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Many normative theorists have advocated constructivism as a way of overcoming skepticism and nihilism. They have produced three types of constructivism that correspond to three conceptions of rationality: formal (Hare and Gewirth), instrumental (Gauthier), and ideal (Rawls). In this book, T.K. Seung examines these three types and vindicates Rawls' claim that only the constructivism of ideal rationality - which accepts Kantiam ideals as its basis - is viable. Unlike Rawls, however, Seung traces Kantian ideas to Platonic forms. Without this Platonic move, he shows, ideal constructivism cannot avoid collapsing to normative positivism. Seung maintains that Platonic forms are the obects of normative intuition and that they are only schematic ideas and principles that must be articulated into a system of concrete normative standards. This process of articulation is normative construction. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that constructivism and intuitionism are in competition with each other, Seung demonstrates the necessity of their natural dependence. That is, their happy union alone can provide a secure foundation for normative theories and save them from the twin evils of scepticism and nihilism

Paul Watzlawick/Peter Krieg (Hrsg.): "Das Auge des Betrachters". Beiträge zum Konstruktivismus. Piper Verlag, München 1991. 278 S., geb., 39,80 DM

This essay prods moral philosophy towards more explicit attention to the political constructions of injustice. I do not appeal to practical or political relevance, but advance a particular kind of constructivist interpretation of moral argumentation (constructivism+) in which our interpretive horizons are extended to include the implicit views of social action, broadly construed—from the macro- to the micro-social, and from the past to the present and the possible—built into philosophical arguments. I challenge the idea that, in order to oppose injustice, we must first articulate and justify a coherent conception of justice and then theorize the social, constitutional, legal, or cultural arrangements through which such justice could be implemented. My argument moves through three levels: 1. contesting the separability of these steps by demonstrating that views of social action are embedded in, not merely derivable from, the well-known formulations of John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. (Thus reconstructed, Rawls is more coherent than most moral philosophers have considered him to be); 2. giving priority to moral justification while leaving the social context in the background, scarcely analyzed, burdens our thinking about in/justice; 3. in order to oppose injustice, it is not the case that we must first articulate and justify a coherent conception of justice.