Strong Federalism, Constraints on the Central Government, and Economic Reform in Brazil
The effects of Brazilian federalism on the process of economic reform are analyzed in the context of the interactions & balance of power between the president & the governors, Congress, & others protecting state interests. Federalism indicators alone -- the resource base of subnational governments, the power of governors, the national Congress' degree of emphasis on subnational interests, & the distribution of government functions across levels -- would give Brazilian state actors leverage over presidents, which was the case in three presidential policy initiatives between 1985-1994 -- state debt containment, state bank control, & fiscal allocation adjustments between the national & subnational governments. This situation was reversed during President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's 1995-2002 regime because of factors specific to his administration, eg, the President's skill in achieving reform, the degree of Congressional backing for the President, & presidential performance. It is concluded that the study of federalism's effects on policy cannot be reduced to institutional issues, but have to include complementary variables. 4 Tables, 81 References. M. Pflum