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THE AUTHOR CONSIDERS THE CRITICISM OF CONSTRUCTIVISM AND RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AS PRESENTED IN THE POLITICAL THEORY OF F.A. HAYEK. HAYEK'S THESIS IS THAT GOAL-DIRECTED RATIONALITY IN POLITICS IS COUNTER-FINAL. THE MAIN ARGUMENT OF THIS PAPER IS THAT, ON CLOSE EXAMINATION, HAYEK APPEARS TO BE A CONSTRUCTIVIST HIMSELF. THE PURPOSE OF HAYEK'S ANTI-RATIONALISM IS PRIMARILY IDEOLOGICAL AND INSTRUMENTAL. HE WANTS TO INDUCE CERTAIN ANTI-RATIONALISTIC BELIEFS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES RATIONALISM HAS BAD CONSEQUENCES. YET THIS VERY PROJECT CAN BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF GOAL-DIRECTED RATIONALITY. FURTHERMORE, HAYEK MIXES ABSTRACT PHILSOPHICAL DOCTRINE WITH EMPIRICAL THEORY. IN HIS CRITIQUE OF CONSTRUCTIVISM, HAYEK CONFUSES TWO NOTIONS OF "RATIONALITY." ON THE ONE HAND, HE ARGUES AGAINST EPISTEMOLOGICAL RATIONALISM ASSOCIATED WITH DESCARTES AND, ON THE OTHER, HE ARGUES AGAINST THE SUBJECTIVISTIC, ACTION-ORIENTED NOTION OF RATIONALITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE IDEA OF "ECONOMIC MAN." ARGUMENTS AGAINST CARTESIAN RATIONALITY DO NOT, HOWEVER, IMPLY THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF GOAL-DIRECTED RATIONALISM IN POLITICS. THE SO-CALLED INFORMATION PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED AT AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL LEVEL. IT IS A PRACTICAL PROBLEM, WHICH HAYEK HAS CERTAIN IDEAS ABOUT SOLVING. THEREFORE, HAYEK'S THESIS OF "TACIT KNOWLEDGE" IS NOT AN EXPRESSION OF SKEPTICISM AS IS OFTEN BELIEVED.

The theme addressed is the criticism of constructivism and rationalism in politics as presented in the political theory of F. A. Hayek. Hayek's thesis is that goal‐directed rationality in politics is counter‐final. The main argument of this article is that on closer examination Hayek appears to be a constructivist himself. The purpose of Hayek's anti‐rationalism is primarily ideological and instrumental. Hayek wants to induce certain anti‐rationalistic beliefs because he believes rationalism has bad consequences. Yet this very project can be considered a case of goal‐directed rationality. Furthermore, the argument is that Hayek mixes abstract philosophical doctrine with empirical theory. In his critique of constructivism, Hayek confuses two notions of 'rationality'. On the one hand he argues against epistemological rationalism associated with Descartes, and on the other he argues against the subjectivistic, action‐oriented notion of 'rationality' associated with the idea of 'economic man'. Arguments against Cartesian rationalism do not, however, imply the impossibility of goal‐directed rationalism in politics. The so‐called information problem cannot be solved at an epistemological level. It is a practical problem, which Hayek has certain ideas how to solve. The argument here, therefore, is that Hayek's thesis of 'tacit knowledge' is not an expression of skepticism as is often believed.

The author shows modern conservative concepts of politics as a variant of normative political theory. Conservatism shows up as a reaction to enlightened rationalism. In contrast to rationalistic revolutionary constructivism, conservatism pleads for a return to a religious basis for man's spiritual & political life. Conservatism creates policies based on tradition & the family, which sustains feelings of obligation toward the community. The state is not just an instrument for special interests, but an expression of substantial cooperation in the nation & its society. Thus, conservatism leads to a demand for reforms of existing liberal institutions. Adapted from the source document.

Examines the philosophical foundations of democratic legitimacy, arguing that legitimacy in complex modern democratic societies results from public deliberation over matters of common concern, & that a public sphere of deliberation about such matters is crucial to the legitimacy of democratic institutions. The relationship between the normative presuppositions of democratic deliberation & the idealized content of practical rationality is discussed from a perspective of "Kantian constructivism," & an effort is made to acknowledge the historical & sociological specificity of democracy while insisting against the ethnocentric liberalism that the practical rationality embodied in democratic institutions has a culture-transcending validity claim. W. Howard

This book contains seminal discussions of central issues in the philosophy of language, mathematics, mind, religion and time. Is common language conceptually prior to idiolectics? What is a theory of meaning? Does constructivism provide a satisfactory account of mathematics? What are indefinitely extensible concepts? Can we change the past? These are only some of the very important questions addressed here. Both the papers written by the contributors and Dummett's replies provide a great wealth of stimulating ideas for those who currently do research in the respective areas touched upon without making the reading exceedingly tedious. This feature, common to most of the papers in this book, makes it possible to use the material presented in undergraduate courses at university level

This article examines how the special theoretical significance of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is affected by attempts to apply relativist-constructivism to technology. The article shows that the failure to confront key analytic ambivalences in the practice of SSK has compromised its original strategic significance. In particular, the construal of SSK as an explanatory formula diminishes its potential for profoundly reconceptualizing epistemic issues. A consideration of critiques of technological determinism, and of some empirical studies, reveals similar analytic ambivalences in the social study of technology (SST). The injunction to consider "technology as text" is critically examined. It is concluded that a reflexive interpretation of this slogan is necessary to recover some of the epistemological significance lost in the constructivist move from SSK to SST.

I: Fundamentals of Moral Action -- Empirical and Intelligible Character in the Critique of Pure Reason -- Morality as Freedom -- On the Formalism of Kant's Ethics -- Agency and Anthropology in Kant's Groundwork -- The Submission of our Sensuous Nature to the Moral Law in the Second Critique -- II: Moral Practice and Knowledge -- Theory as Practice in Kant -- Autonomy, Omniscience and the Ethical Imagination: From Theoretical to Practical Philosophy in Kant -- The Interests of Reason: From Metaphysics to Moral History -- III: From Morality to Justice and History -- Kant's Principle of Justice as Categorical Imperative of Law -- Histoire et Guerre chez Kant -- Freedom as a Regulative Principle: On Some Aspects of the Kant-Herder Controversy on the Philosophy of History -- IV: Kant in Contemporary Contexts -- How Kantian is Rawls's "Kantian Constructivism"? -- The Ideal Speech Situation: Neo-Kantian Ethics in Habermas and Apel -- Kant: Respect, Individuality and Dependence.

Selforganization — the Convergence of Ideas. An Introduction -- I. Epistemological Foundations -- Science and Daily Life: The Ontology of Scientific Explanations -- Self-Organization, Emergent Properties and the Unity of the World -- On a Fundamental Paradigm Shift in the Natural Sciences -- The Cognitive Program of Constructivism and a Reality that Remains Unknown -- II. Selfreference and Selfregulation in Social Systems -- How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law -- Self-Regulation in Social Systems -- Systemic Therapy — A Particular Drift Between Systems Theory and Psychotherapy -- Literary Systems as Self-organizing Systems -- Chekhov's Letter: Linguistic System and its Discontents -- III. The Appearance of Structure -- Concepts of Self-Organization in the 19th Century -- Cognitive Systems as Self-Organizing Systems -- IV. The Selforganization of Science -- Self-Organization and Autopoiesis in the Development of Modern Science -- The Selforganization of Science — Outline of a Theoretical Model -- Actor-Networks versus Science as Self-Organizing System: A Comperative View of two Constructivist Approaches -- Self-Organization and New Social Movements -- Person Index.

William Godwin (1756-1836) occupe une position singulière dans la controverse britannique entre partisans et adversaires de la Révolution française. S'il adhère à l'idéal démocratique, il rejette le jacobinisme et disqualifie la violence auxquels il oppose la persuasion progressive de l'opinion publique. W. Godwin réfute la doctrine du contrat social et la codification des droits qui régissent les principes de la Première République. Adversaire déclaré de toute coercition politique, il défend une version minimaliste du rôle des institutions. Anticipant John Stuart Mill, il fonde la justice sur une interprétation altruiste de la doctrine utilitariste qui tente de rendre compatible l'individualisme méthodologique et l'exigence conjointe de la liberté, de l'égalité et de la fraternité. Il esquisse les contours d'une société juste qui, propriété et Etat étant abolis, repose sur l'autonomie et la libre coordination des individus, et dont la richesse réside dans le loisir. Cette utopie libertaire consacre W. Godwin comme l'un des fondateurs de la doctrine anarchiste. L'utilitarisme godwinien tend au perfectionnisme et n'échappe pas au constructivisme. Cette réflexion stimulante n'en ébauche pas moins une philosophie de la société civile qui est profondément actuelle.

John Rawls' a theory of justice. Social contract vs utilitarianism
Rawls' A Theory of Justice constructs a modem version of the theory of social contract by emphasizing distributive justice, which attempts to offer an alternative to the utilitarian doctrine. Unlike utilitarianism, Rawls' theory is neither altruistic nor teleogical, but deontological : one must try to find the right rules without taking a stand on the purposes of individuals. These rules, the two principles of justice — the broadest basic liberties and democratic equality together with advantage granted to the underprivileged (fraternity) —, are in lexicographic order. They form a social optimum (what is right) compatible with, but taking precedence over, the economic optimum (relative only to what is good). The choice of these principles belongs to game theory. The players will choose them rather than those pertaining to any other doctrine because of the maximin criterion. Rawls is open to « public choice » critics who reject distributive justice (fraternity) on the basis of utilitarian arguments. Rawls' constructivism does not agree easily with the individualism and liberalism which he claims.

Sociologists of science who portray their work as a challenge to the epistemology of science, including H. M. Collins (Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, London: Sage Publications, 1985), are criticized. One reason is that they target hackneyed, positivist defenses of the unique position of scientific knowledge of the physical world, rather than tackling the more sophisticated formulations. The dispute cannot be resolved by empirical evidence drawn from studies of science or history. The aim of science is the acquisition of knowledge of the physical world, with experiment rather than mere observation as the source of significant scientific data. Sociologists' assertion that scientific debates are settled by social & political pressures rather than by experimental means is seen as an extreme position unsupported by case examples. Experimental outcomes are determined by the physical world itself. One branch of the sociology of science, constructivism, takes antirealism to the point that the physical world itself seems to be a social construction, & fails to distinguish between knowledge & the object of knowledge. The use of relativistic sociology of science to justify serious treatment of "creation science," for example, is raised as a possibility. A. Waters

About the Origins of this Volume -- Section 1: Culture-Specific Psychosomatic Paradigms -- Are functional syndromes culture-bound? -- The Medical Anthropology of Viktor von Weizsäcker in the Present Clinical Context of Heidelberg -- Ethnomedical Fundaments in the Work of Viktor von Weizsäcker -- Phenomenology of the Body: The Subject-Object Problem in Psychosomatic Medicine and the Role of traditional Medical Systems herein -- Memory within the Body: Women's Narrative and Identity in a Southern Italian Village -- Section 2: Sociosomatics and Ethnicity -- The Symbolic and the Physiological: Epigastric Patients in Family Medicine in Flanders -- Nerves and Nostalgia: Greek-Canadian Immigrants and Medical Care in Québec -- The Development and Change of Health Research among Migrant Workers in West-Germany: Ideologies and Practice between 1956 and 1986 -- Section 3: Local Cultures of Biomedicine -- The Practice of Biomedicine and the Discourse on Hope: A Preliminary Investigation into the Culture of American Oncology -- Culture, Cancer, and Communication in Italy -- Images and Interpretations of Severe Illness: Ethnological Aspects of Dealing with Cancer -- Emil Kraepelin and the Origins of American Psychiatric Diagnosis -- Section 4: From Patients' Complaints to Cultural Narrative -- The Love-Lorn Consumptive: South Asian Ethnography and the Psychosomatic Paradigm -- Traditional European and Chinese Definitions of Illness and Medical Practice -- Section 5: Medical Systems and Cultural Change: An Analysis of Facts and Theories -- The Hierarchies of Medicines: A Contextual Analysis of Schismogenic Processes -- Cultural Constructivism: Sickness Histories and the Understanding of Ethnomedicines beyond Critical Medical Anthropologies -- Holistic Health and a Changing Western World View -- List of Contributors.