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Ethical constructivism holds that truths about the relation between rationality, morality, and agency are best understood as constructed by correct reasoning, rather than discovered or invented. Unlike other metaphors used in metaethics, construction brings to light the generative and dynamic dimension of practical reason. On the resultant picture, practical reasoning is not only productive but also self-transforming, and socially empowering. The main task of this volume is to illustrate how constructivism has substantially modified and expanded the agenda of metaethics by refocusing on rational agency and its constitutive principles. In particular, this volume identifies, compares and discusses the prospects and failures of the main strands of constructivism regarding the powers of reason in responding to the challenges of contingency. While Kantian, Humean, Aristotelian, and Hegelian theories sharply differ in their constructivist strategies, they provide compelling accounts of the rational articulation required for an inclusive and unified ethical community.

Constructivismabout practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and practical judgment. The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Kant himself, John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the out-look. In this essay I explore a somewhat different variety of practical constructivism, which I callAristotelian Constructivism. My aim is to establish conceptual space for this form of constructivism by indicating both in what ways it agrees with its Kantian counterparts and in what ways it differs. I argue that Aristotelian Constructivism is on one sense more faithful to the constructivist enterprise than the Kantian varieties, in that its understanding of both the establishment of practical truthandthe vindication of the theory itself is constructivist.

"Realism and constructivism, two key contemporary theoretical approaches to the study of international relations, are commonly taught as mutually exclusive ways of understanding the subject. Realist Constructivism explores the common ground between the two, and demonstrates that, rather than being in simple opposition, they have areas of both tension and overlap. There is indeed space to engage in a realist constructivism. But at the same time, there are important distinctions between them, and there remains a need for a constructivism that is not realist, and a realism that is not constructivist. Samuel Barkin argues more broadly for a different way of thinking about theories of international relations, that focuses on the corresponding elements within various approaches rather than on a small set of mutually exclusive paradigms. Realist Constructivism provides an interesting new way for scholars and students to think about international relations theory"--Provided by publisher

Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Contemporary Constructivism and Its Usefulness in a Confucian Context -- Early Childhood Education in China: A Reevaluation of Confucianism and Constructivism -- A Hermeneutic Approach to a Theoretical Framework of Teachers' Constructivist Cocreation -- Chapter 2: Constructivism in Confucian Culture -- Thinking in a Chinese Way -- Constructivism and Confucianism -- Dewey, Confucius, and Tao Xingzhi -- Similarities -- Differences -- Implications for Cross-Cultural Learning Today -- Contemporary Constructivist Theories and Implications -- Flexible Teachers -- Prepared Environments -- Respectful Sociomoral Atmosphere -- The Chinese Context, The Guide, and Its Implementation -- Chapter 3: Constructivist Teaching in China Today -- Chinese Preschool and Kindergarten Teachers' Utilization of Constructivism -- Teacher Preference for Direct Teaching -- Etic Perspectives on the Prevalence of Direct Teaching -- Teacher Utilization of Constructivism -- Research Paradigm Shift -- Proprieties and Benevolence -- The Coherence of Theories and Practices -- Constructivist Teacher Education Theories and Implications -- Act I, Scene I: Active Learning -- Act I, Scene II: Heuristic Teaching -- Act I, Scene III: The Relationship Between Play and Learning -- Act II: DAP Versus Standards - An Example of Teachers' Practical Strategies -- Chinese Teacher Education Policies -- Conceptual Framework -- Chapter 4: A Hermeneutic Analysis of Chinese Teachers -- A Holistic Research Design -- Do Re Mi Youeryuan -- The Chinese Teachers -- Interviews, Observations, and Documents -- Interviews -- Observations -- Documents -- A Hermeneutic Analysis -- Preliminary Analysis -- Constant Comparative Analysis -- Hermeneutics -- Chapter 5: Flexibility and Balancing: Against the "Apprenticeship of Observation".

The paper proposes to expand the constructivist view from empirical analysis to pragmatic advice. Its main thesis is: The fact that methods and concepts in the production of knowledge and standards for justifying truth claims are culturally bound does not preclude these bonds from being observed and also controlled and adjusted. Knowledge work imports scientific methods and concepts into virtually all segments of society. Whether knowledge is well manufactured and trustworthy is no longer the sole concern of scientific communities but of clients, stakeholder groups, political bodies, and other actors. The paper begins with reconsidering the symmetry principle of the Strong Programme from a methodological point of view. It argues that excluding justified beliefs from the realm of independent variables is unwarranted. Even if it is impossible to introduce truth as a cause, it is possible to accept justifications of beliefs as causes. In a second line of analysis, this paper explores that the concept of cultural relativity of knowledge has an internal instability. Every lesson in cultural relativism is a lesson in designing cognitive strategies to transcend it. The better the social construction of scientific knowledge is understood and even causally explained, the better reflexive abstraction opens up possibilities to operate with this causality and loosen or tighten the cultural bonds. Examples demonstrate that crossing established boundaries and aiming at higher degrees of cultural independency are as meaningful as value based restrictions to smaller domains. It is in this context that constructivism has a future as a frame for deliberative forms of knowledge construction and justification.

This volume presents twelve original papers on the idea that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. The contributors offer new perspectives, some sympathetic and some critical, on constructivist understandings - Kantian or otherwise - of morality and reason.

Albert Weale's Democratic Justice and the Social Contract is an important book. It offers an innovative and original (proceduralist) account of justice. In so doing, it places what Brian Barry called 'the empirical method' at the centre of normative political philosophy's attempts to generate determinate answers to moral questions. This article-written from the perspective of someone sympathetic to both the commitment to mutual advantage and the empirical method – focuses on the kind of argument it is that Weale is offering and in particular on the nature of his constructivist project. It argues that Weale's commitment to equality lies outside the constructivist project and that this undermines his aspiration to genuine constructivism. The article goes on to consider, on the basis of arguments found in Democratic Justice and the Social Contract, various ways in which Weale might have grounded his egalitarian commitments from within the constructivist project.

International audience ; Pragmatic constructivism is characterized in a particular epistemology based on the quest for parametric objectivity. In Peter Knoepfel's public policy analysis, this theoretical perspective relates to the study of the construction of marks of objectivity (that is, the measures contained in or inferred by a policy: problems, criteria, procedures, mechanisms, norms) which, according to him, make up the substance of policies. The place granted to the concepts of 'actors', 'resources' and 'institutional rules' in the proposed analytical framework is a clear illustration of this (Knoepfel, Larrue & Varone, 2006). However, this quest is unlikely to be successful if there is no empirical endeavour to explain the interactions between the three concepts. This is why Peter Knoepfel has constantly formulated the equation between actors, resources and rules, in operationalizable terms – in both his research work carried out in close proximity to public action (through various mandates) and in his teaching in Switzerland and abroad. The policy analysis defended by him is constantly shaped by a pragmatic perspective. The aim is to gain insight into concrete (observable) practices, through which actors produce a shared normative signification, particularly in terms of an hypothesis on problem causation (who or what is 'guilty' or 'objectively responsible' for the collective problem to be resolved?) and an hypothesis on state intervention (how can the collective problem be alleviated or resolved?). This pragmatism is located in a constant effort at methodological operationalization, which is systematically aimed at exploring the explanation for this trilogy (actors, resources, rules) and its interactions as a pragmatic concept. Peter Knoepfel always expects the explanation of a policy to cite factors that are important. For him the idea of importance (as for the pragmatists, Hilary Putnam (1990) in particular) is always dependent on the reason for asking the question why? In this instance, why ...

International audience ; Pragmatic constructivism is characterized in a particular epistemology based on the quest for parametric objectivity. In Peter Knoepfel's public policy analysis, this theoretical perspective relates to the study of the construction of marks of objectivity (that is, the measures contained in or inferred by a policy: problems, criteria, procedures, mechanisms, norms) which, according to him, make up the substance of policies. The place granted to the concepts of 'actors', 'resources' and 'institutional rules' in the proposed analytical framework is a clear illustration of this (Knoepfel, Larrue & Varone, 2006). However, this quest is unlikely to be successful if there is no empirical endeavour to explain the interactions between the three concepts. This is why Peter Knoepfel has constantly formulated the equation between actors, resources and rules, in operationalizable terms – in both his research work carried out in close proximity to public action (through various mandates) and in his teaching in Switzerland and abroad. The policy analysis defended by him is constantly shaped by a pragmatic perspective. The aim is to gain insight into concrete (observable) practices, through which actors produce a shared normative signification, particularly in terms of an hypothesis on problem causation (who or what is 'guilty' or 'objectively responsible' for the collective problem to be resolved?) and an hypothesis on state intervention (how can the collective problem be alleviated or resolved?). This pragmatism is located in a constant effort at methodological operationalization, which is systematically aimed at exploring the explanation for this trilogy (actors, resources, rules) and its interactions as a pragmatic concept. Peter Knoepfel always expects the explanation of a policy to cite factors that are important. For him the idea of importance (as for the pragmatists, Hilary Putnam (1990) in particular) is always dependent on the reason for asking the question why? In this instance, why ...