Suchergebnisse

This essay prods moral philosophy towards more explicit attention to the political constructions of injustice. I do not appeal to practical or political relevance, but advance a particular kind of constructivist interpretation of moral argumentation (constructivism+) in which our interpretive horizons are extended to include the implicit views of social action, broadly construed—from the macro- to the micro-social, and from the past to the present and the possible—built into philosophical arguments. I challenge the idea that, in order to oppose injustice, we must first articulate and justify a coherent conception of justice and then theorize the social, constitutional, legal, or cultural arrangements through which such justice could be implemented. My argument moves through three levels: 1. contesting the separability of these steps by demonstrating that views of social action are embedded in, not merely derivable from, the well-known formulations of John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. (Thus reconstructed, Rawls is more coherent than most moral philosophers have considered him to be); 2. giving priority to moral justification while leaving the social context in the background, scarcely analyzed, burdens our thinking about in/justice; 3. in order to oppose injustice, it is not the case that we must first articulate and justify a coherent conception of justice.

Perelman's idea of value is applied as a notion that, though obscure, makes agreement possible within the universal audience (the set of present day adult reasonable individuals), in order to, on the one hand, propose an ethics that overcomes the limitations of Rawls' liberalism, founded on Kantian constructivism, and, on the other hand, criticize Habermas' purely dialogical model as being scarcely applicable. Nevertheless, this is achieved while conserving the contributions made by both philosophers in solving the ethical and political conflicts of the present world. Argumentative ethics, as here presented, asserts an agreement between rival claims of justice as being the result both of strategic and communicative action, based on a conception of moral progress, understood as a point of no retum which embodies the conception of human rights and their development in contemporary society. ; Se aplica la idea perelmaniana de valor como una noción que, aunque confusa, permite el acuerdo del auditorio universal (el conjunto de individuos adultos y razonables), con el propósito de presentar una ética que, de una parte, supere las limitaciones del liberalismo rawlsiano fundamentado en el constructivismo kantiano, y de la otra, critique por limitadamente practicable el modelo puramente dialógico de Habermas. Todo esto, no obstante, salvando las contribuciones que estos dos pensadores aportan para resolver conflictos éticos y políticos en el mundo actual. La ética argumentativa aquí presentada defiende el acuerdo entre pretensiones rivales de justicia como resultado de la acción estratégica tanto como de la acción comunicativa, sobre la base de un concepto de progreso moral entendido como un punto de no retomo encamado en la concepción de los derechos humanos y su desarrollo en la sociedad contemporánea.