ObjectiveI examine the democratic consequences (on turnout, vote quality, and representation) of being encouraged to think more deliberately about political preferences.MethodsA nationally representative survey experiment randomly exposes some respondents to a treatment designed to encourage greater cognitive deliberation; I observe the treatment effects on (1) a measure of the ideological consistency of candidate preferences, (2) preference certainty, and (3) intentions to turn out, dividing the sample according to age, gender, and political knowledge in order to observe hypothesized conditional effects.ResultsThe treatment tended to reduce voting incentives among those who tend to be less engaged—women, the young, and low‐knowledge citizens. It did not, however, predict preference consistency significantly.ConclusionEncouraging greater cognitive deliberation may not only shrink the electorate, but may produce a more biased one as well, a normatively undesirable outcome that does not appear to be counterbalanced by any increase in "correct voting."
Evaluation of the current government by voting is a key element in the mechanism of political responsibility. Consequently, democratic governance is normatively attractive because elections are an effective tool for enhancing public welfare. In recent years, there has been a renaissance in the field of voter explanation, largely driven by unexpected election outcomes. Over the past five years, scholars have learned a lot about how voters actually make decisions and what their behavior implies for democratic accountability and public welfare. However, these advances in knowledge have also generated more open questions than answers. Retrospective voting is a concept in American political science, the essence of which boils down to the fact that society can evaluate the past political activities of the government. Voters view government performance on criteria such as economic efficiency, criminal justice systems, social stability, environmental and health outcomes within the election deadline (2-4 years), and then, through voting in elections, citizens formulate more successful governments. The models are based on the fact that the coalition in power does influence the results by which it is judged. Political results are adequate indicators of the credibility and effectiveness of the choice of officials. The stand-alone idea is that civil powers have the right to selectively punish and reward politicians based on performance indicators.If voter decisions do not provide adequate incentives for elected officials or distort these incentives altogether, democracy can lead to ineffective policies. Like the classic problems of collective action, individually rational voter behavior can sometimes lead to bad results for society, because the essence of the state is that all citizens pay for the mistakes of the top leadership. Thus, modern American scientists believe that retrospective voting does not automatically provide the correct messages, especially if the authorities interpret them erroneously. In Ukraine, this topic has almost never been covered. The purpose of this article is to provide a systematic assessment of the theory of retrospective voting, as the leading theory of modern electoral democracies. The purpose of the article was achieved using the method of systems analysis. ; В последние годы в области объяснения поведения избирателей произошел ренессанс, в значительной степени обусловленный неожиданными исходами выборов. За минувшие пять лет ученые многое узнали о том, как избиратели на самом деле принимают решения и что их поведение подразумевает для демократической ответственности и общественного благосостояния. Тем не менее, эти достижения в области знаний также породили больше открытых вопросов, чем ответов. Ретроспективное голосование – это концепция в американской политической науке, суть которой сводиться к тому, что общество может оценивает прошлую политическую деятельность правительства. Избиратели рассматривают деятельность правительства по таким критериям как эффективность экономики, системы уголовного правосудия, социальной стабильности, экологические и медицинские результаты в сроки, установленные выборами (2-4 года), а потом через голосование на выборах граждане формулируют более успешные правительства.В Украине данная тема практически никогда не была освещена. Цель этой статьи дать системную оценку теории ретроспективного голосования, как ведущей теории современных электоральных демократий. Цель статьи была достигнута с помощью метода системного анализа. ; В останні роки в області пояснення поведінки виборців стався ренесанс, в значній мірі обумовлений несподіваними наслідками виборів. За минулі п'ять років вчені багато дізналися про те, як виборці насправді приймають рішення і що їх поведінка має на увазі для демократичної відповідальності і суспільного добробуту. Проте, ці досягнення в галузі знань також породили більше відкритих питань, ніж відповідей. Ретроспективне голосування - це концепція в американській політичній науці, суть якої зводиться до того, що суспільство може оцінювати минулу політичну діяльність уряду. Виборці розглядають діяльність уряду за такими критеріями як ефективність економіки, системи кримінального правосуддя, соціальної стабільності, екологічні та медичні результати в терміни, встановлені виборами (2-4 роки), а потім через голосування на виборах громадяни формулюють більш успішні уряди. В Україні дана тема практично ніколи не була освітлена. Мета цієї статті дати системну оцінку теорії ретроспективного голосування, як провідної теорії сучасних електоральних демократій. Мета статті була досягнута за допомогою методу системного аналізу.
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political science ; official journal of the Dutch Political Science Association (Nederlandse Kring voor Wetenschap der Politiek), Band 30, Heft 3, S. 307-334
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 4th International Conference on E-Voting and Identity, VoteID 2013, held in Guildford, UK, during July 17-19, 2013. The 12 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from 26 submissions. The papers include a range of works on end-to-end verifiable election systems, verifiably correct complex tallying algorithms, human perceptions of verifiability, formal models of verifiability and, of course, attacks on systems formerly advertised as verifiable
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Roll-call votes of African American representatives are explored to discern more explicitly the ideological cohesiveness of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and factors that affect vote choice. We use adjusted Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores. The adjustment corrects for changes in the ADA's scale from year to year. The analysis is carried out focusing on CBC coherence with respect to ideological voting and potential influences on Caucus unity We pool the CBC data from the period under investigation (1971-1996) to address the impact of variables identified as affecting roll call voting. The findings suggest that while there is considerably more diversity within the CBC than we some times imagine, African American representatives are more cohesive with the Black Caucus on roll call behavior than they are with either their regional or state party delegations. In addition, analyses suggest that seniority, correspondence between the president's party and the CBC, presidential policy preferences, percent black voters in the district, and electoral margin of victory in the district may help explain variation in Caucus unity Finally, we conclude high vote cohesion is meaningful for the CBC and the representation of black interests in Congress.
THERE ARE TWO DISTINCT VIEWS ON HOW CANDIDATE (OR PARTY) ISSUE STRATEGIES INFLUENCE MASS EVALUATIONS. ONE IS THE VIEW UNDERLYING THE CLASSIC SPATIAL MODEL THAT THE PROXIMITY BETWEEN THE VOTER'S OWN ISSUE POSITIONS AND THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE CANDIDATES DRIVES THE EVALUATION. THE OTHER VIEW IS DIRECTIONALLY MOTIVATED. IN THE DIRECTIONAL MODEL VOTERS ARE SEEN AS HAVING ONLY DIFFUSE PREFERENCES FOR ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER ON AN ISSUE, WITH VOTER SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION STIMULATED BY A CANDIDATE TAKING A STRONG STAND IN FAVOR OF A PARTICULAR SIDE. RESEARCHERS HAVE LONG RECOGNIZED THAT ELECTORATES ARE HETEROGENEOUS. THE AUTHORS CONSIDERS A MODEL IN WHICH EACH OF THESE TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS OF ISSUE-BASED VOTING IS CORRECT FOR A PART OF THE ELECTORATE. THEY FIND THAT CANDIDATES TRYING TO OPTIMIZED SUPPORT IN THIS HETEROGENEOUS ENVIRONMENT WILL GENERALLY ADOPT MORE EXTREME POSITIONS THAN THOSE IMPLIED BY PROXIMITY THEORY AND MORE CENTRAL POSITIONS THAN THOSE IMPLIED BY DIRECTIONAL THEORY.
It is known that, in Condorcet's classical model of jury decisions, the proportion of jurors supporting a decision is not a significant indicator of that decision's reliability: the probability that a particular majority decision is correct given the size of the majority depends only on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority, and is invariant under changes of the proportion in the majority if the absolute margin is held fixed. Here I show that, if we relax the assumption that juror competence is independent of the jury's size, the proportion can be made significant: there are then conditions in which the probability that a given majority decision is correct depends only on the proportion of jurors supporting that decision, and is invariant under changes of the jury size. The proportion is significant in this way if and only if juror competence is a particular decreasing function of the jury size. However, the required condition on juror competence is not only highly special – thereby casting doubt on the significance of the proportion in realistic conditions – but it also has an adverse implication for the Condorcet jury theorem. If the proportion is significant, then the Condorcet jury theorem fails to hold; and if the Condorcet jury theorem holds, the proportion is not significant. I discuss the implications of these results for defining and justifying special majority voting from the perspective of an epistemic account of voting.
In: International law reports, Band 22, S. 651-689
ISSN: 2633-707X
Mandates — Supervision by United Nations — Territory of South-West Africa — Voting Procedure of General Assembly — Voting Procedure under United Nations.United Nations — Charter of — Interpretation of — Article 18, paragraph 2, on Voting Procedure.United Nations — General Assembly — Procedure of — Voting Procedure — "Important Questions" within the Meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter — Decisions of General Assembly on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning Territory of South-West Africa — "Degree of Supervision" of General Assembly in the Matter of Territory of South-West Africa — Whether a Matter of Procedure — Supervision Conforming "so far as possible" with Supervision Exercised by the League of Nations — Whether Implying Continuation of Unanimity Rule Obtaining under Covenant of the League — Whether Voting Procedure under Article 18, paragraph 2, Consistent with Correct Interpretation of Principle that Degree of Supervision of General Assembly Shall Approximate So Far as Possible to That of League of Nations — Interpretation of Previous Advisory Opinion of the Court.
In recent years, several nations and private associations have introduced Internet voting as additional means to conduct elections. To date, a variety of voting schemes to conduct Internet-based elections have been constructed, both from the scientific community and industry. Because of its fundamental importance to democratic societies, Internet voting – as any other voting method – is bound to high legal standards, particularly imposing security requirements on the voting method. However, these legal standards, and resultant derived security requirements, partially oppose each other. As a consequence, Internet voting schemes cannot enforce these legally-founded security requirements to their full extent, but rather build upon specific assumptions. The criticality of these assumptions depends on the target election setting, particularly the adversary expected within that setting. Given the lack of an election-specific evaluation framework for these assumptions, or more generally Internet voting schemes, the adequacy of Internet voting schemes for specific elections cannot readily be determined. Hence, selecting the Internet voting scheme that satisfies legally-founded security requirements within a specific election setting in the most appropriate manner, is a challenging task. To support election officials in the selection process, the first goal of this dissertation is the construction of a evaluation framework for Internet voting schemes based on legally-founded security requirements. Therefore, on the foundation of previous interdisciplinary research, legally-founded security requirements for Internet voting schemes are derived. To provide election officials with improved decision alternatives, the second goal of this dissertation is the improvement of two established Internet voting schemes with regard to legally-founded security requirements, namely the Polyas Internet voting scheme and the Estonian Internet voting scheme. Our research results in five (partially opposing) security requirements for Internet voting schemes. On the basis of these security requirements, we construct a capability-based risk assessment approach for the security evaluation of Internet voting schemes in specific election settings. The evaluation of the Polyas scheme reveals the fact that compromised voting devices can alter votes undetectably. Considering surrounding circumstances, we eliminate this shortcoming by incorporating out of band codes to acknowledge voters' votes. It turns out that in the Estonian scheme, four out of five security requirements rely on the correct behaviour of voting devices. We improve the Estonian scheme in that regard by incorporating out of band voting and acknowledgment codes. Thereby, we maintain four out of five security requirements against adversaries capable of compromising voting devices.
If we want to know what is happening to political parties today, the answer depends in part on how we define the term `party' and in part on the time frame used for analysis. In this paper we focus on parties as voting coalitions in the US House and the Senate over the last 40 years. To assess the ideological placement and cohesiveness of each party in the House and Senate, we use adjusted scores issued by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Our adjustment corrects for changes in the ADA's scale from year to year. The analysis is carried out by focusing on each of the four main regional factions comprising the parties. The cross-chamber comparisons for the Republicans show a high degree of stability with respect to ideological placement and cohesiveness; eastern Republicans maintain a more liberal stance throughout the period of analysis. For Democrats in both chambers there has been a liberal shift in recent years and an increase in cohesiveness overall; the southern Democrats are distinctively more conservative than the rest of the party, although less so in recent years. Both of the `outlier' factions (eastern Republicans and southern Democrats) unexpectedly display less cohesiveness than do the mainline factions of their respective parties. The paper concludes with some discussion of why this may be the case, what the future holds for outlier cohesiveness, and implications for responsible parties in the United States.
There are two distinct views on how candidate (or party) issue strategies influence mass evaluations. One is the view underlying the classic spatial model that the proximity between the voter's own issue positions and the positions taken by the candidates drives the evaluation. The other view is directionally motivated. In the directional model voters are seen as having only diffuse preferences for one side or the other on an issue, with voter support and opposition stimulated by a candidate taking a strong stand in favor of a particular side. Researchers have long recognized that electorates are heterogeneous. We consider a model in which each of these two different views of issue-based voting is correct for a part of the electorate. We find that candidates trying to optimize support in this heterogeneous environment will generally adopt more extreme positions than those implied by proximity theory and more central positions than those implied by directional theory.
Abstract. During the time of the election, indigenous minorities face enormous problems and difficulties. At times, their basic democratic rights are not always freely exercised. This paper explores the challenges encountered by one of Ethiopia's indigenous minorities, the Hararis, during the sixth national election in Ethiopia. A descriptive, qualitative research method was used to investigate the nature of the problem and resolutions came up. Primary data (published legal documents, court cases and formal letters) were collected from various sources. The National Election Board of Ethiopia has inadvertently attempted to prevent the rights of indigenous minority Hararis (living in other parts of the country) from voting for candidates that form the Harari National Assembly. The basic reasons for the National Election Board to do so have no legal justification and are challenged by the federal and regional constitutions, particularly by articles explicitly addressing minorities and Hararis residing outside the Harari region to vote. The final decisions made by the federal cassation court were found to be correct, fair, acceptable, and in concurrence with the federal and regional constitutions. The study found out that the federal and regional constitutions of the country play a prominent role in protecting the rights of minorities to vote.Keywords. Indigenous minorities; Harari National Assembly; Election; National Election Board of Ethiopia; voting rights.JEL. F21, F68, O53, K23.
Duverger's law holds that single member district rules produce two-party systems, but third party voting remains an important feature of these institutional contexts. To explain the discrepancy between theory and empirical reality, Gary Cox specified four conditions that are necessary for the theoretical expectations to bear out. Yet, subsequent research has focused mostly on just one of these conditions, namely, that voters have correct information about the competitiveness of their preferred party in the district. The purpose of this paper is to assess the role of all four conditions. Using original survey data from the 2015 United Kingdom general election, the analysis suggests that violations of the information condition matter, but that violations of the short-term instrumental rationality condition can be a significant factor as well. Consequently, future research should pay more attention to this condition when seeking to explain third party voting.
"Der Wähler sollte im Idealfall vollständig über die Parteipositionen zu wichtigen politischen Streitthemen informiert sein, um die Partei wählen zu können, deren Interessen und Ideen seinen eigenen am besten entsprechen. Dennoch ist das politische Wissen im Allgemeinen recht gering ausgeprägt. Darüber hinaus ist Wissen über verschiedene soziale Gruppen hinweg ungleich verteilt, wodurch die Legitimität der repräsentativen Demokratie infrage gestellt wird. Der 'Wahl-O-Mat' zielt darauf ab, die Wählerschaft über Parteipositionen zu informieren und hierdurch 'correct voting' zu fördern. Im Zuge des Wahlkampfes zur Bundestagswahl 2013 wurde der 'Wahl-O-Mat' mehr als 10 Millionen Mal genutzt. In diesem Artikel gehen wir der Frage nach, inwiefern der "Wahl-O-Mat" das Wissen seiner Nutzer über die Parteipositionen zu wichtigen politischen Streitthemen fördert. Unsere Analyse basiert auf einem prä-experimentellen Online-Design, das zwei Wochen vor der Wahl durchgeführt wurde. Die zentralen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Nutzung des 'Wahl-O-Mat' das Wissen zu Parteipositionen erhöht, allerdings nur in geringem Maße. Neben einem Anstieg des Wissens wuchs auch die Anzahl der 'weiß nicht'-Antworten. Das Ausmaß, in dem Individuen durch die 'Wahl-O-Mat'-Nutzung lernen können, hängt stark von ihrem Vorwissen ab, wobei dieses wiederum durch individuelle Motivation und Ressourcen bestimmt wird." (Autorenreferat)