Suchergebnisse

It elaborates a phenomenologic systematization of corruption; a serious spiritual morbid process, whose genesis starts since the origin of humanity. Nowadays, it`s pandemic in the anethic and dehumanized society, which is ruled by antivalues. In Peru, corruption was not registered in the Tahuantinsuyo empire. It began in the Colony when the conquerors introduced it into our society; and it has continued through the Republic period until our days. It has become a serious problem to our spiritual health, with a devastating impact in every field of our social reality, until it became a factor of destabilization of the state and ungovernability. It presents a , dysfunctional psicosocial profile of Peruvians; defines corruption as a serious spiritual disturbance, in which the individual suffers of a lack of conscience of the damage caused to his fellowmen. The characteristics, etiology, phenomenology and structure are discussed. Also, the different stages of corruption, its main manifestations, the dysfunctional institutionality in its aberrant forms. The informal institutionality, and hidden institutionality, the eschatological culture has been described, the more common expressions of the language of corruption and the image of corrupted leaders. As well as the syndrome of corrupted politics, its semiology and its consequences. Finally, some reflections of this disturbance and the appropiate alternatives with the purpose of contributing in the eradication of this from the heart of the society. ; Se elabora una sistematización fenomenológica de la corrupción; grave proceso mórbido espiritual, cuya génesis se remonta a los orígenes de la humanidad. Actualmente es una pandemia en la sociedad anética y deshumanizada, regida más por los antivalores. En elPerú, la corrupción no tuvo registro en la Época del Tahuantinsuyo. Esta se inició en la Época Colonial con la presencia de los conquistadores, quienes la introdujeron en la sociedad peruana; y continuó en la Época Republicana hasta la actualidad, habiéndose convertido en un grave problema de salud espiritual, con impacto devastador en todos los campos de la realidad social, hasta convertirse en un factor de desestabilización del Estado y de ingobernabilidad. Seguidamente se presenta el perfil psicosocial disfuncional del peruaño; se formula una definición de la corrupción como un grave trastorno espiritual, en el cual el individuo carece de conciencia del daño que ocasiona a sus semejantes. Se abordan sus características, etiología, fenomenología y estructura. También, se mencionan los diversos escenarios de la corrupción, sus principales manifestaciones, la institucionalidad disfuncional en sus formas aberrantes: La institucionalidad informal y la institucionalidad oculta. Luego se describe la cultura escatológica, el lenguaje de la corrupción con las expresiones más comunes del acervo popular y la imagenología de las cúpulas dirigentes. Así como el síndrome de la corruptela política, la semiología correspondiente y las secuelas de la corrupción. Finalmente, unas reflexiones sobre este trastorno y las alternativas pertinentes con el propósito de contribuir a erradicarlo del seno de la sociedad.

La crisis de salud pública causada por la pandemia de COVID-19, junto con la subsiguiente emergencia económica y la agitación social, ha empujado a los gobiernos a aumentar el gasto de manera sustancial y rápida. Debido a la naturaleza apremiante de la crisis, las normas y procedimientos de contratación pública se han relajado en muchos lugares para acelerar las transacciones. Sin embargo, esto también puede crear oportunidades para la corrupción. Utilizando información a nivel de contrato sobre el gasto público de la plataforma de compras electrónicas de Colombia, y una estrategia de identificación de diferencias en diferencias, encontramos que los municipios clasificados por un algoritmo de aprendizaje automático como tradicionalmente más propensos a la corrupción reaccionan al aumento del gasto liderado por una pandemia. utilizando una mayor proporción de contratos discrecionales no competitivos y aumentando su valor promedio. Esto es especialmente así en el caso de los contratos para adquirir bienes y servicios relacionados con la crisis. Nuestra evidencia sugiere que los grandes shocks negativos que requieren un gasto rápido y masivo pueden aumentar la corrupción, compensando al menos parcialmente los efectos atenuantes de este instrumento fiscal. ; The public health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the subsequent economic emergency and social turmoil, has pushed governments to substantially and swiftly increase spending. Because of the pressing nature of the crisis, public procurement rules and procedures have been relaxed in many places in order to expedite transactions. However, this may also create opportunities for corruption. Using contract-level information on public spending from Colombia's e-procurement platform, and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, we find that municipalities classified by a machine learning algorithm as traditionally more prone to corruption react to the pandemic-led spending surge by using a larger proportion of discretionary non-competitive contracts and increasing their average value. This is especially so in the case of contracts to procure crisis-related goods and services. Our evidence suggests that large negative shocks that require fast and massive spending may increase corruption, thus at least partially offsetting the mitigating effects of this fiscal instrument.

Two hundred years ago in Great Britain, the political system was dominated by electoral power exercised through rotten boroughs, a system characterized by institutionalized corruption - these electoral boroughs were owned by local elites, and voting was restricted to a handful of people. Whilst industrially she was the wonder of the world, the political system in Great Britain was restricted, corruption was the norm, and it seemed impossible to imagine that such an ancient system could be changed. By the time of the Reform Act of 1832 however, Britain had already been going through a process of constitutional change lasting for hundreds of years – it is only now, from our position of 20/20 hindsight, that we choose to interpret all of the events since the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 as if it were some seamless whole, an inevitable process that would lead to the position of superior moral governance that we appear to think we are in now ; Two hundred years ago in Great Britain, the political system was dominated by electoral power exercised through rotten boroughs, a system characterized by institutionalized corruption - these electoral boroughs were owned by local elites, and voting was restricted to a handful of people. Whilst industrially she was the wonder of the world, the political system in Great Britain was restricted, corruption was the norm, and it seemed impossible to imagine that such an ancient system could be changed. By the time of the Reform Act of 1832 however, Britain had already been going through a process of constitutional change lasting for hundreds of years – it is only now, from our position of 20/20 hindsight, that we choose to interpret all of the events since the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 as if it were some seamless whole, an inevitable process that would lead to the position of superior moral governance that we appear to think we are in now.

Seligson, M. (2003). Corrupción y democracia. Revista de Ciencias Sociales 14, 67-96. ; Uno de los problemas más serios que Ecuador ha enfrentado en los últimos años es el de la corrupción. Publicitados escándalos en el gobierno y en el sector bancario han ocupado titulares en noticias nacionales e internacionales. La corrupción en Ecuador no se ha limitado a estos sectores sino que se ha extendido a muchas áreas. Un reciente informe de la Contraloría General del Estado encontró que de 1.496 auditorías efectuadas en el año 200, en un 34% de los casos había indicios de responsabilidad penal y en 50% de los casos podía haber responsabilidad civil. La Comisión de Control Cívico de la Corrupción fue creada en 1997 para enfrentar este serio problema. Las encuestas de opinión pública no son buenos instrumentos para medir la magnitud y naturaleza de la corrupción en altas funciones puesto que tales actos son pocos en número y la mayor parte de lo que el público sabe acerca de ellos viene de los reportes de los medios de comunicación. Las encuestas, sin embargo, son mecanismos excelentes para medir la clase de corrupción que afecta a los ciudadanos en sus vidas diarias. De hecho, más adelante se demuestra que en comparación con los bien conocidos pero a menudo criticados Índices de Percepción de la Corrupción de Transparencia Internacional, las encuestas son la mejor forma de medir tal corrupción. El Proyecto de Opinión Pública Latinoamericana de la Universidad de Pittsburgh ha realizado varios estudios sobre corrupción, concentrándose en la magnitud de la corrupción experimentada por los ciudadanos, la percepción ciudadana de la honestidad o deshonestidad en varias instituciones y el impacto de la corrupción sobre la democracia. En este capítulo el interés se concentrará en Ecuador, incluyendo comparaciones con otros países cuando sea apropiado ; Corruption is one of the most serious problems Ecuador has faced in the last years. Public scandals in government and in the banking sector were placed in the headlines of national and international media. The corruption in Ecuador has also spread to other sectors of the society. A recently report found that there were 34% cases of penal responsibility and 50% cases of civil responsibility from 1.496 investigations made in 2001. The Civil Commission of Corruption Control was created in 1997 to face this serious problem. The public polls are not good instruments to measure the magnitude and nature of corruption in high functions because these acts are very few and what the public opinion know about them comes only from media reports. The public polls, however, are excellent instruments to measure the kind of corruption that affects citizens in their daily lives. In fact, as it will be proved further in this paper, public polls are the best way to measure corruption, even better than the well known and criticized International Transparency Corruption Perception Index. Pittsburgh University Latinoamerican Public Opinion Proyect has made several studies about corruption, focusing in the magnitude of corruption experienced by citizens, citizen perception of honesty / dishonesty in institutions and corruption's impact on democracy. In this work the main interest will be Ecuador, including different comparisons with other countries when necessary.

The lands of the country are at the disposal of the government and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Studies show that the people in the country, regardless of laws and regulations, use fraudulent methods to seize state-owned land with illegal possession and land use change cause harm and damage to their collective rights of individuals. There are conditions requires that the relevant agencies in order to prevent crimes against national resources and people's rights as well as justice and legal mechanisms to take advantage of this barrier to prevent crimes against them. The crimes against the country's natural resources and national judicial authorities must by resolution of criminal and non-criminal record in economic conditions that cause conflict or corruption in their national resources for their prevention. However, due to the lack of laws codified in the long line of process maturity and the failure to enforce strong sanctions on these crimes is always the problem of the economy is growing. This thesis examines the prevention of criminal and non criminal policy legislation in this regard, that the process of the process of the investigation of the factors Rgzar impact of the rate of rejection.

ABSTRACT Corruption crime has recently received more attention from the police. The management of investigating corruption cases is an interesting problem and it has had a big influence on both political and state life. The purpose of this study was to explain and identify the leadership of the team of investigators in the corruption cases investigating management. This research used a qualitative approach combined with a descriptive research method. The results of this study concluded that leadership is a process used by leaders to direct the organization and to provide examples of behavior for their subordinates in the investigation team.

Two hundred years ago in Great Britain, the political system was dominated by electoral power exercised through rotten boroughs, a system characterized by institutionalized corruption - these electoral boroughs were owned by local elites,and voting was restricted to a handful of people. Whilst industrially she was the wonder of the world, the political system in Great Britain was restricted, corruption was the norm, and it seemed impossible to imagine that such an ancient systemcould be changed. By the time of the Reform Act of 1832 however, Britain had already been going through a process of constitutional change lasting for hundredsof years – it is only now, from our position of 20/20 hindsight, that we choose to interpret all of the events since the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 as if it were some seamless whole, an inevitable process that would lead to the position of superior moral governance that we appear to think we are in now.

Two hundred years ago in Great Britain, the political system was dominated by electoral power exercised through rotten boroughs, a system characterized by institutionalized corruption - these electoral boroughs were owned by local elites, and voting was restricted to a handful of people. Whilst industrially she was the wonder of the world, the political system in Great Britain was restricted, corruption was the norm, and it seemed impossible to imagine that such an ancient system could be changed. By the time of the Reform Act of 1832 however, Britain had already been going through a process of constitutional change lasting for hundreds of years – it is only now, from our position of 20/20 hindsight, that we choose to interpret all of the events since the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 as if it were some seamless whole, an inevitable process that would lead to the position of superior moral governance that we appear to think we are in now.

in this article we come up with a multiple definition of corruption that accounts for three kinds of corruption –individual, institutional and systemic- likely to be found in any kind of political regimen. The corruption is not seen as an exceptional or abnormal behavior, is the «normal» result of the human proneness to cooperate. We saw how the systemic corruption was understood in the occidental political tradition as the main cause of regimen change; this causal relation is outstanding to explain the actual threats face by the modern democracies. We study in detail the impacts of corruption and dispute the widespread theory of the life cycle of corruption and its dependency on the economic development. We stress the need of different and better measures of corruption to account for systemic corruption and new institutions designed to reverse their generalization in modern democracies. ; En este artículo se propone una definición múltiple de corrupción que tome en consideración los tres tipos de corrupción -individual, institucional y sistémica- susceptibles de ser encontradas en cualquier régimen político. La corrupción no aparece como una conducta «excepcional» o «anormal» sino en directa continuidad con la propensión humana a la cooperación. Se evidencia como la corrupción sistémica ha sido conceptualizada como causa del cambio de régimen político en la tradición política occidental; esta relación causal es muy relevante para explicar las actuales amenazas a las democracias modernas. Se estudian en detalle los impactos de los diferentes tipos de corrupción y se procede al cuestionamiento de la teoría del ciclo de vida de la corrupción y su relación con desarrollo económico. Se señala la necesidad de diferentes y mejores mediciones de la corrupción, que den cuenta de la corrupción sistémica, y de nuevas instituciones diseñadas para revertir su generalización en las democracias modernas.

This article focuses on the study of corruption as one of the factors influencing and facilitating the socialization of Mexican political elites in the context of political relations based on close friendship, family relations, caciquism or bossism, and patronage. It also analyzes the phenomenon of corruption as a factor in the process of political recruitment, mobility of elites and provides a scheme in the exercise of political power in Mexico. ; El presente artículo se concentra en el estudio de la corrupción como uno de los elementos que influye y facilita la socialización de las élites políticas mexicanas en el marco de relaciones políticas fundadas en compadrazgo, amiguismo, padrinazgo, familiarismo y clientelismo. Asimismo, se analiza el fenómeno de la corrupción como un factor que interviene en el proceso de reclutamiento político, movilidad de las élites y proporciona un referente en el ejercicio del poder político en México.

The article presents two possible situations regarding the measurements that qualify Cuba as a less corrupt country than its peers in the region, highlighting how both are partially on the island: some dictatorships have less corruption by better controlling governance and, at the same time, the measurements often overlook indicators on Human Rights. ; El artículo presenta dos posibilidades ante las mediciones que califican a Cuba como un país menos corrupto que sus pares de la región, resaltando cómo ambas están parcialmente en la isla: algunas dictaduras tienen menos corrupción al controlar mejor la gobernabilidad y, a su vez, las mediciones suelen pasar por alto indicadores sobre Derechos Humanos.

Estudiamos cómo la divulgación de prácticas corruptas afecta a las empresas y sus empleados. Construimos medidas novedosas a nivel de empresa de participación en prácticas corruptas utilizando auditorías aleatorias y suspensiones de adquisiciones públicas en Brasil. En promedio, las empresas expuestas crecen después de las auditorías. Sin embargo, este resultado enmascara una gran heterogeneidad dependiendo del grado de participación de la empresa en el esquema de corrupción. Utilizando datos a nivel de contrato, préstamo y trabajador, mostramos que las empresas altamente corruptas sufren después de las iniciativas anticorrupción, mientras que otras empresas expuestas crecen al cambiar su estrategia de inversión cuando dejan de hacer negocios con el gobierno. ; We study how the disclosure of corrupt practices affects firms and their employees. We construct novel firm-level measures of involvement in corrupt practices using randomized audits and public procurement suspensions in Brazil. On average, exposed firms grow larger after the audits. However, this result masks large heterogeneity depending on the degree of firm involvement in the corruption scheme. Using contract-, loan-, and worker- level data, we show that highly corrupt firms suffer after anti-corruption initiatives, while other exposed firms grow by changing their investment strategy when shifting away from doing business with the government.

México ha firmado y ratificado las iniciativas más importantes de la lucha contra la corrupción en el mundo. En tanto miembro de la OCDE, G-20, y miembro activo de las Naciones Unidas, la Organización de los Estados Americanos, el Fondo Monetario Internacional, y la Banca Mundial, México ha acordado luchar contra la corrupción. A nivel nacional, cada presidente como parte de su programa Nacional ha incluido iniciativas anti-corrupción en sus agendas políticas. Sin embargo, los niveles de corrupción e impunidad en México continúan siendo altos, lo cual plantea las siguientes preguntas: ¿Por qué, los políticos nacionales prometen frenar la corrupción al principio de sus gobiernos? ¿Porqué los políticos nacionales que prometen reducir la corrupción al finalizar sus gobiernos se ven envueltos en asuntos de corrupción? ¿Están los políticos mexicanos comprometidos en luchar contra la corrupción? Este artículo pretende analizar estas cuestiones, y se embarca en una exploración de las campañas de lucha contra la corrupción como uno de los pilares del sistema político mexicano desde el gobierno de José López Portillo (1976-1982) hasta Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). ; Mexico has signed and ratified the most important anti-corruption initiatives in the world. As member of the OECD, G-20, and active member of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, Mexico has agreed to fight corruption. At national level, every Mexican president, as part of their National program, has included anticorruption initiatives in their political agendas. However, the levels of corruption and impunity in Mexico continue being high, which raises the following questions: Why do national politicians promise to curb corruption at the beginning of their governments? Why many Mexican Politicians who promise to reduce corruption at the end of their governments are involved in corruption affairs? Are Mexican politicians engaged in fighting corruption? This paper tries to analyze these questions, and it embarks on an exploration of the anti-corruption campaigns as a mainstay of the Mexican Political system since the government of José López Portillo (1976-1982) to Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). ; L'état mexicain a signé les initiatives les plus importantes dans la lutte contre la corruption mondiale. En tant que membre de la OCDE, le G-20, l'ONU, l'OEA, le Fonds Monetaire International et la Banque Mondiale, l'état mexicain a toujours été favorable à la lutte contre la corruption. Chaque président a intégré cette lutte à ses programmes politiques. Cependant, les niveaux de corruption et d'impunité restent hauts au Mexique, ce qui pose quelques questions : pourquoi, au début de leurs mandats, les hommes politiques promettent de réduire la corruption ? Pourquoi ces mêmes hommes corruption se voient si souvent impliqués dans des scandales de corruption ? S'agit-il d'un engagement réel ? Cet article vise à analyser ces problèmes en explorant les campagnes de lutte contre la corruption comme étant un principe fondamental du système politique mexicain dès le gouvernement de José López Portillo (1976-1982) jusqu'au mandat de Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018).

México ha firmado y ratificado las iniciativas más importantes de la lucha contra la corrupción en el mundo. En tanto miembro de la OCDE, G-20, y miembro activo de las Naciones Unidas, la Organización de los Estados Americanos, el Fondo Monetario Internacional, y la Banca Mundial, México ha acordado luchar contra la corrupción. A nivel nacional, cada presidente como parte de su programa Nacional ha incluido iniciativas anti-corrupción en sus agendas políticas. Sin embargo, los niveles de corrupción e impunidad en México continúan siendo altos, lo cual plantea las siguientes preguntas: ¿Por qué, los políticos nacionales prometen frenar la corrupción al principio de sus gobiernos? ¿Porqué los políticos nacionales que prometen reducir la corrupción al finalizar sus gobiernos se ven envueltos en asuntos de corrupción? ¿Están los políticos mexicanos comprometidos en luchar contra la corrupción? Este artículo pretende analizar estas cuestiones, y se embarca en una exploración de las campañas de lucha contra la corrupción como uno de los pilares del sistema político mexicano desde el gobierno de José López Portillo (1976-1982) hasta Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). ; Mexico has signed and ratified the most important anti-corruption initiatives in the world. As member of the OECD, G-20, and active member of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, Mexico has agreed to fight corruption. At national level, every Mexican president, as part of their National program, has included anticorruption initiatives in their political agendas. However, the levels of corruption and impunity in Mexico continue being high, which raises the following questions: Why do national politicians promise to curb corruption at the beginning of their governments? Why many Mexican Politicians who promise to reduce corruption at the end of their governments are involved in corruption affairs? Are Mexican politicians engaged in fighting corruption? This paper tries to analyze these ...

Este artículo analiza la democracia argentina en su trama de corrupción, con todo lo que tiene de común –y de distinto– con respecto a otros regímenes democráticos de Latinoamérica y Europa. Las respuestas nos llevan a pensar el presente desde viejas y nuevas categorías. En el trasfondo de esta discusión asoman ciertos nudos teóricos y prácticos con los que enfrentamos al problema democrático arraigado en la corrupción. Desde la instauración democrática en 1983 se pueden distinguir dos formas diferentes de corrupción en la cumbre del poder. El gobierno de Carlos Menem, de diez años de duración, y los gobiernos del matrimonio Kirchner, que permanecieron 12 años en el poder. De estas dos experiencias distintas pondremos el acento en ese entramado de corrupción institucional que llamamos Estado faccioso. ; This article is intended to analyse Argentinian democracy in its corruption, taking into account everything that it has in common– and all its differences– regarding other democratic regimes in Latin America and Europe. The answers lead us to think about the present from both old and new categories. Deep inside this discussion some theoretical and practicalissues can be spotted with which we have to face the democratic problem linked to corruption. Since the democratic establishment in 1983 two different forms of corruption can be distinguished in the highest positions of power. For instance the government of Carlos Menem, which was as long as ten years of duration and the governments of the Kirchner couple, who were on power for twelve years. From these two different experiences we will make emphasis on the institutional corruption that we call factious State.