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Carl Schmitt was an anti-liberal conservative jurist during the Weimar Republic in Germany whose position on emergency powers sponsors a hardline form of 'realism'. To restore peace and order qua the homogeneity of the people in times of crises, he sponsors the role of the sovereign in deciding on an extreme emergency even by transgressing the wordings of a written constitution. However, this article seeks to use the case of the Thai government's response to Covid-19 through the invocation of emergency powers to expose deficiencies pertaining to the Schmittian model. Rather than calling for the politics of exclusion, the present outbreak of Covid-19 in Thailand reiterates the essence of legality and communitarian and social solidarity.

Summary:1. Introduction: constitutional normality. 2. Constitutional abnormality. 2.1. The various possibilities in the face of extraordinary situations. 2.1.1. The non-constitutionalization of extraordinary measures for State protection. 2.1.2. The constitutional regulation of the concentration of powers. 2.1.3. The detailed constitutionalization of one or more exceptional situations. 2.1.4. The parallel activity of the ordinary legislator. 2.2. The Spanish doctrine and its conception of the state of exception. 2.3. An alternative proposal: constitucional emergency law. 2.3.1. Material perspective: affecting the basic elements of the rule of law as a requirement for the outbreak of constitutional emergency. 2.3.2. Taxonomy: regulated constitutional emergency versus non-regulated constitutional emergency and how the law subsists in both cases. 2.4. Constitutional emergency law in practice. 2.4.1. Regulated constitutional emergency: beyond Article 116 SC. 2.4.2. Non-regulated constitutional emergency: 23-F as an example. 3. Conclusions. BIBLIOGRAPHY.Summary: constitutional normality consists of the regular and general application of a series of pre-established legal rules, with the objective of achieving the peaceful coexistence of citizens. However, there are extraordinary danger situations in which some ordinary rules may not be enforced, in order to restore political-constitutional normality. Although it is impossible to anticipate all the anomalous circumstances likely to occur, it is in the interests of legal security that at least the most common threats should be foreseen. This is what the majority of Spanish doctrine agrees to call a state of exception or exception right, understood in a broad sense.This work rejects the latter terminological conception, and this under a new taxonomic proposal applicable to the field of constitutional abnormality. On the basis of the differentiation between situations of regulated and non-regulated constitutional emergency, we defend the true legal exception is manifested when, in the absence of applicable regulation in case of a specific threat, the state reaction finds no other limits than the respect for the principle of proportionality in the defense of democratic legal values. It is the latter, in fact, which makes it impossible to confirm the total suspension of the Law in the face of a non-regulated exceptional circumstance, all these legal premises belonging to what we understand to be constitutional emergency law. ; La normalidad constitucional consiste en la aplicación habitual y general de una serie de reglas jurídicas preestablecidas, ello con el objetivo de ordenar la pacífica convivencia ciudadana. Sin embargo, existen situaciones de peligro extraordinario en las que deberá estar justificado que las reglas habituales cedan en gran medida, ello con el objetivo de lograr una pronta restauración de la normalidad político-constitucional. Aunque anticipar todas las circunstancias excepcionales susceptibles de producirse es tarea del todo imposible, va en beneficio de la seguridad jurídica la previsión de, al menos, las amenazas más comunes. En esa regulación consiste lo que la doctrina española mayoritaria conviene en denominar estado de excepción o derecho de excepción, entendidos en sentido amplio.Este trabajo rehúye la anterior concepción terminológica, y lo hace en el marco de una nueva propuesta taxonómica aplicable al ámbito de la anormalidad constitucional. Así, partiendo de la diferenciación entre situaciones de emergencia constitucional reglada y no reglada, defendemos que la verdadera situación jurídica de excepción se manifiesta cuando, no existiendo regulación aplicable frente a la amenaza concreta, la reacción estatal no encuentra más límites que el respeto al principio de proporcionalidad en la defensa de los valores democráticos consagrados en la Constitución. Es esto, además, lo que impide afirmar la suspensión total del derecho frente al hecho excepcional no regulado, perteneciendo todas estas premisas jurídicas a lo que nosotros entendemos que es el derecho de emergencia constitucional.

Nine out of ten modern constitutions contain explicit emergency provisions, describing who can call a state of emergency (and under which conditions) and the additional powers government enjoys under a state of emergency. As states of emergency typically allocate additional powers to the executive, they lend themselves easily to abuse and provide political incentives to declare emergencies. In this paper, we analyze under what conditions government behavior under a state of emergency deviates from constitutional provisions and a de jure/de facto gap thus emerges. Such a gap can be caused by the unlawful declaration of an emergency, the noncompliance with constitutional provisions in the course of an emergency, or the perpetuation of a state of emergency beyond the constitutionally defined length. Based on a novel dataset comprising 853 emergency declarations, 115 are identified as unlawful. We find that events caused by political turmoil are more likely to be followed by an unlawful emergency than natural disasters. Autocratic governments are more likely to renege against the constitution than democratic governments. Focusing on the 97 emergencies declared as reactions to domestic events, we also find that bicameral systems are more likely to suffer from unlawful states of emergencies than unicameral ones, as are countries hit by recessions, and countries where the constitution justifies emergencies under more numerous conditions.

In this article the author analyzes the sterility of so-called Criminal Law Symbolic and the ineffectiveness of one of its recurring expressions in our reality, as is the declaration of a state of constitutional emergency, to fight crime, apropos of the recent experience lived in the Province Constitutional Callao, and highlights the misuse of a repressive, vindictive and devoid of reasonable criminal policy; in order to conclusively reaffirm the ethical duty and constitutional obligation of every democratic state and right criminological design and implement a policy respecting the dignity of the human person is effective to control and reduce crime. ; En este artículo, la autora analiza la esterilidad del denominado derecho penal simbólico y la ineficacia de una de sus expresiones recurrentes en nuestra realidad para combatir la criminalidad, como es la declaración de estado de emergencia constitucional, a propósito de la reciente experiencia vivida en la Provincia Constitucional del Callao. Asimismo, subraya el mal uso de una política penal represiva, vindicativa y carente de razonabilidad, con la finalidad de reafirmar concluyentemente el deber ético y la obligación constitucional que tiene todo Estado democrático y de derecho de diseñar y aplicar una política criminológica eficaz para controlar y reducir la criminalidad, respetando la dignidad de la persona humana.