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We let students play a corruption game, embedded into a variant of the ultimatum game. Those allotted the role of public servants chose between whistleblowing, opportunism and reciprocity by delivery (of a contract) and those acting as businesspeople chose how to frame the game and whether to blow the whistle. While opportunism and abstaining from whistleblowing is the Nash equilibrium, another likely outcome was that businesspeople allocate resources to punishing public servants for non-delivery, exhibiting a preference for negative reciprocity. Anticipating this, public servants might tend to reciprocate or blow the whistle upfront. Female public servants were more inclined to behave opportunistically; female businesspeople were less engaged in negative reciprocity. This corroborates a favorable role of women in anticorruption. Businesspeople who strongly preferred a corrupt framing of the game and obtained a form with corrupt wording were more willing to punish non-delivering public servants. This operates against camouflaging a bribe as a gift, because gifts fail to signal negative reciprocity. -- Corruption ; ultimatum game ; whistleblowing ; gender ; signaling ; trust

This article explores the psychic meaning of corruption understood as an attack on norms of conduct in organizations. The primary focus is on why individuals fail to become securely attached to norms, and on the part played in this failure by certain key features of corruption: greed, arrogance, a sense of personal entitlement, the idea of virtue as personal loyalty, and the inability to distinguish between organizational and personal ends. The essay considers the moral dimension of the problem and suggests that conduct normally interpreted as corrupt often expresses a powerful attachment to primitive moral thinking rather than a rejection of morality.

Identifying core values is the first step in creating a shared understanding in society regarding the expected behaviour of public office occupants. Certain countries publish a list of core values to guide their civil servants in their daily operations, drawn from social normal's, democratic principles, and professional culture. The changing environment of the public sector requires the articulation of core values. Many countries have updated their core public service values in recent years, and additional revisions are still being implemented. In the course of these revisions, countries have again emphasized "traditional" values, giving them modern connotations and adding "new" values to reflect a results-based culture of public service.

AbstractChina presents a mixed picture in terms of its anti-corruption efforts. On the one hand, rampant corruption remains a huge challenge for the party-state because it not only results in the loss of state assets but also damages the legitimacy of the regime. On the other hand, China's record of curbing corruption is not particularly worse than other comparable countries. This paper explains the reasons behind this mixed picture by focusing on the anti-corruption strategy employed by the central Party authorities. Effective anti-corruption measures are determined by the high probability of detecting corrupt agents and the meting out of effective and warranted punishment. In China, the central government is unable or unwilling to investigate a large number of officials, especially high-ranking officials. However, at the same time, it must impose severe punishment on convicted high-ranking officials. Although this mode of selective discipline compromises the credibility of the state in terms of anti-corruption efficacy, it also creates uncertainty for corrupt agents because corrupt officials are not guaranteed exemption.

China presents a mixed picture in terms of its anti-corruption efforts. On the one hand, rampant corruption remains a huge challenge for the party-state because it not only results in the loss of state assets but also damages the legitimacy of the regime. On the other hand, China's record of curbing corruption is not particularly worse than other comparable countries. This paper explains the reasons behind this mixed picture by focusing on the anti-corruption strategy employed by the central Party authorities. Effective anti-corruption measures are determined by the high probability of detecting corrupt agents and the meting out of effective and warranted punishment. In China, the central government is unable or unwilling to investigate a large number of officials, especially high-ranking officials. However, at the same time, it must impose severe punishment on convicted high-ranking officials. Although this mode of selective discipline compromises the credibility of the state in terms of anti-corruption efficacy, it also creates uncertainty for corrupt agents because corrupt officials are not guaranteed exemption. (China Q/GIGA)

A discussion of the article by Jens Chr. Andvig and Karl O. Moene, "How Corruption May Corrupt" (in Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 13(1), 1990), as an illustration of the importance of Norsk Utenrikpolitisk Institutt (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs [NUPI]) to political sciences. Adapted from the source document.