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The subject matter of research in this paper is theoretical controversy related to the definition of right-wing extremism. Given the fact that extremism is a variable, amorphous and insufficiently researched phenomenon, largely conditioned by time, space, political and cultural differences, there is a great confusion in the field of political science when defining right-wing extremism. The problem of researching right-wing extremism is additionally complicated by various terms that are being used in the contemporary literature as its synonyms, such as right-wing radicalism, neo-Fascism, ultra-radicalism, etc. In order to provide the most valid theoretical determination of right-wing extremism, the author provides a detailed analysis of all the components constituting this phenomenon and examines their causality. In the political praxis, the term extremism is extensively abused, which additionally complicates its determination. Videlicet, politicians often use term 'extremist' in order to discredit their political opponents. While during the French revolution aristocracy saw the bourgeoisie as extremists, the members of the working class later stated that the bourgeoisie were extremists. The problem lies in the fact that, in politics, extremists are not only the ones who use violence as modus operandi; indeed, it is also used by political opponents who do not belong to the extreme political option. Another aggravating factor in defining right-wing extremism is that many administrative and academic definitions do not make a clear distinction between extremism and related phenomena, such as terrorism, radicalism and populism. Extremism is most often equaled with terrorism, which gives rise to another problem in defining this phenomenon. The relation between extremism and terrorism is the relation of general and specific. Namely, every act of terrorism is concurrently considered to be an act of extremism, but not vice versa, given the fact that every act of extremism does not lead towards a higher level of political violence (i.e. towards terrorism). Even in the terms of legal sanctioning, it is much easier to incriminate terrorism in comparison to extremism. The Serbian criminal legislation envisages relevant punishment for committing an act of terrorism, without even mentioning extremism, which implies that there is no penalty prescribed for committing an act of extremism. Despite numerous academic and administrative definitions on the concept of extremism, there is still a lack of a balanced approach to defining right-wing extremism, which is also largely conditioned by political definitions. The most prominent problem in addressing the social phenomena such as right-wing extremism lies in the fact that these social phenomena are dynamic and, in order to be analysed in a scientifically objective manner, they must be examined in the specific temporal, spatial and socio-political context.

While the author is impressed by Cornwell's style and presentation, he is appaled by the lack of seriousness exhibited by the author who writes about an imprtant subject (not broached for the first time, by any means) and by demonstrated inability to supress his preconceived notions and even prejudices. Cornwell relies heavily on Owen Chadwick, which assures that he mentions most important facts about the involvement of the Cardinal and Pope Pius XII (whom Cornwell systematicaly entitles by his family name. Pacelli) in contemporary politics, but he bends and ignores Chadwick's research when he makes his judgment about the Pope. Cornwell's treatment of the Catholic Church in the Independent State of Croatia (he gives it an entrie chapter) is a traversy of research and objective writing. His main source. if not the only, for the presentation of the Church in Croatia during the World War II is the 35 years old book by Carlo Falconi. Cornwell perhaps did not know , but he could have and must have been informed, that Falconi wrote his piece on the basis of the propagandistic material given to him by the Yugos]av secrete service and propagandists, which served the purpose of anti-Chatolic propaganda in Yugoslavia. A well intended reader could excuse Cornwell (he does not read Croatian and could not know what some authors wrote about Falconi's sources at the time his book appeared), if he did not point those "Croatian materials" as essential not only for the condemnation of the Croatian Catholic episcopate, but for Pius XII as well. (SOI : CSP: S. 190)

У овом раду дискутује се o позиционирању кључних друштвено-политичких актера у савременој Србији у контексту прихватања скупа симбола јавног наратива дефинисаног као "европске вредности". На примеру одржавања тзв. "Параде поноса", разматра се однос медија и елита према једном догађају који се перципира као суштински услов за "европске интеграције", али према коме истовремено постоји амбивалентан однос, проистекао из етаблираног традиционалистичког политичког дискурса, који подразумева отпор према прихватању сексуалних различитости. Циљ овог рада је да укаже на комплексну природу идентификовања основних симболичких вредности друштва у савременој Србији, која се испољава, пре свега, у виду хегемонијских борби које се воде на линији промоције конзервативних вредности, насупрот ономе што се доживљава као "опасни" уплив либералних "европских" идеја, попут промоције права сексуалних мањина. У раду се анализирају медијски наративи везани за одржавање "Параде поноса" 2010. и 2014. године, са циљем утврђивања промене наратива у склопу декларисаног "европског пута" Србије, и то, пре свега, кроз деловање и позиционирање кључних актера, од политичких елита до припадника екстремно десних организација и навијачких група. ; This paper discusses the position of the key social and political actors in contemporary Serbia, referring to the broadly accepted concept defined as "European values". The article focuses on the so-called "Belgrade Pride Parade", a highly contested event in the Serbian public, which is at the same time considered as the essential part of the EU accession process. Through the analysis of the media discourses related to the "Pride" events in 2010 and 2014, the paper shows the complex relation between the officially proclaimed politics of "European integration" and still very strong nationalist discourses, inherited from the 1990s. The aim of the article is to analyse the present hegemonic struggles between the political forces defending "traditional", conservative values and the political agents that promote "dangerous", liberal "European" ideas, such as protecting the rights of sexual minorities. The comparative analysis of the media representation of two events in 2010 and 2014 shows the changes in the public narrative. I argue that the violent clashes that occurred in 2010 Belgrade Pride Parade between the police and the members of right wing organisations were mostly the result of the lack of the political will among the Serbian elites, followed by ambivalent media representations, promoting at the same time the necessity of accepting "European values" and justification of violence. On the other hand, the absence of violent events in 2014 shows the will of the state apparatus to secure the "Pride". However, the media reports on the event, as well as the public statements made by Serbian officials, still remain ambivalent towards the very nature of the "Pride", justifying it only by the pressure made by the EU and the protection of constitutional rights. Moreover, the presence of new narratives in the media, discussing the high price of organizing such event, shows the shift in the public discourse from common nationalist arguments to the new, neoliberal rhetoric. This change doesn't indicate the radical shift of the social climate in Serbia from conservative to liberal, but, more likely, establishes Serbia as just one of the many states on the European periphery, operating within wider framework of neoliberal agendas. ; Тема броја – Конфликт и помирење на Балкану (ур. Александар Крел) / Topic of the Issue - Conflict and Reconciliation in the Balkans (ed. Aleksandar Krel)

The author analyses the concept of neo-classicism in contemporary political philosophy. The study begins with a description of contemporary neo-classic developments and continues with a precise delineation of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy of politics. In the end, the author concludes that the antiquity-inspired philosophy of politics today has the corrective function to steer liberal society towards community. (SOI : PM: S. 156)

The author analyzes the confrontation between the brothers Radic and the advocates of the "new course", which inaugurated in the Rijeka and Zadar resolutions new political orientation for Croats. Following an analysis of political and economic conditions, the author presents the critique of the "new course" politics. The central element of his analysis is a comparison between the concept of Austroslavism, which the brothers Radic advocated and the anti-Vienna position, which was the center-piece of the "new course" ideology. (SOI : CSP: S. 485)

The two construction ventures mirrored political currents and were affected by politics while themselves making politics. In the aftermath of the regime's backlash following the Croatian quest for more autonomy within the Yugoslav federation, the Cathedral was reduced in size and relocated to an inappropriate site. Builders of the St. Sava's church, meanwhile, defied recommendations by experts to adjust its style to the surroundings or change the location. Even though the authorities offered financial assistance with the construction permit, the Serb church in Split remained unfinished. In the late 1980s as ethnic tensions grew and the multiethnic country was on the brink of war and disintegration, leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church and propaganda in the capital of Serbia Belgrade exploited the Split case as an evidence of discrimination against the Serbian ethnic minority in predominantly Catholic Croatia. The Serbian Church, utilizing the unfinished temple, also attempted to revive symbolically the ancient Byzantine/Roman disputes over the church community in the ancient city in order to imply that there existed a long tradition and "continuity" of religious disputes in this region. Yet, both the Croatian authorities and the Catholic Church sought to appease the Serbian church, rather than to accept the challenges. This case demonstrates that the Serbian Orthodox Church followed the militant course of the regime in Serbia, which was the principal firebrand of the 1991-95 Balkan war. (SOI : CSP: S. 126) + This article is built on primary sources that include the author's research in the offices of state commissions for relations with religious communities with numerous interviews carried out between 1985-1991. It examines church-state relations and interconfessional rivalry under communism in the former Yugoslav federation of six republics. Construction of new religious facilities, especially in case of building of significant edifices symbols of religious and ethnic identity, was a popular practice by which religious institutions animated the faithful, sought to break the isolation imposed upon them by the regime, and symbolically expressed resistance against the communist system, and finally, competed with one another in a society with three major religious institutions and over forty minor religious groups. The analysis tracks down coinciding processes of rebuilding of two significant churches symbols. One is a Serbian Orthodox memorial church dedicated to the chief Serb national saint Sava, built in neo-Byzantine style, and installed amidst a historic Romanesque block in the predominantly Croatian Catholic town of Split. The other church under construction was the city's co-Cathedral of St. Peter the Apostle, damaged in World War II

The study is a contribution to the discussion on the definition of war in modern era and focuses on contemporary debates. By exploring the essence of politics and nation, in line with Carl Schmitt's theory of politics and by taking into consideration the forms of national liberation wars, the author points to the inadequacy of von Clausewitz's instrumental/political definition of war and lists most critical remarks to this theory. The author describes other theories, such as the pure war theory (war separated from politics) and the existential war theory (a political entity is being shaped and coming into being). Then he systematically lays out the modern concept of the nation and the corresponding definition of war. In defining wars, the author relies on the modern philosophy of the subject, particularly by G.W.F. Hegel, and on Scheler's theory of nation and war. Finally, the study shows that international relations are still to a large extent determined by the nationally-based politics, and that contemporary wars include many features of international and national-liberation wars. (SOI : SOEU: S. 78)

Up to the Second World War, most women worked at low paying, low skill agricultural and industrial jobs. But women could also be found working in higher qualified professions, especially those that were traditionally allotted to them in society, such as those in the fields of education, social welfare, nursing, and the creative arts. Organizations concerned with women's emancipation reflected the different socio-economic and educational level of working women. Such organizations as the professional union of healthcare workers, for example, declared themselves to be apolitical but they became increasingly involved in union activities and politics in the period before the Second World War. On the other hand, other working women's organizations kept their demands strictly limited to economic or narrowly professional matters. According to the historiography, rural women who were poorer and less educated were subject to proletarianization in urban areas, at the same time, however, they had opportunities to participate in relatively creative activities. These activities went beyond the framework of their everyday domestic lives. For example, they worked at cottage industries and could sell these products at the market place, which supplemented domestic income. (SOI : CSP: S. 503)

The author examines attempts to reform the communist systems in Europe during the 1960s, especiallly as they relate to the process of election to organs of government in Croatia and Yugoslavia in 1967 and 1969. Issues surrounding the legitimacy of government, economic development, and internal political and national tensions provided the impetus for the growth of the reform movement. Economic reforms were geared towards recognition of market forces, while political reforms revolved around a general democratization of the system. The allowance for "slightly greater freedom" in politics meant minimum tolerance of diversity including national rights as well. The growing strength off the reform movement quickly revealed the threat reform posed to the fundamental social relations upon which the communist model of society was based. Reform especially threatened the dominant role played by the communist party. Conservative forces predominated in the ensuing political struggle, and the curtailment of reformist tendencies was also influenced by the involvement of the USSR. An example of the curtailment of reformist tendencies were the elections to the Croatian Sabor and the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia. A relative liberalization of elective processes to the legislative branch took place when more than one candidate was allowed to run for a single mandate. In many instances during the 1967 elections, struggles between the candidate supported by the League of Socialists, the official candidate, and an independent, or "unofficial" candidate, were common. The loss of total control over the electoral process was viewed unfavourably by the ruling party and the former control over elections was quickly reestablished. (SOI : CSP: S. 346)

In the period 1945-1950, the oldest educational and cultural organization of the Croatian peasantry, "Seljacka Sloga" (Peasant Unity), renewed its work throughout Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina. In terms of the extent of the organization, the number of local branches (over 600) approached the prewar figure, and an equally respectable number of people (over 60,000) participated in the various educational and cultural activities it offered. These activities primarily followed traditional patterns: instruction in reading and writing, advice on economic and health issues, promotion and preservation of cultural customs and heritage, and assistance to amateur peasant artists of all kinds. But the very existence and work of the organization in this period was in large part determined by the political objectives of the new socialist government, which saw in the organization's activities the possibility of strengthening its influence in the countryside. is thus possible to conclude that "Sloga" at this time was made an instrument of politics, and this shaped the content of its work and determined the nature of its organization. The new government forced "Sloga" to join the pro-communist National Front and make its policies according to the set principles of, at first, national democracy, and later, socialism. The leaders of "Sloga" were under constant pressure from the state. Nonetheless, the author concludes that the "Sloga" played an important role in the postwar era, a time of extreme poverty, when other institutions did not exist. In the countryside, its revived cultural and educational activities satisfied basic needs. (SOI : CSP: S. 146)

Petar Rogulja's article "Before the Dawn" (1916) led to an intense debate about the organization of the Croatian Catholic Movement (Hrvatski katolicki pokret - HKP). He is important because he elaborated the ideology of the movement, which played an important role for Catholicism in the political life of Croatia. Rogulja and his supporters (the 'nacionalci' or 'nationalists') tried to reorganize he HKP into a "total system" (potpuni sistem). This meant that cultural and economic organizations were to be included as integral parts of a future political party. His opponents (the integralists or 'integralci') were not successful in attacking his policy. After the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes", the first Yugoslavia, was formed (1918), the seniors of the Church organized their own political party - Hrvatska pucka stranka (HPS - Croatian Popular Party). The party claimed to represent "positive elements of the Christian congregation", but also claimed that it was "non-confessional". The seniors made a commitment to "interconfessionalism". The creation of the "Catholic Action - Katolicka akcija" (KA) by Pius XI. provided official support for those Catholics that did not support the policy direction taken by the HKP. Unlike the HKP, which was organized from below, that is to say, by the laity outside of the auspices of the Church hierarchy, the organization of the KA was initiated from above, by the Church hierarchy as a whole. The KA, as defined by the encyclical "Ubi arcano Dei" (1922), along with other acts of the Holy See and the Catholic Church hierarchy, was not to include organizations intending to achieve "mundane objectives", thus, political parties. A political party was at the heart of the HKP, but even though this was the case, Rogulja's supporters contributed to the organization of the KA. Though the KA was meant to be non-political, this did not mean that it was indifferent to politics generally, or to those who based their political activity on Christian/Catholic tenets. Seniors faithful to Rogulja's orientation believed that members of the KA would support their party in political matters. In any case, the leaders of the Catholic Church throughout Croatian lands never obligated its members to support the HPS. Opponents of the seniors' political party, mainly adherents of the Croatian Union of the Eagle (1923), accused them of anti-clericalism. The political disputes among Catholic activists in Croatia was brought to an end, but not resolved, by the Yugoslav Monarch's suspension of the Vidovdan constitution in 1929, at which time political parties where outlawed. (SOI : CSP: S. 455f.)