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Abstract
This essay argues that Rawls's recent constructivist approach waivers between a relativist defense and a more Kantian account which grounds his conception of justice in the idea of an agreement between free and equal moral persons. It is suggested that this ambiguity lies at the center of his attempt to provide a "political not metaphysical" account which is also not "political in the wrong way".

Facilitated communication, a technique that is said to enhance the communicative abilities of individuals with severe language impairments, has engendered much controversy. Biklen and Duchan (1994) and Green and Shane (1994) present two sides of this controversy. Biklen and Duchan argue that from a constructivist's perspective, the primary issue is the underlying cultural presuppositions regarding mental retardation and science rather than the efficacy of facilitated communication. Green and Shane present research evidence challenging the efficacy of facilitated communication within a positivist's framework. We present a brief review of science as viewed through positivists' and constructivists' lenses. Using the framework of social constructivism adopted by Biklen and Duchan, we disagree with them on three points: (a) even though the process of constructing scientific knowledge is strongly affected by human social, emotional, and cognitive processes, it also involves matters of fact that cannot be ignored; (b) social constructivists' accounts of science can be accepted as descriptive without being prescriptive; (c) although we cannot prove that belief systems, including positivism and social constructivism, are true or false in the larger sense, belief systems have differential consequences for technological changes of the type that are valued by persons with severe impairments of communication.

This article reviews recent work in socio-historical technology studies. Four problems, frequently mentioned in critical debates, are discussed—relativism, reflexivity, theory, and practice. The main body of the article is devoted to a discussion of the latter two problems. Requirements for a theory on socio-technical change are proposed, and one concrete example of a conceptual framework that meets these requirements is discussed. The second point of the article is to argue that present (science and) technology studies are now able to break away from a too academic, internalistic perspective and return to the politically relevant "Science, Technology & Society" issues that informed much of this work more than a decade ago.

Argues that in the area of speech perception there are many indications that constructivism is inadequate. Examines research on infants, capacities in the initial state and language acquisition. (SJO)

The theme addressed is the criticism of constructivism and rationalism in politics as presented in the political theory of F. A. Hayek. Hayek's thesis is that goal‐directed rationality in politics is counter‐final. The main argument of this article is that on closer examination Hayek appears to be a constructivist himself. The purpose of Hayek's anti‐rationalism is primarily ideological and instrumental. Hayek wants to induce certain anti‐rationalistic beliefs because he believes rationalism has bad consequences. Yet this very project can be considered a case of goal‐directed rationality. Furthermore, the argument is that Hayek mixes abstract philosophical doctrine with empirical theory. In his critique of constructivism, Hayek confuses two notions of 'rationality'. On the one hand he argues against epistemological rationalism associated with Descartes, and on the other he argues against the subjectivistic, action‐oriented notion of 'rationality' associated with the idea of 'economic man'. Arguments against Cartesian rationalism do not, however, imply the impossibility of goal‐directed rationalism in politics. The so‐called information problem cannot be solved at an epistemological level. It is a practical problem, which Hayek has certain ideas how to solve. The argument here, therefore, is that Hayek's thesis of 'tacit knowledge' is not an expression of skepticism as is often believed.

Examines the philosophical foundations of democratic legitimacy, arguing that legitimacy in complex modern democratic societies results from public deliberation over matters of common concern, & that a public sphere of deliberation about such matters is crucial to the legitimacy of democratic institutions. The relationship between the normative presuppositions of democratic deliberation & the idealized content of practical rationality is discussed from a perspective of "Kantian constructivism," & an effort is made to acknowledge the historical & sociological specificity of democracy while insisting against the ethnocentric liberalism that the practical rationality embodied in democratic institutions has a culture-transcending validity claim. W. Howard

This article examines how the special theoretical significance of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is affected by attempts to apply relativist-constructivism to technology. The article shows that the failure to confront key analytic ambivalences in the practice of SSK has compromised its original strategic significance. In particular, the construal of SSK as an explanatory formula diminishes its potential for profoundly reconceptualizing epistemic issues. A consideration of critiques of technological determinism, and of some empirical studies, reveals similar analytic ambivalences in the social study of technology (SST). The injunction to consider "technology as text" is critically examined. It is concluded that a reflexive interpretation of this slogan is necessary to recover some of the epistemological significance lost in the constructivist move from SSK to SST.

Sociologists of science who portray their work as a challenge to the epistemology of science, including H. M. Collins (Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, London: Sage Publications, 1985), are criticized. One reason is that they target hackneyed, positivist defenses of the unique position of scientific knowledge of the physical world, rather than tackling the more sophisticated formulations. The dispute cannot be resolved by empirical evidence drawn from studies of science or history. The aim of science is the acquisition of knowledge of the physical world, with experiment rather than mere observation as the source of significant scientific data. Sociologists' assertion that scientific debates are settled by social & political pressures rather than by experimental means is seen as an extreme position unsupported by case examples. Experimental outcomes are determined by the physical world itself. One branch of the sociology of science, constructivism, takes antirealism to the point that the physical world itself seems to be a social construction, & fails to distinguish between knowledge & the object of knowledge. The use of relativistic sociology of science to justify serious treatment of "creation science," for example, is raised as a possibility. A. Waters