Includes author's preface. ; Independence is not made in one day; but there is a day when it is obtained. Like most ex-colonies, Malta since 1965 had celebrated 21 September as her National Day. A measure of consensus had been reached in Parliament at the time that Dr. Giorgio Borg Olivier headed Malta's (Nationalist) Government. A quarter of a century later, Malta's statehood is itself beginning to have a history. In this - especially after 1971 - the very acquisition of independence has been turned into an acrimonious partisan issue between the main contending political parties, although the argument that questions how far Malta became independent in 1964 remains fundamentally a political rather than a constitutional one. 'Independence', 'freedom' and indeed 'national' days have assumed an unenviable (and unique) history of their own. Independence Day was eliminated as a national day and even as a public holiday by the Mintoff - led Malta Labour Party (MLP) following its assumption of office in 1971. After using the pre-independence national day of 8 September (1565/1945) temporarily as a stop-gap, national day became 13 December (1974) when Malta was declared a republic - no longer a constitutional monarchy as it had been since independence. But this day was itself replaced by another, that of 31 March (1979) marking the expiry of a new military agreement with the former colonial power, Britain, concluded in 1972. When in May 1987 the Partit Nazzjonaiista (PN) were returned after sixteen years in opposition, the government would have wished to rehabilitate Independence Day; equally it sought "reconciliation' in an island that had become more internally polarized than ever. In view of the impossibility of reaching consensus about restoring Independence Day to its former status, in March 1989 it was agreed to do without a National Day as such and instead to have no less than five (5) days designated as "national" feasts, these to include 21 September 1964, 13 December 1974 and 31 March 1979. The first of these to be commemorated under this new agreement, 31 March, ended in a terrible fracas during which, inter alia, the Commander of the Maltese Armed Forces was assaulted on the dias by well-known MLP supporters as he was about to take the salute. Thus the meaning attributed to words - 'freedom' itself, for one - begs many a definition. Nationalistic rhetoric abounds in what appears to have become a machismo bout: 'whatever you can do I can do better'. ; peer-reviewed
This book is mainly devoted to a discussion of the broad experiences of the opposition parties that have emerged as a part of the movement towards multi-party politics in Africa. The contributors to the book tackle an interesting mix of issues from a critique of opposition politics in the context of the economic decline in Africa to an assessment of the effors made by the opposition to establish an effective presence under extremely difficult circumstances. The book also draws attention to the many internal organisational/leadership problems that have contributed as much to the weakness of the opposition as the machinations of the ruling parties. Ethnicity, religion and regionalism are identified as crucial factors militating against the opposition. Case studies are drawn from Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. ; Contents: 1. Economic Crisis, Multipartyism, and Opposition Politics in Contemporary Africa / Adebayo O. Olukoshi -- 2. Contestation over Political Space: The State and the Demobilisation of Opposition Politics in Kenya / Karuti Kanyinga -- 3. Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe: The Struggle within the Struggle / Tandeka C. Nkiwane -- 4. The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power / Aminata Diaw and Mamadou Diouf -- 5. The Rise to Power of an Opposition Party: The MNSD in Niger Republic / Jibrin Ibrahim and Abdoulaye Niandou Souley -- 6. The Dilemmas of Directed Democracy: Neutralising Ugandan Opposition Politics under the NRM / Johan Ssenkumba -- 7. From People´s Politics to State Politics: Aspects of National Liberation in South Africa / Michael Neocosmos -- 8. Political Opposition and Democratic Transitions in Nigeria, 1985-1996 / Osita Agbu
Thirty-five years ago, V. 0. Key (1949: 183-204) ably surveyed the Arkansas political landscape. Since then, a number of observers have assessed subsequent developments (see Drummond, 1957; Yates, 1972; Ranchino, 1972; Bonds, 1974; Bass & DeVries, 1976: 87-106; Johnston, 1981; Johnston, 1983; and Lamis, forthcoming). This present consideration of parties and campaigns in contemporary Arkansas politics approaches the subject from three perspectives. The first associates shifting statewide electoral patterns since Key wrote with changes in the character of the state political party organizations he described. The second details the selection, tenure, and activity of the leaders of these organizations since 1970. The third addresses modern directions in campaign style and practice, with special reference to the role and status of party organization in the conduct of election campaigns. Major data sources include the above-mentioned analyses, contemporaneous journalistic accounts, and personal interviews with several party and campaign organization notables.
The purpose of this essay is to discuss the impacts of ethnicity in the politics of the contemporary American city. The importance of ethnicity is seen as derivative of the structure of local politics in the United States and the processes which have resulted in the establishment and maintenance of ethnic identities and communities in American cities. As such, the paper is intended to provide a context for the remaining papers in this session which focus on the recent political behavior of specific ethnic groups in particular cities.
One of the least reflected on consequences of the collapse of the Soviet bloc was the opening of the Romany question. Over the 1990s the countries of central and eastern Europe have undergone an economic and political transformation. On the one hand this has had a negative impact on the overwhelming majority of Romanies but, on the other hand, has offered them the opportunity to give active answers, an opportunity previously not available for them under the totalitarian regime. ; One of the least reflected on consequences of the collapse of the Soviet bloc was the opening of the Romany question. Over the 1990s the countries of central and eastern Europe have undergone an economic and political transformation. On the one hand this has had a negative impact on the overwhelming majority of Romanies but, on the other hand, has offered them the opportunity to give active answers, an opportunity previously not available for them under the totalitarian regime.
This essay explores the role of the cell phones and the practice of texting within the context of the civilian backed coup that overthrew President Joseph Estrada in January of 2001 popularly known as "People Power II." It focuses in particular on a set of political fantasies among the Filipino middle class, including their belief in in the power of communication technologies to transmit messages at a distance and in their ability to possess that power. In the same vein, they had faith in their ability to master their relationship to the masses of people with whom they regularly shared Manila's crowded streets, utilizing the power of crowds to speak to the state. Communication from this perspective held the messianic promise of refashioning the heterogenous crowd into a people addressing and addressed by the promise of justice. But as we shall see, such telecommunicative notions were predicated on the putative "voicelessness" of the masses. For once heard, the masses called attention to the fragility of bourgeois claims to shape the sending and reception of messages about the proper practice of politics in the nation-state.
The role of such people as the refugee, the immigrant and the subjugated minority is explored in this book, together with their attendant legal regimes, in the persistent but ever unsettled processes of national/global formation.
[Introduction]: In the mid to late 1990s the Australian women's movement was consumed by suggestions of inter-generational warfare that distracted movement actors from some important tasks. Questions were raised about the presence and visibility of young women in the movement. Assertions that some forms of feminist praxis were 'good', and some were not, undervalued the value of the important work being done in this 'between the waves' moment. In this paper I contend that young women are playing a key role in maintaining the political space available for Australian feminist activism in a "postsocialist" context. I argue against the generational paradigm as a model for understanding changes that occur within social movements over time. Further I argue that, despite both media rhetoric and the claims of some young feminists, there is little to suggest that the activism of contemporary young feminists constitutes a 'third wave' of the women's movement. I offer an understanding of this "cross-generational moment" (Zita 1997:1) that draws a more productive and inclusive picture of the role of young women in the contemporary Australian women's movement.
This paper was presented to the 14th Nordic Conference of Media and Communication Research, the "Political Copmmunication" Working Group, Kungälv, Sweden, 14–17 August 1999. The project presented in this paper is one of many funded by the large-scale "Power and Democracy in Denmark" research initiative commissioned and funded by the Danish Parliament in 1998. The research initiative is set up in an organisational framework that is completely independent of the political actors, who have left it entirely in the hands of an academic steering committee to define the research priorities and to award research grants. The research team of the project Mediatised politics: politicaldiscourses and the media in contemporary Danish democracy consists of Louise Phillips and Kim Christian Schroder, Department of Communication, Roskilde University, Denmark.
In late 2001, the Australian government put asylum seekers at the centre of its re-election campaign by refusing to accept 438 asylum seekers picked up by the Norwegian cargo ship Tampa. It then introduced legislation giving the Commonwealth powers to interdict asylum seekers at sea, and to forcibly return them to the port of embarkation. These measures extend the punitive regime of mandatory detention in privately owned and operated centres. This paper examines recent legislative and identity politics in the context of the long-standing white Australian fear of invasion from the north. ; Vers la fin de l'année 2001, le gouvernement australien plaça les demandeurs d'asile au centre de sa campagne électorale pour un nouveau mandat en refoulant 438 demandeurs d'asile recueillis par le navire cargo Tampa. Le gouvernement déposa ensuite un projet de loi conférant au Commonwealth des pouvoirs accrus lui permettant de stopper des demandeurs d'asile en haute mer et de les reconduire de force à leur port d'embarquement. Ces mesures étendent aussi la politique répressive de détention obligatoire dans des centres appartenant au secteur privé et exploités par le secteur privé. Cet article se penche sur les politiques législatives et identitaires récentes dans le contexte de la crainte qu'ont les australiens de race blanche de longue date d'une invasion venant du nord.
Over the past two decades authoritarian regimes in many parts of the developing world, as well as in East/Central Europe, have been replaced by democracies. This paper looks at the issue of democratization from a gender perspective. While many of the problems afflicting the 'new democracies' (such as the elitist character of political parties, and the failure of the state to guarantee civil and political rights or make a significant dent in poverty) affect all citizens, they are manifested and experienced in gender-specific ways. Women's persistent exclusion from formal politics, in particular, raises a number of specific questions about how to reform democratic institutions, since these institutions are not automatically gender-equitable. In a democratic polity citizens are presumed to have equal rights, opportunities and voice in the governance of the public domain. All versions of liberal democracy link the right to vote with the right to stand for office. Yet women are hugely under-represented in national assemblies and governments. Women's political invisibility is particularly striking in those countries where their political mobilization contributed to the demise of authoritarianism and the transition to democracy. The suppression of the conventional political arena under authoritarian rule very often shifts the political centre of gravity to 'movement-type activities' and gives prominence to women's political mobilization. What very often unites the disparate groups constituting the women's movement in these contexts is their commitment to bringing about a change in government. Nevertheless, social, political and ideological heterogeneity of women's groups, tensions between the feminist and the feminine streams, and divisions over strategy foreshadow future difficulties in forging political coalitions and aggregating interests to effect change in more 'normal' times. The new wave of democratization has not had a feminizing affect on the parliaments and the governments of the new democracies. Deeply entrenched barriers exclude women from meaningful participation in political parties. In the post-transition period, the more established political parties in countries like Brazil and Chile have remained remarkably resistant to women's participation. Newly formed parties of the left have been more accessible to women, though participation in these smaller parties may arguably produce more symbolic than real benefits. The masculine construction of political authority makes it extremely difficult for women to be elected into office without some form of electoral engineering, such as quotas or reserved seats. The adoption of quotas and reserved seats for women by the South African ANC and the Ugandan NRM, which dominate politics in their respective countries, has produced a significant increase in women's political profile. But given the lack of any realistic political options for women outside these two parties, women's political leverage vis-à-vis the party hierarchy remains strictly limited. Besides the issue of political equality and democratic justice, the argument for increasing women's representation in decision-making bodies also hinges very often on an implicit assumption that women can, more effectively than men, contribute to the formulation of woman-friendly policies because they are somehow better able to represent women's interests. But this is a controversial assumption. Questions continue to be raised about how such a diverse group as 'women' can find meaningful representation in the polity in the absence of procedures for establishing what the group wants or thinks, and in the absence of mechanisms for keeping the 'representatives' accountable to their constituents. Questions have also been raised as to why the growing presence of women in politics (in some contexts) is not translating into substantive change toward policies capable of making a positive impact on the lives of ordinary women. Given the limited success to date in feminizing political parties and getting women elected, it is not surprising that other strategies are also needed for bringing women's interests into the policy-making process. One such strategy is to enter and work directly through the public administration. Democratic transitions, however restricted, represent propitious moments for making interventions because the state is potentially more fluid than at other times. But this space is often limited because of the top-down, elitist nature of the transition. Moreover, the ability of those working on the 'inside' to push for change on a sustained basis depends less on having an institutional space per se, and much more on the relationships with autonomous women's organizations on the 'outside' that they are able to establish and exploit. But it is very often difficult to establish effective inside-outside relationships-popular women's movements and groups, in particular, may feel alienated from the 'women's machineries' in the public administration and from the women who staff these units. They may also deliberately distance themselves from public authorities because of recent experiences of corruption and co-optation. Moreover, the creation and staffing of women's spaces within the state may in itself weaken the women's movements outside the state. Although in some contexts the state has incorporated the participants and the banners of the women's movements, it has been extremely difficult for those on the 'inside' to translate even the watered-down goals of the movement into concrete policies capable of making a positive impact on the lives of female citizens. The efforts to induce change have been patchy and, in the realm of public expenditure decisions, extremely difficult. This is in part due to the lack of effective pressure from an organized women's constituency (noted above) that can articulate a coherent set of issues and priorities for policy attention, and monitor its adoption and implementation by state agencies. It is also due to the disabling environment in which women bureaucrats find themselves. The deliberate attempt to create insulated technocracies, as is currently occurring in some countries and some areas of policy, has serious implications for democratic consolidation. While gender bureaucrats well-versed in economic analytical skills may be able to contribute to what goes on inside insulated technocracies (in ministries of finance, for example), this can hardly substitute for open public debate enabling women's groups and networks, along with other social groups, to scrutinize economic decisions and policies that affect the well-being of their constituents. But women's machineries and women parliamentarians have had more significant impact in some critical areasraising the legitimacy of violence against women as a political issue; enhancing women's awareness of their existing rights through civic education; and facilitating social legislation on highly significant issues such as divorce, child custody, domestic violence, and reproductive health and rights, which address very fundamental aspects of women's oppression. But here again, success in raising these controversial issuesand maybe even legislating for themhas gone hand in hand with a failure of the state (the judiciary and the police, in particular) to guarantee such important individual civil rights across national territories and for all social strata. One cross-cutting concern in the post-transition period is that the national women's movements have been stripped of their most competent cadres, as leaders and key organizers have been drawn into the new state institutions representing gender issues, into political parties and into parliament. Another common concern is the 'NGO-ization' of women's movements, especially through donor-driven, poverty alleviation programmes. Together, it seems, they have contributed to the weakening of both national women's movements and the cross-class alliances that some had managed to forge. The formalization provoked by the proliferation of NGOs and the competition for funds has several problematic implications. Self-reliance and self-help, which characterize this model of social provisioning, can be euphemisms for reliance on the unpaid work of women (who are recruited by NGOs in voluntary and secondary positions). Moreover, politically these projects seem to have taken away the advocacy and campaigning element of local participation. The perennial issue of feminist autonomy continues to preoccupy members of women's movements-whether 'in' or 'out' of the mainstream institutions. Given the dangers of co-optation by the state or party in power, there is a distinct need for maintaining some autonomous space for interest articulation and aggregation. But at the same time, by taking an autonomous path, women's groups and movements also run the risk of becoming politically isolated-hence the need for a politics of engagement with the mainstream. Ultimately, the long-term viability and effectiveness of the women's movement depends on its ability to work at different levels and in different arenas-both 'inside' and 'outside' the mainstream-forging strategic insider-outsider alliances. This message is sometimes lost on advocates of 'mainstreaming' who see the process of institutional change as a purely technocratic exercise of tinkering with institutions in a political vacuum. To be effective and sustainable, the two sets of strategies need to go hand in hand.
In The Prophetic Imagination, Walter Brueggemann writes, "Passion as the capacity and readiness to care, to suffer, to die, and to feel is the enemy of imperial reality. Imperial economics is designed to keep people satiated so that they do not notice. Its politics is intended to block out the cries of the denied ones. Its religion is to be an opiate so that no one discerns misery alive in the heart of God" (41). The prophet's task is to restore passion to the people of God, to cultivate it where it lies dormant, to give it voice when it is voiceless, and to confront its absence. The prophet frees the gospel to confront injustice and oppression.
Since the end of the Cold war, naval analysts and strategist have faced a crisis. On the one hand, they are well versed with the enduring concepts of strategy, intelligence and the procedures and lessons generated by nearly fifty years of Cold War. On the other hand, there is a widespread notion that traditional ways of doing business undermine new, more coperative opportunities that have arisen in international politics since 1989. This critcism is reflected in attempts at New Thinking which places societal, environmental and even Utopian solutions to military and intelligence problems ahead of traditional concepts of strategy. At the same time, events like the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Desert Fox and intelligence surprises (Indian and Pakistan nuclear testing) demonstrate a mastery of the principles of intelligence and strategy are the conerstone of U.S. foreign and defence policy.-- Report documentation page. ; ONR# N001400WR20307. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
International audience ; After a somewhat chaotic seven-year interlude, Russia's international strategy–in terms of diplomacy, defense and politics–has been progressively redefined over the past three years. What is the current situation of Russia's foreign trade? What are the main challenges that must be met in the course of a further opening of the Russian economy? For Western companies, is Russia an emergent market, a promising field of investment or a potential threat?
International audience ; After a somewhat chaotic seven-year interlude, Russia's international strategy–in terms of diplomacy, defense and politics–has been progressively redefined over the past three years. What is the current situation of Russia's foreign trade? What are the main challenges that must be met in the course of a further opening of the Russian economy? For Western companies, is Russia an emergent market, a promising field of investment or a potential threat?
