Suchergebnisse

Croatian Republican Peasant Party (CRPP) was not accepted by Croatian peasantry, and its activity depended already on the Communist Party of Croatia (CPC), the main aim of which was to destroy Croatian Peasant Party (CPP). CRPP had no members, but its activity manifested through the work of its Executive Committee, publication of Slobodni dom and temporary activities of its lower committees. CRPP rejected the "treacherous" leadership and used the organizational form of CPP for constituting its committees, citing its traditional role and continuity of Radic's policy. Finishing the preelection campaigns in 1945 and 1946 in favour of CPP, which acted under support of the National Front, CRPP, rejected by its potential followers, but also despised by its founder, withered away. Preelection meetings of CRPP had only propaganda purposes, not organizational development of the Party. After 1947 the committees were not founded any more, no sessions convoked. A short revival of CRPP in 1950 only confirmed all its hopelessness and its dependence on Communist Party. The communists became strong enough and had no need of the services of that party, and the danger from revival of CPP was anyway dependent only on threat from the outside. (SOI : CSP: S. 87)

The article provides an analysis of youth values in Croatia in the socialist and post-socialist periods, comparing them with values of older citizens and of the political elite. The comparative analysis is based on data obtained through four empirical investigations conducted in 1986, 1999 and 2004. The results show that the predominant youth values remain stable, with minor oscillations in rank. The aspects in which the young are different from the older citizens are a broader variety of interests, a greater acceptance of post-materialistic values, and a lesser acceptance of traditional and political values. It is also shown that the optimism of youth is constantly on a high level, as well as their satisfaction with life, which is more pronounced than with older citizens. In all analyzed segments the political elite is noticeably different from both above-mentioned groups. The overall findings confirm that the acceptance of observed values varies depending on the social-political context, and the age and social status of the respondents. Since the scope of the variations is limited, the author concludes that this analysis gives one more confirmation of the relative stability of values, and of the fact that they are transmitted from generation to generation in a way which does not endanger social continuity. Adapted from the source document.

The article provides an analysis of youth values in Croatia in the socialist and post-socialist periods, comparing them with values of older citizens and of the political elite. The comparative analysis is based on data obtained through four empirical investigations conducted in 1986, 1999 and 2004. The results show that the predominant youth values remain stable, with minor oscillations in rank. The aspects in which the young are different from the older citizens are a broader variety of interests, a greater acceptance of post-materialistic values, and a lesser acceptance of traditional and political values. It is also shown that the optimism of youth is constantly on a high level, as well as their satisfaction with life, which is more pronounced than with older citizens. In all analyzed segments the political elite is noticeably different from both above-mentioned groups. The overall findings confirm that the acceptance of observed values varies depending on the social-political context, and the age and social status of the respondents. Since the scope of the variations is limited, the author concludes that this analysis gives one more confirmation of the relative stability of values, and of the fact that they are transmitted from generation to generation in a way which does not endanger social continuity. Adapted from the source document.

The two construction ventures mirrored political currents and were affected by politics while themselves making politics. In the aftermath of the regime's backlash following the Croatian quest for more autonomy within the Yugoslav federation, the Cathedral was reduced in size and relocated to an inappropriate site. Builders of the St. Sava's church, meanwhile, defied recommendations by experts to adjust its style to the surroundings or change the location. Even though the authorities offered financial assistance with the construction permit, the Serb church in Split remained unfinished. In the late 1980s as ethnic tensions grew and the multiethnic country was on the brink of war and disintegration, leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church and propaganda in the capital of Serbia Belgrade exploited the Split case as an evidence of discrimination against the Serbian ethnic minority in predominantly Catholic Croatia. The Serbian Church, utilizing the unfinished temple, also attempted to revive symbolically the ancient Byzantine/Roman disputes over the church community in the ancient city in order to imply that there existed a long tradition and "continuity" of religious disputes in this region. Yet, both the Croatian authorities and the Catholic Church sought to appease the Serbian church, rather than to accept the challenges. This case demonstrates that the Serbian Orthodox Church followed the militant course of the regime in Serbia, which was the principal firebrand of the 1991-95 Balkan war. (SOI : CSP: S. 126) + This article is built on primary sources that include the author's research in the offices of state commissions for relations with religious communities with numerous interviews carried out between 1985-1991. It examines church-state relations and interconfessional rivalry under communism in the former Yugoslav federation of six republics. Construction of new religious facilities, especially in case of building of significant edifices symbols of religious and ethnic identity, was a popular practice by which religious institutions animated the faithful, sought to break the isolation imposed upon them by the regime, and symbolically expressed resistance against the communist system, and finally, competed with one another in a society with three major religious institutions and over forty minor religious groups. The analysis tracks down coinciding processes of rebuilding of two significant churches symbols. One is a Serbian Orthodox memorial church dedicated to the chief Serb national saint Sava, built in neo-Byzantine style, and installed amidst a historic Romanesque block in the predominantly Croatian Catholic town of Split. The other church under construction was the city's co-Cathedral of St. Peter the Apostle, damaged in World War II