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Since the end of the Cold War and in the context of the recent spread of economic globalization, Southeast Asian regionalism has steadily deepened and expanded, centering on ASEAN. The concept of the ASEAN Community is one of the most important aspects of this regionalism, and there have been hopes that this will be realized by 2015. The mainstream theories such as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism have offered competing explanations of this transformation. However, recently, a new phenomenon that cannot be fully explained by these state-centric theories has arisen—the movement toward constructing a regional order from below by transnational civil society actors. By adopting the analytical viewpoint of the New Regionalism Approach, which has maintained a keen interest in civil society in the process of regionalization, this study attempts to empirically analyze still largely unexplored activities undertaken by transnational civil society actors, in particular who has promoted the "alternative regionalism" against the "neoliberal regionalism" in the course of the formation of the ASEAN Community. It also seeks to examine the embryonic change toward the establishment of a new regional order in Southeast Asia from the bottom-up perspective. In conclusion, the article proves that by engaging with transnational civil society actors, ASEAN is gradually moving from an "elite club" to a "people-centered" organization. However, given the predominance of neoliberal discourse, "alternative regionalism" has not had enough influence for this to be fully realized. Nevertheless, the growing number of transnational civil society actors is resulting in improved potential to transform the persistent sovereign state system.

PurposeThis paper seeks to provide a systematic understanding of the controversy surrounding commerce in US schools.Design/methodology/approachThe paper surveys the history, research and policies related to commerce in schooling (1890‐2005) within the USA. The literature is organized according to four emergent US perspectives – protectionist, celebrant, cultural critic, and educated consumer.FindingsThe review finds that dominant US assumptions of commercial media subscribe to a stimulus‐response model of learning, rather than an active model of young people as constructing their own experiences with commercial media. Much of the research and many of the policies about commercial media in schools reflect adult assumptions about how young people learn, rather than provide empirical research about how young people actually interact with commercial texts while in school. The paper questions an excessive emphasis on the texts and technologies of instruction and calls for more empirical research that is grounded in theories of social constructivism, symbolic interactionism, and media education.Research limitations/implicationsThe four dominant media perspectives generated through this review of literature are limited to the USA.Practical implicationsA useful review of literature and schema to inform the understanding of educators, policy makers, and researchers as to the dominant US perspectives about commercial media and the education of young people. The schema can be used as a springboard for research and inquiry into the perspectives and policies of commercial practices and education in other countries.Originality/valueThis paper contextualizes nearly a century of research on commercial media and the education of youth in the USA, and provides a historical and theoretical context for researching education, technology and commerce in the USA and other countries.

Unlike certain Israeli historians or sociologists who have developed a critical "post‐Zionist" approach, Israeli psychologists display few signs of this critical trend. This is especially disquieting in light of the latest back and forth movement between warfare to the peace process—a movement that created many new social and individual dilemmas that would benefit from an open debate within social and clinical psychology. This paper tries to account for this deficiency by looking at its possible historical, political, and cultural roots. The historical aspects relate to the influence of European and American psychological traditions. Two political aspects are presented: (1) Israeli psychologists, through their involvement in the military and their acceptance of the Zionist claim for security, tend to belong to the political mainstream (Gergen, 1973, 1989); and (2) a hyper‐political atmosphere scared Israeli psychologists into neutrality and objectivism. This provided a convenient rationale for apoliticism, especially when Israeli political polarization in the 1980s and 1990s was perceived as threatening psychologists' professional authority. Culturally, the psychologists, like the European social strata from which most of them originated, tended to adopt the American tradition of individualism as a reaction to the strong collectivist trend that dominated Israeli society during its early years. This may account for their weak and delayed social response of humanism, feminism, and constructivism. Exceptions to this general trend are highlighted, and the question of how Israeli psychology might become more politically sensitive and critical is explored. This discussion may have relevance for the development of political psychology in other societies, especially those going through transition of values or suffering from long, violent conflicts.

Unlike certain Israeli historians or sociologists who have developed a critical "post-Zionist" approach, Israeli psychologists display few signs of this critical trend. This is especially disquieting in light of the latest back & forth movement between warfare & the peace process -- a movement that created many new social & individual dilemmas that would benefit from an open debate within social & clinical psychology. This paper tries to account for this deficiency by looking at its possible historical, political, & cultural roots. The historical aspects relate to the influence of European & American psychological traditions. Two political aspects are presented: (1) Israeli psychologists, through their involvement in the military & their acceptance of the Zionist claim for security, tend to belong to the political mainstream (Gergen, 1973, 1989); & (2) a hyper-political atmosphere scared Israeli psychologists into neutrality & objectivism. This provided a convenient rationale for apoliticism, especially when Israeli political polarization in the 1980s & 1990s was perceived as threatening psychologists' professional authority. Culturally, the psychologists, like the European social strata from which most of them originated, tended to adopt the American tradition of individualism as a reaction to the strong collectivist trend that dominated Israeli society during its early years. This may account for their weak & delayed social response of humanism, feminism, & constructivism. Exceptions to this general trend are highlighted, & the question of how Israeli psychology might become more politically sensitive & critical is explored. This discussion may have relevance for the development of political psychology in other societies, especially those going through transition of values or suffering.from long, violent conflicts. 38 References. Adapted from the source document.

Dass wir alle in einer gemeinsamen Wirklichkeit leben, setzen wir meist unhinterfragt voraus. Sehen Andere die Welt dann doch einmal anders, mag es uns scheinen, als sähen sie diese einfach nicht so, wie sie wirklich ist. Schwerer fällt uns anzuerkennen, dass andere zuweilen in ganz anderen Wirklichkeiten unterwegs sind als wir selbst. - Der Autor zeigt, wie sich die Vorstellung einer Pluralität menschlicher Wirklichkeiten mit der Annahme einer wahrnehmungsunabhängigen Realität vereinbaren lässt, ohne sich in einen Relativismus der vielen Wirklichkeiten zu verlaufen. In Auseinandersetzung mit "kontinentalen" und "analytischen" Ansätzen legt er eine elegante Theorie menschlicher Wirklichkeiten vor, die konstruktivistische und realistische, phänomenologische und naturalistische Motive unerwartet miteinander verbindet.

Frauen begehen kaum Gewaltverbrechen - Mord ist ein vorwiegend von Männern verübtes Delikt. Am spektakulären Einzelfall bilden sich normative Vorstellungen zu Macht, Gewalt, Sexualität und Geschlecht anhand der Konstruktion eines abnormalen Anderen ex negativo ab: Er führt vor, was die normale Frau, der normale Mann nicht sein kann.Melanie Grütter zeigt, dass die Definition von krimineller Abweichung in Wissensdiskursen ausgesprochen wirkmächtig in Bezug darauf ist, wie Geschlecht gedacht wird. Ihre historische Analyse stützt sich auf bisher kaum oder gar nicht erschlossene Primärquellen und eröffnet Einblicke auf die Permanenz und den Wandel von Geschlechterverhältnissen bis in die gegenwärtigen Diskurse

'Ausgangspunkt des Beitrags ist eine neue Erklärung für die Existenz der beiden bis heute konkurrierende problemsoziologischen Schulen. Diese Erklärung schließt unmittelbar an die Simulakrentheorie Jean Baudrillards an, in der ein grundlegender Wandel des Verhältnisses zwischen materieller und symbolischer Welt am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts behauptet wird. Dieser Wandel führt zu einer zunehmenden Unzugänglichkeit der Bestandteile der sozialen Wirklichkeit, die von der Problemsoziologie traditionell als 'soziale Bedingungen' untersucht worden sind. Dieses Zugangsproblem hat nicht nur - so die These des Autors - die Problemsoziologie zu einem Wechsel vom objektivistischen zum konstruktionistischen Verständnis sozialer Probleme gleichsam gezwungen, sondern es macht auch eine wissenssoziologische Reformulierung der konstruktionistischen Problemtheorie erforderlich. In das Zentrum der Analyse müssen nun die symbolischen Strukturen und Prozesse rücken, die für den Erfolg von Problemwahrnehmungen verantwortlich sind.' (Autorenreferat)

'Die definitionstheoretische oder konstruktivistische Devianzsoziologie hat bis in die achtziger Jahre eine gewisse Popularität dadurch erlangen können, daß sie als herrschaftskritisch auftrat und insbesondere opferlose Verbrechen thematisierte, bei denen eine Solidarisierung mit den Täterinnen als Opfer von Stigmatisierungsprozessen möglich war. Diese Situation hat sich mit der Problematisierung von Gewaltphänomenen geändert, bei der eine derartige Solidarisierung schwieriger ist. Die Autorin plädiert dennoch für eine Weiterverfolgung der definitionstheoretischen Perspektive im Hinblick auf Gewalt und analysiert in diesem Artikel die verschiedenen Formen der Konstruktion von Gewaltphänomenen in der Öffentlichkeit.' (Autorenreferat)

Why do states intentionally and publicly violate international norms, even when they anticipate (social or material) costs for doing so? Unfortunately, constructivist scholarship on norm-dynamics lacks a well-developed account of deliberate and open norm transgressions. This gap in the literature has led to a limited understanding of resistance to international norms. Constructivist scholarship on norm-dynamics often treats compliance as an inherent "good" that all states move toward. However, I argue that public acts of norm noncompliance can serve important social functions and are strategically performed by states in pursuit of specific (social or material) ends. I demonstrate that states will overtly and self-consciously violate international norms to either assert their identity as insiders or outsiders in international society or to contest those categories altogether. Drawing on work in sociology and the social psychology of deviance, I develop the concept of norm transgressions to capture intentional and purposeful violations of international norms. I present a typology of norm transgressions (rejective, adaptive, inclusionary, and exclusionary) to provide the groundwork for future scholarship on overresistance to international norms. The concept of norm transgression bears important implications for our understanding of deviancy, institutional compliance, and normative change in international politics.

Numerous academic works have critiqued Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme for being mercantilist and failing to promote democratization and human rights (Orr 1990; Rix 1993; Arase 1995, 2005). Such accounts assess Japan's ODA policy from Western theoretical perspectives that advocate Western approaches, such as military and economic interventions to contain repressive states. While receptive to these criticisms, Japanese policy-makers have perceived their country's international role in 'bridging' (kakehashi) terms and structured their ODA accordingly, as this paper details in the case of Japan's ODA policy towards Myanmar. 1 . - The rationale behind Japan's kakehashi approach lies in the construction of Japan's self-identity as a state able to reenter international society after World War II through focusing on economic development rather than military and coercive action. Proponents of the kakehashi approach construct Japan both as a model of successful democratization through development which other states can learn from, as well as the means through ODA to 'bridge' the divide between repressive regimes and liberal democratic capitalism. This critical approach examines Japan's kakehashi or bridging strategy in terms of Japan's response to the anti-government protests in September 2007, Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, and in the build up to parliamentary elections in November 2010 in Myanmar to demonstrate the permanence of this approach in spite of a change of government in Japan. In so doing, the kakehashi approach reveals opportunities to engage with, rather than contain, repressive regimes, thereby raising the possibility of enticing such states back into international society though economic incentives. (Pac Rev/GIGA)