School in Canada; his Ph.D. dissertation won the Barry Richman Best Dissertation Award (Academy of Management), the Gunnar Hedlund Best Dissertation Award (European International Business Academy), and the Udayan Rege Best Dissertation Award (Administrative Science Association of Canada). His research interests include international joint venture evolution, real options, and foreign subsidiary management. Address: Korea University Business School, Korea University, Seoul, 136-701, Korea; e-mail: chungc21@gmail.com . Holger Ernst (" Not-Sold-Here: How Attitudes Influence External Knowledge Exploitation ") is a professor at WHU–Otto Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany, where he holds the Chair for Technology and Innovation Management. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Kiel, Germany and is a regular visiting professor at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. His main research interests are in the fields of technology and innovation management, intellectual property management, and new product development. Address: WHU–Otto Beisheim School of Management, Technology and Innovation Management, Burgplatz 2, D-56179 Vallendar, Germany; e-mail: hernst@whu.edu . Dror Etzion (" The Role of Analogy in the Institutionalization of Sustainability Reporting ") is an assistant professor of strategy and organizations at McGill University. He received his Ph.D. from the IESE Business School. His research is oriented around organizations and the natural environment, with a particular interest in the emergence, evolution, and utility of sustainability metrics. Address: Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, 1001 Sherbrooke St. W., Montreal, QC H3A 1G5, Canada; e-mail: dror.etzion@mcgill.ca . Fabrizio Ferraro (" The Role of Analogy in the Institutionalization of Sustainability Reporting ") is an assistant professor of strategic management at the IESE Business School. He received his Ph.D. in management from Stanford University. His research focuses on the role of theories, language, and tools in the creation and diffusion of novel governance regimes. Address: IESE Business School, Avda. Pearson, 21, Barcelona, Spain, 08034; e-mail: fferraro@iese.edu . Adam M. Grant (" When Callings Are Calling: Crafting Work and Leisure in Pursuit of Unanswered Occupational Callings ") is an associate professor of management at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and his B.A. from Harvard University. His research on work motivation, job design, prosocial and proactive behaviors, and employee well-being has appeared in numerous management and business journals. Address: 3620 Locust Walk, Suite 2000 SH/DH, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370; e-mail: grantad@wharton.upenn.edu . Exequiel Hernandez (" Prior Alliances with Targets and Acquisition Performance in Knowledge-Intensive Industries ") is a Ph.D. student at the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. His research focuses on social capital arising from firms' network ties to various external organizations—including firms, immigrant groups, and other stakeholders—and its effects on firm strategy and performance. Address: 3-365 CSOM, 321 19th Ave. S., Minneapolis, MN 55455; e-mail: herna136@umn.edu . Martin Hoegl (" Not-Sold-Here: How Attitudes Influence External Knowledge Exploitation ") is a professor at WHU–Otto Beisheim School of Management (Germany), where he holds the Chair of Leadership and Human Resource Management. His main research interests include leadership and collaboration in organizations, management of R&D personnel, knowledge creation in innovation processes, resource-constrained innovation, the management of geographically dispersed and interorganizational collaboration, as well as the influence of cross-cultural differences on individual and team behaviors in organizations. Address: WHU–Otto Beisheim School of Management, Chair of Leadership and Human Resource Management, Burgplatz 2, 56179 Vallendar, Germany; e-mail: hoegl@whu.edu . Lars Bo Jeppesen (" Marginality and Problem-Solving Effectiveness in Broadcast Search ") is an associate professor of innovation management at Copenhagen Business School. His main interest is distributed innovation processes and the question of how firms access innovations located outside their boundaries. Address: Department of Innovation and Organizational Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Kilevej 14A, DK 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark; e-mail: lbj.ino@cbs.dk . Victoria Johnson (" When Callings Are Calling: Crafting Work and Leisure in Pursuit of Unanswered Occupational Callings ") is an assistant professor of organizational studies at the University of Michigan. She received her Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia University and her B.A. from Yale University. Her book, Backstage at the Revolution, a study of organizational imprinting, was published by the University of Chicago Press in 2008. Address: 500 Church St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109; e-mail: vjohnsn@umich.edu . Karim R. Lakhani (" Marginality and Problem-Solving Effectiveness in Broadcast Search ") is an assistant professor in the Technology and Operations Management Unit at the Harvard Business School and a faculty associate at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. He received his Ph.D. in management from the MIT Sloan School of Management. He is a student of innovation and problem solving occurring at the boundaries of communities, firms, and markets. Address: Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163; e-mail: klakhani@hbs.edu . Ulrich Lichtenthaler (" Not-Sold-Here: How Attitudes Influence External Knowledge Exploitation ") is an assistant professor of technology and innovation management at WHU–Otto Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany, where he also received his Ph.D. In summer 2008, he was a visiting scholar at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. His current research interests include employee attitudes, absorptive and desorptive capacity, dynamic capabilities, and open innovation. Address: WHU–Otto Beisheim School of Management, Technology and Innovation Management, Burgplatz 2, D-56179 Vallendar, Germany; e-mail: lichtenthaler@whu.edu . Patrick A. Morris (" Too Good to Be True? The Unintended Signaling Effects of Educational Prestige on External Expectations of Team Performance ") is the founder of Grupo Maio Patrimonio, Ltd., an emerging markets investment fund based in Brazil. He received a B.A. in economics from Harvard University and an M.S. in agricultural economics and aquaculture from Auburn University. Address: 2-4164b Kaumualii Hwy, Koloa, HI 96756; e-mail: themaygroup@yahoo.com . Stephen J. Sauer (" Too Good to Be True? The Unintended Signaling Effects of Educational Prestige on External Expectations of Team Performance ") is an assistant professor of organizational studies at Clarkson University's School of Business. He received his Ph.D. in management and organizational behavior from Cornell University. His research activities focus on issues of status in group processes, leadership, and team performance. Address: Department of Organizational Studies, School of Business, Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY 13699-5790; e-mail: ssauer@clarkson.edu . Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt (" Too Good to Be True? The Unintended Signaling Effects of Educational Prestige on External Expectations of Team Performance ") is an associate professor of business administration at the Darden School of Business at the University of Virginia. She received her Ph.D. from the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University. Her research focuses on conflict management, negotiation, and inclusive leadership within global teams and organizations. Address: Darden School of Business, University of Virginia, P.O. Box 6550, Charlottesville, VA 22906-6500; e-mail: thomashuntm@darden.virginia.edu . Akbar Zaheer (" Prior Alliances with Targets and Acquisition Performance in Knowledge-Intensive Industries ") is a professor, the Curtis L. Carlson Chair of Strategic Management, and the director of the Strategic Management Research Center at the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. He received his Ph.D. from the Sloan School of Management at MIT. He has published extensively in scholarly journals on issues such as organizational networks, interorganizational trust, and strategic alliances, and he has coedited three books on organizational trust. Address: Carlson School of Management, Room 3-365, University of Minnesota, 321 19th Ave. S., Minneapolis, MN 55455; e-mail: azaheer@umn.edu . Mark J. Zbaracki (" When Truces Collapse: A Longitudinal Study of Price-Adjustment Routines ") is an associate professor of general management at the Richard Ivey School of the University of Western Ontario. He received his Ph.D. from Stanford University. He studies managerial work in activities such as total quality management, pricing, and, most recently, North European ferries. Address: Richard Ivey School of Business, Office 3N62, 1151 Richmond St. N., London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada; e-mail: mzbaracki@ivey.uwo.ca .