PERANAN TOKOH AGAMA DALAM MENINGKATKAN PARTISIPASI POLITIK MASYARAKAT PADA PILKADA BUPATI 2010DI KABUPATEN HALMAHERA SELATANOleh : DEMIANUS AYANIM : 080814020ABSTRAKTokoh agama mempunyai peran yang sangat penting dalam rangka menggerakan partisipasi masyarakat dalam sebuah pilkada. Keberhasilan tokoh agama dalam rangka menggerakan partisipasi masyarakat dalam pilkada di wilayah kabupaten Halmahera Selatan sangat ditentukan oleh kemampuan atau gaya dari tokoh agama dalam memberikan orasi politiknya dalam kampanye, himbauan dan sarannya dalam mempengaruhi warga masyarakat atau juga sangat ditentukan oleh cara tokoh agama dalam menggunakan kewenangan sebagai pemimpin agama. Dengan demikian, maka peran tokoh agama dengan partisipasi politik publik mempunyai hubungan yang sangat erat dan tidak bisa dipisahkan, sebab apabila peran dari tokoh agama semakin baik maka partisipasi politik juga akan semakin meningkat. Hal ini sangat menarik untuk dielaborasi lebihlanjut, sehingga untuk melihat keterkaitan tersebut mendorong penelitian ini dilakukan.Penelitian ini berlokasi di Halmahera Selatan disaat pilkada pada tahun 2010 berlangsung. Dan metode yang dipakai dalam melakukan penelitian ini adalah melakukan wawancara mendalam kepada beberapa informan yang dianggap mempunyai pengetahuan yang komprehensif tentang informasi yang terkait dengan topic penelitian.Berdasarkan hasil penelitian di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan, tokoh agama berperan aktif dalam memberikan nasihat, ceramah atau khotbah politik terhadap masyarakat ketika menjelang pilkada bupati. Peranan tokoh agama ini didasari dengan tanggung jawab iman terhadap masyarakat dalam rangkah membina, memotivasi dan mengarahkan masyarakat dalam rangka turut aktif untuk berpartisiapsi pada pilkada.Bentuk partisipasi masyarakat masih menggunakan unsur primodialisme sebagai factor utama dalam menentukan pilihannya, maka suku terbesarlah yang menjadi pemimpin terpilih di daerah tersebut yang dalam hal ini adalah suku Togale (Tobelo-Galela).Kata Kunci : Peranan, Tokoh Agama, Partisipasi, Masyarakat2I. PENDAHULUANPemilihan langsung Kepala Daerah menjadi consensus politik nasional, yang merupakan salah satu instrument penting penyelenggaraan pemerintahan setelah digulirkannya otonomi daerah di Indonesia. Sedangkan Indonesia sendiri telah melaksanakan Pilkada secara langsung sejak diberlakukannya Undang-undang nomor 32 tahun 2004. tentang pemerintahan daerah. Hal ini apabila dilihat dari perspektif desentralisasi, Pilkada langsung tersebut merupakan sebuat terobosan baru yang bermakna bagi proses konsolidasi demokrasi di tingkat lokal. Pilkada langsung akan membuka ruang partisipasi yang lebih luas bagi masyarakat dalam proses demokrasi untuk menentukan kepemimpinan politik di tingkat lokal. System ini juga membuka peluang bagi masyarakat untuk mengaktualisasi hak-hak politiknya secara lebih baik tanpa harus direduksi oleh kepentingan-kepentingan elite politik, seperti ketika berlaku sistem demokrasi perwakilan. Pilkada langsung juga memicu timbulnya figure pemimpin yang aspiratif, kompeten, legitimate, dan berdedikasi. Sudah barang tentu hal ini karena Kepala Daerah yang terpilih akan lebih berorientasi pada warga dibandingkan pada segelitir elite di DPRD. Akan tetapi Pilkada tidak sepenuhnya berjalan mulus seperti yang diharapkan. Semua pihak-pihak yang ikut andil dalam pelaksanaan Pilkada, harus memahami dan melaksanakan seluruh peraturan perundangan yang berlaku secara konsisten. Pada dasarnya Pilkada langsung adalah memilih Kepala Daerah yang profesional, legitimate, dan demokratis, yang mampu mengemban amanat otonomi daerah dalam wadah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI). Selayaknya Pilkada di Indonesia dilaksanakan dengan efektif dan tetap menjunjung tinggi asas demokrasi dan hukum.Masyarakat di Halmahera Selatan telah melakukan pemilihan kepala daerah dan wakilnya dalam hal ini daerah kabupaten yaitu Bupati dan Wakil Bupati, pada tanggal 10 Oktober 2010 dengan enam calon pasangan Bupati dan wakilnya. Halmahera Selatan dulunya kabupaten Maluku Utara tetapi kemudian diberlakukannya Undang-undang Otonomi Daerah kabupaten Maluku Utara dengan ibu kotanya Sofifi berkembang menjadi daerah provinsi Maluku Utara dan dibagi menjadi enam kabupaten yaitu halmahera Utara, Halmahera Selatan, Halmahera Tengah, Halmahera Barat, Halmahera Timur dan Kepulauan Sula, serta dua kota yaitu kota Ternate dan kota Tidore.Dalam proses pilkada langsung tentunya sangat dibutuhkan peran dari para tokoh agama dalam meningkatkan partisipasi politik masyarakat, karena sesungguhnya tanpa disadari dimata masyarakat tokoh agama merupakan sosok yang paling disegani dan patut untuk diteladani. Realita yang terdapat di masyarakat, Tokoh agama punya kharisma tersendiri yang dapat dan mampu3merubah sifat, cara pandang bahkan tingkah laku seseorang untuk menjadi yang lebih baik. Dalam kaitannya dengannya pilkada langsung yang dilakukan di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan partisipasi politik masyarakat tidak terlepas dari peranan para tokoh agama dalam mengoptimalkan masyarakat untuk turut aktif dalam berpartisipasi terhadap pilkada langsung yang dilakukan.Salah satu tujuan terpenting dalam pilkada adalah memilih pemimpin yang berkualitas. Kualitas pemimpin itu dpat diukur oleh berbagai instrumen seperti tingkat pendidikan dan kompetensi. Keberhasilan pilkada langsung tidak hanya diukur oleh penyelenggaranya yang lancar dan damai tetapi juga outcomes (manfaat/hasil) yang yang diperoleh apakah telah menghasilkan pemimpin yang berkualitas, terutama dari sisi manajerial dan kompetensi. Tetapi bisa saja pilkada langsung dilakukan hanya untuk ajang perebutan kekuasaan melalui mekanisme "voting" dari suara pemilih, sehingga dikhawatirkan akan menghasilkan pemimpin yang hanya populer dan diterima secara luas, namun tidak mempunyai kecakapan dan kemampuan dalam mengolah daerah, sekalipun kepala daerah jabatan politis dan tidak menuntut keahlian khusus, namun kemampuan manajerial dan kompetensi sangat penting. Abdul (2005, 116).Namun pilkada langsung hanya dijadikan ajang perebutan kekuasaan, sehingga berbagai upaya dilakukan untuk merebut suara pemilih. Ada indikasi kuat masing-masing kandidat segalah cara termasuk yang dilarang seperti "money politic" untuk mendapat dukungan. Mereka juga tidak segan-segan mengeksploitasi masyarakat dan sentimen primordial untuk menarik simpati meskipun disadari bahwa cara itu kontraproduktif terhadap perkembangan demokrasi. Banyak indikator yang menunjukkan bahwa pendekatan yang digunakan para kandidat untuk mendekat masyarakat lebih menonjolkan primordialisme. Hal itu tercermin dari ajakan untuk memilih dengan memakai sentimen kesukuan, agama, golongan, dan wilayah tertentu. Dari berbagai spanduk dan poster yang dipampangkan juga tergambar sebuah klaim dukungan terhadap calon tersebut dengan memakai bendera komunitas tertentu. Rozali (2005, 130).Partisipasi masyarakat, pilkada langsung yang sudah beberapa kali diselenggarakan di Indonesia masih tetap memerlukan upaya sosialisasi yang intensif agar potensi konflik yang membayanginya dapat diredam atau diminimalesir. Sejurus dengan upaya itu dibutuhkan partisipasi masyarakat agar sosialisasi itu berjalan optimal dan efektif, sehingga pada gilirannya masyarakat daerah dapat menggunakan hak memilih kandidat kepala daerah secara lebih rasional dan obyektif. Kegiatan seorang dalam partai dalam partai politik merupakan suatu bentuk partisipasi politik. Partisipasi politik mencakup semua4kegiatan sukarela melalui mana seorang turut serta dalam proses pemilihan pemimpin-pemimpin politik, dan turut serta secara langsung atau tidak langsung dalam pembentukan kebijakan umum. Kegiatan-kegiatan ini mencakup kegiatan memilih dan pemilihan umum; menjadi anggota golongan politik seperti partai, kelompok penekan, kelompok kepentingan; duduk dalam lembaga politik seperti dewan perwakilan rakyat, atau mengadakan komunikasi dengan wakil-wakil rakyat yang duduk dalam badan itu, berkampanye dan menghadiri kelompok diskusi dan sebagainya. Daniel dan Alvian (2002, 115).Berdasarkan pra observasi di lokasi penelitian, menunjukkan kecenderungan bahwa tingkat partisipasi politik masyarakat di desa atau kecamatan tertentu relatif tinggi, dan ada desa dan kecamatan yang tingkat partisipasi politiknya relatif rendah. Masalah tersebut di atas besar kemungkinan salah satu faktornya adalah peran dari tokoh agama di desa dan kecamatan tertentu cukup tinggi dan di desa atau kecamatan tertentu relatif rendah. Hal ini dapat dilihat oleh perbedaan dari peran tokoh agama di desa dan kecamatan tertentu lebih tinggi dibandingkan dengann desa dan kecamatan lainnyaII. KERANGKA KONSEPTUALA. Konsep PerananPeranan berasal dari kata peran. Peran memiliki makna yaitu seperangkat tingkat diharapkan yang dimiliki oleh yang berkedudukan di masyarakat. (Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia, 2007: 845) "peranan adalah bagian dari tugas utama yang harus dilksanakan".Soekanto (1984: 237) "Peranan merupakan aspek yang dinamis dari kedudukan (status)". Apabila seseorang yang melakukan hak dan kewajiban sesuai dengan kedudukannya, maka dia menjalankan suatu peranan.Nasution (1994: 74 ) menyatakan bahwa "peranan adalah mencakup kewajiban hak yang bertalian kedudukan". Lebih lanjut Setyadi (1986 : 29 ) berpendapat "peranan adalah suatu aspek dinamika berupa pola tindakan baik yang abstrak maupun yang kongkrit dan setiap status yang ada dalam organisasi".Usman (2001 : 4 ) mengemukakan " peranan adalah terciptanya serangkaian tingkah laku yang saling berkaitan yang dilakukan dalam suatu situasi tertentu serta berhubungan dengan kemajuan perubahan tingkah laku.Berdasarkan beberapa pendapat diatas dapat disimpulkan bahwa peranan adalah suatu pola tindakan yang dilakukan oleh seseorang yang dalam hal ini adalah tokoh agama baik secara individual maupun secara bersama-sama yang dapat menimbulkan suatu peristiwa.5B. Konsep Tokoh AgamaTokoh agama termasuk kekuatan politik dalam system politik, yaitu kita bisa melihat dalam struktur poilitik.Dilihat dari tugas dan fungsi dari tokoh agama, bisa dikatakan sebagai pemimpin, kepemimpinan (leadership) adalah kemampuan seseorang (yaitu pemimpin atau pengikut-pengikutnya) sehingga orang lain tersebut bertingkah laku sebagaimana dikehendaki oleh pemimpin tersebut, Soejono Soekanto (2000 ; 318) menurutnya kepemimpinan dibagi atas 2 bagian yaitu :a. Kepemimpinan yang bersifat resmi (formal leader) yaitu kepemimpinan yang tersimpul di dalam suatu jabatan.b. Kepemimpinan karena pengakuan masyarakat akan kemampuan seseorang untuk menjalankan kepemimpinan (informal leadership).Kedua contoh kepemimpinan di atas maka kita bisa melihat tokoh agama termasuk pada informal leadership. Kepemimpinan ini mempunyai ruang lingkup yang tanpa batas-batas resmi, karena kepemimpinan demikian didasarkan atas pengakuan dan kepercayaan masyarakat.Peranan dan fungsi dari tokoh agama sangat penting dalam mengendalikan ketegangan sosial yang terjadi di masyarakat dalam iklim yang semakin demokrasi ini. Tokoh agama berperan sangat penting dalam menciptakan atau membentuk opini publik atau pendapat umum yang sehat. Oleh karena itu isu-isu yang menyesatkan dan kabar bohong yang tersebar bisa ditangkal masyarakat bila selalu berada dibawah bimbingan tokoh agama.Tokoh agama atau pemimpin adalah orang yang menjadi pemimpin dalam suatu agama, seperti : para kiay, ulama, pendeta, pastor dan lain-lain. Keberadaan tokoh agama di masyarakat seringkali lebih di dengar perkataan-perkataannya dari pada pemimpin-pemimpin yang lain.C. Konsep Partisipasi PolitikDewasa ini istilah partisipasi selalu muncul dan ramai dibicarakan baik itu pejabat pemerintah, kaum politisi maupuan kelompok ilmuan ketika mereka berbicara mengenai politik. Partisipasi politik menurut Nelson dikutip Ndraha (1987:102), mengatakan bahwa partisipasi ada dua jenis, yaitu :1. Partisipasi horizontal, adalah partisipasi sesama warga atau anggota suatu perkumpulan.2. Partisipasi vertikal, adalah partisipasi yang dilakukan oleh bawahan dengan atasan. Antara klien dengan patron atau antara masyarakat sebagai perkumpulan dengan pemerintah.6Dalam menemukan makna yang lebih kengkap, maka yang hampir sama dengan pendapat di atas adalah tindakan sosial atau seperti yang disebut oleh Weber sebagai sosial-action. Istilah ini dikemukakan oleh Weber untuk perbuatan manusia yang mempunyai arti subjektif. Dengan ini dimaksudkan setiap orang dalam mencapai tujuan terdorong oleh motivasi yang menguntungkan.Miriam Budiarjo (1982, 1) memberikan pengertian tentang partisipasi politik adalah kegiatan seseorang untuk ikut serta aktif dalam kehidupan politik, yaitu dengan jalan memilih pimpinan negara dan secara langsung mempengaruhi kebijan pemerintah (Pubclic Policy), kegiatan ini mencakup seperti memberikan suara dalam pemilihan umum, menghadiri rapat umum atau menjadi anggota suatu partai atau kelompok kepentingan, mengadakan hubungan kontanting dengan pejabat pemerintah atau anggota parlemen dan sebagainya.H. NU dan Sidney Verba dikutip Miriam Budiarjo partisipasi politik adalah kegiatan pribadi yang legal, sedikit banyak bertujuan untuk mempengaruhi seleksi pejabat-pejabat negara dan tindakan-tindakan yang diambil oleh mereka. Yang teropong utama adalah tindakan-tindakan yang bertujuan untuk mempengaruhi keputusan-keputusan pemerintah, sekalipun fokus sebenarnya lebih luas, tetapi abstrak yaitu usaha-usaha untuk mempengaruhi alokasi nilai secara otaratitatif masyarakat.Sementara Herbert Mc. Closky mengemukakan bahwa partisipasi politik adalah kegiatan sukarela dari warga masyarakat melalui mana mereka mengambil bagian dalam proses pembentukan kebijakan umum. Menurut Hoogerwerf (1985:189) mengatakan bahwa partisipasi politik adalah keikutsertaan pada kebijaksanaan pemerintah dan pada terwujudnya kebijaksanaan itu. Dari berbagai pendapat di atasa terlihat bahwa partisipasi politik mencakup aspek-aspek yang sangat luas termasuk juga tingkah laku politik dan pemilihan penguasa di dalam suatu kegiatan politik yang disebut pemilihan umum.Pengertian umum mengenai partisipasi ini biasanya sederhana yaitu keikut sertaan suatu kelompok masyarakat dalam kehidupan politik, misalnya : memilih pemimpin negara, menghadiri rapat umum, menjadi anggota suatu partai dan lain-lain. Alfian (1986, 70).7III. METODOLOGI PENELITIANPenelitian ini difokuskan pada Bagaimana peranan Tokoh Agama dalam meningktakan partisipasi politik masyarakat dalam pilkada 2010 di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan.Yang dimaksud dengan peranan tokoh agama dalam penelitian ini adalah suatu pola tindakan yang dilakukan oleh seseorang yang dalam hal ini adalah tokoh agama baik secara individual maupun secara bersama-sama yang dapat menimbulkan suatu peristiwa.Adapun dalam hal ini indikator dari tokoh agama adalah sebagai berikut:a. Himbauan atau saran dari tokoh agama kepada masyarakat dalam menghadapi pilkada.b. Politik para tokoh agama dalam menghadapi pilkada seperti pidato/kampanye.c. Nasehat, misalnya masyarakat harus hati-hati agar tidak terpengaruh dengan money politic dalam memberikan suaranya.d. Petunjuk atau perintah agar masyarakat dapat aktif dalam pemilihan kepala daerah.Sedangkan partisipasi politik masyarakat merupakan kegiatan-kegiatan sukarela dari masyarakat dalam kegiatan politik dengan mengambil bagian dalam proses pembentukkan kebijakan umum oleh pemerintah kabupaten, dalam kegiatan ini antara lain, seperti memberikan usul, saran, pendapat dalam mempengaruhi kebijakan pemerintah di kabuten Halmahera Selatan.Adapun indikator dari partisipasi politik masyarakat adalah:a. Memberikan suara dalam pemilihanb. Menghadiri rapat umumc. Menjadi anggota salah satu kelompok kepentingand. Mengadakan hubungan (contacting) dengan pejabat pemerintah atau anggota parlemen.Dengan demikian yang akan dilakukan dalam penelitian ini adalah mencari informasi yang jelas, akurat dan terpercaya baik berupa pernyataan, keterangan atau data-data yang dapat membantu dalam penyelesaian penulisan ini.Penelitian kualitatif tidak dimaksudkan untuk membuat generalisasi dari hasil penelitiannya. Oleh karena itu, pada penelitian kualitatif tidak dikenal adanya populasi dan sampel (Suyanto, 2005 : 171). Subjek penelitan yang telah tercermin dalam fokus penelitian ini ditentukan secara sengaja. Subjek penelitian informan yang akan memberikan berbagai informasi yang akan diperlukan selama proses penelitian. Informan adalah seorang yang benar-benar mengetahui suatu persoalan atau permasalahan tertentu yang darinya dapat diperoleh informasi yang8jelas, akurat, dan terpercaya baik berupa pernyataan, keterangan atau data-data yang dapat membantu dalam memenuhi persoalan/permasalahan.Adapun informan yang digunakan penulis dalam penelitian ini adalah Tokoh Agama dan Masyarakat.IV. PEMBAHASANA. Peran Tokoh Agama Dalam Menigkatkan Parisipasi Politik Merupakan Sosialisasi Politik Dalam Pilkada Bupati di Kabupaten Halmahera SelatanAgama merupakan lembaga yang menawarkan kebahagiaan dan keselamatan melalui pengajaran dan pelaksanaan ajaran-ajaran yang disampaikan oleh para peletak dasar agama, dimana ajaran tersebut kemudian dituliskan dalam Kitab Suci masing-masing. Agama sebagai sebuah lembaga tentu menuntut adanya suatu susunan hirarki atau kepengurusan yang mendampingi dan melayani jemaat dalam usahanya mencapai kebahagiaan dan keselamatan. Para pengurus atau pimpinan jemaat dalam agama inilah yang kemudian disebut sebagai tokoh agama. Jadi tokoh agama adalah orang yang karena kualitas pribadinya dipercaya dan diberi tugas khusus untuk memimpin umat beragama.Para tokoh agama memiliki tugas dan peran yang khas yaitu: Menjadi panutan atau memberi teladan bagi umatnya, khususnya di tengah situasi daerah yang diperhadapkan dengan pilkada langsung, menyejahterahkan umat Tuhan, Mendampingi umat dalam persatuan dengan Tuhan, dan memimpin ibadat, mengajar, mempersatukan, serta mendampingi dalam perwujudan iman.Tokoh agama tampak antara lain dalam upaya pengarahan dalam sejumlah besar orang oleh golongan elite tertentu untuk mendengarkan pidato-pidato politik dalam suatu rapat umum atau kampanye.Dalam wawancara langsung dengan inisial D. N, tokoh agama bahwa:Menjelang pilkada bupati di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan, tokoh agama selalu memberikan ceramah/Khotbah kepada jemaat/masyarakat dengan tujuan bahwah masyarakat harus turut aktif untuk berpartisipasi dalam pilkada bupati.Adapun pendapat dari insial T. H, tokoh agama bahwa : Ya, pada prisnsipnya telah menjadi tugas dari pada tokoh agama dalam memberikan ceramah/dakwah terhadap masyarakat dalam menyambut pilkada, mengingat sebagian besar masyarakat kurang terlalu memahami tentang pentingnya pilkada yang mengakibatkan masyarakat tidak memberikan dukungannya terhadap kandidat yang ada atau yang kita kenal dengan namanya golput.9Pendapat lain yang dikemukakan oleh inisial R. S, tokoh agama, yaitu : Masalah pilkada sebenarnya bukanlah menjadi urusan tokoh agama, karena sesungguhnya ketika berbicara tentang pilkada secara tidak langsung kita berbicara tentang politik. Berbicara politik tentunya tidak terlepas dari unsure masyarakat. Nah, masyarakat inilah yang kemudian merupakan urusan dari tokoh agama. Merupakan tanggung jawab iman terhadap masyarakat dalam rangkah mengarahkan dan perlu juga diberikan gambaran tentang pilkada dengan tujuan masyarakat tidak asal memilih setiap calon yang ada dan terlebih lagi dapat menggunakan hak pilihnya sebagai warga negara yang baik.Dari berbagai pernyataan yang dikemukakan di atas, menggambarkan bahwa ceramah, dakwah, khotbah atau peasan politik yang dilakukan oleh tokoh agama terhadap masyarakat didasarkan pada tanggung jawab iman. Tanggung jawab inilah yang kemudian mendorong tokoh agama untuk memberikan ceramah, dakwa atau khotbah kepada masyarakat untuk turut aktif dalam pilkada bupati yang dilaksanakan di Kabupaten Halamahera Selatan.Peranan dari tokoh agama tersebut di atas secara tidak langsung telah melakukan sosialiasi politik. Karena sesungguhnya sosialisasi politik merupakan suatu proses yang memungkinkan seorang individu bisa mengenali sistem politik, yang kemudian menentukan sifat persepsi-persepsinya mengenai politik serta reaksi-reaksinya terhadap gejalah politik.B. Tanggapan Responden Terhadap Peran Tokoh Agama Dalam Meningkatkan Partisipasi PolitikAda pun tanggapan respoden terhadap peran (ceramah, dakwah, khotbah, pesan politik) tokoh agama dalam meningkatkan prtisipasi politik yang dikemukakan oleh inisial L. A, mahasiswa, bahwa:Ya, selalu ada ceramah, khotbah atau pesan politik yang disampaikan kepada masyarakat menjelang pilkada. Dan menurut saya, apa yang disampaikan oleh tokoh agama itu baik karena untuk kepentingan masyarakat kabupaten Halmahera Selatan pada umumnya. Dengan adanya himbauan, ceramah atau khotbah politik kepada masyarakat, saya yakin masyarakat akan lebih aktif lagi dalam berpartisipasi pada pilkada.Pernyataan ini pulah dijawab oleh inisial H. B, warga, yang mengatakan: Sudah menjadi tugas dan tanggung jawab tokoh agama dalam membina dan mengararahkan masyarakat ke hal-hal yang baik dalam hal ini adalah turut aktif dalam pilkada bupati. Oleh karena tugasnya dalam membina dan mengarahkan masyarakat maka selalu ada nasihat, ceramah atau khotbah politik kepada masyarakat ketika menjelang pilkada dilaksanakan. Namun dalam penyampaian10pesan politik atau ceramah kepada masyarakat, tokoh agama tidak pernah menyuruh untuk berpartisipasi pada salah satu calon tertentu. Dalam penyampain ceramah, khotbah atau pesan politik kepada masyarakat selalu netral. Hal yang sama disampaikan oleh inisial T. N, warga bahwa :Ya, tokoh agama selalu memberikan ceramah, khotbah atau pesan politik kepada masyarakat ketika menjelang pilkada Bupati di kabupaten Halmehera Selatan. Dan menurut saya apa yg disampaikan tokoh agama itu patut dituruti karena itu merupakan kepentingan masyarakat pada umumnya. Tetapi dalam penyampaian tersebut, tokoh agama selalu netral dan tidak menentukan calon mana yang harus dipilih. Tokoh agama memberikan kehendak bebas kepada masyarakat untuk memilih. Kemudian inisial T. A, warga, juga mengemukakan pendapatnya bahwa :Ya, benar tokoh agama berperan aktif dalam memberikan ceramah, dakwa pesan politik kepada masyarakat menjelang pilkada. Sejauh ini yang saya tahu tokoh agama dalam menjelangkan tugasnya sebagai pemuka agama, selalu netral dalam mengarahkan masyarakat untuk menyambut pilkada dan tidak memihak kepada salah satu calon tertentu. Walaupun dalam kenyataannya ada salah satu calon Bupati yang membantu kami lewat bantuan dana untuk pembangunan fisik gedung Gereja, tetapi tokoh agama tidak menuntut kepada kami selaku jemaat/masyarakat untuk memilih calon Bupati yang telah membantu kami. Tokoh agama memberikan kehendak bebas untuk memilih calon bupati sesuai dengan pilihan kami.Dari jawaban responden di atas dapat disimpulkan bahwa menjelang pilkada Bupati di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan tokoh agama berperan aktif dalam mengarahkan masyarakat untuk berpartipasi aktif pada pilkada. Adapun dalam mengarahkan masyarakat untuk berpartispasi aktif pada pilkada, tokoh agama selalu bersifat netral dan tidak menentukan calon mana yang harus dipilih. Tokoh agama memberikan kehendak bebas kepada masyarakat untuk memilih. Mengingat hak untuk memlih merupakan hak asasi manusia.Adapun dalam pemberian ceremah, nasihat, khotbah atau pesan politik merupakan hal yang penting untuk dilakukan oleh para tokoh agama. Hal ini disebabkan karena sebagian kecil masyarakat tidak terlalu perduli dengan adanya pilkada bupati yang menurut mereka hanya membuang waktu dan tidak menghasilkan sesuatu apapun, demikian kata inisial D. B, warga. Tetapi ada juga yang mengatakan bahwa dalam menjelang pilkada masyarkat perlu diberi ceramah, khotbah, atau pesan politik untuk menghindari hal-hal yang tidak diinginkan seperti golput dan money politic. Oleh bebrapa responden berikut11mengatakan sangat penting pemberian ceramah, khotbah atau pesan politik kepada masyarakat ketika menjelang pilkada, diantaranya adalah inisial N. K, mahasiswa yang mengatakan bahwa :Merupakan hal yang sangat penting ketika tokoh agama memberikan cermah, dakwa, khotbah, atau pesan politik kepada masyarakat menjelang pilkada. Pada umumnya masyarakat yang ada di kabupaten Halmahera Selatan merupaka masayakat awam yang masih kurang pemahaman tentang politik maupun partisiapasi. Oleh karena itu sangat penting memberikan ceramah, dakwah, khotbah atau pesan politik kepada masyarakat dengan tujuan agar masyarakat mengerti dan mau berpartisipasi dalam pilkada. Mengingat di mata masyarakat tokoh agama merupakan seorang individu yang patut diteladani dan dicontohi. Jadi apapun yang dikatakana para tokoh agama, pasti akan dituruti.Pernyataan ini pulah dijawab oleh inisial Y. A, tokoh masyarakat, bahwa :Ya, penting sekali bagi masyarakat untuk diberi ceramah, dakwa, khotbah atau pesan politik kepada masyarakat menjelang pilkada. Dengan adanya ceramah, dakwah khotbah atau pesan politik dari tokoh agama, masyarakat dapat mengerti pentingnya pilkada bagi kehidupan masyarakat. dan ketika masyarakat mengerti pentingnya pilkada, maka dengan sendirinya masyarakat akan turut aktif untuk berpartisipasi dalam pilkada. Dalam waktu bersamaan inisial H. D, warga mengatakan bahwa : Menurut saya, selagi ceramah, khotbah atau pesan politik yang disampaikan oleh para tokoh agama selagi masih bersifat netral itu penting untuk dilakukan atau diikuti. Dan selama ini tokoh agama dalam pemberian ceramah tersebut masih bersifat netral, dan itu merupakan hal yang penting bagi masyarakat dalam memasuki pemilihan kepala daerah yang dalam hal ini adalah pemilahan bupati.Berdasarkan jawaban dari responden di atas dapat menggambarkan bahwa betapa pentingnya peranan tokoh agama dalam mengarahkan masyarakat untuk berpartisipasi aktif pada pemilihan kepala daerah yang dalam hal ini adalah pemilihan bupati dan wakil bupati. Karena dengan adanya ceramah, khotbah politik atau bahkan pesan politik dari tokoh agama dapat menimbulkan kesadaran dari tiap jemaat/masyarakat untuk berpartisipasi dalam pilkada bupati.C. Partisipasi Politik Masyarakat Dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan12Pemilihan kepala daerah menjadi consesnsus politik nasional, yang merupakan salah satu instrument penting penyelenggaraan pemerintah setelah digulirkan Otonomi Daerah di Indonesia yang kemudian dituangkan dalam Undang-Undang (UU) No. 32 Tahun 2004, tentang pemerintah daerah. Hal ini jika dilihat dari perspektif desentralisasi, pilkada tersebut merupakan terobosan baru yang bermakna bagi proses konsolidasi demokrasi di tingkat lokal. Pilkada akan membuka ruang partisipasi yang lebih luas bagi masyarakat dalam proses demokrasi untuk menentukan kepemimpinan di tingkat lokal.Pada dasarnya pilkada merupakan pememilihaan kepala daerah yang profesional, legitimate dan demokratis, yang mampu mengemban amanat otonomi daerah dalam wadah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI). Salah satu tujuan terpenting dalam pilkada adalah memilih pemimpin yang berkualitas. Kualitas pemimpin dapat diukur oleh berbagai intrumen seperti tingkat pendidikan dan kompetensi.Masyarakat di Halmahera Selatan telah melakukan pemilihan kepala daerah dan wakilnya dalam hal ini adalah daerah kabupaten yaitu Bupati dan wakil Bupati, pada tanggal 10 Oktober 2010 yang diikuti enam pasangan calon Bupati dan wakilnya, yang kemudian dimenangkan oleh pasangan Dr. H. Muhammad Kasuba, MA dan Drs. Rusdan I. Haruna, M.Si.Bertolak dari hasil observasi menunjukkan bahwa dalam pemilihan kepala daerah yang dalam hal ini adalah pemilihan Bupati dan Wakilnya cenderung di warnai dengan beberapa alasan masyarakat untuk memilih calon tersebut, diantaranya adalah alasan karena kesamaan etnis, karena kedekatan keluarga, karena kemampuannya, karena kesamaan agama, karena partai politik, karena nasihat dari para tokoh agama dan karena ada jaminan masa depan yang diberikan. Dari hasil observasi ini kemudian penulis melakukan penelitian di lapangan dan melakukan wawancara langsung dengan beberapa orang masyarakat untuk dijadikan responden, diantaranya adalah inisial R. B, warga bahwa:Kalau saya memilih seorang calon bupati, hal yang paling utama ialah karena calon tersebut sama suku dengan saya, kemudian calon tersebut seiman juga dengan saya. Lebih dari itu calon tersebut memiliki visi dan misi yang jelas. Kemudian menurut inisial H. Y, warga bahwa :Kalaupun saya memilih seorang calon Bupati itu karena visi misi yang jelas, kemudian suku dan agama. Menurut saya ini penting karena ketika calon tersebut berhasil, maka hal yang utama dia akan memperjuangkan suku dan agama terlebih dahulu. Kemudian persoalan tokoh agama yang memberikan dorongan13kepada masyarakat untuk terlibat dalam pemilihan itu benar, tetapi tokoh agama pada umumnya memberikan kehendak bebas kepada masyarakat untuk memilih calon bupati. Dan saya pikir, apa yang disampaikan oleh para tokoh agama itu benar, persoalan pilihan itu hak masyakat yang tidak bisa dipaksakan oleh siapa pun. Tokoh agama hanya mengarahkan dan memberikan pandangan kepada masyarakat dan selanjutnya merupakan hak dari masyarakat calon mana yang menurutnya patut untuk dipilih. Di tempat berbeda juga dikemukakan oleh inisial L. A, Mahasiswa, bahwa :Dalam menentukan pilihan kepada salah satu calon tertentu saya melihat dari sudut pandang kemampuan untuk memimpin yang dimiliki oleh setiap calon tertentu dan kemudian jaminan masa depan yang diberikan. Era sekarang ini, menurut saya ketika memilih seorang bupati janganlah kita melihat karena dia memiliki kekuatan financial yang memadai tetapi tidak mempunyai kemampuan untuk memimpin dan terlebih lagi tidak mampu membawa daerah ini ke tujuan yang sesungguhnya yakni kesejahteraan masyarakat pada umumnya.Pernyataan ini juga dikemukakan oleh inisial N. T, warga yang mengatakan bahwa : Alasan untuk saya memilih seorang bupati itu karena dilihat dari kemampuan untuk memimpin dan punya visi misi yang jelas untuk membawa daerah ini mampu bersaing dengan daerah lain. Disamping itu juga saya melihat latar belakang kehidupan calon tertentu apakah mempunyai gaya hidup yang terpuji atau tidak. Karena latar belakang kehidupan yang terpuji dapat menunjang untuk melakukan hal-hal terpuji juga dalam membangun daerah ini dan mampu memperjuangkan apa yang menjadi hak dari masyarakat pada umumnya.Kemudian inisial A. G, tokoh masyarakat juga mengatakan bahwa: Alasan utama ketika saya memilih seorang bupati itu yaitu karena latar belakang suku dan agama yang sama dengan saya. Setelah itu mempunyai visi dan misi yang jelas untuk mampu membawa daerah ini sesuai dengan harapan masyarakat pada umumnya dan terlebih lagi amanat UUD 1945 itu dapat terealisasi dengan baik, yakni mensejahterahkan kehidupan yang berbangsa dan bernegara.Dari pernyataan responden tersebut di atas, menunjukkan bahwa partisipasi politik berbeda-beda dari masyarakat yang satu ke masyarakat yang lain. Kadar partisipasi politik pun bervariasi. Hal itu dapat dilihat dari alasan respoden dalam memilih calon bupati, yang pada umumnya unsur SARA (suku, agama dan ras) yang menjadi prioritas utama untuk memilih calon bupati. Ini disebabkan karena daerah kabupaten Halmahera Selatan pada umumnya berpenduduk yang menjungjung tinggi nilai-nilai sukuisme. Adapaun suku Togale (Tobelo-Galela) merupakan suku terbesar yang menduduki kabupaten Halmahera14Selatan, kemudian disusul suku-suku kecil lainnya yakni suku Makian, suku Bajo dan Buton. Hal ini dapat dibuktikan dengan terpilihnya Dr. H. Muhammad Kasuba, S.Ag, MA sebagai bupati kabupaten Halmahera Selatan dalam dua periode berturut-turut yang notabene adalah suku Togale. Kemudian agama dan ras yang selalu mendominasi untuk dijadikan alasan dalam memilih seorang bupati. Hal ini diyakini bahwa siapan pun dia ketika disinggung soal agama, semua pasti akan membelah agamanya.Setelah unsur SARA, kemampuan serta visi dan misi merupakan alasan untuk memilih seorang bupati. Ini disebabkan karena cara berpikir masyarakat yang mulai berkembang dan pendidikan yang sudah meningkat. Kemudian jaminan masa depan yang diberikan oleh para kandidat. Ini berarti ada janji-janji politik dari kandidat dalam berkampanye.Kesimpulan yang ditarik dari uraian tersebut di atas adalah bahwah pemilihan kepala daerah di kabupaten Halmahera Selatan unsure SARA yang mendominasi partisipasi masyarakat untuk memilih serta tidak terlepas dari peran tokoh agama dalam memberikan ceramah, khotbah politik atau bahkan pesan politik kepada masyarakat. Sehingga realita yang terjadi suku terbesarlah yang memipin daerah kabupaten Halmahera Selatan, yakni suku Togale (Tobelo-Galela) yang dalam hal ini adalah Dr. H. Muhammad Kasuba, S.Ag, MA yang notabena adalah suku Togale telah memenangkan pilkada dua kali secara berturut-turut.Dengan adanya pelaksanaan pilkada Bupati di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan akan membawa harapan baru bagi segenap elemen masyarakat untuk kiranya dapat tercipta suatu kehidupan sosial politik dan ekonomi yang lebih baik. Menurut inisial H. B, warga : Ya, ketika pilkada Bupati terlaksana menurut saya akan terciptanya suasana kehidupan sosial politik dan ekonomi yang lebih baik. Begitu pun dengan inisial T. N, LSM, yang mengatakan bahwa :Dalam pelaksanaan pilkada Bupati tentunya akan berdampak pada perubahan yang nantinya akan tercipta kehidupan sosial politik dan ekonomi yang lebih baik, mengingat perkembangan pengawasan pemerintah pusat terhadap pemerintah daerah selalu ketat dalam menjalani roda pemerintahan.Hal ini juga disampaikan oleh inisial L. A, mahasiswa yang mengatakan bahwa : Terlaksananya pilkada di Kabupten Halmahera Selatan akan tercipta suasana kehidupan sosial politik dan ekonomi. Dimana dapat memudahkan hubungan kinerja pemerinta pusat dan pemerintah daerah, dan pemerintah daerah terhadap masyarakat khusunya di kabupaten Halmahera Selatan.15Hal ini karenakan masyarakat yakin bahwa calon yang jadi nanti mampu membawa masyarakat ke dalam suasana yang demikian. Pelaksanaan Pilkada Bupati merupakan hal yang penting untuk dilaksanakan di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan. Menurut berinisial L. A, warga, bahwa :Penting sekali bagi masyarakat untuk dilakukannya pilkada Bupati, karena secara tidak langsung dapat memudahkan akses masyarakat terhadap pemerintah danBertolak dari jawaban responden di atas hasil penelitian menunjukan masyarakat menyatakan penting untuk dilakukannya pilkada langsung di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan. Hal ini sisebabkan oleh berbagai alasan yang dikemukakan, antara lain :- Merupakan upaya mewujudkan demokrasi local dimana masyarakat diberikan hak untuk memilih pemimpin menurut keinginannya- Pengambilan atau wujud dari pada kedaulatan rakyat pada tingkat local- Mendidik masyarakat menentukan pimpinannya, sesuai dengan hati nuraninya- Untuk memilih pemimpin yang mampu merubah daerah yang lebih baik- Karena menurut UU masa jabatan Bupati hanya 5 tahun, jadi setelah itu haarus dipilih kembali- Karena tidak mungkin terus hidup dalam kekosongan (tanpa pemimpin) dan oleh karena itu harus secepatnya mengisi kekosongan itu untuk mengatur dan menentukan Halmahera Selatan ke depan- Agar terciptanya kesejahteraan, kemakmuran, dan kedamaian masyarakat Halmahera Selatan- Karena daerah pemekaran harus ada kepala daerah oleh karena itu pilkada harus ada- Secara umum adalaha menjalankan amanat UU- Secara khusus adalah menjadi jaminan terciptanya kehidupan sosial politik dan ekonomi yang lebih baik- Pilkada merupakan sarana dalam pelaksanaan prinsip-prinsip demokrasi dalam menghargai hak-hak dari pada rakyat tanpa adanya intervensi apapun dengan kepentingan terselubung.Dalam pencalonan kepala daerah selalu saja dilakukan kampanye oleh para kandidat untuk mensosialisasikan setiap visi dan misi mereka guna menarik perhatian dan simpatisan dari pada masyarakat. Di dalam masa kampanye para kandidat calon kepala daerah dan masyarakat berkesempatan bertemu langsung dan saling berdialog tentang visi dan misi yang ditawarkan oleh calon kandidat dan harapan dari masyarakat.16Sebagian besar masyarakat Halmahera Selatan senang mengikuti rapat umum, dialog atau kampanye karena mereka ingin mendengar langsung setiap visi dan misi yang disampaikan oleh calon tertentu, namun ada juga yang mengaku tidak senang mengikuti rapat umum, dialog atau kampanye karena kesibukan mereka yang sebagian besar adalah petani. Jadi mereka berpikir dari pada mereka harus duduk-duduk diam mendengarkan para calon bupati tanpa mendapat sepeserpun uang, lebih baik mereka bekerja di kebun yang bisa menghasilkan sesuatu yang bermanfaat bagi kelanjutan hidup mereka. Kata inisial E. N, warga Desa Sayoang, Kecamatan Bacan Timur, Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan. Dan kemudian pernyataan ini dibenarkan oleh inisial A. S, kepala Desa Sayoang, Kecamatan Bacan Timur, Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan.V. PENUTUPA. Kesimpulan1. Para tokoh agama mempunyai peran dalam pilkada langsung di Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan, itu kita bisa lihat dari ceramah, dakwah, khotba yang diberikan oleh tokoh agama dalam sebulan menjelang pilkada. Adapun peran dari Para tokoh agama ini dilakukan atas dasar tanggung jawab iman terhadap masyarkat sehingga merasa penting untuk memberikan nasihat politik kepada masyarakat agar tidak tepengaruh pada money politic dan golput.2. Tidak ada nasihat yang diberikan tokoh agama kepada masyarakat cenderung pada calon tertentu.3. Partisipasi masyarakat kabupaten Halmahera Selatan dalam pemilihan kepala daerah, unsur SARA menjadi prioritas utama untukk dijadikan alasan memilih seorang bupati, sehingga mengakibatkan suku terbesarlah yang menjadi pemimpin di daerah tersebut yang dalam hal ini adalah suku Togale (Tobelo-Galela). Akan tetapi disamping unsure SARA, tokoh agama juga turut berperan dalam mempngaruhi masyarakat untuk menggunakan hak suaranya dalam pemilihan melauli ceramah, dakwah, khotbah politik atau nasihat politik.B. Saran1. Perlu adanya pemberdayaan politik masyarakat, misalnya dengan melakukan penyuluhan dan pendidikan politik, melaluli event-event politik dalam lingkup yang lebih kecil.172. KPUD dan pemerintah harus berupaya agar kesadran dan pengetahuan masyarakat pemilih akan hak-haknya berdemokrasi dapat ditingkatkan kualitasnya sehingga masyarakat turut aktif dalam berpartisipasi dalam pemilihan eksekutif maupun legislatif.3. Kepala daerah yang terpilih pada pemilihan dalam bekerja jauhkanlah korupsi dan bangun Kabupaten Halmahera Selatan dengan penuh tanggung jawab4. Melalui pemelihan langsung Bupati dan wakil Bupati, aktivitas-aktivitas politik mengalami perubahan, dari elemen masyarakat dari tingkat bawah samapai tingkat atas kini semakin giat dalam aktivitas politik, dengan berbagai macam perilaku politik yang terkadang bisa membawa dampak bagi proses politik atau bagi kehidupan masyarakat. Disarankan agar melalui pemilihan langsung Bupati dan wakil Bupati , kemampuan dan kualitas para calon terus ditingkatkan pemahaman tentang peraturan pilkada langsung dan sistem politik yang dibangun dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa, bernegara serta dapat memberikan pendidikan politik dalam pemilihan langsung.DAFTAR PUSTAKABudiarjo, Miriam, 2008, Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik, PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta.Huntington, P. Samuel dan Nelson Joan, 1986, Partisipasi Politik di Negara Berkembang, Rineka Cipta, Jakarta.Kantaprawira, Rusadi, 2004, Sistem Politik Indonesia, suatu Model Pengantar, Sinar Baru, Bandung.Merdalis, drs. 2006. Metode Penelitian. Bumi Aksara, JakartaMerson H.E 1976. Adminitrasi Pemerintahan dalam Pembangunan Nasional. Jakarta : Gramedia Pustaka.Naptilu, Paimin.DR, M.Si. 2007. Menakar Urgensi Otonomi Daerah. Alumni, BandungPoerwadarminta 1996. Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia. Balai Pustaka Utama. Jakarta18Prof. DR. Toha, Mifta, MPA. 2006. Birokrasi dan Politik di Indonesia. Jakarta : PT. Pustaka Indonesia PressSarudajang, S. Harry, Dr. 2012. Pilkada Langsung. Kata Hasta Pustaka, Jakarta.Simangunsong, Bonar. Ir. Drs, MSc. SE dan Sinuraya, Daulat. Ir, MM. 2004. Negara, Demokrasi dan Berpolitik Yang Profesional. Kharisma Virgo Print, Jakarta.Soekanto, Soerjono. 2003. Sosiologi Suatu Pengantar. Raja Grafindo Persada, Jakarta.Sugiyono, 2007. Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif Kualitatif R&D. Bandung: Alfabeta.Sumber-Sumber Lain :Skripsi : Kinerja DPRD di Bidang Pengawasan Pembangunan, Oleh Jeklin Gorab, Fisip Unsrat 2008Peraturan Pemerintah RI No. 6 Tahun 2005, Tentang Pemelihan, Pengesahan, Pengangkatan dan Pemberhentian Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala DaerahUndang-Undang No. 32 Tahun 2004, Tentang Pemerintah DaerahInternet, google@www.maluku utara.
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Mary Elizabeth King on Civil Action for Social Change, the Transnational Women's Movement, and the Arab Awakening
Nonviolent resistance remains by and large a marginal topic to IR. Yet it constitutes an influential idea among idealist social movements and non-Western populations alike, one that has moved to the center stage in recent events in the Middle East. In this Talk, Mary King—who has spent over 40 years promoting nonviolence—elaborates on, amongst others, the women's movement, nonviolence, and civil action more broadly.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the central challenge or principal debate in International Relations? And what is your position regarding this challenge/in this debate?
The field of International Relations is different from Peace and Conflict Studies; it has essentially to do with relationships between states and developed after World War I. In the 1920s, the big debates concerned whether international cooperation was possible, and the diplomatic elite were very different from diplomats today. The roots of Peace and Conflict Studies go back much further. By the late 1800s peace studies already existed in the Scandinavian countries. Studies of industrial strikes in the United States were added by the 1930s, and the field had spread to Europe by the 1940s. Peace and Conflict Studies had firmly cohered by the 1980s, and soon encircled the globe. Broad in spectrum and inherently multi-disciplinary, it is not possible to walk through one portal to enter the field.
To me it is also important that Peace and Conflict studies is not wary of asking the bigger hypothetical questions such as 'Can we built a better world?' 'How do we do a better job at resolving conflicts before they become destructive?' 'How do we create more peaceable societies?' If we do not pose these questions, we are unlikely to find the answers. Some political scientists say that they do not wish to privilege either violence or nonviolent action. I am not in that category, trying not to privilege violence or nonviolent action. The field of peace and conflict studies is value-laden in its pursuit of more peaceable societies. We need more knowledge and study of how conflicts can be addressed without violence, including to the eventual benefit of all the parties and the larger society. When in 1964 Martin Luther King Jr received the Nobel Peace Prize, his remarks in Oslo that December tied the nonviolent struggle in the United States to the whole planet's need for disarmament. He said that the most exceptional characteristic of the civil rights movement was the direct participation of masses of people in it. King's remarks in Oslo were also his toughest call for the use of nonviolent resistance on issues other than racial injustice. International nonviolent action, he said, could be utilized to let global leaders know that beyond racial and economic justice, individuals across the world were concerned about world peace:
I venture to suggest [above all] . . . that . . . nonviolence become immediately a subject for study and for serious experimentation in every field of human conflict, by no means excluding relations between nations . . . which [ultimately] make war. . . .
In the half century since King made his address in Oslo, nonviolent civil resistance has not been allocated even a tiny fraction of the resources for study that have been dedicated to the fields of democratization, development, the environment, human rights, and aspects of national security. Many, many questions beg for research, including intensive interrogation of failures. Among the new global developments with which to be reckoned is the enlarging role of non-state, non-governmental organizations as intermediaries, leading dialogue groups comprised of adversaries discussing disputatious issues and working 'hands-on' to intervene directly in local disputes. The role of the churches and laity in ending Mozambique's civil war comes to mind. One challenge within IR is how to become more flexible in viewing the world, in which the nation state cannot control social change, and with the widening of civil space.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?
I came from a family that was deeply engaged with social issues. My father was the eighth Methodist minister in six generations from North Carolina and Virginia. The Methodist church in both Britain and the United States has a history of concern for social responsibility ― a topic of constant discussion in my home as a child and young adult. When four African American students began the southern student sit-in movement in Greensboro, North Carolina, on February 1, 1960, by sitting-in at a Woolworth's lunch counter, I was still in college. Although I am white, I began to think about how to join the young black people who were intentionally violating the laws of racial segregation by conducting sit-ins at lunch counters across the South. Soon more white people, very like me, were joining them, and the sweep of student sit-ins had become truly inter-racial. The sit-in movement is what provided the regional base for what would become a mass U.S. civil rights movement, with tens of thousands of participants, defined by the necessity for fierce nonviolent discipline. So, coming from a home where social issues were regularly discussed it was almost natural for me to become engaged in the civil rights movement. And I have remained engaged with such issues for the rest of my life, while widening my aperture. Today I work on a host of questions related to conflict, building peace, gender, the combined field of gender and peace-building, and nonviolent or civil resistance. At a very young age, I had started thinking as a citizen of the world and watching what was happening worldwide, rather than merely in the United States.
Martin Luther King (to whom I am not related) would become one of history's most influential agents for propagating knowledge of the potential for constructive social change without resorting to violence. He was the most significant exemplar for what we simply called The Movement. Yet the movement had two southern organizations: in 1957 after the success of the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56, he created, along with others, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The other organization was the one for which I worked for four years: the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC, pron. snick), which initially came into being literally to coordinate among the leaders of the student sit-in campaigns. As the sit-ins spread across the South, 70,000 black, and, increasingly, white, students participated. By the end of 1960, 3,600 would have been jailed.
SCLC and SNCC worked together but had different emphases: one of our emphases in SNCC was on eliciting leadership representing the voices of those who had been ignored in the past. We identified many women with remarkable leadership skills and sought to strengthen them. We wanted to build institutions that would make it easier for poor black southern communities to become independent and move out of the 'serfdom' in which they lived. Thus we put less prominence on large demonstrations, which SCLC often emphasized. Rather, we stressed the building of alternative (or parallel) institutions, including voter registration, alternative political parties, cooperatives, and credit unions.
What would a student need (dispositions, skills) to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
One requirement is a subject that has virtually disappeared from the schools in the United States: the field of geography. It used to be taught on every level starting in kindergarten, but has now been melded into a mélange called 'social sciences'. You would be surprised at how much ignorance exists and how it affects effectiveness. I served for years on the board of directors of an esteemed international non-profit private voluntary organization and recall a secretary who thought that Africa was a country. This is not simplistic — if you don't know the names of continents, countries, regions, and the basic political and economic history, it's much harder to think critically about the world. Secondly, students need to possess an attitude of reciprocity and mutuality. No perfect country exists; there is no nirvana without intractable problems in our world. No society, for example, has solved the serious problems of gender inequity that impede all spheres of life. Every society has predicaments and problems that need to be addressed, necessitating a constant process. So we each need to stand on a platform in which every nation can improve the preservation of the natural environment, the way it monitors and protects human rights, transitions to democratic systems, the priority it places on the empowerment of women, and so on. On this platform, concepts of inferior and superior are of little value.
You also co-authored an article in 1965 about the role of women and how working in a political movement for equality (the civil rights movement) has affected your perceptions of the relationship between men and women. Do you believe that the involvement of women in the Civil Rights Movement brought more gender equality in the USA and do you think involvement in Nonviolent Resistance movements in other places in the world could start such a process?
From within the heart of the civil rights movement I wrote an article with Casey Hayden, with whom I worked in Atlanta in the main office of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and in the Mississippi Freedom Summer of 1964. Casey (Sandra Cason) and I were deeply engaged in a series of conversations involving other women in SNCC about what we had been learning, the lessons from our work aiding poor black people to organize, and asking ourselves whether our insights from being part of SNCC could be applied to other forms of injustice, such as inequality for women. The document reflected our growth and enlarging understanding of how to mobilize communities, how to strategize, how to achieve lasting change, and was a manifestation of this expanding awareness. The title was Sex and Caste – A Kind of Memo. Caste is an ancient Hindu demarcation that not only determines an individual's social standing on the basis of the group into which one is born, but also differentiates and assigns occupational and economic roles. It cannot be changed. Casey and I thought of caste as comparable to the sex of one's birth. Women endure many forms of prejudice, bias, discrimination, and cruelty merely because they are female. For these reasons we chose the term caste. We sent our memorandum to forty women working in local peace and civil rights movements of the United States. The anecdotal evidence is strong that it inspired other women, who started coming together collectively to work on their own self-emancipation in 'consciousness raising groups.' It had appeared in Liberation magazine of the War Resisters League in April 1966 and was a catalyst in spurring the U.S. women's movement; indeed, the consciousness-raising groups fuelled the women's movement in the United States during the 1970s. Historians reflect that the article provided tinder for what is now called 'second-wave feminism', and the 1965 original is anthologized as one of the generative documents of twentieth-century gender studies.
We have to remember that women's organizations are nothing new, but have been poorly documented in history and that much information has been lost. Women have been prime actors for nonviolent social change in many parts of the world for a long time. New Zealand was the first country to grant women the vote, in 1893, after decades of organizing. Other countries followed: China, Iran, later the United States and the United Kingdom. Women in Japan would not vote until 1946. IR expert Fred Halliday contends that one of the most remarkable transnational movements of the modern age was the women's suffrage movement. The movement to enfranchise women may have been the biggest transnational nonviolent movement of human history. It was a significant historical phenomenon that throws light on how it is sometimes easier to bring about social and political change now than in the past.
Nonviolent movements seem to be growing around the world, and not only in dictatorships but also in democracies in Europe and the USA. How do you explain this?
I think that the sharing of knowledge is the answer to this question. Study in the field of nonviolent action has accelerated since the 1970s, often done by people who are both practitioners and scholars, as am I. Organizing nonviolently for social justice is not new, but the knowledge that has consolidated during the last 40 years has been major. The works of Gene Sharp have been significant, widely translated, and are accessible through the Albert EinsteinInstitution. His first major work, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, in three volumes, came out in 1973 (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers). It marked the development of a new understanding of how this form of cooperative action works, the conditions under which it can be optimized, and the ways in which one can improve effectiveness. Sharp's works have since been translated into more than 40 languages. Also valuable are the works and translations of dozens of other scholars, who often stand on his shoulders. Today there may be 200 scholar-activists in this field worldwide, with a great deal of work now underway in related fields. Knowledge is being shared not only through translated works, but also through organizations and their training programs, such as the War Resisters League International and the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, each of which came into existence in Britain around World War I. Both are still running seminars, training programs, and distributing books. George Lakey's Training for Change and a new database at Swarthmore College that he has developed are sharing knowledge. So is the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict, which has built a dramatic record in a short time, having run more than 400 seminars and workshops in more than 139 countries. The three major films that ICNC has produced (for example, 'Bringing Down a Dictator'), have been translated into 20 languages and been publicly broadcast to more than 20 million viewers.
After its success, leaders from the Serbian youth movement Otpor! (Resistance) that in 2000 disintegrated the Slobodan Milošević dictatorship formed a network of activists, including experienced veterans from civil-resistance struggles in South Africa, the Philippines, Lebanon, Georgia, and Ukraine to share their experiences with other movements. People can now more easily find knowledge on the World Wide Web, often in their original language or a second language, and they can find networks that share information about their experiences, including their successes and failures.
I reject the Twitter explanation for the increased use of nonviolent action or civil resistance, because all nonviolent movements appropriate the most advanced technologies available. This pattern is related to the importance of communications for their basic success. Nonviolent mobilizations must be very shrewd in putting across their purpose, their goals and objectives, preparing slogans, and conveying information on how people can become involved. In order for people to join—bearing in mind that numbers are important for success—it is critically important to make clear what goal(s) you are seeking and why you have elected to work with civil resistance. This decision is sometimes hard to understand for people who have suffered great cruelty from their opponent, and who maintain 'but we are the victims', making the sharing of the logic of the technique of civil resistance vital.
What would you say is the importance of Nonviolent Resistance Studies in the field of International Relations and Political Science? And how do you counter those who argue that some forms of structural domination are only ended through violence?
In this case we can look at the evidence and stay away from arguing beliefs or ideology. Thanks to political scientists Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, who have produced a discerning work, Why Civil Resistance Works (2011), we now have empirical evidence that removes this question from mystery. They studied 323 violent and nonviolent movements that occurred between 1900 and 2006 and found that the nonviolent campaigns were twice as effective as violent struggles in achieving their goals, while incurring fewer costly fatalities and producing much greater prospects for democratic outcomes after the end of the campaign. They found only one area in which violent movements have been more successful, and that is in secessions. So, we don't need to dwell in the realm of opinion, but can read their findings. Other scholars have written about the same issues using qualitative data ― by doing interviews, developing case studies, and analytical descriptions ― but the work of Chenoweth and Stephan is quantitative, putting it in a different category due to its research methods.
Reading 'Why Civil Resistance Works' it caught my eye that nonviolent campaigns seem less successful in the Middle East and Asia than in other regions. Did you see that also in your own work? And if so, do you have an explanation for it? In addition, do you believe that the 'Arab Awakening' is a significant turn in history, or did the name arise too quickly and will it remain a temporary popular phrase?
What I encountered in working in the Middle East was an expectation, notion, or hope among people that a great leader would save them and bring them out of darkness. This belief seems often to have kept the populace in a state of passivity. Sometimes such pervasive theories of leadership are deeply elitist: one must be well educated to be a leader, one must be born into that role, one must be male, or the first son, etc. Such concepts of leadership discourage the taking of independent civil action.
I think that the Arab Awakening has been significant for a number of reasons. As one example, there had been a widespread (and patronizing) assumption in the United States and the West that the Arabs were not interested in democracy. We have heard from various sources including Israel for decades that Arabs are not attracted to democracy. As a matter of fact, I think that all people want a voice. All human beings wish to be listened to and to be able to express their hopes and aspirations. This is a fundamental basis of democracy and widely applicable, although democracy may take different forms. The Arab Awakening rebutted this arrogant assumption. This does not mean that the course will be easy. One of my Egyptian colleagues said to me, 'We have had dictatorship since 1952, but after Tahir Square you expect us to build a perfect democracy in 52 weeks! It cannot happen!'
Among the first concessions sought by the 2011 Arab revolts was rejection of the right of a dictator's sons to succeed him. The passing of power from father to son has been a characteristic of patriarchal societies, in the Arab world and elsewhere. Anthropologist John Borneman notes, 'The public renunciation of the son's claim to inherit the father's power definitively ends the specific Arab model of succession that has been incorporated into state dictatorships among tribal authorities'. In Tunisia to Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen (not all of which are successes), such movements have sought to end the presumption of father-son inheritance of rule.
I believe that we are seeing the start of a broad democratization process in the Middle East, not its end. The learning and preparation that had been occurring in Egypt prior to Tahrir Square was extensive. Workshops had been underway for 10 to 15 years before people filled Tahrir Square. Women bloggers had for years been monitoring torture and sharing news from outside. One woman blogger translated a comic book into Arabic about the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr, from the 1960s, and had it distributed all over Cairo. Labor unions had been very active. According to historian Joel Beinin, from 1998 to 2010 some 3 million laborers took part in 3,500 to 4,000 strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations, and other actions, realizing more than 600 collective labor actions per year in 2007 and 2008. In the years immediately before the revolution, these actions became more coherent. Wael Ghonim, a 30-year-old Google executive, set up a Facebook page and used Google technologies to share ideas and knowledge about what ordinary people can do. The April 6 Youth Movement, set up in 2008, three years before Tahrir, sent one of its members to Belgrade in 2009, to learn how Otpor! had galvanized the bringing down of Milošević. He returned to Cairo with materials and films, lessons from other nonviolent movements, and workshop materials. This all goes back to the sharing of knowledge. Yet the Egyptians have now come to the point where they must assume responsibility and accountability for the whole and make difficult decisions for their society. It will be a long and difficult process. And it raises the question of what kind of help from outside is essential.
Why do you raise this point; do you think outside help is essential?
I know from having studied a large number of nonviolent movements in different parts of the globe that the sharing of lessons laterally among mobilizations and nonviolent struggles is highly effective. African American leaders were traveling by steamer ship from 1919 until the outbreak of World War II to the Indian subcontinent, to learn from Gandhi and the Indian independence struggles. This great interchange between black leaders in the United States and the Gandhian activists, as the historian Sudarshan Kapur shows in Raising Up A Prophet (1992), was critically significant in the solidification of consensus in the U.S. black community on nonviolent means. I have written about how the knowledge moved from East to West in my book Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Scholarly exchanges and interchanges among activists from other struggles are both potentiating and illuminating. Most observers fail to see that nonviolent mobilizations often have very deep roots involving the lateral sharing of experience and know-how.
You have written a book about the first uprising, or 'intifada', in the Occupied Palestinian Territories between 1987 and 1993. The second Palestinian uprising did not contain much nonviolent tactics though. Do you foresee another uprising soon? If not, why? If yes, do you think that Nonviolent Actions will play again an important role in that uprising, or is it more likely to turn violent?
Intifada is linguistically a nonviolent word: It means shaking off and has no violent implication whatsoever. (This word is utterly inappropriate for what happened in the so-called Second Intifada, although it started out as a nonviolent endeavor.) In the 1987 intifada, virtually the entire Palestinian society living under Israel's military occupation unified itself with remarkable cohesion on the use of nonviolent tools. The first intifada (1987-1993, especially 1987-1990) benefited from several forces at work in the 1970s and 1980s, about which I write in A Quiet Revolution (2007), one of which came from Palestinian activist intellectuals working with Israeli groups, who wanted to end occupation for their own reasons. These Israeli peace activists thought the occupation degraded them, made them less than human, in addition to oppressing Palestinians. The second so-called intifada was not a 'shaking off'. For the first time, it bade attacks against the Israeli settlements, which had not occurred before.
Let me put it this way: in virtually every situation, there is some potential for human beings to take upon themselves their own liberation through nonviolent action. We may expect that such potential is dormant and waiting for enactment. Disciplined nonviolent action is underway in a number of village-based struggles against the separation barrier in the West Bank right now, in which Israeli allies are among the action takers. As another example, the Freedom Theatre in Jenin is using Freedom Rides, a concept adopted from the U.S. southern Civil Rights Movement, riding buses to the South Hebron Hills villages and along the way using drama, music, and giant puppets as a way of stimulating debate about Israeli occupation. Bloggers and writers share their experiences (see e.g. this post by Nathan Schneider). For the first time, as we speak, the Freedom Bus will travel from the West Bank to make two performances in historic pre-1948 Palestine (Israel), in Haifa and the Golan, in June 2013. A Palestinian 'Empty Stomach' campaign, led by Palestinian political prisoners in Israel, has had some success in using hunger strikes to press Israeli officials for certain demands. With the purpose of prevailing upon Israel to conform to international resolutions pertaining to the Palestinians and to end its military occupation, Palestinian civic organizations in 2005 launched a Boycott, Divestment Sanctions (BDS) campaign, drawing upon the notable example of third-party sanctions applied in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. The Palestinian Authority has called for non-state observer status at the United Nations and supports the boycotting of products from Israeli settlements resistance.
More and more Palestinians are now saying, 'We must fight for our rights with nonviolent resistance'. Many Israelis are also deeply concerned about the future of their country. I recently got an email from an Israeli who was deeply affected by reading Quiet Revolution and has started to reach out to Palestinians and take actions to bring to light the injustices that he perceives. Tremendous debate is underway about new techniques, novel processes, and how to shift gears to more effective mutual action. The United States government and its people continue to pay for Israel's occupation and militarization, which has abetted the continuation of conflict, although it is often done in the name of peace! The United States has not incentivized the building of peace. It has done almost nothing to help the construction of institutions that could assist coexistence.
Also, it is very important for the entire world, including Israelis, to recognize intentional nonviolent action when they see it. The Israeli government persisted in denying that the 1987 Intifada was nonviolent, when the Palestinian populace had been maintaining extraordinary nonviolent discipline for nearly three years, despite harsh reprisals. Israeli officials continued to call it 'unending war' and 'the seventh war'. Indeed, it was not perfect nonviolent discipline, but enough that was indicative of a change in political thinking among the people in the Palestinian areas that could have been built upon. Although some Israeli social scientists accurately perceived the sea change in Palestinian political thought about what methods to use in seeking statehood and the lifting of the military occupation, the government of Israel generally did not seize upon such popularly enacted nonviolent discipline to push for progress. My sources for Quiet Revolution include interviews with Israelis, such as the former Chief Psychologist of the Israel Defense Force and IDF spokesperson.
Your latest book is about the transitions of the Eastern European countries from being under Soviet rule to independent democracies. You chose to illustrate these transitions with New York Times articles. Why did you chose this approach; do you think the NY Times was important as a media agency in any way or is there another reason?
There is another reason: The New York Times and CQ Press approached me and asked if I would write a reference book on the nonviolent revolutions of the Eastern bloc, using articles from the Times that I would choose upon which to hang the garments of the story. The point of the work is to help particularly young people learn that they can study history by studying newspapers. The book gives life to the old adage that newspaper reporters write the first draft of history. In the book's treatment of these nonviolent revolutions, I chose ten Times articles for each of the major ten struggles that are addressed, adding my historical analysis to complete the saga for each country. It had been difficult for Times reporters to get into Poland, for example, in the late 1970s and the crucial year of 1980; they sometimes risked their lives. Yet it's in the nature of journalism that their on-the-spot reportage needed additional analysis; furthermore newspaper accounts often stress description.
After the 1968 Prague Spring, when the Soviet Union sent 750,000 troops and tanks from five Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia, crushing that revolt, across Eastern Europe a tremendous amount of fervent work got underway by small non-official committees, often below the radar of the communist party states. This included samizdat (Russian for 'self published'), works not published by the state publishing machinery, underground publications that were promoting new ways of thinking about how to address their dilemma. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania were the most active in the Eastern bloc with their major but covert samizdat. As it was illegal in Czechoslovakia for a citizen to own a photocopy machine, 'books' were published by using ten pieces of onion-skin paper interspersed with carbon sheets, 'publishing' each page by typing it and its copies on a manual typewriter.
The entire phenomenon of micro-committees, flying universities, samizdat boutiques, seminars, drama with hidden meanings, underground journals, and rock groups transmitting messages eluded outside observers, who were not thinking about what the people could do for themselves. The economists and Kremlinologists who were observing the Eastern bloc did not discern what the playwrights, small committees of activist intellectuals, local movements, labor unions, academicians, and church groups were undertaking. They did not imagine the scope or scale of what the people were doing for themselves with utmost self-reliance. In essence, no one saw these nonviolent revolutions coming, with the exception of the rare onlooker, such as the historian Timothy Garton Ash. Even today the peaceful transitions to democracy of the Eastern bloc are sometimes explained by saying 'Gorby did it', when Gorbachev did not come to power until 1985. Or by attributing the alterations to Reagan's going to Berlin and telling Gorbachov to tear down the Wall.
By December 1981, Poland was under martial law, which unleashed a high degree of underground organizing, countless organizations of self-help, reimagining of the society, and the publishing of samizdat. Still, even so, some people believe that this sweeping political change was top-down. It is indisputably true that nonviolent action usually interacts with other forces and forms of power, but I would say that we need this book for its accessible substantiation of historically significant independent nonviolent citizen action as a critical element in the collapse of the Soviet Union.
You also mention Al Jazeera as an important media agency in your most recent blog post at 'Waging Nonviolence'. You wrote that Al Jazeera has an important role in influencing global affairs. Could you explain why? And more generally, how important is diversification of media for international politics?
Al Jazeera generally has not been taking the point of view of the official organs of governments of Arab countries and has usually not reported news from ministries of information. Additionally, it often carries reports from local correspondents in the country at issue. If you are following a report from Gaza, it is likely to be a Gazan journalist who is transmitting to Al Jazeera. If it is a report from Egypt, it may well be an Egyptian correspondent. Al Jazeera also has made a point of reporting news from Israel, and utilizing reporters in Tel Aviv, which may be a significant development. Certainly in the 2010-2011 Arab Awakening, it made a huge difference that reports were coming directly from the action takers rather than the official news outlets of Arab governments.
President George W. Bush did not want Al Jazeera to come to the United States, because he considered it too anti-American. I remember reading at the time that the first thing that Gen. Colin Powell said to Al Jazeera was 'can you tone it down a little?' when asking why Al Jazeera couldn't be less anti-American in its news. To me, either you support free speech or you do not; it's free or it's not: You can't have a little bit of control and a little bit of freedom.
Until recently, Al Jazeera was not easily available in the United States, except in Brattleboro, Vermont; Washington, DC; and a few other places. It was difficult to get it straight in the United States. I mounted a special satellite so that I could get Al Jazeera more freely. This does not speak well for freedom of the press in the United States. This may change with the advent of Al Jazeera America, although we still do not know to what degree it will represent an editorially free press.
News agencies are important for civil-resistance movements for major reasons. Popular mobilizations need good communications internally and externally! People need to understand clearly what is the purpose and strategy and to be part of the making of decisions. Learning also crucially needs to take place inside the movement: activist intellectuals often act as interpreters, framing issues anew, suggesting that an old grievance is now actionable. No one expects the butcher, the baker, or the candlestick maker, and everyone else in the movement to read history and theory.
When news media are interested and following a popular movement of civil resistance, they can enhance the spread of knowledge. In the U.S. civil rights movement, the Southern white-owned newspapers considered the deaths of black persons or atrocities against African Americans as not being newsworthy. There was basically a 'black-out', if you want to call it that, with no pun. Yet dreadful things were happening while we were trying to mobilize, organize, and get out the word. So SNCC created its own media, and Julian Bond and others and I set up nationwide alternative outlets. Eventually we had 12 photographers across the South. This is very much like what the people of the Eastern bloc did with samizdat — sharing and disseminating papers, articles, chapters, even whole books. The media can offer a tremendous boost, but sometimes you have to create your own.
Last question. You combine scholarship with activism. How do you reconcile the academic claim for 'neutrality' with the emancipatory goals of activism?
To be frank, I am not searching for neutrality in my research. Rather, I strive for accuracy, careful transcription, and scrupulous gathering of evidence. I believe that this is how we can become more effective in working for justice, environmental protection, sustainable development, pursuing human rights, or seeking gender equity as critical tools to build more peaceable societies. Where possible I search for empirical data. So much has been ignored, for example, with regards to the effects of gendered injustice. I do not seek neutrality on this matter, but strong evidence. For example, since the 1970s, experts have known that the education of women has profoundly beneficial and measurable effects across entire societies, benefiting men, children, and women. Data from Kerala, India; Sri Lanka; and elsewhere has shown that when you educate women the entire society is uplifted and that all indicators shift positively. The problem is that the data have for decades been ignored or trivialized. We need much more than neutrality. We need to interpret evidence and data clearly to make them compelling and harder to ignore. I think that we can do this with methodologies that are uncompromisingly scrupulous.
Mary Elizabeth King is professor of peace and conflict studies at the UN-affiliated University for Peace and and is Scholar-in-Residence in the School of International Service, at the American University in Washington, D.C. She is also a Distinguished Fellow of the Rothermere American Institute at the University of Oxford, in the United Kingdom. Her most recent book is The New York Times on Emerging Democracies in Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: Times Reference and CQ Press/Sage, 2009), chronicling the nonviolent transitions that took place in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine in the late 1980s and early 1990s. She is the author of the highly acclaimed A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance (New York: Nation Books, 2007; London: Perseus Books, 2008), which examines crucial aspects of the 1987 uprising overlooked or misunderstood by the media, government officials, and academicians.
Related links
King's personal page Read the book edited by King on Peace Research for Africa (UNU, 2007) here (pdf) Read the book by King Teaching Model: Nonviolent Transformation of Conflict (UNU, 2006) here (pdf)
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
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As a Caribbean institution of Higher Learning, the University of the West Indies is seen as a major contributor to integration efforts in the Region very often mandated by CARICOM to carry out educational missions to that effect. Working in a geographically fragmented and multilingual space, foreign language education is a major preoccupation for academic departments or sections in the respective campuses. The Mona Campus, based in Jamaica, was very one of the earliest to recognize the need to add LSP courses in its curriculum as electives (Business) or as 'service courses' for other programmes (Tourism and Hospitality Management). To these existing LSP courses, the French Section at the Mona Campus added in 2003 a new LSP course geared toward International Relation students. The originality of the course lays its chosen method of delivery by total simulation. The course was offered twice since its approval and under two different schedules (two-week intensive and semester-long). This chapter discusses the impact of these two schedules on the course delivery and learning process. The comparison shows the importance of student's motivation and learning autonomy. The study also comments on the use of blended learning (on-line module complementing face-to-face delivery) and suggests that virtual reality may offer a new addition to Total Simulation for LSP. ; To cite the digital version, add its Reference URL (found by following the link in the header above the digital file). ; TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 73 French for International Conference at The University of the West Indies, Mona: Total Simulation in the Teaching of Languages for Specific Purposes Marie-José Nzengou-Tayo The University of The West Indies, Mona Gilles Lubeth The University of The West Indies, Mona Abstract: As a Caribbean institution of Higher Learning, the University of the West Indies is seen as a major contributor to integration efforts in the Region very often mandated by CARICOM to carry out educational missions to that effect. Working in a geographically fragmented and multilingual space, foreign language education is a major preoccupation for academic departments or sections in the respective campuses. The Mona Campus, based in Jamaica, was very one of the earliest to recognize the need to add LSP courses in its curriculum as electives (Business) or as 'service courses' for other programmes (Tourism and Hospitality Management). To these existing LSP courses, the French Section at the Mona Campus added in 2003 a new LSP course geared toward International Relation students. The originality of the course lays its chosen method of delivery by total simulation. The course was offered twice since its approval and under two different schedules (two-week intensive and semester-long). This chapter discusses the impact of these two schedules on the course delivery and learning process. The comparison shows the importance of student's motivation and learning autonomy. The study also comments on the use of blended learning (on-line module complementing face-to-face delivery) and suggests that virtual reality may offer a new addition to Total Simulation for LSP. Keywords: CARICOM, French for international trade, international conferences, Language for Specific Purposes (LSP), methodology Introduction Language for Specific Purpose (LSP) has developed with the expansion of international trade and the development of multilingual and multicultural working teams. Short language courses are designed at the request of enterprises or institutions in order to meet the specific demands related to the work environment. Though LSP courses have been in existence for more than three decades, their introduction in the academic programs of language majors is quite recent and has been a hot debate for several years at MLA and ADFL meetings. In the Caribbean, with the development of integration, the need for LSP has been felt as the CARICOM (Caribbean Community) started to look beyond the English-speaking Caribbean and opened itself to non-English-speaking territories (Surinam and Haiti joined the organization in 1995 and 2002 respectively while Cuba and the Dominican Republic have observer status). These political trends impacted on our foreign language offerings, stressing the need to open our curriculum to professionally oriented courses. The Department of Modern Languages and Literatures and the language sections of the two other campuses TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 74 had various responses: at the St. Augustine Campus (Trinidad and Tobago), a Latin American Studies program was developed; at Cave Hill (Barbados), a cross-faculty program in Management Studies with a minor in a foreign language was approved; at Mona, LSP courses were developed and students from other faculties were allowed to declare minors in French or Spanish. In this article, we present the circumstances surrounding the design of the latest addition to French for Specific Purpose courses offered at the University of The West Indies, Mona (UWI, Mona), the methodological choices made and their implication for assessment. Because the course has been offered twice since its approval by the University Academic Quality Assurance Committee and with two different schedules, we will compare and discuss these two delivery modes. Language for Specific Purpose at the UWI, Mona At the UWI, Mona, the introduction of French for Special Purpose came out of a pragmatic approach at a time when high schools were experiencing a high turnover of French teachers and a reduction of schools offering A-level French (equivalent to the Baccalauréat). Noting that our graduates were being hired in the insurance and tourism industries, it was thought that equipping them with professional language skills would give a 'practical' touch to our program. The recruitment of a colleague with professional experience in translation led to discussions about a more professionally oriented program. "French for Business" was the first LSP course to be designed in 1991–1992 with the creation of a level III course of French for business or "Business French." The course was developed as an elective in response to a situation in which French graduates were moving toward the business sector instead of education. In the subsequent years, other LSP courses were introduced: "French for Hospitality" in 1998–1999 and "French for International Conferences" in 2003. The introduction of this last course coincided with a drastic overhaul of the French curriculum. The offering of "French for International Conferences" came at a time when the French section of the Department was repositioning itself and revising its offerings. The course was designed with a view to attracting International Relations (IR) students while capitalizing on the latest trend in French foreign language teaching methods. The decision was based on the fact that IR majors and French majors minoring in IR outnumbered students majoring in French only. It was taken at a time when the section was going into a survival mode, taking drastic measures and moving away from the traditional language curriculum (36 credits equally divided between language and literature). The section opted for a mix of language, literature, film and culture, and French for specific purpose courses. It was a drastic choice since the section was moving away of the traditional literary offerings. Though the section has not fully recovered, it has increased its numbers and the majority of students pursuing French are double majors (French and Spanish) with a professional objective of becoming translators or interpreters, followed by IR and Linguistics majors. Total Simulation in French Foreign Language Teaching and Learning Even though Total Simulation in French Foreign Language Education was initiated in the 1970s at the BELC (Bureau d'Enseignement de la Langue et de la Civilisation Françaises à l'Étranger / Office for the Teaching of French Language and Civilization TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 75 Abroad) it did not really become mainstream until the late eighties. This approach to language teaching evolved from role playing and the need to expand role playing over a longer period of time with a view to involving diverse aspects of communication (Yaiche, 1996). Total Simulation was borrowed from continuous professional education where staff received specific training to deal with job-related situations. Total Simulation for French Foreign Language Teaching was first conceptualized by Francis Debyser, a professor at the CIEP (Centre International d'Études Pédagogiques / International Center for Peda-gogical Studies). In the 1980s, Total Simulation became more broadly accepted and moved from experimental to established status. Publishers become interested and several textbooks were published by Hachette between 1980 and 1990 (Yaiche, 1996). By the 1990s, Total Simulation was redirected toward the teaching of French for Specific Purpose (Business French, French for International Relations, Hospitality French). Total Simulation benefits today from IT and its use in the classroom. It is still at the experimental stage as is the case of 'Virtual Cabinet' for the teaching of English, which has been developed by Masters' students at University of Lyon II (http://sites.univ-lyon2.fr/vcab/demo/) or 'L'auberge' developed by University Lille III for incoming French Foreign Language Students (http://auberge.int.univ-lille3.fr/). Characteristics of a Total Simulation Course in Foreign Language Learning Total Simulation in Foreign Language Teaching and Learning could be considered revolutionary in its approach and methodology. First, the role of the teacher is transformed as he or she becomes a facilitator and a participant in the simulation instead of an instructor. For instance, in the International Conference Simulation, the teacher plays the part of the Secretariat. He or she compiles and archives the material needed for the progress of the conference. He or she also provides documents and the linguistic tools needed for the project. Secondly, simulation follows a set pattern of five stages (See Bourdeau, Bouygue, & Gatein, 1992; Yaiche, 1996). The first stage is the creation of the setting. In the case of the International Conference, it means, choosing the theme and the place of the conference. The second stage is to identify the participants. At this point, the role playing starts as the learners have to choose an identity and the country that they will represent. Learners will have to play several roles: delegates from their chosen countries (Minister of Foreign Affairs or High Ranking Civil Servant or Ambassador). At one point, they also play the part of journalists. The countries are fictitious but based on the characteristics of real countries. During this stage, learners choose their identity and civil status; they invent a short biography indicating two physical, moral, psychological, intellectual characteristics, two distinctive objects, (Yaiche, 1996). The third and fourth stages consist in conducting the simulation: the official opening ceremony and the working sessions. At this point, learners are to present their country's respective position paper. Interaction takes place as well as negotiations for a common position and action plan. During this stage, the facilitator plays an important part in ensuring the archiving of all productions and the elaboration of a data bank for the progress of the conference. Students are provided with documents and assisted in acquiring the mastery of the linguistic tools needed for the exercise (e.g., mastery of high language register for official speeches; mastery of diplomatic lexicon for the phrasing of the final resolution and the press release, TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 76 ability to write an abstract or a synthetic report from a news article, etc.). The final stage is geared toward ending the simulation. In the case of the International Conference, it is marked by the writing of the final resolution and a press conference. Since IR students are to be prepared to face and manage diplomatic incidents/crisis during negotiations, elements that could lead to such incident are introduced between the fourth and fifth stage of the simulation when students are drafting the final resolution of the conference. Students are expected to draw on their negotiating skills in order to solve the problem or assuage the potential conflict and bring the conference to a positive closing ceremony. Assessment is blended in the simulation: oral expression is assessed during the opening ceremony (a five-minute presentation) and during the press conference. Students are video recorded and marking takes place afterwards. (See evaluation sheet in appendix B). Both examiners are present to abide by University Examination Regulations. Writing proficiency is assessed through a press release and the conference final resolution, which is done individually during a traditional in-class test. It is also assessed 'outside' of the simulation through the submission of a take-home assignment, the format of which is either a précis writing or a critical review of a newspaper article related to the theme of the conference. Students are provided with a choice of articles from Le Monde Diplomatique, a well-established and recognized reference journal from which they will select an article for review or summary. LSP and Total Simulation in Jamaica and at the UWI, Mona French teachers in Jamaica were introduced to Total Simulation in 1993 thanks to a new French Linguistics Attaché who was also appointed at The University of the West Indies from 1992–1997. A specialist in Total Simulation, she organized two workshops for the Jamaica Association of French Teachers and one for the Tourism Product Development Company (TPDCo), a Jamaican state agency responsible for the training of the workforce in the tourism sector. The co-authors received additional training at the annual training seminar organized by the Centre International d'Études Pédagogiques (CIEP) held in Caen in July 1996 (Nzengou-Tayo) and July 2009 (Lubeth) respectively. The first total simulation course at the UWI was developed in 2003. Two factors contributed to the choice of this methodology. One was the renewed interest in LSP with the review of the French program. After a quality assurance review in 2003, the French section, threatened by low numbers in registration, revised its program with a stronger professional component (introduction of an additional LSP course and translation modules). The second was the institutionalization of summer courses, which offered the possibility of using an intensive format. The idea was to design a course that could imitate a real life situation: an international conference taking into account that such an event is usually limited over a period of time (1–2 weeks) and requires a full work day. The course was submitted to the University Quality Assurance Committee for approval (See course proposal in Appendix A). In the initial submission, evaluation was by 50% coursework and 50% final examination (Appendix A). However, when the course was first taught in 2006, we requested a change of the evaluation scheme to 100% coursework (50% oral presentation and 50% written assignment). The reason for this change was directly related to the philosophy behind total simulation, which required a formative form of assessment that would blend seamlessly in the simulation. TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 77 Case Study: The 2006 and 2009 Experiences Since its creation, French for International Conferences (FREN 3118) has been offered twice: first, in 2006 as an intensive summer course over two weeks, and secondly, in 2009 as a regular semester course over thirteen weeks. These two modes of delivery will be compared and discussed in this section. Course delivery schedule. In 2005–2006, during the two-week period during which the course was offered, the timetable averaged 25 hours per week with 5 daily contact hours. FREN 3118 was the only course attended by the students. Students were put in an immersion situation as they interacted with a native speaker of French during the week. During the second week, ten hours were set aside for independent research in an attempt to give students an opportunity to develop learning autonomy. In 2009–2010, the course was taught during the first semester according to the regular schedule. The timetable featured 3 one-hour sessions per week. In addition to FREN 3118, students were simultaneously registered for four other courses whose demands were competing with the French course. The fast pace of the semester (13 weeks) did not allow for a scheduled independent research. Students had to use their free time for independent research to develop their learning autonomy. The difference between the schedules of the 2006 and 2009 course delivery had an impact on the course management as well as the students' learning experience. It is evident that 2009 students did not have the same learning stimulus as the 2006 ones. They had the pressure of their other courses in term of time and workload. In addition, regular attendance was an issue since students sometimes missed classes either due to timetable clashes or assignment deadlines to meet in other courses. The running of the course was affected as each student had a part to play in the progress of the simulation and absence from class meetings affected the proceedings of the conference. Student profile and number. The course targets third-year students and requires a general language module at level III as a co-requisite. However, the co-requisite can be waived depending on the level of the students. For instance, when the course was offered during the summer 2006, it was waived for second-year students who had received a B+ in the two modules of the level II language courses. In 2009, a third-year International Relations student who had completed level I of the French language courses with A and was reading the level II language course was allowed to register. The waiver was granted based on his outstanding results at level I and also after an interview in which he demonstrated a high level of motivation and learning autonomy. In 2006, the course was offered with 9 students and in 2009 there were 14 registered students. Numbers can be an issue for conducting a total simulation course. For instance, our experience taught us that, even though Cali, Cheval, & Zabardi (1992) suggest a number of 20 participants divided according to a ratio by type of countries1 in La Conférence Internationale et ses Variantes, country-ratio balance can still be observed TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 78 with lesser numbers. Based on our 2006 experience, we recommend a minimum of 8 students. Indeed, a lesser number would not allow their distribution according to the recommended country ratio. In addition, work in commissions, which is part of the simulation process, would be less productive. Similarly, 20 is the maximum manageable number of students during total simulation. The attention to be devoted to students' progress and the group dynamics become a challenge with larger numbers. Therefore, beyond 20, the group would be divided and two concurrent simulations conducted, provided that staffing is not an issue for the institution. Topics and scenarios. On both occasions, the theme of the conference was inspired by current affairs relevant to the Caribbean region. In 2006, the conference was titled "Libre circulation des travailleurs à l'échelle mondiale: Faisabilité et conditions" (Feasibility and Conditions for a Global Free Movement of Labour). The theme was inspired by discussions taking place in the media about the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) put in place by CARICOM countries that year. The scenario was developed to involve a group of 9 countries, members of a regional organization seeking to achieve integration through free movement of workers. The 2009 edition of the conference, "Réchauffement climatique: Stratégies et équité" (Global Warming: Strategies and Equity) was inspired by the then ongoing international negotiations on global warming. The course started in September, just three months before the Copenhagen Summit. The scenario was based on the creation of an international organization, the Group of 14 (G14) specially dedicated to addressing the issue of global warming, and therefore holding its first conference accordingly. The choice of topics related to current international or regional issues stimulates the students' interest as they can have access to current reference material. They develop their critical thinking as they are exposed to various diverging opinions and asked to present their country's position at the start of the conference. For example, at the 2009 conference, the delegate of "Bonangue" expressed the country's position as follows: Conscient des graves effets [du réchauffement climatique] sur l'environnement, nous tenons à prendre action immédiatement parce que les effets poseront un problème pour le pays. Par le passé, la Bonangue a donné priorité aux revenus, dans certains cas, au détriment de l'environnement. Le pays est disposé à porter [sic] les changements nécessaires. The delegate of "Kalasie," on the contrary, indicated, "La Kalasie est favorable au recours aux crédits d'émission de gaz utilisables par les investisseurs." Another delegate from "Lisérbie" chose to stress the social impact and the importance to reach a consensus on the matter. The multiple and sometimes diverging country positions will contribute to the life of the conference as the objective is to find a common ground and sign a final resolution, which would bring the conference to a close. TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 79 Resources and methods. The course outline was developed in accordance with the prescribed textbook La Conférence Internationale et ses Variantes (Cali et al., 1992). The authors' recom-mendations were followed with some adjustments, which will be presented below. Since countries have to be fictitious to respect the principle of Total Simulation, two websites, CIA: The World Factbook, and Quid were used to establish the profile of these invented countries.2 Using the principle of 'mots-valises' students invented the name of the countries they were representing. For instance, "Lisérbie," "Kalasie" or "Dukenyah" were obviously created in reference to existing countries or regions. Other names were arbitrary and left to the students' imagination as "Cadeaux d'Ouest," "Amapour" or "Kadia." Other web resources were used in accordance with the theme of the conference and a companion website was developed on the University Virtual Learning Environment (OurVLE) (UWI, Mona "Virtual Learning Environment") to take advantage of information technology at our disposal at the Mona Campus. The 2006 intensive format. We introduced some slight variations from the standard format of the simulation. First, the course started with a screening of the French movie Saint-Germain ou la Négociation (2003) with Jean Rochefort. The objective was to highlight the objectives, modalities of diplomatic negotiations as well as to insist on the high-language register used during negotiations, which the students would have to use. Despite the historical context (the 16th century), the film was particularly suitable as it showed protocol and behind-the-scene events taking place during political negotiations. Secondly, students were given an introductory lecture on the processes of international conferences coupled with a tour of the Jamaica Conference Centre in Kingston. This was facilitated by a colleague and professional translator who worked at international conferences and was familiar with the facility. Various documents were made available online on a range of topics: international organizations pursuing regional integration through implementation of free movement of labor (the European Union, CARICOM) and a compilation of documents on immigration and globalization. In 2006, the course page on OurVLE was used only for archival purposes. The instructor, playing the part of the conference Secretary, uploaded for future reference documents that had been identified as relevant to the conference. Since the students' time were dedicated to the course, it was easy to simulate the rhythm of a conference with meetings in commission and plenary sessions. The course outline was design to be the "agenda" of the conference. The intensive format helped to develop a group dynamic based on solidarity and conviviality, which stimulated weaker students to make efforts to improve their proficiency. The 2009 semester-long format. The semester-long delivery of FREN 3118 differed from the intensive summer course on some points. The presentation by the guest lecturer and the film screening were maintained, but, due to timetable constraints, the tour of the Conference Centre did not take place. The main innovation was in the extensive use of the online module and the exploration of the functionalities offered by the Moodle platform supporting OurVLE TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 80 where all the material necessary for the presentation of the theme and the conduct of the activities of the conference were uploaded. All documents were made available online via OurVLE, expanding from print and website links to audio and video. Students' productions were added to the resources identified by the instructor. The instructor/facilitator provided the following resources: explanatory documents on global warming (its geopolitical implications and the negotiation process); documents with terminology used in diplomatic language; and audiovisual documents from France2, France3, and YouTube. A link to Yann Arthus-Bertrand's documentary Home (2009) was also put on the course portal. As Secretariat, the instructor/facilitator uploaded reports of sessions held during the preparatory phase (the preconference meetings). These reports gave students a regularly updated overview of progress made, a review of notions covered as well as the calendar of events (the schedule of meetings). Using the functionalities offered by Moodle, students were able to contribute to the development of the course portal. Using the 'upload a single file' and the forum features, they uploaded their own production, including country and delegate profiles, reports resulting from the sessions in commission and plenary sessions, and draft resolutions. The course portal was useful for archiving the various activities conducted during the course. Students were able to refer to a central repository outside of the contact hours. This tool also had financial and ecological benefits as it reduced the cost of photocopying. Indeed, whereas all documents had to be printed in 2006, only documents produced during the conference (student-generated commission and plenary reports, agenda and list of speakers) were printed for circulation in 2009. Because of the discontinuity of the timetable (3 hours spread over 13 weeks), the 2009 conference did not flow as harmoniously as the 2006 one. With competing interests, students found it difficult to dedicate themselves to the conference. Running from one class to another, they sometimes lost track of the conference objectives, which in turn had an impact on the group dynamics and progress as indicated by the results of the continuous assessment (i.e., the coursework). Evaluation and students' results. As mentioned earlier, the course assessment was done by 100% coursework. The percentage was equally divided between oral and writing proficiency (50% each). Oral proficiency was assessed as follows: delegate's address at the opening ceremony weighting 25%; delegate's interview at the press conference (15%); and one intervention as a journalist interviewing the delegates at the press conference (10%). Writing proficiency was assessed through a press release (10%), an individual proposal for the final resolution (15%), and one précis writing/critical review of document(s) (25%). Students' oral and written productions were graded using a criterion-referenced assessment grid (See Appendix B for details). In 2006, we got a 100% pass rate with results ranging from A+ to C. In 2009, the pass rate was 71.42%. With the intensive format, students demonstrated their mastery of high-level register. Students who were considered 'weak' based on their low grade in the general language courses, managed to improve their proficiency level and achieve acceptable performances in oral presentations. In 2009, there was a large gap between the TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 81 best and the weakest students (2 students got As, 4 students failed, and 8 students' grades ranged from B+ to D). Group average was 49.79%. When comparing the two groups' results, we have to admit that we had some doubts initially about the intensive format because of the limited time given to students to properly absorb the notions and the various tasks required in the course. Yet, it appears that stretching the process over a semester is not a decisive factor for improved performance. The role of group dynamics in total simulation is yet to be measured though it is generally recognized in class interaction and learning. During the regular semester, the group dynamics did not play a cohesive role as it did in the summer course where more proficient students helped to strengthen the weaker ones. Competing academic interests and irregular attendance during the regular semester also had an impact on students' low performance. Conclusion At the UWI, Mona, we introduced LSP courses in our academic programs as part of our major from a pragmatic standpoint in reviewing our curriculum. Though we are aware that LSP courses generally target professionals already in the field, as a result, the design and offering of such courses is usually preceded by a need analysis and the identification of the language processes (i.e., register, lexicon, syntax, speech acts) needed to achieve the requested proficiency (Mangiante & Parpette, 2004). Both "Business French" and "French for International Conferences" count toward the major, though only one can be taken as a core course, the other being an elective. Because LSP courses have a professional orientation, they give undergraduates the impression of being prepared for the world of work. The use of total simulation comforts this impression because of its task-based approach and the fact that it recreates a work environment with its idiosyncrasies. Combined with information technology (OurVLE), it becomes an original and valuable method. The dual-mode adds flexibility to the course and expands access to authentic material. However, success depends heavily on students' learning autonomy, which is enhanced by a tool like OurVLE. Motivation and participation are essential for the success of students as evidenced by the results of the third-year student who was accepted while doing the first module of level II French and was one of the top two students in the course. Our experience suggests that the intensive format yields better results because it reinforces student concentration, dedication, and performance, which also benefit from the positive impact of the group dynamics. Recent development in the field shows an orientation toward multimedia and information technology to create virtual worlds where Total Simulation is made possible on a large scale. The combination of the two is very promising for language learning and teaching but presents new challenges to foreign language teachers and course developers. Notes 1Cali, Cheval, & Debardi (1992) identify the following categories: developing countries, developed countries, least developed countries, and Central or Eastern European countries in transition towards market economy. The latter category being now obsolete, the decision was made to replace it with countries in the same geographical region. TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 82 2See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ and http://www.quid.fr. References Arthus-Bertrand, Y. (2009). Home. Home Project. Retrieved (September–November 2009) from http://www.youtube.com/homeprojectFR L'auberge. Retrieved February 21, 2010 from http://auberge.int.univ-lille3.fr/ Bourdeau, M., Bouygue, & M., Gatein, J. J. (1992). Le congrès médical: Simulation globale sur objectifs spécifiques. Ministère des affaires étrangères, sous direction de la coopération linguistique et éducative, CIEP-BELC, 1991/92. Sèvres: CIEP. Cali, C., Cheval, M., & Zabardi, A. (1992). La conférence internationale et ses variantes. Paris: Hachette, Français langue étrangère. Mangiante, J. M., & Parpette, C. (2004). Le français sur objectifs spécifiques: De l'analyse des besoins à l'élaboration d'un cours. Paris: Hachette. Le Monde Diplomatique. 2009. Paris: Editions "Le Monde." Retrieved from http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/ Virtual Cabinet. Retrieved February 21, 2010 from http://sites.univ-lyon2.fr/vcab/demo/ Yaiche, F. (1996). Les simulations globales: Mode d'emploi. Paris: Hachette, Français langue étrangère. TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 83 APPENDICES Appendix A Original submission to the Academic Quality Assurance Committee of the UWI, Mona Campus in 2003–2004. The assessment was subsequently modified to 100 percent coursework in 2005–2006. DEPARTMENT OF MODERN LANGUAGES & LITERATURES COURSE PROPOSAL Course Title: French for International Conferences Course Code: FREN 3118 Level: 3 Semester: 1 Credits: 3 Prerequisite: A Pass in F24A (FREN 2001) Co-requisite: F34A (FREN 3001) Contact hours: 4 hours per weeks (1 lecture, 1 writing tutorial, 1 oral expression, 1 listening comprehension) Rationale: French is one of the major languages of the United Nations and other inter-national institutions. In response to increased demand for specialized foreign language courses, this course will introduce students to the technical French of international relations and negotiations Course description: This course is designed to reproduce an international conference setting during which various aspects of diplomatic negotiations will be envisaged with a view to using French at the formal/foreign affairs level. Objectives: At the end of the course students should be able to Demonstrate understanding of French spoken in a formal/diplomatic setting Read articles in French on international issues. Write press reviews, press releases in French about an international issue. Express a personal view about a topical International issue in French Express a simulated official view about a topical International issue in French Simulate an official address in French Simulate a press conference in French TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 84 ASSESSMENT 50% in-course: 3 one-hour in-class tests: Reading comprehension (15%); Writing (20%); Listening comprehension (15%) 50% Final Examination: Oral presentation (25%) and 2-hour written examination (25%) TEXTS La Conférence Internationale et ses Variantes. Chantal Cali, Mireille Cheval and Antoinette Zabardi. Paris: Hachette Livre, Français Langue Étrangère, 1995. Audio-visual material from TV5 (such as Kiosque, Une fois par mois, Le dessous des cartes). Articles from journals such as Le monde diplomatique. REFERENCES Plaisant, François. (2000). Le ministère des affaires étrangères. Toulouse: Editions Milan, Les Essentiels Milan, 2000. Kessler, Marie-Christine. (1998). La politique étrangère de la France. Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po. http://www.france.diplomatie.gouv.fr Appendix 2. Assessment grid for oral presentation Official Address: (5-minute presentation at the Opening Ceremony). Press Conference Part 1 and 2: Presentation of Country Position followed by Questions and Answer session). Students plays the country official and then the journalist parts. FREN 3118: Oral Presentation Assessment Grid NAME: Grade Comments Relevance of Arguments /5 Fluency /5 Consistent use of high-language register /3 Communicative skills /2 Accuracy and richness of vocabulary /5 Accuracy and use of complex syntactic structures /5 Accurate pronunciation /5 FINAL GRADE (25%) /25 TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 85 FREN 3118: Press Conference Assessment Grid—Presenter NAME: Grade Comments Relevance of Arguments (5 pts. x 3 = 15) Presentation Answer (1) Answer (2) Fluency (5 pts. x 3 = 15) Presentation Answer (1) Answer (2) Consistent Use of High Language Register (3 pts. x 3 = 9) Presentation Answer (1) Answer (2) Communicative skills (2 pts. x 3 = 6) Presentation Answer (1) Answer (2) Accuracy and Richness of Vocabulary (5 pts. x 3 = 15) Presentation Answer (1) Answer (2) Accuracy and Use of Complex Syntactic Structures (5 pts. x 3 = 15) Presentation Answer (1) Answer (2) Accurate Pronunciation /5 marks x 3 = 15 Presentation Answer (1) Answer (2) Unconverted Total (90 pts.) / FINAL GRADE (15%) TOTAL SIMULATION IN TEACHING LSP Scholarship and Teaching on Languages for Specific Purposes (2013) 86 FREN 3118: Press Conference Assessment Grid—Journalist NAME: Grade Comments Relevance of question (5 pts. x 4 = 20) Question 1 (Name) Question 2 (Name) Question 3 (Name) Question 4 (Name) Fluency (5 pts. x 4 = 20) Question 1 (Name) Question 2 (Name) Question 3 (Name) Question 4 (Name) Consistent use of high-language register (3 pts. x 4 = 12) Question 1 (Name) Question 2 (Name) Question 3 (Name) Question 4 (Name) Accuracy and richness of vocabulary (5 pts. x 4 = 20) Question 1 (Name) Question 2 (Name) Question 3 (Name) Question 4 (Name) Accuracy and use of complex syntactic structures (5 pts. x 4 = 20) Question 1 (Name) Question 2 (Name) Question 3 (Name) Question 4 (Name) Accurate pronunciation (5 marks x 4 = 20) Question 1 (Name) Question 2 (Name) Question 3 (Name) Question 4 (Name) Unconverted Total (112 pts.) FINAL GRADE (10%)
The Situation In The Middle East Report Of The Secretary-General On The Implementation Of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) And 2393 (2017) ; United Nations S/PV.8206 Security Council Seventy-third year 8206th meeting Friday, 16 March 2018, 10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Van Oosterom. . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Esono Mbengono Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Tenya Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mr. Miller Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-07334 (E) *1807334* S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 2/10 18-07334 The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, to participate in this meeting. Mr. De Mistura is joining the meeting via video-teleconference from Brussels. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Recalling the Security Council's latest note 507 on its working methods (S/2017/507), I wish to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. Note 507 also encourages briefers to be succinct and to focus on key issues. Briefers are further encouraged to limit initial remarks to 15 minutes or less. I now give the floor to Mr. De Mistura. Mr. De Mistura: We have been constantly, around the clock, in touch with the Secretary-General, my colleagues in the field and all those with influence because, as the Security Council knows, many events, some of which are very worrisome, have taken place in the past few days. On 7 March, I briefed the Council in consultations on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). At that time, I said that there had not been any sustained ceasefire or adequate humanitarian access at that stage. On 12 March, the Secretary-General himself orally reported to the Council on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and United Nations efforts to create such conditions by using his own good offices or those of his own team, including ourselves (see S/PV.8201). The Secretary-General also underscored that it was incumbent on all the parties and on all those with influence in the Council, in the Astana process and in the broader International Syria Support Group to act on the resolution throughout Syria without delay. Allow me to update the Council on where we stand on the matter since then — that is, since the Secretary- General gave a very comprehensive report — on the very day after the sad anniversary of the beginning of the conflict. We are entering the eighth year. In everything that we are doing in the horrific conflict, our compass — and I know the Council feels the same — has been, is and should be the Syrian people, wherever they are, who are telling us that they are fed up with the conflict and the way in which civilians are being affected in the cross-fighting. That is our compass. So whatever we do these days and whatever we suggest, including our current facilitation role, is constantly framed by the urgent needs of ordinary civilians — women, children and men. Since the briefing by the Secretary-General, in the past few days further meetings have taken place between the Russian Federation and Jaysh Al-Islam on the outskirts of Douma, which is the northernmost of the three opposition-controlled enclaves in eastern Ghouta. The result of that engagement is a tenuous and fragile ceasefire between the Government, the Russian military and the Jaysh Al-Islam forces, which has now largely continued to hold for the sixth day. We hope that it will continue to do so, notwithstanding the engagement between Government forces and Jaysh Al-Islam in other areas outside Douma, such as the village of Reihan. In other words, the talks, the discussions and the ceasefire have been effected and implemented with Jaysh Al-Islam in Douma but not beyond. However, that is only one part of eastern Ghouta. For example, the ceasefire is not being replicated in the rest of eastern Ghouta or elsewhere, and it is extremely fragile. While I speak, I understand that at this very moment there are some delicate meetings taking place regarding the follow-up to the arrangement regarding Douma. Let us therefore hope that the ceasefire holds because that would be at least one good piece of news among very bad news. The United Nations has been practicably offering its good offices but efforts to facilitate meaningful contacts between the Russian Federation and Faylaq Al-Rahman or Ahrar Al-Sham have not yet produced results. They are dominant forces in the two other enclaves in eastern Ghouta — in Harasta and around Kafr Batna, Ayn Tarma, Arbin, Zamalka and Jobar, respectively. In those two other areas, we have not seen any ceasefire to speak of. Rather we have seen Government forces and their allies pursue a concerted escalation against those two enclaves with rapid ground offensives, accompanied by shelling and airstrikes. Reports of a public market in Kafr Batna having been 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 3/10 hit are just coming in. Of course, we need to verify them, since they are new reports. Again, regrettably, there are numerous civilian casualties. We have also seen continuous shelling coming from those areas of eastern Ghouta inside civilian areas of Damascus again. We are also hearing from people inside eastern Ghouta, asking the United Nations, the Council and Member States with influence to pressure the armed opposition groups to let civilians leave and to pressure all parties for a ceasefire and protection for those who do not want to leave but want to stay. The bottom line of all this is that too many civilians are suffering and too many have died in that area. Let me first say that it need not be that way. Negotiations in Douma in the past few days show that there is a way to create the conditions to advance the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As we have done so far, the United Nations therefore stands ready to offer its good offices to all parties to facilitate further engagement of that kind so as to make a concrete contribution to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) in all areas of eastern Ghouta. The United Nations is not ready to facilitate ultimatums from either side. It stands ready to facilitate discussion, a ceasefire and evacuations. Meanwhile, violence has escalated across many other parts of Syria, where there is no ceasefire to speak of. In Afrin, the Turkish Government forces and their armed allies continue to gain ground rapidly. We have also received reports of shelling in besieged Fo'ah and Kafraya — two villages which, for a long time, have been held by the opposition. There have also been air strikes in Idlib and a new armed-opposition offensive in Hama. Clashes and air strikes have also occurred in Dar'a, southern Syria. If now is the time for de-escalation, the Security Council had better convince me that de-escalation is indeed taking place. What we see on the map looks like the opposite — escalation. Let me re-emphasize that resolution 2401 (2018) cannot be applied piecemeal. It is not an à la carte menu. It applies to all non-Security- Council-listed terrorist groups across Syria. Let me also reiterate the words of the Secretary-General who stated that even efforts to combat terrorist groups identified by the Council do not supersede obligations under international law. I am sure that members of the Council will have the opportunity to hear a briefing from Mr. Mark Lowcock. Meanwhile, since I have the opportunity to brief the Council today, let me provide some information about the humanitarian situation. On 13 March, the United Nations observed the evacuation of 147 civilians, including 10 critical medical cases — the majority of them women and children from Douma who sought shelter in rural Damascus. Based on the outcome of discussions and meetings between the Russian military and Jaysh al-Islam, facilitated by the United Nations, on 15 March, United Nations colleagues also delivered a convoy of food assistance to Douma for 26,100 people in need. Additional medical cases were also evacuated. Let us be honest and admit that positive efforts are generally welcome and long overdue, but remain limited. Civilians require much more, including medical and health-care supplies, the restoration of water, commercial access and freedom of movement. Members of the Council must have seen the report in which Mr. Peter Maurer, who had been meeting with some of the people in eastern Ghouta, stated they were simply asking for water. They just needed water. Humanitarian colleagues who entered those areas spoke of having seen hunger, dire want, poverty, haggard faces and despair all around. Even for experienced people, such as my own humanitarian colleagues, it is an unsustainable situation in which people are on the brink of collapse a few kilometres — 20 minutes' drive — from Damascus. Let me be clear, that is only in Douma — an area which has seen a few days of ceasefire and positive movement on humanitarian access. Can we imagine the situation elsewhere? In other words, in the other two enclaves of eastern Ghouta further south, we have seen no ceasefire to speak of and to borrow the words of the Secretary-General, people are still living in hell on Earth. Scores of people have been killed and the injured left unattended because health workers could not reach them due to the relentless air strikes. We have heard fresh allegations about the use of incendiary weapons in various urban areas and the targeting of medical facilities since 12 March, as well as new and disturbing allegations of chlorine use in those areas. As the Secretary-General has stated, we cannot independently verify those allegations but we also cannot and should not ignore them. We have also received reports of thousands of people displaced, some moving further into eastern Ghouta and many others exiting en masse in large groups, as a result of the advances of the Syrian Government in Hama, Noria and in Saqba. S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 4/10 18-07334 Evacuations not observed by the United Nations are also reported to have taken place, including from Misraba and other areas. The United Nations was not present to observe those evacuations and is unable to know the precise number of them. We urge parties that all evacuations must take place in accordance with the highest protection standards under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Whether civilians choose to stay or leave, they must be protected against attacks and have access to the essentials to survive. They must be safe and voluntarily enter a place of their of choosing. The United Nations stands ready to provide assistance to people in need — those who choose to stay and those who want to leave. We are also extremely concerned about the plight of civilians throughout Syria. They include the displaced, as well as almost 3 million in besieged and hard-to-reach areas and those caught up in escalations in Idlib, Hama, Aleppo and Dar'a. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands that all parties immediately lift the sieges of populated areas. To date, that has not occurred. According to my colleagues, the situation in Afrin is particularly worrying. We have received reports of tens of thousands of people displaced within Afrin and to nearby Tell Rifaat and surrounding villages, Nubul and Zahra, and other areas of Aleppo governorate. The United Nations has also received reports of civilian casualties and restrictions on movement for many of the large numbers of civilians seeking to leave the city. I urge all parties to ensure that civilians seeking to leave Afrin be given safe passage. Since 6 March, it has been reported that people in Afrin city have suffered from severe water shortages as its source of water has been damaged by the fighting. Allow me to add a point of particular importance that was revealed in a recent report. The safety of Syrian women in particular is threatened when they are evacuated following the lifting of a siege or end of a battle. Threats include widespread sexual and gender-based violence, which has been widely documented and mentioned by women's groups. The protection and needs of women must be at the forefront of our response. With regard to a separate humanitarian issue, on 14 March my technical team participated in the first meeting of the Working Group on detainees and missing persons that took place in Astana. We pressed the Astana guarantors at that meeting and before to make progress on the crucial issue, which to us, is one of the main reasons we attend meetings in Astana. It is an issue that has been at the forefront of our concerns. We have offered to host a standing secretariat so that information on detainees can be distributed in all meetings of the Working Group. Thus far, the guarantors have simply agreed to consider our proposal about a standing secretariat in Geneva to monitor the issue of detainees, but no final decision has been taken. We will intensify our contact with them and the parties in order to accelerate work on that important — frankly, crucial — humanitarian issue. We should remind ourselves that the issue of detainees and missing persons was first raised in Astana a year ago and, sadly, no concrete progress has been made so far. We owe it to the Syrian families on all sides who have long been awaiting word on the fate of their relatives. Although the logic of war clearly still prevails and resolution 2401 (2018) is not being implemented as it should be, as the Secretary-General stated, we absolutely refuse to give up hope of seeing Syria rising from the ashes. The Syrian people deserve to be helped. The Syrian people are proud. They love their country. We need to help them to go back to having a normal country. There too, it is with the people of Syria in mind and their legitimate aspirations for the long-term shape of their country that we continue our political efforts — in spite of what we see on the ground — for a sustainable settlement of the conflict. And there too, the voices of women across Syria conveying their wish to play a meaningful role — just as with our own civil society — in the next stage of the political process must be heard. Therefore, my team and I have continued to consult, in the context of the political side, widely and intensively on the formation of the constitutional committee in Geneva in an effort to advance the full and complete implementation of resolution 2254 (2015) within the framework of the United Nations-facilitated political process in Geneva. To this end, we seek to leverage the momentum produced by the Sochi final declaration, which emphasizes the fact that we should have a constitutional committee in Geneva with the assistance of the United Nations. We take note, therefore, of the statement issued — today, I believe — by the Astana guarantors in their own ministerial meeting, in which they reaffirmed that "the results of the Sochi Congress, especially to form the constitutional committee and to facilitate the 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 5/10 beginning of its work in Geneva with the assistance of the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria as soon as possible." However, I have to be frank. I must report that at this stage — more than two weeks beyond one month since the National Dialogue Congress in Sochi — we have not yet received the complete inputs on the pool of candidates for a constitutional committee developed in Sochi, from the three guarantors. It is my intention, in close consultations with all concerned, to look carefully at this pool when we receive it, and at others as required and consistent with resolution 2254 (2015), to facilitate the establishment of the constitutional committee. I must also report, once again, that there is still some serious homework to be done regarding the Syrian Government's readiness to engage on implementing the Sochi final declaration and moving forward with a constitutional committee in Geneva. I have impressed that on the relevant guarantors repeatedly in recent weeks, just as I continue to make clear the readiness of the United Nations to engage the Government of Syria on this matter. We need them to be part of it. We need to have the comprehensive participation of all Syrian parties. In the meantime, we have been proactive in offering creative suggestions as to how to expedite the formation of that constitutional committee. We continue to assess various options on how to advance discussions on all four baskets of the political process in Geneva. In particular, it is clear that there must be more and serious talks with the Government, the opposition and all Syrian and international stakeholders on what is required in order to establish a secure, calm, neutral environment, as per resolution 2254 (2015), in which a constitutional process and United Nations-supervised presidential and parliamentary elections, pursuant to a new constitution, could viably take place. We remained determined to engage all parties. As I said in my most recent briefing, a month ago (see S/PV.8181), conflict is increasingly spilling over Syria's borders, or at least risks doing so. This month we have further incidents of potential and real international confrontation within Syria that we cannot independently verify, but which concern us. That is precisely we need urgent action on the political front. Syrians need to see some positive movement on the political process. On Monday I will be attending a meeting of European Union (EU) Foreign Ministers here in Brussels. On Tuesday, I should be back in Geneva. I will attend the meeting at the invitation of High Representative Mogherini, in the context of the preparatory efforts of the EU and the United Nations for their joint ministerial conference in Brussels at the end of April. I hope that the Conference will provide a significant opportunity to bolster international support for the Syrian people though humanitarian commitments. I also hope that the gathering of a significant number of Foreign Ministers will also provide an opportunity to reinvigorate the collective efforts of the international community towards a sustainable peace through the United Nations-led peace process in Geneva, within the framework of resolution 2254 (2015) and other relevant resolutions. In conclusion, I urge caution. We must recognize that we are witnessing developments of the utmost gravity on the ground. These events demand action, and the world is worried and watching. I remain concerned that concrete matters that we have been trying to advance — resolution 2401 (2018), detainees and a constitutional committee — need to move faster and with more meaningful impact than has so far proven possible. And de-escalation must replace what we are watching at the moment — a clear tendency towards escalation. I will continue, creatively and determinedly, to seek to facilitate the overall political process. As the Secretary-General said on Monday, the ultimate goal is to help the Syrians and to "see a united, democratic Syria able to avoid fragmentation and sectarianism and with its sovereignty and territorial integrity respected, and to see a Syrian people able to freely decide their future and choose their political leadership." (S/PV.8201, p. 5) The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mr. Tenya (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank you, Sir, for convening this meeting and Mr. De Mistura for his briefing. We are grateful for his tireless and important efforts. We agree that the continuation of the conflict and the regrettable humanitarian situation in Syria undermines the prospects of making political S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 6/10 18-07334 progress. The unpunished lack of compliance with international law, international humanitarian law and Security Council resolutions erode the needed trust for sustainable peacebuilding. While we express our deep sympathy and solidarity with the victims, we would like at the same time to indicate our concern over the impact of the Syrian conflict on regional stability, the Council's credibility and the functioning of an rules-based international system. More specifically, the international community is awaiting an immediate ceasefire throughout Syria, full access to the needed humanitarian assistance, the attainment of a political agreement that could bring about sustainable peace in Syria, and accountability for the heinous crimes committed, including the use of chemical weapons. There can be no more excuses and no more delays. The humanitarian ceasefire, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018), must be implemented immediately in eastern Ghouta, Idlib, Afrin, Raqqa, Rukban and throughout Syria. All parties should commit to resolving the conflict peacefully, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). That will require the constructive participation of the Syrian Government and the opposition groups in establishing a constitutional committee, as agreed in Sochi. We believe that a new constitution must be drafted to lay the political and institutional groundwork for sustainable peace in Syria. The Syrian Government and all parties to the conflict must rise to the occasion in confronting the gravity of the situation, prevent its further deterioration and escalation, and fulfil their obligations and responsibilities. The Astana guarantors must also meet expectations in terms of the special responsibility entailed by their influence and involvement on the ground. Yesterday's meeting in Astana and the meeting to be held in Istanbul in early April must yield concrete outcomes, including in the matter of those detained and missing. As a member of the Council, Peru believes that its own responsibility vis-à-vis the tragic humanitarian situation in Syria entails requiring all parties involved in the conflict, especially those with greater ability to influence events on the ground, to comply with international law and international humanitarian law. Peru places priority on the protection of civilians, in particular women and children, and stresses the importance of maintaining the unity of the Council concerning this and all other conflicts and humanitarian crises, wherever they might arise. In conclusion, we convey our support for Mr. De Mistura's work to encourage dialogue among the Syrian opposition groups that have expressed their willingness to comply with the ceasefire and expel terrorists from eastern Ghouta and other parties to the Syrian conflict. Mr. Esono Mbengono (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the initiative of convening this meeting owing to the gravity of the situation on the ground. We also thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, for his informative briefing. As we continue to seek a solution to the tragic humanitarian situation throughout the country, it is also important to continue pursuing political efforts. We all believe that there is no military solution to the Syrian issue. The international community must continue to support and encourage the intra-Syrian negotiations and impress upon all parties that it is only by sitting around the negotiating table and engaging in frank, direct and inclusive dialogue that a solution can be reached that addresses everyone's concerns. In such a process, we must ensure that the sovereignty and unity of Syria are respected. We support the United Nations in its mission as a mediator in finding a political solution to the Syrian issue, pursuant to resolution 2254 (2015). It is imperative to relaunch negotiations in Geneva and all other peace initiatives, including those in Astana and Sochi, which must lead to the resumption of negotiations in Geneva. The final outcome must ensure the well-being of the Syrian people. Consolidating a political process in Syria will be difficult without eradicating terrorism. The international community must also demonstrate its unfaltering unity by joining forces and following the same criteria to combat the various terrorist organizations operating in Syria. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): We thank Special Envoy De Mistura for his update. The humanitarian situation in Syria remains dire. We echo the United Nations call on all parties to facilitate a ceasefire and unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country, pursuant to resolution 2401 (2018). It is also vital to take the measures necessary to protect civilians 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 7/10 and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required under international law and human rights standards. As members of the Security Council are aware, the guarantor States of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities adopted a joint statement on the settlement of the conflict and its future direction at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on 16 March in Astana. Kazakhstan remains committed to bringing peace to Syria. The situation is not simple, but nevertheless we cannot give up. Kazakhstan has taken the following positions. First, we do not believe in a military solution, for that would only aggravate an already difficult situation. We need serious compromises from every side. Any conflict — even the most serious — ends with negotiations, and we must strive to achieve the goal of bringing peace to Syria. We know of many fine examples in which conflicting parties in many other countries have come together despite difficult negotiations so as to find common prosperity for their peoples. Secondly, Kazakhstan calls on the Syrian Government and opposition parties to immediately begin substantive talks on the entire spectrum of issues. Astana does not anticipate any political or international miracles, yet sees great promise in a collective and pragmatic approach. Kazakhstan, for its part, is deeply committed to ending the intense suffering, which has lasted for eight long years. We all know that today Syria is undergoing a significant challenge that must not lead to a deadlock, but offer new opportunities to pave the way to a peaceful and lasting political settlement to the crisis. We hope that the forthcoming ninth round of talks, to be held in Astana in May, will offer an opportunity to end the war. In that regard, we will urge the guarantors and Syrian parties to overcome their differences through dialogue and reach a final agreement covering every aspect of the issue. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte D'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire thanks Mr. De Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, for his briefing on the latest developments in the political process and the situation in the country, and for his work to find a solution to the ongoing crisis. The Ivorian delegation remains concerned about the upsurge in fighting, which with every passing day further distances us from finding a peaceful settlement through political negotiations. Despite the efforts of the international community to establish a ceasefire, we continue to witness indiscriminate attacks and bombardments in eastern Ghouta and other areas in Syria, thereby resulting in a large number of casualties among civilians and the destruction of important infrastructure. My country therefore calls once again for an immediate cessation of hostilities and urges the international community to work together towards the effective implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). That resolution, which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council, calls for establishing a humanitarian cessation of hostilities of at least 30 days so as to allow for the safe, lasting and unhindered access of humanitarian convoys to deliver essential supplies to the people of eastern Ghouta and other areas in Syria. Should it be implemented, such a temporary cessation of hostilities could not only alleviate the suffering of millions of people living in distress and hopelessness, but also allow for the resumption of political talks among Syrian parties in a peaceful environment. In that regard, Côte d'Ivoire hopes that the Astana meeting will lead to a lasting ceasefire, improve the humanitarian situation and establish the conditions for advancing the political process. My country welcomes all initiatives aimed at reviving the inter-Syrian dialogue and encourages Mr. De Mistura to continue undertaking, within the framework of the Geneva process, the steps needed to set up the committee responsible for drafting Syria's new constitution, as agreed at the meeting in Sochi in the Russian Federation. In conclusion, my delegation urges the Syrian parties to give priority to dialogue, which is the only way to advance the political process with a view to a definitive end to the crisis, in accordance with the road map laid out by resolution 2254 (2015). That is Côte d'Ivoire's profound conviction and it is in the interests of the Syrian people. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational States of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the briefing given by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, to whom we reiterate our support in the discharge of his duties. As on previous occasions, my delegation wishes to express its support for the various meetings held in S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 8/10 18-07334 different contexts and at different levels, which have allowed for the creation of de-escalation zones, the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access. At the same time, we remain converned over the urgent need to advance in a political process that will help to resolve the conflict in Syria so that the people can return to peace. That is why we again highlight the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress, held in Sochi on 30 January. It focused on strengthening the political process led by the United Nations within the framework of resolution 2254 (2015), particularly through the drafting of a new constitution by a constitutional committee, which we believe should be representative and neutral. We underscore in particular that the mandate, terms of reference, powers, rules of procedure and selection criteria for the composition of the committee must be agreed in the United Nations-supported talks held in Geneva. In that regard, we firmly believe that the principles agreed at the Sochi Congress will lead to a strong commitment on the part of the parties to respecting the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, in the context of its right to choose its own political, economic and social systems, without pressure or foreign interference. We are certain that the political process will resume as a result of those dialogues. However, and despite the advances in the political arena, we remain concerned over the critical situation of the Syrian people. In that regard, we welcome the holding of the Astana meeting and its outcome, and we hope that those political agreements will be reflected on the ground. We also express our greatest hopes for the success of the summit to be held shortly among high-level representatives of Turkey, Iran and Russia. We hope that it will serve to reaffirm the Astana agreements and de-escalation zones with a view to reducing violence and addressing the needs of families of detained, kidnapped and disappeared persons. Once again, the Council has the challenge of remaining united and calling on the parties involved to join forces and maintain the impetus of the Astana talks and the political process in Sochi, among others, the outcomes of which, we reiterate, must strengthen the political process in Geneva. We hope that those forums for dialogue will promote points of convergence and consensus in order to reduce violence and allow the humanitarian access that is so necessary, not only for the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons, but also to achieve sustainable peace in Syria. To that end, it is crucial for the parties to demonstrate their willingness to seek a settlement to the conflict, which has persisted for more than 8 years. We again call on all parties involved to effectively implement resolution 2401 (2018) throughout the entire Syrian territory in order to achieve unrestricted humanitarian access and permit the necessary urgent medical evacuations. We reject any attempt at fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria, and believe that the Syrian people must be able to freely decide their future and political leadership within the framework of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. In that regard, we reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict is through an inclusive, negotiated and concerted political process, led by the Syrian people for the Syrian people, which will enable a peaceful solution for all parties involved. The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. I wish to again remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable to Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Mr. Ja'afari (Syria) (spoke in Arabic): On 12 March (see S/PV.8201), I informed the members of the Security Council of a number of measures undertaken by the Syrian Government to alleviate the suffering of Syrians throughout my country caused by armed terrorist groups. Today, I assure those present once again that the Government of Syria is indeed most keen to save the lives of its citizens and continues to take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and security. In line with those efforts, the Government of Syria opened the new secure corridor in Hamouriyah village, which was liberated from terrorists yesterday in eastern Ghouta. Its aim is to assist the evacuation of civilians who are being used as human shields by terrorist groups. Just yesterday, Thursday, 15 March, more than 40,000 civilians exited eastern Ghouta through the new additional corridor. They went to the Syrian Government, which coordinated with the Syrian Red Crescent, to facilitate their safe transportation to temporary shelters that are equipped with all the necessary resources. They were not transferred to camps, or tents. The Syrian Army, in coordination with 16/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8206 18-07334 9/10 the Russian Reconciliation Centre for Syria, has opened a total of three corridors in Hamouriyah, Jisreen and Wafideen. Yesterday, the Government of Syria also allowed the entry of a joint assistance convoy of the Red Crescent, the Red Cross and the United Nations, made up of 25 trucks carrying 340 tons of various medical and nutritional supplies. The Syrian Government will continue to allow the passage of such convoys, security conditions permitting. In return for all those efforts undertaken by the Government of Syria to protect its citizens, the armed terrorist groups — upon direct instructions from the Governments of the States supporting them — continue to use civilians as human shields in eastern Ghouta and prevent them from using the corridors as they target them with bullets and missiles. It is quite strange that the Government of Syria is shouldering the huge responsibility of implementing resolution 2401 (2018) and responding to the needs of civilians exiting the inferno of terror in the eastern Ghouta, while the United Nations agencies working in Damascus, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Governments of other countries that are lamenting the destiny of our civilian population have done nothing materially or morally to alleviate the suffering of tens of thousands of people who have escaped from terrorism. One hundred thousand civilians were displaced in Afrin and around 100,000 fled eastern Ghouta —— a total of almost 200,000 civilians — yet no one has provided them with help. Some States members of the Security Council are abusing the work of the Council in launching campaigns to defame and spread misinformation about the Government of Syria, especially with respect to the unofficial Arria Formula meeting that the Council held on 12 March. However, I recall that the United Nations is an Organization of Governments and not a theatre for the display of power, and that giving the opportunity to terrorist groups, including the so called White Helmets affiliated with the Al-Nusra Front, to use the platform of the Security Council represents a gross violation of Security Council resolutions, especially those on combating terrorism. The biggest scandal is that one of the United Nations agencies working in Damascus has asked for the transfer of 76 White Helmets out of eastern Ghouta. It does not care about the tens of thousands of civilians but it cares about 76 White Helmet terrorists. If the Security Council really wants to know about what is happening in Syria, it should ask some of our people who are still living in the city of Raqqa to talk before the Council about the scandals perpetrated against civilians by the outlaw coalition, and its extreme respect for international law after it completely destroyed their city. The coalition has committed the most terrible massacres against civilians, provided protection to 4,000 terrorists affiliated with Da'esh, and facilitated their exit from the city of Raqqa in order to use them somewhere else in Syria. The city of Raqqa is to us what Dresden is to Germany. The Security Council should also ask to hear from some of our people in Afrin, who could tell its members about the ideal implementation of the provisions of international humanitarian law and resolution 2401 (2018) by the invading Turkish forces that have perpetrated terrible massacres against civilians and displaced tens of thousands of them. The Council should also ask some foreign terrorist fighters who have returned to their countries to explain in an open meeting of the Security Council how the Governments of their countries were actually involved in their recruitment, training and financing and how they provided them with arms and sent them to Syria to commit massacres against the Syrian people. The problem is, however, that these fighters have been recycled, renamed and rebranded as the moderate opposition in Syria. The Security Council should also ask some of our people who have left eastern Ghouta over the past few days to talk about the terrorist practices of Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham, the three groups that have been called the moderate Syrian opposition by the United States, France, Britain and their agents in the Gulf Sheikhdoms, and to talk in particular about how those groups kill anyone who tries to get out. They have seized all forms of humanitarian and medical assistance and sold it at very high prices. The Council should also ask some of our people from Fo'ah and Kafraya to talk about their years of suffering in the ongoing oppressive siege there, which has been conducted by Al-Nusra Front with direct assistance from Turkey and Qatar. However, it seems that those defenders of humanity have no ears and tongues to listen about the suffering of those civilians and talk about it. If Western countries in the Security Council were one part in a thousand as sincere as the Russian Federation in their assertions that they really care about the Syrian people and respect the provisions S/PV.8206 The situation in the Middle East 16/03/2018 10/10 18-07334 of the international law, the purposes and principles of the Charter and the Security Council resolutions, particularly those pertaining to combating terrorism, then terrorism would not have emerged in Syria and in other countries. No civilian would have suffered in eastern Ghouta or in eastern Aleppo or in the old city of Homs, Raqqa or any other Syrian city. Those Western countries have invested in terrorism to bring down Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Now, they have also invested in terrorism in Syria and that investment has failed. It is as if these countries were saying that, given a choice between supporting the demons of terrorism, on one the hand, and the Syrian State, on the other, they, the sponsors of terrorism, would choose the demons. In conclusion, the Government of my country reiterates its principled position that the solution to the Syrian crisis is a political one, based on an intra-Syrian dialogue led by Syria without any foreign interference or preconditions. I have spent hours and hours in negotiations with Mr. De Mistura on those very words in resolution 2254 (2015). I remind Council members that the success of the political track and the tangible enhancement of the humanitarian situation will depend primarily on creating an environment conducive to international and regional commitment to seriously fighting terrorism in Syria and freeing the process from politicization. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.
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Robert Wade on Zombie Ideas, Being inside the World Bank, and the Death of Ethics in Economics after the Marginal Revolution
The global economy is at the core of some of the main issues in contemporary International Relations. But how do we understand the global economy and what impact does that have on how we deal with the power politics around it? A fault line seems to have emerged between those who take economic theory seriously and those who denounce it for being part of the problem. Informed by his training as an anthropologist, Robert H. Wade—professor at the LSE—takes a different tack: he bases his engagement with the way in which Adam Smith has been appropriated to advocate for a dominant view of 'free markets' on real-world economics and in-depth accounts of insiders. In this Talk, Wade—among others—discusses experimentation in international economic regimes, why the International Financial Institutions don't fight economic crises, and the powers and perils of being inside the World Bank.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
If we'd reframe your question as being more broadly about global studies, I think that one of the really fundamental questions is how and why it is that the precepts of neoliberalism have penetrated into every nook and cranny of Western societies, and have penetrated to a very large extent many non-Western countries.
This has happened especially, but not only, through the agency of the IMF and the World bank, which have imbued these neoliberal principles; through the mechanism of graduate education: children of the elites in developing countries go out to American, British, other Western universities, and they learn that this is 'true' economics, or 'true' IPE, or 'true' Political Science, and then they come back and implement these same principles and make them a reality back home. But across the globe, this even holds for the Nordic countries. In Iceland and other Nordic countries, from the 1980s, networks of people sharing a belief in neo-liberal precepts, began to form and sort of place each other in key positions within the state, and in politics, and built a momentum in this direction. These precepts have become understood as just natural, as in Margaret Thatcher's 'there is no alternative'.
I live in the UK, and the great bulk of the British public really does believe that the government is just like a household writ large, and the same rules of budgeting that apply to the household should apply to the state. That when times are tough the household has to tighten its belt, cut back on spending, and it is only fair that the government does the same, and if the government does not, if the government runs a deficit in hard times, then the government is being irresponsible. And this is a completely mistaken and pre-Keynesian idea, but it is a 'zombie idea'—that is, however much arguments and evidence may be mounted against it, it just keeps coming up and up and up, and governments come to power riding on this zombie idea and a flotilla of related ideas.
The persistence of this zombie idea is all the more amazing as we just had a global financial crisis in 2007/8, which would prompt a rethinking of these ideas. But these neoliberal precepts have been, if anything, more strongly reinforced. In previous hard times—and obviously the 1930s depression is the exemplary case—there has been a stronger move towards, what you could call, social democratic precepts. But not this time! Indeed, even after the crisis, the whole of the European Union with 500 million people is even more thoroughly structured on the basis of these ideas. I am thinking of what is popularly known as the Fiscal Compact signed by the EU Member States in 2012, which commits all governments to balance budgets all the time—that is, first, the structural deficit may not rise above 0.5 percent of GDP. Second, the public debt may not rise above 60 percent of GDP. Third, automatic financial sanctions are levied on governments that exceed these two thresholds. Fourth, the whole procedure is supervised by the European Commission, and this is presented as in the name of sound budgeting. This package is presented as justified by the proposition that government is a household writ large. The most elementary principles of Keynesian macroeconomics show why this is not simply mistaken, but a disaster, and will keep generating recessionary pressures. It is sold as a kind of excuse for avoiding to put in place the essential conditions for the monetary union, namely, a common budget and a sizable transfer mechanism to the regions just as exists in the United States. But they do not want to do that, but still they call this agreement 'cooperation', which is all about not cooperation, but about writing these dictates around this zombie idea written into the very basic architecture of the EU. Beyond EU politics, it materializes all the way down to, I don't know, the function of the privatization of the Post Office, it goes all the way down to the sort of capillaries of how universities are run, and the incentive systems that have placed upon academics, and there is very little pushback. The one reason, why I am almost completely delighted about Jeremy Corbyn's election as the leader of the Labour party, is that this is one small case of where there seems to be some concerted pushback against these zombie ideas. The point being that the established Labour party basically bought into this whole set of neo-liberal ideas. It combined maintaining the overall structure of inequality in society with more emphasis on providing some help to the poor, but they had to be hardworking poor.
Yet, one knows that there can be dramatic changes in the prevailing zeitgeist of norms. One knows that there can be big changes in the space of a few decades and the question is can one imagine a scenario in which they might be a big change in norms back to a more kind of social-democratic direction. So where will this take place? Because of technological change in the labor market, there is a real big crisis of employment with many middle-class jobs cut out and polarization in the labor market. This might then induce a political movement to have a much bigger change in income distribution than anybody with power is now talking about. Talk of re-distribution these days is really almost entirely around redistribution through the state, but the point I would make is that if there is to be any significant reduction of inequality, especially inequality at the top, there has to be more attention to changes in market-income distribution.
Let me explain. The share of profits in national income has been going up and the share of labor income has been going down. So we should harness the shareholder structure of the market to affect a more equal income distribution by enabling a much wider section of the population to buy into the profit share. At the moment the profit share goes to senior executives and equity holders, but equity holders are highly concentrating at the top of the income and wealth distribution. If equity earners could be spread much more equally, then a much wider section of the population would get income, while they sleep so to speak. We could institute something like trusts, whose members could be the employees of a company, the customers, the neighbors of the company, and the trust would borrow on capital markets and take out insurance against the repayment of the lending of loan and then it would buy shares, it would use that borrowed money to buy shares in the company, and the company would pay out dividends on the shares and then that dividend income coming out of profits would be distributed to the members of the trust. That would be a way of getting the rising share of profits in national income distributed out to the population at large. I particularly like this metaphor of "earning income while you sleep", since at the moment it is only the rich people, who are earning income while they sleep. Somehow that facility of earning income while you sleep has to be made much more widely and available—by using the market against itself, so to speak.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
I suppose the starting point was really this; my father was a New Zealand diplomat, so we moved quite often. By that time I was twelve my parents were posted to Colombo, Ceylon as it was called then. After having lived just in Western countries, I suddenly encountered at this very formative age Colombo and Sri Lanka. I was just amazed by that experience; by the color, the taste, the exoticness, but I was also very struck by how the many boys at the same age as me, were walking around with no shoes. I particular remember this boy carrying a baby on his shoulder, the baby looked half-dead and covered in scabs, and I think it was then I got the idea of just how unequal the world was. Then at university I studied economics, but I also visited my parents in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and I got another sense of that great disparity in wealth and living standards. At this time I had come across Adam Smith and the wealth of nations question and that helped to encapsulate or to crystalize my interests. So I wanted to go the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex and got enrolled for a PhD in economics, but en route I spent several weeks in India and during that time I began to dwell upon just how boring and how useless everything I studied under the name of microeconomics. I kept thinking of these dreadfully dry textbooks of marginal cost curves and marginal revenue curves and utility function and difference curves etc., which I had forced myself to sit exams in. By this time I had done a little bit of fieldwork, living on Pitcairn Island in the middle of the Pacific.
When I got back to Sussex after fieldwork I announced that I wished to not do a PhD in economics, but to do one in anthropology thinking all the time, that this would actually be more use for understanding why for example India, where I had been, was so very poor. So that's what I did: a PhD in anthropology… In some ways I regard that as having been a mistake, because the sort of mainstream of anthropology is very far away from the Adam Smith questions. Having done the degree in anthropology, pretty soon I began to change direction and pay much more attention to the state, to the state bureaucracy. I went to India and I studied the Irrigation Department and other related departments. I went to South Korea and I studied state irrigation agencies and I went to Taiwan and I studied the state more broadly. So I was kind of moving up from my Italian village, moving kind of up the scale in terms of state agencies and then the state as a whole.
Then I went to work for the World Bank in the 1980s and my main reason for doing that was not to do the research the World Bank wanted me to do, but rather to study the World Bank from the inside as fieldwork. If in some ways switching to anthropology was a mistake, in other ways it was not, because I approached those kind of Wealth-of-Nations-questions in a way very different from how economists approached them. For example when I went to Taiwan and studied the trade regime, the first thing I did was to go and talk to people who operated through the trade regime, whereas I noticed that the published works by economists celebrating Taiwan's free trade regime was based on what the rules said and what certain government officials told them was the case. They had never actually talked to people who traded through the trade regime. If they would have, they would have learned about all the covert controls that went on such that there was quite a distinction between the liberal face of the trade regime and the reality of the trade regime. The reality was that the government was managing trade in line with industrial policy, but the government absolutely did not want the world to know that. So all this was kept hidden and I was really regarded as rather unwelcome visitor—and in fact to this day my book Governing the Market (1990, read the introduction here) is not well received in Taiwan. It says the government of Taiwan did a good job of managing the market, but they want the world to believe that Taiwan is a free trade country. So that is the kind of intellectual trajectory that I have been on.
So I think that the value of the anthropology PhD was that it really taught me, in practical terms, the meaning of the anthropological maxim, which is 'soaking and poking'. To put it another way—I love this—anthropologists are social scientists, who believe that the plural of anecdote is evidence. And indeed I place a lot of weight on anecdotes, on gossip, on the stories people tell, whereas economists would be much happier reducing, let us say, South Korea's trade regime to one data point in a matrix, and then compare that data point with, let us say, Malaysia's data point to see how the trade regimes are correlated with growth, or something like that, and that is really not my interest.
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
Despite what I've just said, I do think that a graduate training in economics is very useful, provided one does not believe it. And that is really difficult, because the socialization pressures are intense: if you do not say the right things—which are neoliberal type things on the whole—then you will likely not get a high grade. But I have noticed that economists tend to know how to think, how to make arguments, they tend to understand the idea of causality, and that may seem an astonishing thing to say on my part, because it implies that students coming from other disciplines are often weak in understanding the very basic ideas of causality, but that is my experience. I had many students coming from, who knows, IR or Political Science or Sociology or Anthropology, who clearly do not have much idea of causality; they can describe things, but they find thinking in terms of cause and effect, in terms of independent and dependent variables, in terms of left and right side, they just find it difficult. So I do think that there is a lot to be said for studying economics, and mastering the maths, provided that the critical facility is not lost. That is point number one.
Point number two is that I think that there is a huge premium on doing fieldwork, and the field work maybe in developing countries, but when I say field work, I don't just mean going out to villages, going out to see poor people 'over there'. I am talking of fieldwork inside bureaucracies: to try and understand the culture, the incentive systems that people are working under—fieldwork at home so to speak, in the countries one comes from. From the students' point of view, it is clearly much easier to sit in the LSE library to do the research. So in my marking I give quite a premium to a student actually doing fieldwork, going out and interviewing, and having the experience of writing up and interpreting the interviews and somehow fitting it back into a larger argument—but really few students actually do that, and I think that that is a real, real big mistake. Mind you, the same risk holds for fieldwork in economics as it does for studying economics: I encourage students to work for (do fieldwork in, experience) the World Bank; and several have—but to the best of my knowledge almost none of them has kept their critical perspective. They really come to buy into it.
The relations between states are settled either through diplomacy or warfare. Why would we have to focus on economics to understand IR?
Because economics—such as for example balances of payment, surpluses and deficits—set the constraints and incentives on countries in terms of their relationships with each other. A great deal of diplomacy is driven by economic pressures: diplomacy to get other countries to for example open their markets, or to cut deals with countries—'if you do this, we will do that'—deals that may relate to areas that are rather different, for instance if you buy more of these of our exports, we will help you fight such and such country, because the manufactures are in my constituency.
So, in a way, the way you framed the question is part of the reason why I react against the discipline of IR: because it tends to treat diplomacy, war, and so on, as somehow rather separate from economic pressures, and I see these economic pressures as very powerful drivers of both of the other two things. As another example, one of the drivers of the Syrian conflict was that there was an acute drought (like Weizman observed in Theory Talk #69, red), which meant that many people were rendered destitute; rural areas flooded into the cities, and the Assad regime just was—understandably—unable to cope; and large numbers of young men, concentrated in cities, rootless and with no jobs, just were recruiting fodder for the Wahhabi sect. I have always thought of economics—not so much as in the making choices in conditions of scarcity, that is sort of Lionel Robin's definition—in the sense of Alfred Marshal, about how people make a living, as a very fundamental driver of a lot of what happens in International Relations.
Pikkety recently published Capital in the 21st Century, causing quite the stir. But why would inequality between people matter for IR?
Let me comment by invoking a very contemporary exhibit—the migration crisis in Europe now. Maybe a decade ago I looked at the figures and if you took the average income of the EU-15 prior to latest extensions and then expressed the average income of countries outside of the EU—including sub-Sahara Africa—as a percentage, then there was a really dramatic falling away of income levels relative to the EU, in countries all around the EU and whether you took market exchange rates or purchasing power parity. If you went round to sub-Sahara Africa and took the average, it was more like two percent in market exchange rates and seven percent in purchasing power parity; and the 'problem' is that there is certainly here a rather thin slither of sea between Africa and the promised land of Europe and to the east there are these great open planes, where armies can go up and down to the speed of light, so to speak, but people can also move pretty quickly across these planes.
So all one has to do—and this might just be only a bit of an exaggeration—if one is on the poor end of this poverty pyramid is hop across the border and you have a chance at least of getting a very appreciable increase in living conditions and income, with which you can then get savings to remit back to home. So the migrations pressures are just huge. So that is one reason for linking inequality to issues in International Relations—really fundamental issues, and very very difficult to dissolve.
You've done anthropological fieldwork inside the World Bank—an institution drawing a lot of criticism from its detractors in IR. Can you shed some kind of light about what kind of 'animal' the World Bank is?
First of all, let me say that at the micro-level—the level of the people you know and the people I know inside the World Bank—I agree that there are people doing a lot of good work. But if you look at the organization more generally—the World Bank and also the IMF—they are clearly instruments mainly of US foreign policy—and any number of US senators, members of the House, have basically said that. When they are defending the International Financial Institutions (they often criticize them), they do so by saying they are important for US foreign policy. And you have to look at the governance structures to see how it is that the US in particular—but Western states more generally—have from the beginning, through the very Articles of Agreement, created a structure which locks in their power, and has made it very difficult for other countries (including Japan) to significantly increase their shareholdings. The US has kept the presidency of the Bank and the much less recognized Number Two position of the IMF, and has used these positions to have a very strong influence.
Just to illustrate what the Bank and the Fund do: at the time of the East-Asian crisis—specifically the Korean crisis in 1997-1998—the IMF mission was in Seoul. The negotiations were in a hotel there. David Lipton from the US Treasury (and a former student of Larry Summers who was by then Deputy Secretary) was just down the corridor of where the negotiations took place, and every so often the IMF people would walk out of the negotiations and consult with David Lipton, then come back in and—as Paul Blustein reports in his book called The Chastening—often said something rather different from what they had been saying before they consulted with David Lipton.
Just to take another example, the US being able to appoint the president of the Bank—to appoint a person known personally to the Treasury Secretary or to the Secretary of the State, or both—is really of great value: when there is a 'trustful relationship'—or a relationship of dependency, the president being dependent on those who appointed him in the Administration—it is possible for those people in the Administration, or people close to them, to just ring up the president of the Bank, and talk in a very informal, confidential, trustful way about what is happening in Latin America, or what is happening in the Middle East, and what the US thinks the Bank should or should not be doing in those places. Larry Summers appointed a protégé of his to one of the regional development banks, and this person—who is very senior in the bank—told me that Larry would frequently ring him, while he is being driven home in the evening from the Treasury, just to have a chat about how things were going in her region, and to pass on suggestions about what the Bank should be doing there, and to get intelligence from her about what was happening in the region, and so on. The point is that, making these personal connections is of immense value, but at the same time, the US Congress, in particular, is very much against having a big Bank against allowing a capital increase for the World Bank—so that the bank could, as it should be doing, increase its lending for infrastructure investment ten times. It is just a complete scandal how little the Bank has been lending for the past 20 years or more for infrastructure, for roads and power stations and so on. The US does not want the Bank providing socialistic competition with the private sector: it says these things are for the private sector to do, and the Bank has to take care of poverty, because the private sector is not interested in poverty.
So the US wants to keep the presidency of the Bank, it wants to keep, secondly, its unique veto right on the big decisions, such as decisions on whether to increase the capital base—but provided those two things are met it does not care that much about the Bank. In the case of the Fund, the US is also very powerful, but of course the Europeans have a bit more relative power. Right now I think the world is in an even more dangerous sort if financial condition than might appear, because the IMF is acutely short of secure or guaranteed lending resources, so if there is to be another round of crisis—as I think is entirely likely within the next five years—the Fund depends upon borrowing short-term from member countries, like on six months terms, but member countries can say 'no', and that means that the Fund's ability to fight crises is quite constrained. The Fund should implement what was agreed in 2010 by all the member countries represented on the board of the IMF: to roughly double the quote of the guaranteed lending resources, that is, resources the countries actually hand over to the Fund, over which they actually give up country control. All the relevant capitals ratified it with one exception—the US—because Congress refused because the individual barons, who are not under that much party discipline, each said to the Treasury: 'look, the question of the IMF is of zero significance to my electorate, so if you want my vote on the IMF, you have to give me things that I want like projects in my constituency and so on'. The Treasury added up the demands of the people, whose vote had to be won, and it considered those demands were just way, way, way over the top. As long as a Democrat is in the presidency, while the House is controlled by Republicans the world is sort of held hostage to this. Beyond this example, this actually entails a structural problem: the US blocking or producing a gridlock in international organizations, because the Congress is hostile to international organizations, because Congress sees it to imply a loss of US sovereignty. The only way to end this gridlock is to end the US veto in the Fund and the Bank, but the problem is that the US can veto any measures.
One response of the big developing countries is to create bypass organizations—such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Banks, such as the new Development Bank, such as the Contingent Reserve arrangement the BRICs have established, and then a growing number of sort of regional development banks. And I think that that is a good thing, but it does raise questions about coordination, about who is looking after, if you will, the global interests, global issues such as climate change. In short, we need a genuine World Bank, rather than the American-Bank-in-the-World we have today.
You engage thoroughly with economics and economic theory. Now there seem to be two kinds of critical approaches to economics in IPE: one criticizes its rationality as flawed, and another buys into its rationality but attempts to point out where actual policy gets it wrong. Where do you stand in this?
If you take the example of how the EU attempted to impose fiscal rules on Greece, you see a notion of rationality which draws upon these very primitive notions that I referred to right at the beginning, where the government is just a household writ large, and the same set of rules that apply to the budgeting of the household must apply to the government as well. Here, the assumption is that any macroeconomic proposition must have microeconomic foundations, that it must be derivable from propositions about microeconomic agents acting in this sort of self-maximizing way, and if you cannot derive macroeconomic propositions from those micro foundations, then there is something unreliable, un-rigorous about your macroeconomics. So what are then the sources of these micro-economic assumptions?
This leads us to one fundamental and almost completely unaddressed weaknesses of economics can be traced back to the Marginal Revolution in the late 19th century. From that moment onwards, there has been an attempt to model economics on physics, and that was very explicit on the part of people like Pareto and Walras, and Jevons, early Marginalist thinkers. They even drew up tables with terms of physics, like velocity, on one side, and then corresponding terms in economics on the other. That had a huge benefit in terms of the 'science' of economics, because it cut economics loose from Adam Smith's and other classical economists' preoccupations with issues of morality and ethics. Adam Smith thought his most important book was not the Wealth of Nations but his Theory of Moral Sentiments, on which he was working, revising yet again, when he died. For Smith, economics and morals were never separate worlds, but intimately related. So for him, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations were just twins. The point about the marginalist revolution, and the embrace of physics as the model, was that it cut economics free of all that sort of subjective stuff about values. So economics after the marginalist revolution set off with the assumption that not production, but the movement of individuals in markets engaged in trading with each other became the center of gravity of economics. Making the study of exchange rather than the study of production central was analogous to, say, Boyle's Law in physics. Boyle's Law in physics explained the movement of molecules in gasses, as a function of the pressure applied to the gas. So why did they make that analogy?
The point of likening of individuals in microeconomic actions with molecules in gasses was the following. Everybody knows that we do not apply any consideration of ethics or moral sentiments to the movement of the molecules in gas, so neither should we apply any notions of ethics or moral sentiments to the movements of individuals in market exchanges. And that was the way that all considerations of ethics, of morality were just removed from economics. I for instance asked the question to well-known American growth theorist, as we were walking down the street in Providence at Brown University: 'is it moral for people to freeride?' And he said, 'yes of course, provided they do not break the law'. So ethics and questions of morality have been almost completely expunged from economics in a way that would horrify classical economists including Smith; and a particular idea of rationality has been an important part of cleansing economics from those moral considerations. George DeMartino, editor of the Oxford Handbook of Professional Economics Ethics which just appeared has a wonderful phrase to capture this—'econogenic harm': the harm built into the way that economics, professional economists work.
Haven't specific fields, like development economics—a field you engage with yourself—advanced to overcome these weaknesses in economic theory?
Let me root my answer again in observations about the linkages between theory and practice, for it is in practice that economic theory really does its work and its politics becomes visible. It always amazes me we have had a development industry in place for roughly the past 70 years with vast numbers of people, organizations, money all orchestrated underneath this umbrella of development; yet if you go back and read what the early writers about development and economic growth said—I am thinking of people like Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Myrdal, Hirschman, Prebisch, but also Moses Abramovitz. If you go back and look at what they were saying, it seems to me that we have not advanced all that much. Sure, we have advanced a lot in terms of econometric techniques, but in terms of substance we have not. One conclusion I draw from that is that it is really important that international regimes—for example, World Bank and IMF loan conditions, but also WTO regimes—give room for experimentation, because it is really not the case that 'there is no alternative'. This Washington Consensus agenda has clearly not been effective in accelerating production, upgrading it, and production diversification, or export upgrading, or export diversification. So, there should be written into the regimes a lot of room for experimentation. But this isn't there because of the political origin of these regimes; because of what western countries want for the rest world, namely, to open the rest of the world to their markets.
In the 80s there were a lot of experts in industrial development in the World Bank and they did good work, promoting industrial growth and investment in productive infrastructure. But then Anne Krueger came in as chief economist, and brought in a whole lot of people with her—who, like here, were arch-neoliberals. The industrial growth people were invited to find employment elsewhere, or to rebrand themselves as experts in who knows what, environmental assessment, primary education, or good governance. There was no room for them. This also fitted well with some bad experiences the Bank had had with investing in infrastructure. It had gotten into a lot of trouble with large-scale infrastructural interventions such as roads and dams and the like from, especially, US NGOs mobilizing Congress—which then put pressure on the Treasury and so on. My lament throughout this whole conversation has been that we seem to have become just locked into this direction that was set in the 1980s, and it is very difficult to see what kind of economic catastrophe would be necessary to give a sufficient shock to reroute the global system of economic governance.
So after the 1980s, the Bank sort of backed off and began saying that development, economic development, was about poverty reduction—the slogan of the Bank became, 'our dream is a world free of poverty'. You can understand that shift partly in terms of pulling out of the concern with production to get into safe territory, but also because poverty reduction seemed to sort of take care of inequality, because you reduced inequality to poverty—to the poor 'over there', and we can feel good about helping them; but we do not want talk about inequality, which involves us, because then there is the question of justice of our income.
But then the most recent turn is that we're seeing a renewed push for infrastructure in the World Bank and western development agencies. I think that you can link this recent infrastructure push to uncertainty about the sources of economic growth. In the West there is a real question about sustaining economic growth without housing bubbles and stock market bubbles—in other words, without endogenously building financial instability. There may well be a similar sort of issue in terms of the growth of developing countries.
Last question. Adam Smith seems to be constantly present in your work as a critical interlocutor. How come?
I kind of engage in a critical debate with Adam Smith, but especially with people today, who believe his ideas. I often start to frame arguments in terms of his famous 40 word summary of the causes of the relative wealth of nations, which he actually wrote in 1755, which is to say long before the first edition of the Wealth of Nations. I will just tell you what these 40 words say, and then I will tell you the significance of them. He said:
'Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism than peace, easy taxes, and tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.'
So I am struck by how today many economists say or imply that this is essentially right; you need some qualifications of course, but essentially that is the nub of it. You might have to translate peace, easy taxes, tolerable administration of justice into more modern terms, but that is the essence of it. For example, Gregory Mankiw—Professor of economics at Harvard, former chair of the National Council of Economic Advisers during the Bush administration, and author of a very popular textbook in economics—said in the Wall Street Journal in 2006: Adam Smith was right to say that – and then he gave the 40 word quote. The renowned economists Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson wrote Pillars of Prosperity, which also begins with Smith's 40 words, and they even see the book as a kind of elaboration, but in that same kind of spirit, of Smith's basic idea. So my point is that these ideas are still current; they are still the sort of front of a lot of neoliberal thinking. I am just astonished these ideas all these centuries later remain so powerful. I have had at the back of my mind the idea of organizing an international competition to provide a contemporary 40 word statement, which is sort of equivalent to Smith's, which would obviously have to be of a more global character, encompassing the globalized world economy.
Robert Hunter Wade worked at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 1972-95, World Bank, 1984-88, Princeton Woodrow Wilson School 1989/90, MIT Sloan School 1992, Brown University 1996-2000. Fellow of Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 1992/93, Russell Sage Foundation 1997/98, Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin 2000/01. Fieldwork in Pitcairn Is., Italy, India, Korea, Taiwan. Research on World Bank 1995-continuing. Author of Irrigation and Politics in South Korea (1982), Village Republics: The Economic Conditions of Collective Action in India (1988, 1994), Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia's Industrialization (1990, 2003). Latter won American Political Science Association's award of Best Book in Political Economy, 1992.
Related links
Faculty profile at LSE Read Wade's The Piketty phenomenon and the future of inequality (2014, real-world economics review) here (pdf) Read Wade's Capitalism and Democracy at Cross-Purposes (2013, Challenge) here (pdf) Read Wade's Rethinking Industrial Policy for Low Income Countries (2007 ADB Conference paper) here (pdf) Read Wade's Bringing the State Back In (2005, IPG) here (pdf) Read Wade's Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality? (2004, World Development) here (pdf) Read Wade's Creating Capitalisms (Introduction to 2003 book 'Governing the Market') here (pdf)
The Situation In The Middle East Report Of The Secretary-General On The Implementation Of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) And 2393 (2017) ; United Nations S/PV.8171 Security Council Seventy-third year 8171st meeting Tuesday, 30 January 2018, 10.35 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Umarov. . (Kazakhstan) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Shen Bo Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Woldegerima France. . Mr. Delattre Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Safronkov Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mr. Miller Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/60) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-02496 (E) *1802496* S/PV.8171 The situation in the Middle East 30/01/2018 2/10 18-02496 The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/60) The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2018/60, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). I now give the floor to Ms. Mueller. Ms. Mueller: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to provide the Security Council with an update on the humanitarian situation in Syria. Years of conflict have caused immeasurable human suffering and left countless civilians dead, injured or missing. The United Nations estimates that 13.1 million people are in need of protection and humanitarian assistance, including 6.1 million people who are displaced within the country. Another 5.5 million people have fled the conflict across borders into neighbouring countries. The Council will have heard at first-hand the account of the Emergency Relief Coordinator in his statement to the Security Council on 22 January with regard to his visit to Syria, in which he highlighted the plight of the Syrian people. During the visit, he heard individual stories from some of the people caught up in the violence and conflict. In Homs, he saw entire districts of the city reduced to rubble. The visit was the first for an Emergency Relief Coordinator in more than two years. It was an important opportunity to see ways in which the United Nations can support people in need. It was also a chance to hold discussions with the Government of Syria and our humanitarian partners on how to address some of the most pressing humanitarian needs. As fighting continues, I am particularly concerned about the safety and protection of civilians caught up in the violence in north-west Syria, where hostilities have reportedly caused numerous deaths and injuries. Air strikes and fighting in southern Idlib and northern Hama have resulted in more than 270,000 displacements since 15 December 2017, driving people from their homes to other areas of Idlib. Camps for displaced people are overstretched, forcing most of those displaced to seek shelter in some 160 makeshift settlements. During the cold and wet winter months, many families have nothing else but improvised tents, which they share with others. Attacks on medical facilities and vital infrastructure continue, with reports of at least 16 attacks on health-care facilities during the month of December alone. Yesterday Médecins Sans Frontières reported that air strikes had hit a hospital it supports in the Saraqib district of Idlib, causing five deaths, injuring others and seriously damaging the facility, which is now closed. That was the second reported strike on the facility in nine days. Further north, in Afrin, in Aleppo governorate, the United Nations is carefully monitoring the situation of over 300,000 people living in the district, which is experiencing fighting. We have reports of civilian casualties and that approximately 15,000 people have been displaced within the district, with another 1,000 displaced to Aleppo governorate. We have also received reports that local authorities inside Afrin are restricting civilian movement, particularly for those who want to leave. I am also concerned about the situation in eastern Ghouta and areas of Damascus, where civilian deaths and destruction of civilian infrastructure continue to be reported. In the first 10 days of the year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented at least 81 civilians killed in the enclave, including 25 women and 30 children. Scores of residential buildings in the area have been damaged or destroyed in recent weeks. I also note with concern that shelling continues from eastern Ghouta into Damascus, resulting in civilian deaths and injuries. Although 29 patients in urgent need of medical care were allowed out of eastern Ghouta in late December, hundreds more, most of them women and children, require immediate medical attention. So far, there have 30/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8171 18-02496 3/10 been 21 civilian deaths among those waiting for and needing medical evacuation. Their needs are critical, and the law is clear. I urge all parties, and all those with influence over the parties, to see to it that all such medical evacuations take place without conditions or delay. With reference to all of the flashpoints I have highlighted, I call on the parties to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian and medical infrastructure, in line with international humanitarian law, and to ensure the safe, sustained and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need. I would also like to take this opportunity to reiterate my concern about the protection situation in the city of Raqqa, where returns continue despite the widespread presence of explosive remnants of war. Nearly 60,000 individuals have reportedly returned since the end of hostilities in October 2017. However, humanitarian partners continue to emphasize that, given the high prevalence of landmines, booby traps and unexploded ordinance, Raqqa is not safe for civilian returns. Deaths and injuries due to explosions have been reported with alarming frequency, and trauma cases nearly doubled in recent months. More than 534 civilians have been injured in blasts since the expulsion of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant from the city in October 2017, of whom 112 people died. Each week, between 30 and 50 civilians continue to arrive at trauma centres in Raqqa after being wounded by improvised explosive devices concealed in their homes and neighbourhoods. Risk from explosive hazards is not limited to Raqqa; there are indications that substantial contamination also exists throughout Deir ez-Zor governorate, where there has been little or no mine surveying or clearance. Despite the desperate humanitarian needs in many areas in Syria, the United Nations and humanitarian partners continue to face serious challenges in accessing those in need. Last month, I briefed the Council that none of our cross-line convoys were able to reach besieged locations and that only two convoys had accessed hard-to-reach areas. This month, the United Nations and its partners have had no access to any such locations at all. Not one convoy has been able to deploy. Discussions about convoys have stalled over requirements to lower the number of beneficiaries and about splitting convoys in a way that would not allow us to provide food or other essential items. Our deliveries must continue to be based on humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law, impartially based on civilian need. At the same time, the United Nations is also seeing access to areas previously reached under regular programming coming to a halt. Local authorities in north-east Syria have twice held humanitarian convoys at the checkpoint with Government-controlled areas in eastern Aleppo. Furthermore, local authorities have requested changes related to the operations of our non-governmental partners, which in turn has blocked our assistance delivery to much of north-east Syria. The situation has been further compounded by the refusal of the Governor of Hassakah to issue facilitation letters for our deliveries. While the cross-border operations of our partners continue, such assistance is not sufficient to meet the needs in the north-east. To solve the situation, I call on all parties and those with influence over them to engage now to see that access to those areas resume. Finally, due to insecurity in the north-west, which has included numerous rocket attacks from within Syria into Turkey, on 20 January the United Nations temporarily suspended cross-border deliveries at the two authorized border crossing points in Turkey. The United Nations remains in discussion with Turkish authorities on restarting operations as quickly as possible to ensure the continued delivery of assistance, which hundreds of thousands of Syrians rely upon every month. Those access challenges underscore the importance of using all the modalities of delivery at our disposal. Despite prevailing challenges, the United Nations and its partners have continued to reach millions of people in need each month. For example, in December, regular programming from within the country resulted in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to millions of people, including over 3 million people who received food assistance through 1,500 deliveries. The United Nations and its partners also provided health, protection and education services. Cross-border assistance also continued to reach hundreds of thousands of people in need, as 653 trucks delivered food assistance to more than 500,000 people, health assistance for over 600,000 treatments, as well as other support for hundreds of thousands. After almost eight years of conflict, people's needs are as vast as they are critical. The United Nations and its partners will continue to deliver to millions of S/PV.8171 The situation in the Middle East 30/01/2018 4/10 18-02496 people in need. The United Nations also stands ready to bolster such support, but requires efficient and effective mechanisms to ensure the safe and rapid delivery of aid. To that end, the Emergency Relief Coordinator has identified five areas where the United Nations is looking to make concrete progress. First, we need to finalize the United Nations humanitarian response plan for 2018, for which we will be seeking $3.5 billion to meet the needs of more than 13 million people in all parts of Syria. Secondly, it is important that there be an agreement on medical evacuations for hundreds of critically ill people trapped in besieged eastern Ghouta. People in other besieged areas should get the same assistance. Thirdly, humanitarian access needs to improve. The United Nations has requested agreement for three to four United Nations and Syrian Arab Red Crescent inter-agency cross-line convoys each week. We need consistent access to all people in need. Fourthly, we must reach agreement on the United Nations-supported aid convoys from Damascus to Rukban in south-eastern Syria. While the exceptional delivery of assistance from Jordan in early January was a positive development, a sustainable solution is required. Fifthly, more effective arrangements are needed to enable the United Nations to support the work of Syrian non-governmental organizations and to enable international non-governmental organizations to perform the stronger role they can, and are ready to, play in relieving the suffering. I hope that we will be able to report to the Security Council next month on real progress achieved in those five key areas, and that, month after month, we will move forward until they are all fully addressed. The President: I thank Ms. Mueller for her briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I thank Assistant Secretary-General Mueller for her briefing. When considering the Syria humanitarian issue, we always have in mind the powerful plea last December by the Russian Permanent Representative that we should keep our differences over the politics in Syria out of our consideration of humanitarian issues — a view that we strongly continue to endorse. Last week, Mark Lowcock briefed us on his visit to Syria. It was the first time that an Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs had visited Syria in more than two years, having been blocked previously from visiting. The United Kingdom commends the Under-Secretary-General's efforts to start a meaningful dialogue between the United Nations and the Syrian regime in order to improve the humanitarian situation for the people of Syria. On the basis of discussions and as we iterated today, the Under-Secretary-General set out five clear asks to enable the United Nations to sustain and improve its aid efforts. The United Kingdom fully supports those asks. Unfortunately, the Security Council has been unable to reach agreement on a text that would unanimously call upon the Syrian regime to ensure that those five asks are granted without delay. I want to reflect on this disappointing situation. One of the five key asks of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is the regime's agreement to allow three or four United Nations and Syrian Arab Red Crescent convoys each week across front lines to provide assistance to up to 2.5 million people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. These convoys are needed to deliver aid, including both food and medical supplies, to civilians who have lived in a war zone for almost seven years. That request for consistent, regular access to all people in need is crucial. In 2017, only 27 per cent of United Nations inter-agency convoy requests were approved by the Syrian regime in full. That is significantly worse than in 2016, when 45 per cent of requests were approved. Assistant Secretary- General Mueller's briefing was especially concerning in that respect. We cannot let that happen again in 2018. Ninety-four per cent of those living under siege are located in eastern Ghouta. The Al-Assad regime is using humanitarian aid as a weapon of war by restricting access to the besieged population. There were no aid deliveries to the area for the whole of December, and nearly 12 per cent of children under five years of age in eastern Ghouta suffer from acute malnutrition. It is appalling that innocent children are once again suffering the most. The Under-Secretary-General also requested the immediate evacuation of hundreds of people who are in need of medical assistance from eastern Ghouta. We call on those who can influence the regime to use all of their authority to allow for rapid, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access and medical evacuations 30/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8171 18-02496 5/10 for those in need. According to the Secretary-General, 18 people have already died while waiting for the regime's permission to leave the besieged city. People are dying for want of health care and services that are available fewer than 10 miles away, in Damascus. Let us recall that the backdrop of the Under- Secretary-General's visit was the escalation in air strikes in eastern Ghouta and the north-west, including Aleppo, Idlib governorate and northern Hama. Yesterday at least five people, including a child, were killed by an air strike on a hospital supported by Médecins sans frontières in Syria's Idlib governorate. The facility was also seriously damaged and at least six people, including three medical staff, were injured as a result of the attack. The air strikes on the hospital occurred while the doctors were receiving people who had been injured an hour earlier in another air strike on a market. Those strikes had already killed 11 people. These events are taking place are in areas where there are meant to be ceasefires with the stated aim of putting a prompt end to violence and improving the humanitarian situation. Unfortunately for the people of Syria, that could not be further from the reality. The deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure in Idlib and eastern Ghouta continues, in blatant violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law. The intensification of hostilities has displaced approximately 270,000 people within Idlib since 15 December 2017, stretching scarce resources beyond their limits. The escalation of air strikes in eastern Ghouta has resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths since 30 December. UNICEF reports that, in the first 14 days of 2018, more than 30 children were killed by escalating violence in the enclave. It is against that backdrop that I call on the regime to allow for immediate, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance to meet fully the needs of those who require food and medical supplies. Let all with influence exert it to ensure that. It is our must crucial, immediate request. It is also imperative that all parties adhere to agreed ceasefires and cessations of hostilities, uphold international humanitarian law and protect civilians. Yesterday, a number of us visited the United States National Holocaust Museum's exhibition on Syria. We saw the photographs of those killed and tortured by the regime and we read their biographies, their life stories. It had a profound effect on me, and it brought home how the tragedy in Syria is not just a geopolitical one — it is a human one. For humanity's sake, all of us around this table must ensure that we have done our all. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I would like to thank Ms. Ursula Mueller for her comprehensive briefing. I reiterate France's full support for the recommendations of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Mark Lowcock, which Ms. Mueller has just referenced. I would also like to express my country's grave concerns about the latest developments in the humanitarian situation in Syria. Several points are of particular concern. We note the extremely dire situation of the population in eastern Ghouta — still besieged and denied the humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations that they need — and the escalation of violence, particularly in the Idlib region. In addition, we are concerned about the attacks on hospitals, medical facilities and the provision of health care, as well as the persistent restrictions on humanitarian access in Syria, which are unacceptable and have tightened further in recent weeks — denying the civilian population the access to the essential resources that they so vitally need. Accordingly, I should like to make three main observations. First, we are particularly concerned about the current escalation of violence in eastern Ghouta and the Idlib region, which adds to the suffering of the affected populations. In eastern Ghouta, 400,000 civilians are victims of almost daily bombings by the regime and its allies. According to the World Health Organization, approximately 750 people in eastern Ghouta are still waiting for emergency medical evacuation. Since 30 December, the wounded have been unable to be transported out of eastern Ghouta to receive care; 21 others have died from their wounds, unable to wait another day. We note and stress that it is the responsibility of the Syrian regime to allow those medical evacuations to proceed without delay. The situation in the south of Idlib and in the north of Hama is very worrying as well. The continued bombings led to the displacement of about 250,000 civilians last month. More than 33 people were reportedly killed in less than 24 hours. The town of Sarakab was bombed yesterday morning, and the strikes hit the town market, killing more than 11 people and injuring a number of others. One hour later, the only public hospital in the district — a hospital supported by the non-governmental S/PV.8171 The situation in the Middle East 30/01/2018 6/10 18-02496 organization Médecins Sans Frontières — was struck, killing five people, including a child, and injuring six others, including medical staff. France very firmly condemns attacks on health-care workers and medical infrastructure, as well as the indiscriminate bombings carried out in recent weeks by the Syrian regime against civilians in eastern Ghouta and in residential areas of Idlib province. France reiterates that indiscriminate bombings and the use of incendiary weapons against civilians represent serious violations of international humanitarian law and could constitute war crimes or even crimes against humanity. It is vital and urgent to bring to an immediate end the bombings in Idlib and the siege in eastern Ghouta. The Astana guarantors have taken upon themselves the responsibility to supervise its implementation, and we therefore urge these States to effectively impose on the Syrian regime a complete cessation of hostilities as well as respect for the basic principles and norms of international humanitarian law and human rights law. The second observation is particularly worrying: the deterioration of humanitarian access in recent weeks in Syria. We have reiterated this concern on numerous occasions in this Chamber: the humanitarian situation will not improve without comprehensive, unimpeded, safe and ongoing humanitarian access to the aid distributed by the United Nations and its partners. Nonetheless, the regime is continuing to create unacceptable obstacles to the provision of humanitarian aid. The Syrian authorities have not authorized even a single inter-agency convoy in several weeks. France condemns this unacceptable attitude and reiterates its call for the safe and unhindered access of the United Nations and its humanitarian partners to civilians throughout Syrian territory. The right of the Syrian population both to humanitarian assistance and to protection must be respected unconditionally. The Security Council cannot remain silent given these recurring violations of international humanitarian law, which require a strong response from the Council. Finally, I would like to touch on the obvious discrepancy between the continuing violence on the ground in Syria and the diplomatic offensives, which are not facing up to the situation. We know that only an inclusive political solution that is elaborated under the auspices of the United Nations and that sets up a political transition in the context of resolution 2254 (2015) can bring a lasting and credible end to the suffering of the Syrian people. However, the regime is continuing its policy of methodical and deliberate obstruction, as we saw during the negotiation session held in Vienna on 25 and 26 January. In this context more than ever, we need to support the United Nations and United Nations mediation in Geneva, as well as eschew any temporary solutions agreed without the opposition, which would be unrealistic as they would not meet the aspirations of all Syrians. It is up to those countries that support the regime, primarily Russia and Iran, to bring to bear the pressure necessary to ensure that the regime puts an end to this negative and irresponsible strategy. Make no mistake: there can be no negotiated political transition in Syria without a total ceasefire, humanitarian access throughout the whole of the territory and the creation of a neutral environment that would restore trust and ensure the safety of all Syrians. How credible is a regime that is stepping up the bombing in Idlib, preventing medical evacuations in eastern Ghouta and refusing to authorize a single humanitarian convoy? How credible can diplomatic efforts be that are devoid of any specific assurances and that do not lead to any significant and lasting improvement in the humanitarian situation in Idlib and eastern Ghouta? We reiterate that humanitarian aid is unconditional and apolitical. We therefore make an urgent request to see proof of this on the ground. That is exactly what France will seek to defend in the weeks to come, in line with the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex), namely, the establishment of a neutral environment that must include the lifting of sieges, the cessation of hostilities, prisoner exchanges and chemical disarmament, all of this under international supervision so as to ensure genuine constitutional reform and the holding of free elections. That is the only way to bring a lasting end to the suffering of the Syrian people and open the way to an inclusive political process in Syria, in the interests of all the Syrian people. It is for that reason that we will continue to fully support the process stemming from resolution 2254 (2015), and we will make every effort to unite the Council in this respect. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): The Kingdom of the Netherlands wishes to thank Assistant Secretary-General Ursula Mueller for her briefing. 30/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8171 18-02496 7/10 Seven years after the start of the conflict in Syria, the humanitarian situation in the country continues to be a truly heartbreaking drama. While several parties to the conflict are responsible for a wide array of violations of international humanitarian law, it is especially painful to see the horrifying effects of the military actions taken by the Syrian authorities. Instead of protecting their own citizens, the Syrian authorities are bombing them. Instead of providing basic services to their people, the authorities are destroying hospitals and schools. Instead of allowing humanitarian aid into the most affected areas, the authorities are starving some of their own people. The outlook for 2018 remains grim, with a worsening humanitarian situation and a continuation of the battle for influence by regional Powers. Allow me to focus on three important aspects: the current situation on the ground, cross-border aid delivery and the implementation of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) five asks. On the situation on the ground, the international community has been providing funding for a principled humanitarian response. The Kingdom of the Netherlands has provided amply to the United Nations and to international non-governmental organizations in order to provide relief for the suffering of the Syrian people. But this relief is hardly reaching those in need. In besieged eastern Ghouta, we are witnessing the use of starvation as a method of warfare. Not a single aid convoy has reached the 400,000 people trapped there in the last three months. Where have we seen this before? In Idlib, because of the continuous intensified aerial bombardments, aid to more than 250,000 internally displaced persons is extremely difficult to deliver. Improvised explosive devices in Raqqa and elsewhere in Syria have caused large numbers of casualties. The Netherlands urges all Council members to continue their contributions to make all of Syria free of mines and explosive devices. Concerning cross-border aid delivery, it is equally disturbing that today, one month after the Council renewed the authorization of cross-border aid, some of these very aid convoys cannot cross the border because of the security situation. The consequences of this lack of cross-border aid for the large number of displaced people in north-west Syria are tremendous. There is an urgent need to ensure that all convoys can have safe passage to reach those in need, both in Afrin and beyond. In Afrin, the intensification of the military operation there last Sunday has led to more displaced families that have nowhere to go. We call upon all parties to protect civilians, to facilitate humanitarian access and to allow for the safe passage of all people who wish to leave areas under attack. Turning to the implementation of OCHA's five asks, the recent visit by Mark Lowcock to Syria was in itself a positive step, but it is imperative that the dialogue on aid delivery yield effective results as soon as possible. In effect, the requests made by the Emergency Relief Coordinator do not differ much from those of his predecessors, effectively highlighting the lack of progress in terms of sustained, principled humanitarian access to those most in need. The message of the humanitarian and international community has been consistent: respect your obligations under international humanitarian law, protect your own citizens — including health workers and humanitarian aid workers — and allow for rapid, safe and sustained humanitarian access. In conclusion, it is crucial that the Security Council unequivocally unite itself behind the concrete and attainable five asks of OCHA. It remains essential to see progress on the rapid, effective and principled implementation in the coming weeks of all five asks of OCHA. We call on Council members to consider steps to be taken collectively in case no progress takes place and on those who have influence on the Syrian authorities to make sure that humanitarian aid reaches those most in need. Let us not forget that lives are at stake. Mr. Miller (United States of America): The Security Council met only last week (see S/PV.8164) and heard the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs describe his visit to Syria and reiterate a series of requests that, in his estimation, would be a positive step towards improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. Sadly, not only has none of those requests been approved by the Syrian regime, but also the situation in places such as eastern Ghouta continues to deteriorate beyond our worst imagaination. To the surprise of no one, cross-line deliveries in Syria, particularly to besieged and hard-to-reach areas, remain stalled. In S/PV.8171 The situation in the Middle East 30/01/2018 8/10 18-02496 fact, there have been no United Nations inter-agency convoys anywhere for more than six weeks and no convoys to a besieged area for more than eight weeks. We deplore what are, frankly, starve-and-siege tactics, preventing the distribution of aid, which must be needs-based. As a result, many families are going without the most basic food, medicine and other supplies required for survival. Hospitals reuse syringes and other medical items meant for single use and, during the coldest months of winter, families who have run out of fuel and cooking oil burn household items to stay warm. That is happening in Ghouta and elsewhere throughout Syria. We need an immediate, unconditional humanitarian pause in eastern Ghouta, where the impact of air strikes and artillery shelling on the civilian infrastruture has forced the closure of more schools and medical clinics. Those bombings continued over the weekend, further proving that any supposed ceasefire in the area was merely aspirational. We reiterate the need to evacuate hundreds of critically ill people trapped in eastern Ghouta. We have seen no movement on that issue since late December, and the list continues to grow. Only a few weeks ago, we heard that the medical evacuation list contained 600 names, including hundreds of children. That list has now grown to at least 750 people, according to the United Nations staff on the ground. Over the weekend, the United Nations reported that another critically ill person on Ghouta's medical evacuation list died due to the lack of medical treatment. Such deaths are senseless and reflect the Syrian regime's depraved disregard for human life. Such gratuitous cruelty suggests that the regime's siege of eastern Ghouta is directed not at the armed opposition but against the civilian population. We need not remind the members of the Council that a siege directed against civilians is a violation of international humanitarian law. We also appreciate the fact that Sweden and Kuwait worked on a draft presidential statement to address such dire humanitarian challenges. The overwhelming majority of Council members agree that we must be clear in demanding that the Syrian authorities allow immediate medical evacuations and cross-line assistance. When there are hundreds of thousands of Syrians besieged by the regime and starving due to the regime's actions, such demands are the very least that the Council can make. We would also like to take a moment to thank the Government of Jordan for facilitating an extraordinary delivery of humanitarian assistance in mid-January to the internally displaced populations stranded at Rukban. That population now has food and relief items for one month. However, we continue to wait for the Syrian regime's formal approval for the United Nations to begin cross-line aid deliveries to that vulnerable population from Damascus. The United Nations submitted its proposal in mid-November and has still receievd no response. All arrangements have been made for the deliveries to begin as soon as possible. The Syrian regime has only to grant its approval and to stand out of the way for life-saving assistance to reach those in need. As we heard earlier today, members of the Security Council visited the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., yesterday and saw the exhibition about the Syrian regime's arbitrary detention and torture of more than 100,000 civilians. The name of the exhibition is "Please Don't Forget Us". We should bear that, and what the Syrian regime is capable of doing, in mind as we discuss yet again what is taking place in easter Ghouta and elsewhere in Syria. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation wishes to thank Ms. Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for her briefing. Bolivia regrets the crisis in Syria, which, after all these years, has caused so much destruction and the loss of so many lives. Ms. Mueller told us that, since the beginning of the conflict, more than 500,000 people have died; currently, there are 13.1 million people who need humanitarian assistance, 2.9 million of whom are trapped in besieged and hard-to-reach areas; and at least 6.1 million people have been internally displaced. We believe that the most recent events have resulted in an increase in the number of dead, of people who need humanitarian assistance and of internally displaced persons. We call for the cleaning and demining of and access for basic humanitarian assistance to the city of Raqqa to take place as soon as possible to allow for the safe and dignified return of those families who were displaced due to the conflict. We regret that, since the month of October 2017, approximately 220 people have died and others have been injured in blasts. 30/01/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8171 18-02496 9/10 The recent events in Syria show once again the urgent need to revitalize the Geneva political process, reinforcing the tangible results of the Astana meeting, in consultation, of course, with all the parties involved, including the opposition, in order to facilitate the development of mutual confidence-building measures and, as a result, the improvement of the political and humanitarian situation. We are certain that this will also allow for the release of detainees and hostages and the search for the disappeared, as well as for the establishment of conditions for a political process and a sustained and lasting ceasefire. We express our support for the efforts made recently in Vienna and for the work to take place in Sochi. We welcome the decision of the Secretary-General to allow his representative to participate in those events. We once again remind the parties to the conflict that they must allow unconditional access for humanitarian assistance, ensuring and safeguarding the security and physical integrity of humanitarian workers, in particular in the besieged and hard-to-reach areas. In that regard, we reiterate once again our highest recognition for the work being done by the staff of the various humanitarian assistance agencies and bodies on the ground, and we urge the parties involved to meet their obligations under international law, in particular international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We remind the parties involved that they must implement the Astana agreements, respect the de-escalation areas and prevent any attacks on civilian institutions, such as residential areas, schools and hospitals, in line with international humanitarian law, to ensure the protection of civilians and unimpeded access for accredited humanitarian organizations to provide the greatly needed assistance. In that regard, we underscore the work of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which has reached 800,000 people through cross-border convoys. We hope that those operations can continue, for which better coordination and cooperation between the United Nations and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic are recommended. In that context, we underscore the agreements arrived at among Iran, Russia, and Turkey on 22 December 2017, and we urgently call for strengthening them so as to free detainees and abductees, as well as to positively identify missing persons. We stress the importance of the work of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, which has become a guarantor of security and the distribution of humanitarian aid, while ensuring the evacuation of persons from areas facing armed conflict. Lastly, it is important to point out that the humanitarian situation, which is affecting more than 13.2 million people in Syria, must be resolved exclusively through an organized, inclusive and political process based on dialogue and led for and by the Syrian people, which would allow for a peaceful solution respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Syria. We call on members of the Security Council to make every effort to ensure that it remain unified on such an issue as fundamental as humanitarian assistance. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Ms. Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, for her detailed briefing. The humanitarian landscape in Syria that she described to us this morning is, once again, disheartening. Over the past several years, the relevant reports of the Secretary-General and Security Council meetings on this issue have repeatedly related victim fatalities, the renewal of the large-scale displacement of refugees, besieged cities, an increasing spread of diseases, a high level of malnutrition, the destruction of medical infrastructure and other scourges. Given such a situation, the only remedy left is to ensure the immediate, safe and unrestricted access of humanitarian assistance and strict compliance under international humanitarian law, in particular respect for the principle of proportionality as related to conducting military attacks and taking the appropriate precautions with regard to their impact on the civilian population. We therefore regret the persistent restrictions placed on access to humanitarian aid in various areas of Syria, in particular the tragic and untenable situation facing the people of eastern Ghouta and Idlib. We hope that the ceasefire agreement in eastern Ghouta, recently deliberated in Vienna, will have a positive secondary effect in addressing the pressing humanitarian needs of its people. We appreciate the work of the Syrian authorities and Russia that resulted in the medical evacuation of 29 people from eastern Ghouta in December 2017. At the same time, we encourage them S/PV.8171 The situation in the Middle East 30/01/2018 10/10 18-02496 to intensify such efforts as there are hundreds of other people who are in need of urgent care. Another issue that deeply concerns us pertains to demining and, in general, to the deactivation of explosive ordnance, in the light of what is happening daily in cities, such as Raqqa in which 30 to 50 victims, who fall prey to such ordnance, are recorded weekly. We see as positive the dialogue aimed at humanitarian goals between the United Nations and the Government of Syria, especially the visit to the country by Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock. That dialogue and the joint statement on humanitarian mine action issued following the latest Astana meeting positively herald that more substantial progress could be made in that area. Concerning military operations in densely populated areas, such as Afrin, we call for preventing any escalation that could further exacerbate the suffering of the people and hinder achieving a political solution pursuant to resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). It is absolutely necessary that the Council show the world its unity and sense of commitment, and send a message that prioritizes human beings over political interests. We therefore hope that a consensus can be reached on the adoption of a text that reflects the five priorities outlined by Mr. Lowcock, which constitute the bare minimum for alleviating the human suffering of the Syrian people, and that is why Peru fully supports them. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): In taking the floor at this meeting on the humanitarian situation of Syrian Arab Republic, I should like to begin by sincerely thanking Ms. Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, for her detailed briefing on the very unfortunate humanitarian situation that Syria is currently undergoing. Moreover, we listened to Under-Secretary- General Lowcock's briefing on 22 January following his visit to Syria, in which he pointed out for us five areas where improvement is needed in order to address the serious humanitarian situation, including the imperative to address the needs of some 13 million people in Syria, to facilitate medical evacuations and freedom of movement across borders, and to adopt measures so that the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations can provide effective assistance to the Syrian people. Both Ms. Mueller and Mr. Lowcock's briefings afford us a very desolate overview that must focus the attention of the international community on making every effort necessary to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. The specific situation in eastern Ghouta, in which almost 94 per cent of the people are trapped, is a particularly a worrisome issue. The situation of more than 600 people in need of urgent medical care has been, and is being, exacerbated by air-strike campaigns that have led to the displacement of those in Idlib and Hama. In addition to all this, we also point to the catastrophic humanitarian situation resulting from the ongoingOperation Olive Branch, which is leading to the substantial displacement and suffering of civilians. On the one hand, that can only elicit our deep concern, and, on the other hand, we must call for redoubling the efforts of the United Nations and the international community to find a solution to the very serious humanitarian crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic. The President: There are no more speakers inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.
In this dissertation, we are mainly interested in the interactions between poverty and one of its greatest dimensions1, namely health. More specifically, we will focus on their inequalities: does poverty inequality have more effect on poverty than health level? Does health inequality matter to poverty? Poverty and health are two related concepts that both express human deprivation. Health is said to be one of the most important dimensions of poverty and vice-versa. That is, poverty implies poor health because of a low investment in health, a bad environment and sanitation and other living conditions due to poverty, a poor nutrition (thus a greater risk of illness), a limited access to, and use of, health care, a lower health education and investment in health, etc2. Conversely, poor health leads inevitably to poverty due to high opportunity costs occasioned by ill-health such as unemployment or limited employability (thus a loss of income and revenues), a lower productivity (due to loss of strength, skills and ability), a loss of motivation and energy (which lengthen the duration of job search), high health care expenditures (or catastrophic expenditures), etc3. But what are the degree of correlation and the direction of the causality between these two phenomena? Which causes which? This is a classic problem of simultaneity that has become a great challenge for economists. Worst, each of these phenomena (health and poverty) has many dimensions4. How to reconcile two multidimensional and simultaneous events? 1 Aside the income-related material deprivation. 2 Tenants of the ?Absolute Income? hypothesis for instance show that absolute income level of individual has positive impact on their health status (Preston, 1975; Deaton, 2003). Conversely, lack of income (and the poverty state it implies) leads unambiguously to poor health. For other authors, it is not the absolute level per se, but the relative level (i.e. comparably to others in the society) that impacts most health outcomes. This is the ?Relative Income? hypothesis (see van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 2000, for a summary). 3 See Sen (1999) and more recently Marmot (2001) for more information. 4 Poverty could be seen as monetary poverty, human poverty, social poverty, etc. Identically, one talks of mental health, physical health, ?positive? and ?negative? health, etc. So a one-on-one causality could not possibly exits between the two, or will be hard to establish. We?ve chosen the first way of causality: that is, poverty (and inequality) causes poor health. As justification, we consider a life-cycle theory approach (Becker, 1962). An individual is born with a given stock of health. This stock is supposed to be adequate enough. During his life, this stock is submitted to depreciation due to health shocks and aging (Becker?s theory, 1962). We could think that the poorer you are, the more difficult is your capacity to invest in your health5. Empirically, many surveys (too numerous to be enumerated here) show that poor people6 do have worse health status (that is, high mortality and morbidity rates, poor access to health services, etc.). It has been established that poor children are less healthy worldwide, independently of the region or country considered. It is generally agreed that the best way to improve the health of the poor is through pro-poor growth policies and redistribution. Empirically, one of the major achievements of these last two decades in developing countries is the improvement in health status of populations (notably the drop in mortality rates and higher life expectations) following periods of (sustained) economic growth. However, is this relation always true? In some countries as we will see later in this thesis, while observing an improvement in the population?s welfare, the converse is observed in its health status, or vice versa. If health and poverty are so closely related, they should theoretically move in the same direction. But the fact that in some countries we observe opposite trends suggests that some dimensions of health and poverty are not or may not be indeed so closely related, as postulated, and that they may depend of other factors. 1. The Purpose of the Study. 5 Another justification is that many authors have studied the problem the other way. Schultz and Tansel (1992, 1997) for instance showed that ill-health causes a loss of revenues in rural Cote d?Ivoire. Audibert, Mathonnat et al. (2003) also showed that malaria caused a loss of earnings of rural cotton producers in Cote d?Ivoire. 6 Usually defined from some income or expenditure-related metric or some assets-based metric. The ultimate goal of our dissertation in its essence is to measure inequality in health7 in developing countries using mainly Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS, henceforth)8. It deals with interactions between poverty and one of its greatest dimensions, putting aside the income-related material deprivation, namely health. It therefore measures inequality in health status and access to health and discusses which policies should be implemented to correct these inequalities. That is, it aims to see how much rich people are better off and benefit from health interventions, as compared to the poor, and how to reduce such an inequality. The present dissertation contains four papers that are related to these questions. Our main hypothesis (that will be tested) is that poverty impacts health through inequality effects9. Graphically, we can lay these simple relationships as: The dashed line in the figure above suggests that income inequality could impact health directly. But we consider that this direct effect is rather small or negligible, as compared to the indirect effect through inequality in health. Therefore, inequality in health is central to our discussion. To measure inequalities in health, we face three challenges: 7 And corollary health sanitation (access to safe water, toilet and electricity). Though electricity is more a measure of economic development that health measure per se, we add it here as a control for sanitation and nutrition: for example women could read more carefully the drugs? notices, or warm more quickly foods; more generally, electricity often improves the mental and material wellbeing of households. It also conditions health facility?s performance. 8 And potentially other surveys. In this case, we mention explicitly the survey(s). 9 The other important factor that could impact health is the performance of the health system. This is discussed in the Chapter 3. Health Assets Inequality Health Inequality Poverty (Assets Index) - measuring welfare (income metric) and subsequently inequality in welfare, - measuring health, - and measuring inequality in health. The measurements can be conducted using two approaches (Sahn, 2003): - Directly by ranking the households or individuals vis-à-vis their performance in the health indicator; we thus have a direct measure of inequality in health. This is suitable when the health indicator is continuous (such as weight, height or body mass index). According to Prof. David E. Sahn, that approach ?which has been referred to as the univariate approach to measuring pure health inequality, involves making comparisons of cardinal or scalar indicators of health inequality and distributions of health, regardless of whether health is correlated with welfare measured along other dimensions?. - Indirectly by finding a scaling measure such as consumption or income or another indicator (assets index for instance)10 that would help ranking the households or individuals (from the poorest to the richest), and see what are their performance in the health variable of interest. We are therefore measuring an indirect health inequality. The indirect method is mostly suitable when the health indicator is dichotomous (for example whether the individual has got diarrhoea last 2 weeks, or ?have the child been vaccinated?, or ?place of delivery?) or is a rate (such as child mortality). Again, quoting Prof. Sahn, ?making comparisons of health across populations with different social and economic characteristics is often referred to in the literature as following the so-called `gradient? or `socioeconomic? approach to health inequality. Much of the motivation for this work on the gradient approach to health inequality arises out of fundamental concerns over social and economic justice. The roots of the gradient will often arise from various types of discrimination, prejudice, and other legal, social, and economic norms that may contribute to stratification and fragmentation, and subsequently inequality in access to material resources and various correlated welfare outcomes?. While the first method would appear quickly limited for dummy or limited categorical health variables because of the small variability in the population, the second approach could also be 10 Or more generally any other socioeconomic gradient such as education, gender or location. impossible when no information is available to scale the units of observation in terms of welfare. We?ll be mostly focusing on the second approach, as did many health economists, and also due to the nature of the DHS datasets in hand and the indicators that we are investigating. 2. Strategy, Methods and Structure. Measuring wealth-related inequality in health implies in the first stage defining and characterizing the poor. Who are indeed the poor? Traditionally, monetary measures (income or consumption) have been used to distinguish households or people into ?rich? and ?poor? classes. Indeed, it is agreed that the ?incomemetric? approach is one of the best ways to measure welfare11. However, it sometimes, if not often, happens that we lack this essential information in household survey datasets. Especially in our case, the DHS datasets do not have income nor consumption information. Then, how to characterize the poor in this situation? For a long time, economists have eluded the question. But soon, it became evident that an alternative measure is needed to strengthen the ?poverty debate?. In the first part of our dissertation, we start by providing a theoretical framework to find a proxy for wellbeing, in the case where consumption or income-related data are missing, namely by discussing the use of assets as such a proxy. The first part of this thesis is relatively long, as compared to the second. However, this is justified, due to its purpose. The goal of the first part of the dissertation is to participate to the research agenda on poverty. It attempts to measure it in a ?non traditional?12 way. 11 There is a consensus in the economic literature that income is more suitable to measure wealth or welfare in developed countries while consumption is more adequate for developing ones due to various reasons such as irregularity of incomes for informal sector, seasonality, prices, recall periods, trustworthy, etc. (see Deaton 1998 for detail). 12 i.e. a non monetary way. The main rationale for this first part therefore is thus to find a new, non monetary measure to characterize in best, life conditions, welfare and then the poor. This measure is referred to as the ?assets index?. Indeed, as the majority of developing countries are engaged more and more in fighting poverty, inequality and deprivation, more and more information on the state of poverty13 is needed. If in almost all these countries, many household surveys have been implemented to collect information on socioeconomic indicators, the major indicator that is needed to analyze poverty (namely income or consumption data) is unfortunately not often collected due to various reasons (time, cost, periodicity, etc.). Even, if they were collected, the quality of the data is often poor. Therefore, economists tend to rely more on other indicators to compensate for the absence of monetary measures. One of the indicators often used are the assets owned by households. The question arose then how to use these assets to characterize the poor in this context? How to weight each of them? In a first attempt, many economists built a simple linear index by assigning arbitrary weights to the assets14. In a seminal paper, Filmer and Pritchett (2001) propose to construct the so-called ?assets index? which could be used as a proxy for consumption or income. It is commonly agreed that their methodology follows a ?scientific? approach, thus is more credible. In their case, they use a Principal Component Analysis (PCA, henceforth) to build their assets index. Since, many other economists have followed in their footsteps which we label in our dissertation, the ?material? poverty approach (as opposed to the monetary one) since it is based on materials (goods and assets) owned by the households or individuals. Because of the importance of the subject (poverty) and because the method is pretty new and original, this first part of our thesis is as said quite long as compared to the second one and has two papers which focus mainly on poverty and inequality issues and their connections with economic growth. In this part, we start by presenting a methodology of measuring non monetary (material) poverty, when a consumption or income data is not available. We show how one can obtain robust results using assets or wealth variables. Once the method is clearly 13 And more generally welfare. 14 For example a television is given a weight of 100, a radio 50, and so on. But this is clearly not a `scientific? way to proceed, as there is no rational ground in giving such weights. tested and validated, it is then confronted to real data. We show that the index shares basically the same properties with monetary metrics and roughly scales households in the same way as does the consumption or income variables. We discuss the advantages and also the limitations of using the assets index. The important thing to bear in mind is that, once it is obtained, it could be used to rank the observational units by wealth or welfare level. - The first chapter defines in a first section poverty and how it is usually measured (by the income metric approach). We discuss the limitations of the use of income/expenditure and what could be alternative measures. We then propose in section 2 the assets metric as a proxy for poverty measurement and test the material poverty approach on international datasets collected by the DHS program. We explore the material poverty and inequality nexus in the world and how Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)15 compares with other regions. We show, using that index and DHS data, that poverty, at least from an assets point of view, was also decreasing in SSA as well as in other regions of the world. This result contrasts with other findings such as Ravallion and Chen (2001) or Sala-i-Martin (2002) that show that, while other regions of the world are experiencing a decline in their (monetary) poverty rates, SSA is lagging behind, with rates starting to rise over the last decade. Therefore, two different measures of welfare could yield opposite results and messages in terms of policies to implement to combat poverty. Moreover, the method we use not only allows observing changes over time for each country, but also provides a natural ranking among countries (from the poorest to the richest). In this chapter, aside the measure of welfare and poverty, we also discuss in a final section the impact of demographic transition on economic growth and therefore on poverty. Indeed, demographic transition is a new phenomenon that is occurring in developing countries, especially African ones. Its negligence could lead to underestimating poverty measures (both material and monetary) by underestimating real economic growth rates. We show that changes in the composition and the size of households put an extra-pressure on the development process. While traditional authors have not considered the impact of these 15 SSA countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte d?Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The ?rest of the world? is represented by Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen. changes, we show that taking this into account implies higher economic growth rates than those actually observed or forecasted. - Once the assets index approach is established and tested on international data, the question arose how it performs as compared to the monetary metric. Indeed, if monetary measures remain the reference, then our assets index should share some common properties with them. The second chapter assesses the trends in material poverty in Ghana from the assets perspective using the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaires Surveys (CWIQ). It then compared these trends with the monetary poverty over roughly the same period. We show that the assets index could be used and yields the same consistent results as using other welfare variable (such as income, consumption or expenditure). Therefore, using two consecutive CWIQ surveys, we find that material poverty in Ghana has decreased roughly by the same magnitude as monetary one, as found in other studies by other authors such as Coulombe and McKay (2007) using Ghanaian GLSS16 consumption data. Thus, this chapter could thus be viewed as providing the proof that the material and the monetary approaches could be equivalent. The second part of our dissertation seeks how to define and measure health and inequality in health. While the definition of health is not obvious, we propose to measure it with child mortality rates. Our main rationale in doing so is that low child mortality generates, ceteris paribus, higher life expectancy17, thus is an adequate measure of a population?s health. This may not be true in areas devastated by wars, famines, and HIV and other pandemics where child mortality could be high (in this case, the best measure should be life expectancy by age groups). Also, the reader should bear in mind that in fact, child mortality could be itself is a good indicator for measuring the (success of the) economic development level of a society as a whole (Sen, 1995), mainly because in developing countries, child mortality is highly correlated to factors linked to the level of development such as access to safe water, sanitation, vaccination coverage, access to health care, etc. - In the third chapter, we focus on measuring overall population?s health. For this, we estimate child mortality in SSA and compare it to the rest of the world. We explore the 16 Ghana Living Standard Surveys. 17 By construction, life expectancy at birth is highly correlated and sensitive to child mortality (it is based on child mortality rates for various cohorts). Lower child mortality rates lead to higher life expectancy and vice versa. determinants of child mortality using mainly a Weibull model and DHS data with socioeconomic variables18 as one of our major covariates. The use of the assets index information is to see how these quintiles behave in a multivariate regression framework of child mortality (i.e. how they affect child mortality). We find, among others, that mother?s education and access to health care and sanitation are one of the strongest predictors for child survival. Controlling for education and other factors, family?s wealth and the area of residency do not really matter for child survival in SSA, contrasting with results found elsewhere. - The fourth and last chapter answers the ultimate goal of this dissertation, that is, the scope of health inequalities in the developing world, particularly in SSA. It uses the factor analysis (FA) method of Chapter 1 to rank household according to their economic gradient status19 and then studies inequalities in various health indicators in relation with these groups. The intention is to analyze inequality rates between rich and poor for various health variables. In this chapter, we concentrate solely on inequality issues in health and health-related infrastructures and services. Mainly, we analyze inequality in access to sanitation infrastructures (water and electricity20) and various health status and access to health indicators (such as child death, child anthropometry, medically assisted delivery and vaccination coverage) using a Gini and Marginal Gini Income Elasticity approach (GIE and MGIE, henceforth) on one hand, and the Concentration Index (CI) approach on the other. Results show that, while almost all countries have made great efforts in improving coverage in, and access to, these indicators, almost all the gains have been captured by the better-offs of the society, especially in SSA. We extend the analysis to compare GIE estimates to those of CI and find consistent results yielding quite similar messages. 18 Quintiles groups derived from an assets index. 19 By grouping usually households in 5 quintiles from poorer to richer ones. 20 On the rationale of using electricity, see footnote 7 above. 3. Results and Policy Implications. As said above, the major goal in conducting this thesis research is to analyze inequality in health status, health care and health-related services using DHS data. To reach our objective, we follow two intermediate steps: - For assets poverty, results show that assets poverty and inequality are decreasing in every region of the world, including Sub-Saharan Africa. This tends to support our hypothesis that, contrary to common beliefs, African households use assets and building ownerships as saving tools and buffer to economic shocks. The first paper also shows however that the demographic transition actually occurring in developing countries could impede on economic growth and trigger a bullet on policies aiming at combating poverty. - Our third paper shows that child mortality is decreasing in all parts the world. However, the 1990s and early 2000s have been a lost decade for the African continent where many countries have witnessed an increase in rates that is mostly attributable among other factors to the economic and financial turmoils of the 1990s and early 2000s and the HIV epidemic. Our hypothesis is that these phenomena have destabilized the organization of the health care system, cut its funding and hampered its performance. High levels of health inequality can also be part of the puzzle. Coming back to the particular case of HIV/AIDS, the reader should observe that it affects more and more the less poor so that it can also lead to a decline in assets inequality (richer people are dying) along with an increase in child mortality and thus explain in great part our paradox. This setback (the rise in mortality over recent periods despite poverty reduction) will make impossible for these countries to reach the millennium development goals, at least for child mortality. The conclusion to this is that African population?s health has been stagnant over the period 1990-2005. Regression analysis reveals no strong correlation between our measure of welfare (assets index) and child mortality. More important are mothers? education and access to health care and sanitation services. - Finally, our inequality estimates show that they are quite high for all indicators considered. For ill-health indicators (child malnutrition and death), rates are excessively concentrated in poor and rural groups. Concerning access to health care services, rich and urban groups tend to be more favoured than poor and urban ones. But the high level of inequality tends to be reducing at the margin over time, as the poor have increasing access. Finally for access to sanitation services, results show that while the majority of countries have made substantial efforts to increase coverage on the first two periods, the rich and urban classes have benefited more and inequality (which is at high levels) tends to rise at the margin over time, especially for the poor. More preoccupying is the fact that rates are falling between 1995-2000 and 2000-2005, probably because of the privatization of these services and the new costs they impose on households. Overall, inequality in all variables considered is more pronounced in SSA than the rest of the world (expect for death and malnutrition). The sub-continent is still disadvantaged in terms of access to services or ill-health. Where to go from here? In the African sub-continent, we have the following picture: a decreasing (material) poverty and inequality but coupled with a stagnant child mortality situation, a stagnant or increasing malnutrition. This is mostly due to high levels of, and an increasing inequality at the margin in access to sanitation and electricity services coupled with a decreasing access to these services. Thus, despite the fact that we observe a decreasing inequality at the margin in access to health care (even though the average level of inequality is still high) the missing link in health-related services coupled with an overall high inequality in these two types of services hugely impact child health and survival. Therefore, as access to health care services and health-related sanitation services is essential to child survival, our findings call for vigorous policies to promote access of the poor groups and rural areas to these services. African Governments should continue to favour access of the poor to health care and reverse the inequality trends in access to water, sanitation and electricity. This is vital for the health of the population and for the development of Africa. Funding can come from various sources: the Government Budget, International Assistance but also from households themselves (since the first part of our thesis has demonstrated that they are getting richer (and various surveys show that they are willing to pay for quality health care), an adequate fees policy could benefit to the health care system). Measures should be put in place to strengthen the performance of the health system and to mitigate the negative effects of macroeconomic imbalances, economic crises and HIV/AIDS. Only on these conditions the Sub-Continent could hope to eradicate poverty and promote health for all. 4. Contribution of this Thesis. This thesis seeks to analyze empirically the inequality in health and access to health in SSA and how this region compared to the rest of the world. To do so, it develops a new method to characterize poor households and to analyze assets-based poverty, when the monetary measure is unavailable. Such a method is indeed necessary as almost all developing countries have collected many surveys that lack the consumption or income information. Once a poverty measure and a correct measure of health have been found, and their core determinants clearly established, we then proceed to the health inequality analysis, along with its determinants, using two methodologies: the traditional CI and the more recent GIE approaches. These approaches have been the mostly used to explore the inequality in health and access to health these last years. Though already studied in the literature, and sometimes applied on DHS or some groups of DHS datasets, our dissertation differs in its purpose and scope and its large scale. No paper to our knowledge used the totally to-date freely available DHS datasets to study poverty and inequality topics and provide basic statistics. Our main contribution is to shed a new light on the welfare-inequality-health nexus in Africa, how it evolves over time and how it compares to other regions around the world, using all available information. It also put numbers on various important socioeconomic indicators such as poverty, inequality, child health and mortality, access to health-related infrastructures, etc., for developing countries, especially African ones. As we sometimes lack these important information, this thesis proves finally to be a very useful exercise. ; Cette thèse part d'un postulat simple : « l'amélioration du niveau de vie s'accompagne de l'amélioration de l'état de santé générale d'une population » et teste sa validité dans le contexte de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara (ASS). Si cette hypothèse se vérifie en général dans le contexte de l'ASS en ce qui concerne le niveau (plus le pays est riche, plus sa population est en bonne santé), il l'est moins en ce qui concerne les dynamiques, du moins à court et moyen terme. Notamment, les pays qui connaissent une amélioration tendancielle de bien-être matériel ne connaissent pas forcément une amélioration de la santé de leurs populations. Ceci constitue un paradoxe qui viendrait invalider notre postulat. En écartant tout effet de retard ou de rattrapage qui pourrait l'expliquer car nous travaillons sur une période de 15 ans réparties en 3 sous-périodes (1990-1995, 1995-2000 et 2000-2005), nous expliquons ce paradoxe, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, par deux canaux principaux qui peuvent interagir : - la performance du système de santé et - l'inégalité en santé. Si le premier est plus évident mais aussi plus difficile à prouver empiriquement du fait du manque de données sur des séries longues, ou du fait que ces données sont trop agrégées et éparses, le second canal est testable avec des bases de données adéquates qui, elles, sont disponibles au niveau microéconomique (ménages). Les bases de données que nous avons privilégiées sont les Enquêtes Démographiques et de Santé (EDS) du fait de leur comparabilité dans l'espace et le temps (mêmes noms de variables standardisées, même méthodologie d'enquête, mêmes modules, etc.). Ces atouts sont d'autant plus importants que les comparaisons de pauvreté et de bien-être basées sur les enquêtes de revenus ou de consommation butent sur de sérieux problèmes à savoir la comparabilité de ces enquêtes (méthodologies différentes, périodes de rappel différents, prix souvent non collectés de la même manière, etc.). Pour montrer ces effets de l'inégalité de santé sur les niveaux et les tendances de la santé des populations et la pauvreté et le bien-être, nous avons axé notre recherche autour de 3 axes principaux : 1- Comment mesurer le niveau de richesse et donc le bien-être des ménages en l'absence d'information sur la consommation et le revenu ? Les chapitres 1 et 2 de notre thèse se penchent sur cette question. Nous avons privilégié, à l'instar de plus en plus d'économistes, l'utilisation des biens des ménages et les méthodes de l'analyse factorielle et d'analyse en composantes principales pour construire un indice de richesse. Cet indice de richesse est pris comme un substitut du revenu ou de la consommation et sert donc de proxy pour la mesure du bien-être. Bien qu'il comporte quelques lacunes (notamment le fait qu'il ne concerne que les biens matériels et durables du ménage alors que la consommation ou le revenu sont des concepts plus globaux de bien-être, il ne prend pas en compte les préférences des ménages, il ne comporte aucune notion de valeur car le prix n'est pas pris en compte, de telle façon qu'une petite télévision en noir blanc vieille de vingt ans est mise au même niveau qu'un grand écran plasma flambant neuf, etc.), il n'en demeure pas moins que d'un côté, avec les EDS, il n'y a pas moyen de faire autrement en l'état actuel des choses, mais aussi et surtout parce que ces données permettent d'éviter les problèmes évoqués plus haut, notamment celui de la comparabilité des données pour faire de la comparaison spatiale et inter-temporelle des données en matière de pauvreté. Dans le premier chapitre, en nous basant sur cet indice et une ligne de pauvreté définie a priori à 60% pour la première observation dans notre échantillon (Benin, 1996), et en utilisant les données EDS et une analyse en composantes principales (ACP), nous avons pu mesurer la tendance de la pauvreté dite « matérielle » (en opposition à la pauvreté monétaire, basée sur la métrique monétaire). Cette méthode qui est privilégiée par des auteurs comme Sahn et Stifel est d'autant plus intéressante qu'elle donne non seulement les tendances de la pauvreté dans chaque pays, mais elle permet aussi une classification naturelle de ces pays par ordre de grandeur de pauvreté. Cependant, dans la mesure où les biens des ménages et la dépenses de consommation sont disponibles, l'analyste devrait estimer les deux types de pauvreté (matérielle via l'indice de richesse et monétaire via le revenu ou la consommation) car les études montrent souvent que les biens matériels et la consommation ou le revenu ne sont pas très bien corrélés, et donc le choix de l'indicateur de bien-être est crucial en termes de politiques économique et de santé. En effet, si l'indicateur sous-estime le vrai niveau de pauvreté ou d'inégalité (ou les surestime), les dépenses publiques qui en résultent peuvent être plus ou moins surévaluées, de même que les réponses apportées se révéler inadéquates. Donc dans la mesure du possible, il conviendrait de se pencher sur la question du choix de l'indicateur. Les résultats de notre méthodologie montrent que l'ASS reste la région la plus pauvre du monde en termes de possession d'actifs. La région orientale de l'ASS est la plus pauvre au monde (75%) suivie de l'Asie du Sud (64%), le Sud de l'ASS (61%), l'Afrique Centrale (57%), l'Afrique de l'Ouest (55%), l'Asie de l'Ouest (40%), l'Asie du Sud-Est (19%), l'Amérique Latine (18%), les Caraïbes (17%), l'Afrique du Nord (6%), l'Asie Centrale (2%) et l'Europe de l'Est (1%). Notre analyse nous montre que la pauvreté baisse dans l'ensemble des pays Africains au Sud du Sahara (sauf la Zambie), à l'instar des autres pays du monde dans l'échantillon. En effet, en considérant les trends, nous voyons que la moyenne de l'ASS passe de 63% de pauvreté matérielle entre 1990-1995 à 62% en 1995-2000 et 58% entre 2000 et 2005. La baisse est modeste et lente mais non négligeable et surtout, elle est en accélération sur les 2 dernières périodes. Mais elle demeure toutefois beaucoup plus marquée dans le reste du monde. Concomitamment à la baisse de la pauvreté, nous observons aussi une baisse de l'inégalité. Nous terminons ce chapitre par une réflexion sur l'effet de la transition démographique sur la croissance économique et la pauvreté en ASS et dans les autres pays en développement. En effet, la chute de la fertilité et de la mortalité couplées à un exode rural font que le nombre de famille se démultiplie du fait de la transition vers des tailles plus réduites. Ceci impose plus de contraintes (et donc peut avoir un impact négatif) sur la croissance économique et risque de sous-estimer le niveau réel de pauvreté. Il convient, une fois que la pauvreté matérielle et ses tendances ont été bien calculées avec les biens durables (et la transition économique prise si possible en compte), de tester la validité de cette méthode en la confrontant avec les résultats issus de l'analyse monétaire de la pauvreté. Les EDS ne comportant pas données d'information sur la consommation, nous nous sommes tournés vers une autre source de données. Dans le chapitre 2, nous avons testé la robustesse de notre méthode dans le cas particulier du Ghana, en utilisant les enquêtes du Questionnaire Unifié sur les Indicateurs de Base de Bienêtre (QUIBB), et en confrontant les résultats issus de la méthode ACP avec ceux issus de la méthode traditionnelle monétaire et trouvons grosso modo les mêmes résultats (10% de baisse avec la méthode monétaire traditionnelle et 7% avec notre méthode sur la période 1997- 2003). Ceci valide donc le fait que la méthode que nous proposons (à savoir, mesurer le bienêtre et la pauvreté par les biens durables des ménages) est tout aussi valide que la méthode plus traditionnelle utilisant des métriques monétaires. Une analyse fine dans le cas du Ghana montre que la baisse de la pauvreté est due à une croissance économique particulièrement pro-pauvre mais aussi à des dynamiques intra et intersectorielles (réallocation des gens des secteurs moins productifs vers ceux plus productifs) et aussi une forte migration des campagnes vers les villes. Nos simulations montrent que les migrants ruraux ont aussi bénéficié de cette croissance dans les villes où ils trouvent plus d'opportunités. 2- Une fois établie que la pauvreté est en recul en ASS, nous avons voulu mesurer la tendance de la santé de sa population (approximée par les taux de mortalité infantile et infanto-juvénile). Nous discutons dans le chapitre 3 de trois méthodes pour estimer et comparer les taux de mortalité des enfants : - la méthode des cohortes fictives (sur laquelle l'équipe de l'EDS se base pour estimer les taux « officiels » de mortalité), - la méthode non paramétrique (Kaplan et Meier) que privilégient un certain nombre d'économistes et - la méthode paramétrique (Weibull) de plus en plus utilisée pour sa souplesse et sa robustesse. Les deux premières méthodes ont tendance à sous-estimer le vrai niveau de mortalité et de ce fait nous avons privilégié le Weibull. De plus, avec cette dernière, nous pouvons évaluer l'effet de chaque variable spécifique (comme l'éducation ou l'accès à l'eau) sur le niveau de mortalité. Une étude des déterminants de cette mortalité montre qu'outre l'effet attendu de l'éducation des mères, l'accès aux infrastructures de santé (soins médicaux et surtout prénataux durant et lors de l'accouchement) et sanitaires (accès aux toilettes et dans une moindre mesure à l'eau potable) en sont les principaux facteurs. L'effet de richesse joue peu en ASS (mais pas dans le reste du monde), une fois que nous contrôlons pour le lieu de résidence (urbain) et le niveau d'éducation. Ce résultat nous surprend quelque peu, même s'il a été trouvé dans d'autres études. Ensuite, nous avons calculé la mortalité prédite des enfants. De toutes les régions du monde, l'ASS a le niveau de mortalité le plus élevé (par exemple en moyenne 107 décès pour la mortalité infantile contre 51 pour le reste du monde, soit plus du double). Ce résultat était toutefois attendu. Par contre nous avons été quelque peu surpris en ce qui concerne les tendances. Le constat est que sur les 15 ans, la mortalité des enfants a très peu ou pas du tout baissé dans le sous-continent africain (et est même en augmentation dans certains pays, alors qu'ils enregistrent une baisse de la pauvreté matérielle sur la même période). En moyenne, considérant les enfants de moins d'un an, les taux sont passés de 95%o à 89.5%o pour remonter à 91.5%o pour les 3 périodes 1990-1195, 1995-2000 et 2000-2005. Ainsi sur 15 ans, la mortalité infantile n'a baissé que de 3 points et demie en moyenne et surtout, elle remonte sur la période 1995-2005. Un examen des taux de malnutrition des enfants confirme ces tendances. On pourrait dire que ces résultats sont plutôt encourageants et normaux si on fait une analyse d'ensemble du sous-continent. En effet pour l'ensemble de l'ASS, cette légère baisse semble en conformité avec la baisse de 5 points des taux de pauvreté matérielle (63% en 1990-1995 à 58% en 2000-2005). Mais l'ordre de grandeur est faible en termes de magnitude, et surtout si compare au reste du monde où on observe une baisse de la mortalité beaucoup plus conséquente. Mais c'est l'arbre qui cache la forêt. Une analyse plus fine par pays montre en effet une situation plus contrastée. Notre postulat de départ nous dit que sur une période suffisamment longue, une amélioration de bien-être s'accompagne d'une amélioration de la santé. Or on constate que certains pays qui connaissent une baisse de la pauvreté matérielle connaissent également une recrudescence de la mortalité des enfants. Pour une même année, ce résultat peut être normal, traduisant un simple décalage pour que l'amélioration de bien-être se traduise par un meilleur état de santé de la population. Mais à moyen terme (période de 5 ans), nous observons la même absence d'effet. Nous sommes donc face à un paradoxe qu'il nous faut comprendre et tenter d'expliquer. Une des pistes pour comprendre ces résultats est d'analyser la performance des systèmes de santé en Afrique. Les facteurs qui expliquent notamment cette performance sont : des facteurs « classiques » comme la performance économique des périodes passées, les montants et l'allocation des dépenses de santé, l'organisation des systèmes de santé, la baisse de la fourniture de services de soins de santé (vaccination, assistance à la naissance, soins prénataux, soins curatifs, .), la malnutrition, le SIDA, les guerres, la fuite des cerveaux notamment du personnel médical, etc., à côté de facteurs plus « subtils » ou ténus car moins saisissables comme les crises financières des années 1990s qui ont plombé certaines des économies de la sous-région, la qualité des soins, la corruption et les dessous-de-table, l'instabilité de la croissance économique (même si elle est positive), etc. La seconde voie que nous examinons pour expliquer le manque de résultat en santé dans certains pays concerne l'inégalité en santé et ceci fait l'objet de notre dernier chapitre. 3- Expliquer l'absence de lien entre santé et pauvreté dans certains pays de l'ASS : l'effet de l'inégalité en santé. Dans le chapitre 4, nous émettons l'hypothèse que le fort niveau d'inégalité dans l'accès aux services de santé et d'assainissement couplé à la faible performance du système de santé (avec en toile de fond l'impact du Sida) peuvent servir à expliquer en partie notre paradoxe. Nous considérons deux types de services : - soins de santé (vaccination, assistance médicale à la naissance et traitement médical de la diarrhée) et - hygiène et assainissement (accès à l'eau potable et à l'électricité, accès aux toilettes propres). Le choix de ces services est motivé par le fait que le modèle Weibull dans le chapitre 3 nous montre que toutes choses égales par ailleurs, ils sont cruciaux pour la survie des enfants, en particulier en Afrique. Les niveaux d'accès montrent une baisse tendancielle des taux pour les services de santé (surtout pour la vaccination) et une légère augmentation de l'accès à l'électricité et dans une moindre mesure à l'eau potable. L'accès aux toilettes propres demeure un luxe réservé à une petite fraction de la population. Pour les calculs d'inégalité, nous considérons deux indicateurs: - l'indice de concentration (pour mesurer le niveau moyen d'inégalité) - et l'élasticité-revenu du Gini (inégalité « à la marge » quand le revenu d'un individu ou d'un groupe augmente d'un point de pourcentage). Globalement, les pays d'ASS ont un niveau d'inégalité beaucoup plus élevé comme on s'y attendait par rapport au reste du monde. Pour les tendances, nous remarquons que l'inégalité marginale s'accroît pour les services d'assainissement (eau, toilette et électricité), mais qu'elle diminue pour les soins de santé. En ce qui concerne l'inégalité moyenne, elle indique une disproportion dans l'accès des classes riches par rapport à celles pauvres. Même si les groupes pauvres « rattrapent » ceux riches dans la provision de certains services, cela se fait de façon trop lente. De fait, le haut niveau d'inégalité couplé à une recrudescence de cette inégalité à la marge pour certains services tendent à annihiler les effets positifs de la croissance économique et de la réduction de la pauvreté et maintiendraient la mortalité, la malnutrition et la morbidité des enfants en Afrique à des niveaux relativement élevés et plus particulièrement concentrées dans les groupes les plus pauvres. Tout ceci appelle à des politiques économiques, sociales et sanitaires pour renverser fortement les tendances de la mortalité des enfants. En particulier, nos résultats suggèrent qu'il faudrait que les pays Africains puissent entre autres : - accroître les services de soins de santé, notamment les soins préventifs comme les services essentiels à la santé de l'enfant dès sa naissance (vaccination, services prénataux et assistance à la naissance), les soins curatifs et les campagnes de sensibilisation. - renverser la tendance baissière dans la provision des services sanitaires (eau, électricité, environnement et assainissement, prise en charge des déchets, etc.). - améliorer la nutrition et l'environnement immédiat de ces enfants et les comportements des ménages (espacement des naissances, éducation des mères en matière de santé, etc.). - plus généralement comme le montrent d'autres études, il faudrait aussi améliorer la performance globale de leur système de santé en empêchant la fuite des cerveaux, en allouant un budget suffisant à la santé, en organisant mieux les différents organes, de même que les ciblages des politiques de santé, en empêchant la corruption, en améliorant la qualité (accueil, propreté des centres de soins, etc.), en équipant les centres en médicaments, vaccins, moyens de transport et de communication, etc. Intégrer si possible les systèmes plus traditionnels de soins (comme les matrones et les guérisseurs) et le secteur privé, de même qu'une meilleure organisation du système pharmaceutique. Ces politiques constituent un tout et doivent être mise en oeuvre rapidement, ou renforcées le cas échéant. A cette seule condition les pays Africains pourraient espérer rattraper leur retard dans les Objectifs du Millénaire.
