Framed by a new and substantial introductory chapter, this book collects Stefano Guzzini's reference articles and some less well-known publications on power, realism and constructivism. By analysing theories and their assumptions, but also theorists following their intellectual paths, his analysis explores the diversity of different schools, and moves beyond simple definitions to explore their intrinsic tensions and fallacies. Guzzini's approach to the analysis of power - within and outside International Relations - provides the common theme of the book through which the theoretical.
The article critiques the mainstream American invocation of constructivism as a kind of "commonsense," utilitarian approach to foreign policy analysis (FPA). Such a strategy allows social scientists to seem "modern" while remaining resolutely antipostmodernist. Revisionism is also questioned, however, for countering rather than confronting positivism & social scientism. These "counterhegmonic moderates," while rejecting positivism, remain as bound by rationalist objectivity as are conservatives. Postmodernist constructivism for FPA requires more than listening; it also entails a radical subjectivity & participation. 8 References. K. Coddon
Cognitive development theories differ on how young students can meaningfully process new information and retain that information for future knowledge-building through scaffolding within their zone of proximal development. More traditional theories like the cognitive load theory adhere to the rote memorization approach by categorizing students as passive learners and the teachers as initiators who provide information in a structured, often rigid format, to be stored and retrieved for future application using their working memory. In contrast, the more progressive theories, like constructivism, are premised on the belief that students should proactively initiate their own learning while teachers act more as facilitators. The current trend in government policy under ESSA is to embrace the latter approach in the classroom, which is also more inclusive of all types of students, especially neurodiverse students. Moreover, teachers can utilize the wider range of assistive technology tools to accommodate and support their students' unique learning styles.
Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; LUISS PhD Thesis
"German Idealism as Constructivism is the culmination of many years of research by distinguished philosopher Tom Rockmore--it is his definitive statement on the debate about German idealism between proponents of representationalism and those of constructivism that still plagues our grasp of the history of German idealism and the whole epistemological project today. Rockmore argues that German idealism--which includes iconic thinkers such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel--can best be understood as a constructivist project, one that asserts that we cannot know the mind-independent world as it is but only our own mental construction of it. Since ancient Greece philosophers have tried to know the world in itself, an effort that Kant believed had failed. His alternative strategy--which came to be known as the Copernican revolution--was that the world as we experience and know it depends on the mind. Rockmore shows that this project was central to Kant's critical philosophy and the later German idealists who would follow him. He traces the different ways philosophers like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel formulated their own versions of constructivism. Offering a sweeping but deeply attuned analysis of a crucial part of the legacy of German idealism, Rockmore reinvigorates this school of philosophy and opens up promising new avenues for its study."--Publisher's description
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The author of this chapter defines the tension within Oakeshott's philosophy on socio-political construction & deconstructs his conceptualization of constructivism & relativism in relationship to truth. Although Oakeshott's philosophy can relate to a strong constructivism, his anti-rationalism & conceptualization of truth preclude his acceptance of the "rational" constructivist political agenda. Various philosophers' views on truth (Hacking, McCullagh, Sellars, Goldman) are applied as problematizations of Oakeshott's worldview. Oakeshott's ambiguous relativism is recognized to have a misplaced skepticism & inconsistent relativism (Podoksik) emanating from the irreducible pluralism based on the distinct spheres of knowledge generated by separate domains of modes. The severe critiques of the sociological arenas of politics, education & science exemplify this misplacement. The irreducible plurality of his modes (science, history) require different methods of inquiry to produce knowledge, thus forbidding cross disciplinary commonalities leading to an assumption of coherentism that should direct Oakeshott to relativism. But, reciprocal relations between conceptual creativity & nature are excluded by his separation of modal knowledge. 60 References. J. Harwell
InPolitical Liberalism, John Rawls employs a distinctive method of "political constructivism" to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an "overlapping consensus." Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's "political" philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The "method of convergence" would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.
AbstractTaking the complexity and diversity of Islamic law (fiqh) as a point of departure, this article examines a series of positions advanced by Muslim jurists on the relationship between law and astronomy. Focusing primarily on the question of the appropriateness of relying on astronomical calculations to determine the months of the hijri calendar, it considers three epistemological stances modeled by these positions: correspondence, constructivism, and representation. Taken together, these interventions constitute a minoritarian strain within the fiqh literature that exploited the practices, structures, and methods of reasoning of the Hanafi and Shafi'i legal schools (madhhabs) to argue in favor of the employment of astronomical calculations for ritual purposes. Though these were anomalous positions at variance from the dominant evidentiary regime that privileged perception over calculation, the view from the margins they afford provide a helpful window onto the nature of legal reasoning in Sunni Islam, revealing the importance of not only proximate social triggers to change, but also the relevance of more enduring features of madhhab reasoning—the school's role as a historical repository of jurists' opinions, the propensity to recruit the authority and argumentation of preceding departures, and the expectation to proceed with the majority regime in mind.
This article connects J. S. Mill's democratic theory and practice with the contemporary debate surrounding representative constructivism and argues that Mill's advocacy of female suffrage affords an empirical example of the mobilization power of representative constructivism. Studying this concrete example of constructivism alongside Mill's theory of political representation clarifies that constructivism is democratic to the extent it seeks to make citizens themselves appropriate and contest the claims that their representatives construct on their behalf.