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"This collection of essays on state-local relations provides undergraduate students in political science and public administration with an overview of both cooperation and conflict in state-local relations. Contributors to the volume analyze the politicization of state-local relations while also detailing how both policy and administrative coordination continue. By engaging leading experts from around the country, the book draws in policy examples from different states, speaking to a broad U.S. audience. Undergraduate students are the primary audience for this book, but the content also serves as a helpful reference for state and local government officials who recognize that state-local relations is a shifting and changing landscape that requires more deliberate and thoughtful attention"--

As creatures of the states, our municipalities occupy a unique position in our governmental scheme. Not endowed with sovereignty, the municipality possesses no inherent powers, and can only do that which is authorized by the state.' The exercise of local powers, therefore, becomes the exercise of those powers which have been conferred upon it by state legislative action. Possible exceptions to this are those states in which "home rule" has been constitutionally conferred upon municipalities, by which authority to form local governments and to administer municipal affairs in the manner desired by the local electorate prevails. In view of the fact, however, that every action taken by a nonhome-rule municipality or any of its officers, agents or departments amounts to an exercise of a power which is derived, expressly or impliedly, from a statute, it is patent that the construction of such statutes is of paramount importance to cities, for through such construction the legality of local action is determined.

Environmental impact assessment is currently the major Brazilian institution that routinely seeks community input about infrastructure projects. It is criticized both by activists who think it permits projects it should not and by project proponents who think that it is too slow and blocks projects it should allow. In this paper, I evaluate how Brazilian environmental licensing works in practice as an institutional mechanism for resolving state conflicts with civil society over infrastructure projects. I draw on a recent study of community conflicts in 302 electricity projects there, showing that such conflicts are less common than often believed and happen in about 20 percent of the projects. Almost two-thirds of the protests are "informative" in nature, designed not to block the project but to communicate information about the effects of the project or its implementation, often long after licensing is complete. Almost two-thirds also raise socioeconomic issues rather than environmental issues per se. Given these characteristics of current community-based conflict, I explore a number of alternatives to current Brazilian licensing practices. Some, like new regulations on wind power plants or processes that seek free prior informed consent, show potential to productively address state-society conflict on projects, while others - like recent Congressional efforts to speed licensing - are only likely to displace conflict from institutional to non-institutional processes.

This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2022, fatalities from organized violence increased by a staggering 97%, compared to the previous year, from 120,000 in 2021 to 237,000 in 2022, making 2022 the deadliest year since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The increase was driven by two, particularly deadly, state-based armed conflicts: the Russia–Ukraine war, and the war in Ethiopia against TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front). With more than 81,500 and 101,000 fatalities respectively, these are the two most deadly state-based conflict-years recorded in the post-1989 period. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the first large-scale interstate war in 20 years, and the first interstate armed conflict since World War II where a major power in the international system seeks both territorial gains for itself and the subjugation of another state through regime change. We have witnessed an emerging trend of increased conflict between states in the last decade, including cases where major powers support opposite sides in internationalized intrastate conflict. UCDP recorded 55 active state-based armed conflicts in 2022, an increase of one compared to the previous year. Eight of these conflicts reached the level of war. While the fatalities caused by non-state conflict decreased somewhat when compared to 2021, the number of non-state conflicts, as well as both the number of civilians killed in one-sided violence and the number of actors carrying out such violence, increased in 2022.

This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2022, fatalities from organized violence increased by a staggering 97%, compared to the previous year, from 120,000 in 2021 to 237,000 in 2022, making 2022 the deadliest year since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The increase was driven by two, particularly deadly, state-based armed conflicts: the Russia–Ukraine war, and the war in Ethiopia against TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front). With more than 81,500 and 101,000 fatalities respectively, these are the two most deadly state-based conflict-years recorded in the post-1989 period. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the first large-scale interstate war in 20 years, and the first interstate armed conflict since World War II where a major power in the international system seeks both territorial gains for itself and the subjugation of another state through regime change. We have witnessed an emerging trend of increased conflict between states in the last decade, including cases where major powers support opposite sides in internationalized intrastate conflict. UCDP recorded 55 active state-based armed conflicts in 2022, an increase of one compared to the previous year. Eight of these conflicts reached the level of war. While the fatalities caused by non-state conflict decreased somewhat when compared to 2021, the number of non-state conflicts, as well as both the number of civilians killed in one-sided violence and the number of actors carrying out such violence, increased in 2022.

The statehood's maturity always correlates with the strength of the nation's identity. The quality of such correlation becomes crucial and often being improved during the tests. Events late 2013 - early 2014 in Ukraine exposed the conflict between state and society, which resulted in the destruction of the country's integrity, the war in Donbass, identity's trauma of border territories and challenges for local communities. It is necessary to realize the social assets and liabilities of Maidan for subsequent modernization of the country.During the years of independence, Ukraine has almost never carried out the policy of forming a unified national (political) identity. The state should reconsider the policy of recreating the Ukrainian's political nation, including ethnic and regional specifications in order to overcome these trends. World without war did not exist yet, and world development was stable in the course of its change in the cycles of colonization (the approval of empires / confederations, the movement towards bipolarity, the strengthening of the man-made manpower potential, the global economy and identity) and decolonization (territorial reconstruction of the world, shifting the emphasis of development towards social capital, branding of "comfortable places", peripherality of capitalism). Each socio-political shift (war and coup d'état, terrorism and AIDS, natural disasters and changes in social display), as attractors of such cycles, raise the issue of the maturity of relations between the State and the Society. The format of such relationships can be religion, political regime, social contract, setting the system rules of the game, by which the political support of the state institutions of the masses is converted into an increase in the income of the population of various kinds (economic stability, legal, material and social protection of the population, expansion of opportunities and ensuring prospects of growth the system as a whole, its symbolic and social capital). The chosen format of relations between the states and the Society serves as the basis for modernization of the system, responsibility of key actors (power, community, business, media environment) and their correspondence to the single strategic model that the system seeks is the main factor in its successful upgrade. The control points of the relationship between the state and society reflect the media space. The quality of the latter (both national and global - external to the transforming system) establishes the role of media representatives from professionals who are capable of creating an adequate picture of the world for "vultures" against all, and the service of individual actors, their horns and writers. ; Зрілість державності завжди корелюється з міцністю самоідентифікації нації. Якість такої кореляції стає визначальною й часто вдосконалюється під час випробувань. Події кінця 2013 – першої половини 2014 рр. в Україні викрили конфлікт між Державою та Суспільством, який мав наслідками руйнацію цілісності країни, війну в Донбасі, травму ідентичності прикордонних територій та виклик для територіальних громад. Рік після Майдану результує втратою території, наявністю невизнаної офіційним Києвом війни, внутрішнім конфліктом державної еліти, неузгодженістю функцій ВСУ та Нацгвардії., поширенням впливу антидержавних течій на південно-східних територіях та загрозою цілісності України. Невирішеність долі, статусу та перспектив окупованих територій в Україні загострює конфлікт Суспільства і Держави, активізує внутрішні непорозуміння між суспільними групами, владою та опозицією, аутентичними міфами та ситуативними стереотипами, політичним дизайном та соціальною реальністю. ; Зрілість державності завжди корелюється з міцністю самоідентифікації нації. Якість такої кореляції стає визначальною й часто вдосконалюється під час випробувань. Події кінця 2013 – першої половини 2014 рр. в Україні викрили конфлікт між Державою та Суспільством, який мав наслідками руйнацію цілісності країни, війну в Донбасі, травму ідентичності прикордонних територій та виклик для територіальних громад. Рік після Майдану результує втратою території, наявністю невизнаної офіційним Києвом війни, внутрішнім конфліктом державної еліти, неузгодженістю функцій ВСУ та Нацгвардії., поширенням впливу антидержавних течій на південно-східних територіях та загрозою цілісності України. Невирішеність долі, статусу та перспектив окупованих територій в Україні загострює конфлікт Суспільства і Держави, активізує внутрішні непорозуміння між суспільними групами, владою та опозицією, аутентичними міфами та ситуативними стереотипами, політичним дизайном та соціальною реальністю.

Oriana Mastro (Stanford University Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies) & David A. Siegel (Florida State University) have posted Talking to the Enemy: Explaining the Emergence of Peace Talks in Interstate War (Journal of Theoretical Politics 35, no. 3 (2023):...