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First published online: 07 May 2021 ; Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the theory of contests as does the production function in the theory of the firm, yet beyond the existence of equilibrium few general results are known. This paper seeks to remedy that gap. ; This article recieve funding from the EUI Research Council and MIUR PRIN 20103S5RN3 for financial support. This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Springer Transformative Agreement (2020-2024)

We compare expected rent-seeking expenditures & efficiency of simultaneous versus sequential rent-seeking contests. We find that when two risk neutral ex ante identical agents are competing, sequential contests are ex ante Pareto superior to simultaneous contests. We then endogenize the timing decision of rent-seeking expenditures & show that with ex ante identical contestants, all subgame perfect equilibria of this game are sequential contests. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 13 References. Adapted from the source document.