A model is presented in which individuals can vote over government subsidies to a private good and over redistributive taxation. The subsidized good is purchased and shared by couples who act noncooperatively, while possibly being altruistic towards each other. The framework allows a separation of the subsidy policy from redistributive policy. In a majority voting equilibrium the subsidy is used exclusively to correct the individuals' spending pattern. The results suggest that spending on private goods should be an important item in government expenditures when there is strong positive income bias in the political process and/or when household decisions are relatively inefficient. Adapted from the source document.
Political economy models predict that the rich oppose redistribution, and hence vote for conservative parties. Although this seems to fit the data well, I show that this is not true when we control for unobservable characteristics. Using Norwegian survey data, I study to what extent voting is caused by income. Unobserved characteristics correlated with income are handled by using fixed effects panel data discrete choice models. Although a positive association between income and conservative voting persists when controlling for unobservables, the magnitude of the effect is reduced by a factor of five. To correct for measurement error, I instrument income with average income by profession. The magnitude of the coefficients is increased, but the main conclusions remain.
Economists have long counseled reliance on markets rather than on government to decide a wide range of questions, in part because allocation through voting can give rise to a "tyranny of the majority." Markets, by contrast, are believed to make products available to suit any individual, regardless of what others want. But the argument is not generally correct. In markets, you can't always get what you want. This book explores why this is so and its consequences for consumers with atypical preferences.
Economic conditions are said to affect election outcomes, but past research has produced unstable and contradictory findings. This book argues that these problems are caused by the failure to take account of electoral competition between parties. A research strategy to correct this problem is designed and applied to investigate effects of economic conditions on (individual) voter choices and (aggregate) election outcomes over 42 elections in 15 countries. It shows that economic conditions exert small effects on individual party preferences, which can have large consequences for election outcomes. In countries where responsibility for economic policy is clear, voters vote retrospectively and reward or punish incumbent parties - although in coalition systems smaller government parties often gain at the expense of the largest party when economic conditions deteriorate. Where clarity of responsibility for economic policy is less clear, voters vote more prospectively on the basis of expected party policies
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The European Union's 2007 Intergovernmental Conferences in Brussels and Lisbon agreed on a new composition of the European Parliament, and on a new voting system for the Council of Ministers. For the legislative period 2009-2014, the seats of the European Parliament are assigned to the 27 Member States following a proposal of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, plus one additional seat for Italy, here referred to as the "AFCO + 1" seat allocation. Starting in 2014, the Council of Ministers will use a "Double Majority" voting system, whereby an act is adopted if carried by at least 55 percent of the Member States representing 65 percent of the Union's population. The resolution of the European Parliament (2007) draws attention to the overall reform package for the Union's institutions and demands that a future reform should at all events correct any inequalities which have arisen for historical reasons. As a contribution to the prospective debate we here discuss two citizen-based procedures, a "Fix + Prop." seat apportionment for the European Parliament, and the "Jagiellonian Compromise" voting system for the Council of Ministers. A shift to the envisioned citizen-based procedures turns out to go along with a surprisingly balanced compensation of weights, between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
We consider misconceptions about the functioning of the economy as one possible explanation for the emergence of crises in democracies. Furthermore, we study a political process which may lead to successful reform. First of all, we show that voters can make inefficient decisions concerning policy measures because of their insufficient recognition of indirect policy effects. Repeated voting on the basis of such incomplete economic views eventually leads to an economic crisis. Accordingly, the adoption of a correct view may trigger the reversal of a detrimental economic development. We ask whether this could be accomplished by platforms of political parties. Therefore, we analyze a signaling game between a governmental party and voters. We find that extreme reform proposals are particularly credible, and therefore might be the appropriate device for successful reform.
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 70-92
Models of ecological inference (EI) have to rely on crucial assumptions about the individual-level data-generating process, which cannot be tested because of the unavailability of these data. However, these assumptions may be violated by the unknown data and this may lead to serious bias of estimates and predictions. The amount of bias, however, cannot be assessed without information that is unavailable in typical applications of EI. We therefore construct a model that at least approximately accounts for the additional, nonsampling error that may result from possible bias incurred by an EI procedure, a model that builds on the Principle of Maximum Entropy. By means of a systematic simulation experiment, we examine the performance of prediction intervals based on this second-stage Maximum Entropy model. The results of this simulation study suggest that these prediction intervals are at least approximately correct if all possible configurations of the unknown data are taken into account. Finally, we apply our method to a real-world example, where we actually know the true values and are able to assess the performance of our method: the prediction of district-level percentages of split-ticket voting in the 1996 General Election of New Zealand. It turns out that in 95.5% of the New Zealand voting districts, the actual percentage of split-ticket votes lies inside the 95% prediction intervals constructed by our method.