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Despite regular reference to conspiracy theories as a "belief system," few studies have attempted to explore the structure and organization of conspiracy beliefs beyond an examination of correlations between those beliefs. Employing unique data from two national surveys that includes respondent beliefs in 27 conspiracy theories, we decipher the substantive dimensions along which conspiracy beliefs are organized, as well as subgroupings within those dimensions. We find that variation in these conspiracy beliefs can be accounted for with two dimensions: the first regards partisan and ideological identities, while the other is composed of anti-social orientations, such as narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and acceptance of political violence. Importantly, these two dimensions are uncorrelated. We also find that conspiracy beliefs group together by substantive content, such as those regarding partisan actors or science/medicine. Our findings also demonstrate that inferences about the correlates of conspiracy beliefs are highly contingent on the specific conspiracy theories employed by researchers. We provide suggestions for future research in this vein.

Are so-called "birthers" best thought of as true conspiracy theorists, or are they merely partisans expressing a sharp dislike of Barack Obama? Recent work on conspiracy beliefs finds that "birthers" are the product of partisan and ideological motivated reasoning. In this manuscript, we explore how the measurement strategies we employ on public opinion surveys may influence the substantive conclusions we draw about conspiratorial beliefs, rumors, and misinformation. We find that partisan stimuli influence reported beliefs in several different conspiracy theories, and, subsequently, the relationships between individual stated beliefs in those conspiracy theories. The implications of these findings are discussed.

AbstractConspiracy theories and misinformation have become increasingly prominent in politics, and these beliefs have pernicious effects on political behavior. A prominent line of research suggests that these beliefs are promoted by repeated exposure. Yet, as scholars have rushed to understand these beliefs, they have exposed countless respondents to conspiratorial claims, raising the question of whether researchers are contributing to their spread. We investigate this possibility using a pre-registered within-subjects experiment embedded in a panel survey. The results suggest that exposure to a standard conspiracy question causes a significant increase in the likelihood of endorsing that conspiracy a week later. However, this exposure effect does not occur with a question format that offers an alternative, non-conspiratorial explanation for the target event. Thus, we recommend that researchers reduce the likelihood of spreading conspiracy beliefs by adopting a question format that asks respondents to choose between alternative explanations for an event.

Despite the alleged affinity between populism and conspiracy theories, how they relate on the individual level remains relatively unknown. This study explores the relation between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs at the individual level. First, I test whether the conspiracist facets, which directly involve governmental participation, are associated with the dimensions of populist attitudes. Further, I examine the relation of political trust with the dimensions and facets of both constructs as well as their predictive power of the self-reported propensity to vote for a populist party. To test these assumptions, a cross-sectional study was conducted in Germany. Confirmatory factor analyses indicate a strong association between conspiracist facets that directly involve governmental participation and the anti-elitism and sovereignty dimensions of populist attitudes. Findings further show that low political trust is related to all dimensions of populist attitudes–especially anti-elitism–and to the conspiracist facets. Furthermore, the sovereignty dimension of populist attitudes and low political trust predict the propensity to vote for the right-wing populist party AfD. These findings provide new insights to a more nuanced understanding of populism on the individual level and the relation to conspiracy beliefs.

A growing number of Americans stay informed about current events through social media. But using social media as a source of news is associated with increased likelihood of being misinformed about important topics, such as COVID-19. The two most popular platforms—Facebook and YouTube—remain relatively understudied in comparison to Twitter, which tends to be used by elites, but less than a quarter of the American public. In this brief research report, we investigate how cognitive reflection can mitigate the potential effects of using Facebook, YouTube and Twitter for news on subsequent conspiracy theory endorsement. To do that, we rely on an original dataset of 1,009 survey responses collected during the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic in the United States, on March 31, 2020. We find that using Facebook and YouTube for news increases conspiracy belief (both general and COVID-19 specific), controlling for cognitive reflection, traditional news media use, use of web-based news media, partisanship, education, age, and income. We also find that the impact of Facebook use on conspiracy belief is moderated by cognitive reflection. Facebook use increases conspiracy belief among those with low cognitive reflection but has no effect among those with moderate levels of cognitive reflection. It might even decrease conspiracy belief among those with the highest levels of cognitive reflection.

Abstract 
In an era of increasing partisan polarization and media fragmentation, interest in the causes of conspiracy beliefs has been growing rapidly. However, there is little consensus on how to measure these beliefs. Researchers typically present respondents with a conspiratorial statement, then assess their endorsement of the statement using an agree-disagree scale, a true-false scale, or some other variant. Researchers sometimes include a no-opinion response option and sometimes do not. Yet, there is little evidence as to the best format. In this article, we argue that common measures not only are challenging for respondents to answer, but also inflate estimates of conspiracy belief among the mass public. We introduce an alternative measure that presents respondents with an explicit choice between a conspiratorial and a conventional explanation for an event. Across three studies, the explicit choice format reduces no-opinion responding and reduces estimates of conspiracy belief, particularly among those low in political knowledge or cognitive reflection. These results suggest that previous findings may be inflated due to measurement artifacts. This evidence suggests that researchers adopt the explicit choice format for measuring conspiracy beliefs and provide a no-opinion response option.

In the present study, we tested whether Muslim minority members are more susceptible to conspiracy theories than majority members in the Netherlands. We examined conspiracy theories that are relevant (portraying the Muslim community as victim or Jewish people as perpetrators) and irrelevant for participants' Muslim identity (about the 2007 financial crisis, and other theories such as that the moon landings were fake). Results revealed that Muslims believed both identity-relevant and irrelevant conspiracy theories more strongly than non-Muslims. These differences could not be attributed to the contents of Muslim faith: Ethnic minority status exerted similar effects independent of Muslim identity. Instead, evidence suggested that feelings of both personal and group-based deprivation independently contribute to belief in conspiracy theories. We conclude that feelings of deprivation lead marginalized minority members to perceive the social and political system as rigged, stimulating belief in both identity-relevant and irrelevant conspiracy theories.

This paper uses multivariate logistic regressions to explore: (1) potential socio-economic, cultural, psychological and political determinants of AIDS conspiracy beliefs among young adults in Cape Town; and (2) whether these beliefs matter for unsafe sex. Membership of a religious organisation reduced the odds of believing AIDS origin conspiracy theories by more than a third, whereas serious psychological distress more than doubled it and belief in witchcraft tripled the odds among Africans. Political factors mattered, but in ways that differed by gender. Tertiary education and relatively high household income reduced the odds of believing AIDS conspiracies for African women (but not men) and trust in President Mbeki's health minister (relative to her successor) increased the odds sevenfold for African men (but not women). Never having heard of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the pro-science activist group that opposed Mbeki on AIDS, tripled the odds of believing AIDS conspiracies for African women (but not men). Controlling for demographic, attitudinal and relationship variables, the odds of using a condom were halved amongst female African AIDS conspiracy believers, whereas for African men, never having heard of TAC and holding AIDS denialist beliefs were the key determinants of unsafe sex.

Accepted manuscript version. Published version available at https://doi.org/10.1558/ijsnr.36716 . ; Recent studies on conspiracy thinking has concluded that the strongest predictor of the tendency towards conspiratorial thinking is a one-dimensional construct-conspiracy mentality-that is relatively stable over time and valid across cultures. Lantian et al. (2016) found that a single, elaborate question can work as a measure of conspiracy beliefs. We assess the validity of this question for an untypical, religious group: self-identified Neopagans. We also test some recent findings on the relation between conspiracy thinking and paranormal beliefs, attitudes towards group equality, political identification, age, gender, and education. The general patterns hold up well in our investigation, but there was a clear distinction between conspiracy theories about powerful actors and those about minorities. The single-item measure was the largest predictor of the former kind of conspiracy belief followed by level of paranormal beliefs. Anti-egalitarianism and holding a right-wing political identity were the strongest predictors of conspiracy beliefs about minorities. Education was negatively related to conspiracy beliefs of all kinds.

"Conspiracy theories spread more widely and faster than ever before. Fear and uncertainty prompt people to believe false narratives of danger and hidden plots, but are not sufficient without considering the role and ideological bias of the media. This timely book focuses on making sense of how and why some people respond to their fear of a threat by creating or believing conspiracy stories. It integrates insights from psychology, political science, communication, and information sciences to provide a complete overview and theory of how conspiracy beliefs manifest. Through this multi-disciplinary perspective, rigorous research develops and tests a practical, simple way to frame and understand conspiracy theories. The book supplies unprecedented amounts of new data from six empirical studies and unpicks the complexity of the process that leads to the empowerment of conspiracy beliefs"--

ObjectiveThis study disentangles the known correlates of conspiracy beliefs—such as the general predisposition toward conspiratorial thinking, authoritarianism, and partisan and ideological predispositions—in order to better understand the psychological antecedents of such beliefs and answer the question: Who are conspiracy theorists?MethodsWe use classification and regression tree models to explain individual beliefs in specific conspiracy theories, employing a large set of known correlates of conspiratorial thinking.ResultsDepending on the characteristics of the conspiracy theory employed on the survey, we find that political orientations and conspiratorial thinking provide the most analytical leverage in predicting individual conspiracy beliefs. Furthermore, paranormal beliefs were more predictive than previous literature suggests, while psychological biases demonstrated very limited predictive utility.ConclusionsThe psychological antecedents of conspiracy beliefs used to explain those beliefs vary considerably by the stimuli or events at the center of a given conspiracy theory. Therefore, disproportionately favoring one type of conspiracy theory on one's survey may result in inferences about conspiracy theorists that do not translate across studies. Furthermore, though we are not yet capable of fully determining who conspiracy theorists are, conspiratorial thinking, paranormal beliefs, and political orientations are more predictive of particular conspiracy beliefs than other attitudes, predispositions, and orientations.