In many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants' votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants' bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan, I find public provision to be significantly higher in connected villages when compared to those which are isolated. Moreover, I find that the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the lower classes, who are most vulnerable to exploitation when isolated.
Both Russia and, more recently, China play an important role in the development of connectivity in the Baltic states. It goes without saying that the importance of the Baltic states for Russia is traditionally much higher than for China, due to historical, geographical, and economic reasons. Russia often considers the Baltic states as its natural zone of interest, which traditionally is referred to as "near abroad" (rus. Ближнее зарубежье) – a term which also includes Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. In recent decades the Baltic states have achieved considerable progress in lowering their economic and energy dependence on Russia. Even so, Moscow tries to sustain its influence in the region, and demonstrate that it is the dominant actor, including through regular military power projection. China's economic presence in the region has been growing. For Beijing the Baltic states are less important due to geographical distance, lack of natural resources, small markets, and the limited size of the high-tech sector. At the same time, the Baltic states matter for China as it seeks to broaden its economic presence in Europe. For example, the Baltic region could serve as an additional transportation link to the Western European markets. Furthermore, China is interested in selling its high-tech products in the Baltic states (including 5G). Similar to Russia, China sees this region in the framework of global political expansion and power struggle with the United States. 252 253 Russia, China and the Baltic connectivity The aim of this chapter is to examine in detail Russian and Chinese activities in the field of connectivity in the Baltic states, including in the traditional transportation, energy and communication sectors, but also the high-tech and financial-technological sectors. The chapter analyses numerous cases and examples of both countries' presence in these sectors, and explores similarities and differences in their interests, approaches and tools. As a result of Russian and Chinese investments and activities, the Baltic countries face the serious challenge of how to balance possible economic opportunities with considerable risks to national security. The chapter therefore also analyses the security risks involved.
Both Russia and, more recently, China play an important role in the development of connectivity in the Baltic states. It goes without saying that the importance of the Baltic states for Russia is traditionally much higher than for China, due to historical, geographical, and economic reasons. Russia often considers the Baltic states as its natural zone of interest, which traditionally is referred to as "near abroad" (rus. Ближнее зарубежье) – a term which also includes Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. In recent decades the Baltic states have achieved considerable progress in lowering their economic and energy dependence on Russia. Even so, Moscow tries to sustain its influence in the region, and demonstrate that it is the dominant actor, including through regular military power projection. China's economic presence in the region has been growing. For Beijing the Baltic states are less important due to geographical distance, lack of natural resources, small markets, and the limited size of the high-tech sector. At the same time, the Baltic states matter for China as it seeks to broaden its economic presence in Europe. For example, the Baltic region could serve as an additional transportation link to the Western European markets. Furthermore, China is interested in selling its high-tech products in the Baltic states (including 5G). Similar to Russia, China sees this region in the framework of global political expansion and power struggle with the United States. 252 253 Russia, China and the Baltic connectivity The aim of this chapter is to examine in detail Russian and Chinese activities in the field of connectivity in the Baltic states, including in the traditional transportation, energy and communication sectors, but also the high-tech and financial-technological sectors. The chapter analyses numerous cases and examples of both countries' presence in these sectors, and explores similarities and differences in their interests, approaches and tools. As a result of Russian and Chinese investments and activities, the Baltic countries face the serious challenge of how to balance possible economic opportunities with considerable risks to national security. The chapter therefore also analyses the security risks involved.
Abstract IR literature has become inundated with different descriptions for the future of international order. The coming age is purportedly marked by China's ascendancy, American decline, a leaderless "no-one's world", or multiple competing modernities. Yet the global fight against climate change or shared COVID-19 strategies convey a different image of the world's predicament. The situation appears paradoxical: increasingly tense great-power relations are mixed with ever-strengthening interdependencies. This article contributes to these debates by exploring how global orders as well as regionalism today are increasingly defined by various types of connective functional links between intentional actors at various levels of social organisation. To enable a nuanced analysis, the article introduces an analytical framework composed of six connectivity logics, namely cooperation, copying, cushioning, contestation, containment, and coercion. These play out differently within material, economic, institutional, knowledge, people-to-people, and security spheres. The utility of this article's approach is demonstrated through empirical examples related to the policies of key actors in the Indo-Pacific region.
In the midst of rapid socio-political transition, Myanmar is building its telecommunications infrastructure by opening its market to international mobile companies and engaging in national regulatory reform. With one of the lowest internet and mobile subscriber rates in the world, Myanmar faces multiple challenges in building connectivity from both an infrastructural and a policy perspective. Telecom developments could play a significant role in modernizing the country as it emerges from decades of political repression, and although the domestic connectivity plan is moving forward, several challenges need to be dealt with quickly in order to ensure a safe and accessible digital environment. This paper explores connectivity developments in Myanmar, paying particular attention to the opening of the mobile market to international companies, the launch of the new national telecom law, and the development of policies securing digital rights.
Who makes WiFi? Why do different makers matter? What do barbeques and backyards have to do with the internet? This book explores how WiFi is made from the ground up, or in this case from the backyard out. Forged around barbeques, made of found, adapted and off-the-shelf materials and installed in ordinary domestic spaces, this book documents the collective work of individuals committed to making 'Ournet not the internet'. Drawing on rich ethnographic material, Jungnickel's research on community WiFi networking provides an overdue account of the innovative digital cultures and practices of ordinary people making extra-ordinary things. What make-do methods, mods and tales of resourceful ingenuity permit is another way of seeing how technologies come into being. It brings to life an Australian version of WiFi, enriching global studies of wireless technology by signalling the potential of comparative studies. Critically, the book presents the first sustained study of homebrew high-tech backyard technologists who imbue a DIY ethos but do not do it alone - they Do-It-Together (DIT). This timely critique of collective DIT innovation in an increasingly networked society will be of interest to scholars and practitioners of maker culture.
