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This contribution is a review of the research handbook in comparative constitutional law, titled Comparative Constitutional Theory edited by Gary Jacobsohn and Miguel Schor. It was published in 2018 by Edward Elgar Publishing. Every law library worthy of the name should acquire it for the benefit of constitutional scholars and advanced students of constitutional comparison.

In evaluating the success of the American constitutional system, constitutional theorists often focus their attention on the broad structures through which constitutional law is made--for example, the existence of multi-member courts a majority of whose members usually must agree on the text of a single opinion or the difference in training and life experiences that judges have in comparison with legislators. The same theorists tend to pay little attention to a related set of institutional arrangements that are more recent in their development--for example, the proliferation of amicus briefs filed by advocacy groups, the substantial increase in the use of law clerks, or the degree to which public awareness of the content of Supreme Court opinions is increasingly mediated through ideologically-committed talking heads. This paper makes two related points: First, it argues that constitutional theorists have drastically underestimated the degree to which the content and tenor of constitutional law turns on the second, more novel set of institutional arrangements. Second, it argues that the very distinction between the two categories is ephemeral; both the more traditional and the more novel institutional structures of the American constitutional courts are nominal and historically contingent. The paper concludes with an argument that the two sets of institutions can be--and must be--jointly theorized under the rubric of "constitutional culture."

Cities in Federal Constitutional Theory seeks to offer a fresh theoretical account of cities as federalism subjects, exploring the increased importance of cities in recent decades from political, economic, socio-cultural, and demographic perspectives.

Intro -- Foreword -- Series Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Table of Contents -- About the Contributors -- The Methodology of Constitutional Theory - Introduction -- I. Background -- II. The Scope of the Volume -- III. The Chapters and Thematic Groupings -- SELF-UNDERSTANDINGS -- 1. The Significance of the Common Understanding in Legal Theory -- I. Adherence to the Common Understanding -- II. Paying Attention to the Common Understanding -- III. The Limitations of the Common Understanding -- IV. Conclusion -- 2. In Defence of Traditional Methodologies -- I. Introduction -- II. The Orthodox Understanding -- III. Judicial Pragmatism -- IV. Confusion Between the Common Law and Other Kinds of Law -- V. Constitution-making by Judges -- VI. Legal Philosophy -- VII. Parliamentary Sovereignty Today -- 3. Constitutional Methodology and Brexit: Adopting a Model-Theoretic Approach -- I. Defining model-theoretic approaches -- II. What is distinctive about a model-theoretic approach to constitutional theory? -- III. Why adopt a model-theoretic approach to constitutional theory? -- IV. Brexit and Parliamentary Sovereignty -- V. Conclusion -- HOW DO FACTS MATTER? -- 4. Slaying the Misshapen Monster: The Case for Constitutional Heuristics -- I. Introduction -- II. Facts, Theories and Traditions: Making the Constitutional World -- III. A Methodology for Constitutional Theory -- IV. Heuristics and the Limits of Rhetoric -- V. Conclusion -- 5. Why Common Law Constitutionalism is Correct (If It Is) -- I. Introduction -- II. Two Accounts of the British Constitution -- III. What Makes GO or CLC Correct? -- IV. GO and CLC as Rival Interpretations of British Constitutional Practice -- V. Conclusion -- 6. Methodological Pluralism and Modern Administrative Law -- I. Subordinating Administrative Law to Constitutional Law -- II. New Methods of Administrative Law Theory.