Power Corrupts - Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely
In: Conservation ecology: a peer-reviewed journal ; a publication of the Ecological Society of America, Band 3, Heft 2
ISSN: 1195-5449
5233 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Conservation ecology: a peer-reviewed journal ; a publication of the Ecological Society of America, Band 3, Heft 2
ISSN: 1195-5449
In: Representation, Band 3, Heft 13, S. 4-4
ISSN: 1749-4001
In: The political quarterly: PQ, Band 76, Heft 4, S. 575-577
ISSN: 0032-3179
In: American political science review, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 50-56
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 77, Heft 6, S. 168
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: Ethics and corruption in education
Incl. tables and bibl. references. ; Rigged calls for tender, embezzlement of funds, illegal registration fees, academic fraud - there is no lack of empirical data illustrating the diverse forms that corruption can take in the education sector. Surveys suggest that fund leakage from education ministries to schools can be huge, bribes and payoffs in teacher recruitment and promotion lower the quality of the pool of teachers, and illegal payments for school entrance contribute to low enrolment and high drop-out rates. This book presents conclusions drawn from IIEP's research into ethics and corruption in education. It aims to build awareness among decision-makers and education managers of the importance of combating corruption, to provide them with tools to detect and assess corruption problems, and to guide them in formulating strategies to curb malpractices. After defining the key concepts of corruption, transparency, accountability and ethics, it identifies the main opportunities for corruption in education. It describes tools that can be used to assess corruption problems - such as perception and tracking surveys. Lessons are drawn from strategies used worldwide to improve transparency and accountability in educational management. The authors bring these together in a list of recommendations for policy-makers and educational managers. They argue that transparent regulatory systems, greater accountability through strengthened management capacity, and enhanced ownership of the management process can help build corruption-free education systems.
BASE
In: Economics of Governance
Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption.
Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption. We provide empirical evidence which is in line with this result.
BASE
Because corruption must be hidden from the public and is not enforced by courts it entails transaction costs, which are larger than those from legal exchange. This suggests that corrupt contracts are primarily relational contracts where legal exchange serves as a basis for sealing and enforcing corrupt agreements. Legal exchange not only provides for corrupt opportunities, but for the necessary enforcement mechanisms. Examples of such legal exchange are long-term business exchange, belonging to the same firm or political party or being embedded in social relationships. The latter may even comprise the engagement in charitable institutions. Reform should not only focus on limiting opportunities for corrupt behavior but also on impeding the enforcement of corrupt agreements.
BASE
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 31-53
ISSN: 1471-6437
Abstract:In one broad construal, corruption consists of deriving benefit from power over others in morally objectionable ways. The charge that capitalism is corrupt is usefully understood as a claim that modern capitalist economies inevitably and pervasively generate corrupt gains, in this sense, through conduct that does not transgress capitalist norms for individuals' economic conduct. Modern capitalism has two features that would figure prominently in such an indictment: gains from the inferior bargaining power of most workers and gains from the superior political influence of those in the best economic situations. The taint of corruption should be reduced by political measures that move capitalist commerce toward Adam Smith's commercial ideal of gains from exchanging help for help and that show appreciation of the equal importance of everyone's presumed desire to have a life shaped by directives that he or she willingly accepts. Through such measures, capitalism could, in principle, become non-corrupt. In practice, unequal political influence will prevent this. Ending the corruptness of capitalism is an unattainable yet productive goal of reform.
In: Passauer Diskussionspapiere
In: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 51
We let students play a corruption game, embedded into a variant of the ultimatum game. Those allotted the role of public servants chose between whistleblowing, opportunism and reciprocity by delivery (of a contract) and those acting as businesspeople chose how to frame the game and whether to blow the whistle. While opportunism and abstaining from whistleblowing is the Nash equilibrium, another likely outcome was that businesspeople allocate resources to punishing public servants for non-delivery, exhibiting a preference for negative reciprocity. Anticipating this, public servants might tend to reciprocate or blow the whistle upfront. Female public servants were more inclined to behave opportunistically; female businesspeople were less engaged in negative reciprocity. This corroborates a favorable role of women in anticorruption. Businesspeople who strongly preferred a corrupt framing of the game and obtained a form with corrupt wording were more willing to punish non-delivering public servants. This operates against camouflaging a bribe as a gift, because gifts fail to signal negative reciprocity. -- Corruption ; ultimatum game ; whistleblowing ; gender ; signaling ; trust
In: Human relations: towards the integration of the social sciences, Band 58, Heft 6, S. 723-740
ISSN: 1573-9716, 1741-282X
This article explores the psychic meaning of corruption understood as an attack on norms of conduct in organizations. The primary focus is on why individuals fail to become securely attached to norms, and on the part played in this failure by certain key features of corruption: greed, arrogance, a sense of personal entitlement, the idea of virtue as personal loyalty, and the inability to distinguish between organizational and personal ends. The essay considers the moral dimension of the problem and suggests that conduct normally interpreted as corrupt often expresses a powerful attachment to primitive moral thinking rather than a rejection of morality.
In: Africa research bulletin. Economic, financial and technical series, Band 46, Heft 6
ISSN: 1467-6346