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Constructivismabout practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and practical judgment. The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Kant himself, John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the out-look. In this essay I explore a somewhat different variety of practical constructivism, which I callAristotelian Constructivism. My aim is to establish conceptual space for this form of constructivism by indicating both in what ways it agrees with its Kantian counterparts and in what ways it differs. I argue that Aristotelian Constructivism is on one sense more faithful to the constructivist enterprise than the Kantian varieties, in that its understanding of both the establishment of practical truthandthe vindication of the theory itself is constructivist.

The paper proposes to expand the constructivist view from empirical analysis to pragmatic advice. Its main thesis is: The fact that methods and concepts in the production of knowledge and standards for justifying truth claims are culturally bound does not preclude these bonds from being observed and also controlled and adjusted. Knowledge work imports scientific methods and concepts into virtually all segments of society. Whether knowledge is well manufactured and trustworthy is no longer the sole concern of scientific communities but of clients, stakeholder groups, political bodies, and other actors. The paper begins with reconsidering the symmetry principle of the Strong Programme from a methodological point of view. It argues that excluding justified beliefs from the realm of independent variables is unwarranted. Even if it is impossible to introduce truth as a cause, it is possible to accept justifications of beliefs as causes. In a second line of analysis, this paper explores that the concept of cultural relativity of knowledge has an internal instability. Every lesson in cultural relativism is a lesson in designing cognitive strategies to transcend it. The better the social construction of scientific knowledge is understood and even causally explained, the better reflexive abstraction opens up possibilities to operate with this causality and loosen or tighten the cultural bonds. Examples demonstrate that crossing established boundaries and aiming at higher degrees of cultural independency are as meaningful as value based restrictions to smaller domains. It is in this context that constructivism has a future as a frame for deliberative forms of knowledge construction and justification.

Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; LUISS PhD Thesis