Suchergebnisse

U.S. government agencies often struggle to clearly and concisely identify, communicate, and document their contract requirements to government contractors due to numerous factors, including; evolving technologies, urgent national security issues, re-prioritization of needs, changing funding profiles, acceleration and/or delay of the program schedule, political pressures, etc. In addition, the complexity of many U.S. government contracts and related projects requires numerous parties to be involved from a variety of functional areas, resulting in frequent miscommunication, wrongful interpretations, and/or unauthorized contract changes. Thus, the task of managing contract changes post-award becomes an increasingly daunting duty.

We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contracting problems involving incentive constraints. These constraints make the corresponding maximization sup problems non-recursive. Our approach consists of studying a recursive Lagrangian. Under standard general conditions, there is a recursive saddle-point (infsup) functional equation (analogous to a Bellman equation) that characterizes the recursive solution to the planner's problem and forward-looking constraints. Our approach has been applied to a large class of dynamic contractual problems, such as contracts with limited enforcement, optimal policy design with implementability constraints, and dynamic political economy models.

Where does the money come from to buy votes? We argue that an important source of funds for vote-buying comes from 'contract clientelism', or the provision of public contracts to private firms in exchange for campaign donations. Using quantitative data on Colombian infrastructure contracts, we demonstrate that municipalities exhibit an 'electoral contracting cycle' in which incumbents assign low-quality contracts while on the campaign trail. Contract manipulations are more common in municipalities with higher reports of clientelist activity. Qualitative evidence from two Colombian cities, Barranquilla and Santa Marta, reinforce that infrastructure contractors provide a critical source of campaign finance and can create subnational political monopolies. The main contribution is to question the classic tension between clientelistic distribution and public goods provision. Politicians need to assign public contracts to secure funds for clientelistic handouts but, in so doing, they often promote low-quality public goods and weaken local states.

We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contracting problems involving incentive constraints. These constraints make the corresponding maximization sup problems non-recursive. Our approach consists of studying a recursive Lagrangian. Under standard general conditions, there is a recursive saddle-point (infsup) functional equation (analogous to a Bellman equation) that characterizes the recursive solution to the planner's problem and forward-looking constraints. Our approach has been applied to a large class of dynamic contractual problems, such as contracts with limited enforcement, optimal policy design with implementability constraints, and dynamic political economy models.

Pacta sunt servanda, Verträge muss man einhalten. Wo das misslingt, kommt es regelmäßig zu Streit, der häufig nur mit großem Aufwand zu lösen ist. Geht es bald auch einfacher? So genannte Smart Contracts beinhalten eine Software, die die Einhaltung vertraglicher Pflichten kontrolliert und Pflichtverletzungen automatisch mit Sanktionen belegt. Damit lassen sich einerseits Dienstleistungen kundenfreundlicher gestalten, etwa wenn ein Fluggast automatisch die gesetzliche Entschädigung erhält, sobald der Flighttracker eine Verspätung des gebuchten Fluges registriert. Andererseits können Unternehmen ihre Kunden mit Smart Contracts engmaschig kontrollieren, etwa wenn sie der Fahrerin eines Mietwagens den digitalen Zündschlüssel ziehen, sobald diese vertragswidrig ins Ausland fährt. Wie verträgt sich das mit dem geltenden Recht? Verbessern Smart Contracts die Rechtsdurchsetzung oder übt die Software hier unzulässige Selbstjustiz?InhaltsübersichtMartin Fries/Boris P. Paal: Vorwort Teil I: Technische und rechtliche Grundlagen Michèle Finck: Grundlagen und Technologie von Smart Contracts – Paulina Jo Pesch: Blockchain, Smart Contracts und Datenschutz – Jörn Erbguth: Transparenz von Smart Contracts Teil II: Transfer in die kautelarjuristische Praxis Heribert Anzinger: Smart Contracts in der Sharing Economy – Markus Kaulartz: Smart Contract Dispute Resolution Teil III: Zusammenspiel mit dem Zivil- und Zivilprozessrecht Thomas Riehm: Smart Contracts und verbotene Eigenmacht- Robin Matzke: Smart Contracts statt Zwangsvollstreckung – Nico Kuhlmann: Smart Enforcement bei Smart Contracts – Franz Hofmann: Smart Contracts und Overenforcement