Suchergebnisse

Denne artikkelens hovedargument er at det i overveldende grad er økonomien som har vært den drivende faktor bak Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen, inkludert da invasjonsforsvar ble forlatt som forsvarskonsept i 2001. De sikkerhetspolitiske endringene har først og fremst vært utnyttet retorisk for å begrunne nedbygging av forsvarsstrukturen, når den økonomiske nødvendigheten ikke lenger lot seg skjule. Kostnader forbundet med økt deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner har kun i svært beskjeden grad bidratt til reduksjonen i forsvarsstrukturen – kostnadene var her alt for lave til å kunne gi noen troverdig årsaksforklaring alene. Årsaken er i stedet at forsvarsbudsjettene etter den kalde krigen ikke kompenserte for den reelle kostnadsutviklingen i sektoren. Det resulterte i et kjøpekrafttap som gradvis tæret på Forsvaret.
Abstract in English:Economy – the Driving Force behind Norwegian Defence Transformation after the Cold WarThe main conclusion of this article is that to an overwhelming degree, economic factors have been the driving force behind the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces following the end of the Cold War, including the discontinuation of anti-invasion defence as a level of ambition in 2001. The changes in international affairs have been used rhetorically to justify the downsizing of the force structure, when the financial necessity could no longer be concealed or ignored. Additional costs caused by participation in international operations overseas have only to a very limited extent contributed to the sweeping reduction of the armed forces, since these costs were far too small to explain the cutbacks. The actual financial reason is that the defence budgets throughout the 1990s and 2000s did not compensate for the growth in real term costs in the defence sector, particularly those pertaining to the acquisition and operation of modern weapon platforms and systems. This resulted in a loss of purchasing power which gradually wore down the force structure.

Etter å ha gått seirende ut av «klimavalget 2021», står den rødgrønne regjeringen overfor oppgaven med å sikre Norges grønne omstilling. I den offentlige debatten står gjerne argumenter om global solidaritet og miljøhensyn fremst i begrunnelsene for nødvendigheten av en grønn omstilling, mens motstandere av et raskt skifte fokuserer på de negative økonomiske konsekvensene de mener et raskt skifte vil få for Norge. Denne artikkelen søker å nyansere dette bildet, og argumenterer for et bredere kost-nytte-perspektiv som også tar høyde for diplomatiske kostnader ved å fortsette med oljeleting, samt de økonomiske konsekvensene av en treg omstilling. Selv om man holder konsekvensene av klimaendringene helt utenfor vurderingen, argumenterer vi for at usikkerheten rundt fremtidig oljepris og omdømmerisikoen Norge løper ved å fortsette å basere økonomien på ikke-fornybare energikilder, burde være gode argumenter for å revurdere Norges oljepolitikk.
Abstract in English:Norway's Oil Dilemma After Glasgow: An Immoral Argument for a Rapid Green TransitionAfter winning the "2021 climate election", Norway's new government faces the task of ensuring Norway's green transition. In the public debate, global solidarity and environmental considerations are often at the forefront of arguments for the necessity of a rapid green transition, while opponents of a rapid transition tend to focus on the negative financial consequences they believe such a change will have for Norway. This article seeks to nuance this debate, and argues for a broader cost-benefit perspective that also takes into account diplomatic costs of continuing with oil exploration, as well as the economic consequences of a slow transition. We argue that, even if not considering other consequences of climate change, the uncertainty surrounding future oil prices and the reputational risk Norway runs by continuing basing the economy on non-renewable energy sources should be good enough arguments to reconsider Norway's oil policy.

I dette fokusnummeret ser vi tilbake på utviklingen på noen utvalgte områder innenfor internasjonal politikk (temaet) og Internasjonal Politikk (faget) i løpet av de 20 årene som har gått siden 11. september, 2001. Dette innledningsessayet presenterer de fire bidragene som belyser hvert sitt konkrete tema: bruken av narrativer i internasjonal politikk, faget Internasjonal Politikk, forholdet mellom USA og Russland, og folkeretten. Essayet tar et skritt tilbake og ser på helheten i arven fra 11. september og krigen mot terror som fulgte, med fokus på internasjonal politikk og internasjonal sikkerhet. I tillegg gir essayet et overblikk over de målbare kostnadene knyttet til krigen mot terror, status for krigen i dag, og status for fienden man har kjempet mot de siste 20 årene. Angrepene og responsen på dem gikk naturlig nok også på bekostning av noe, og visket ut andre, alternative handlingsforløp. Dette essayet beskriver noen av disse tapte mulighetene, og belyser også utfordring med å gjøre opp et «regnskap» 20 år etter 11. september-angrepene.
Abstract in English:International Politics and the Legacy of 9/11This special issue looks back at the developments within international relations since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 2001, with a particular focus on four specific themes: the use of strategic narratives in international relations, International Relations as academic discipline, US-Russian relations, and international law. This introductory essay present the four contributions to the issue, while also zooming out to present a panoramic view of the many legacies of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror that were to make an imprint on both international relations and international security in general. The essay presents the measurable costs associated with the War on Terror, its current status, as well as that for the enemy against which the two-decades long campaign has been fought. The 9/11 attacks and the forceful response resulted in other potential opportunities being passed up or neglected, making it difficult to chart the actual cost of the war. Finally, the essay examines the difficulty in arriving at an agreed-upon metric for assessing whether the war has been a success.

USA hadde ingen doktriner for opprørsbekjempelse (COIN) da operasjonene i Afghanistan og Irak startet. Mens krigene pågikk ble det, til tross for stor uenighet, innført en slik doktrine i 2007. Krigene førte også til både endringer i organisering og utrustning av amerikanske styrker, og til store endringer av planlagte investeringer av militært ustyr. Begge krigene endte i nederlag, og i tiden etter har USA på ny fokusert på stormaktsrivalisering. Men utgiftene til krigføringen i Afghanistan og Irak, og endringene i investeringsmønster, har svekket USAs evne til å konkurrere militært med Kina og Russland.
Abstract in EnglishAfghanistan, Iraq and the Development of US Military PowerThe United States had no doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq started in 2001 and 2003, respectively. In 2001 the US armed forces were designed for Great Power competition and conflict. During the course of the wars, substantial changes were made in the organization and equipment of the forces, and a COIN doctrine was introduced in 2007. In turn, large scale modernization of, and investments in, equipment suited for Great Power conflict were reduced in scale or cancelled. The cost of the wars and the changes in operational focus have blunted the US's ability to compete militarily with China and Russia.

A current ambition in welfare states across Europe and in the US is for political decision-making to be based on rigorous research (Bason 2010; Cartwright et al 2009; Mulgan 2009; Nilsson et al. 2008). Promoted as 'evidence-based policy-making', 'good analysis, or 'better governance' (Nilsson et.al. 2008) the aspiration finds its roots in the governance paradigm generally referred to as 'new public management' (Hartley 2005) and the central concern for developing a cost-effective and agile public sector (Rod 2010). . Sound as this ambition may seem, it has nevertheless been problematized from within the civil services and from the research community (e.g. Boden & Epstein 2006; Cartwright et al. 2009; Elliott & Popay 2000; House of Commons 2006; Nilsson et al. 2008; Whitty 2006; Rod 2010, Vohnsen 2011). Some warn that the term 'evidence-based' is used too lightly, and often in cases where 'evidence' has not fed into the policy processes but rather has been invoked after the fact to support already agreed upon policy (House of Commons 2006; Nilsson et al. 2008); others warn that politics and science are – if not incompatible – then at odds with one another (e.g. Boden & Epstein 2006; Whitty 2006). The article pin-points the friction points between science and policy-making and discuss why it is that evidence rarely feeds into policy-making and how the evidence-based paradigm effectively challenges the traditional craftsmanship of the civil service.

Hvordan Norge håndterer sin militæraktivisme og fredsaktivisme ble aktualisert i kampanjen for et sete i sikkerhetsrådet. Aktivisme forstås her som nasjonens villighet til å ta initiativ på tross av kostnader. I denne replikken svarer vi på Friis sin kommentar som trekker verdien av vårt bidrag i tvil, da han omtaler vår analyse av Norges unnlatelse av å fremme sin militæraktivisme til fordel for «mykere verdier», som «gammelt nytt.» I kampanjen fremmet Norge både militæraktivisme og fredsaktivisme, men i ulikt materiale og forum. Vi hevder dermed at dette som et minimum er gammelt nytt i nye klær. Ved bruk av nasjonsbranding-rammeverket finner vi at Norge ønsket å fremstille seg som en aktør som er villig til å bidra, samtidig med å understreke Norge som en ikke utpreget militæraktør.
Abstract in English"Old News" on Military Activism and Peace Activism in New ClothesHow Norway communicates its military activism and peace activism was actualized in the campaign for a seat on the Security Council. Activism is here understood as the nation's willingness to take initiatives despite the costs. In Friis' comment on our article, he questions the value of our contribution, as he categorises our analysis of Norway's public relations focus on "softer values" over its military activism, as "old news". However, Norway in the campaign emphasized both military activism and peace activism, but in different ways and and different forums. We thus claim that this – as a minimum – is interesting old news in new clothes. By using the nation branding framework in the context of a tightly contested political contest, we find that Norway sought to present itself as an actor that was willing to make significant contributions to security, whilst stressing simultaneously that Norway was a non-military actor.

Med fem ulike bidrag fra norske samfunnsforskere setter dette fokusnummeret søkelys på norsk klima- og utenrikspolitikk. Bidragene i fokusnummeret viser at det har skjedd en vesentlig sammenkobling av politikkområder som tidligere har vært atskilt, og at klimapolitikken spiller en stadig større rolle i andre politikkområder, slik som utenriks-, handels- og kraftpolitikken. I tillegg kommer det frem at det internasjonale klimaregimet, til tross for nær universell ratifisering av Parisavtalen, stadig fragmenteres. Norge har reagert på dette med å knytte seg stadig tettere til EU, både når det gjelder klima- og kraftpolitikk. Videre påpeker fokusnummeret at internasjonale omdømmekostnader og økende global etterspørsel etter fornybar energi øker presset på en rask grønn omstilling, også innenlands. I sum fremstår Norges ambisjon om å være en global klimaforkjemper som stadig mer uforenelig med rollen som storskala produsent av olje og gass.
Abstract in English:Norwegian Climate and Foreign Policy: Is the Ambition to Be a Global Climate Leader Compatible with Norway's Role as an Oil Producer?The five contributions in this special issue all focus on various aspects of Norwegian climate and foreign policy. The special issue highlights the interconnectedness of policy areas that previously have been separate in showing how climate policy plays an increasing role in other policy domains, such as foreign, trade and energy politics. Even if the Paris Agreement enjoys near universal ratification, the international climate regime is becoming increasingly fragmented. As a result, Norwegian climate policy is becoming increasingly integrated with the EU in both climate and energy regulation. Moreover, the special issue highlights how international reputational costs and increasing future demand for renewable energy are putting additional pressure on a rapid green transition, also domestically. Taken together, Norway's ambition to be a global climate leader appears more and more incompatible with its role as a large producer of oil and gas.

Bilateralt diplomati er ikke en skandinavisk spidskompetence, men det har fået stigende betydning i dagens verden. Et antal cases analyseres her, i hvilke de skandinaviske lande er blevet bilateralt 'disciplineret' af stormagter som Rusland, Kina, Indien eller USA. Sammenlignet med de første ca. 15 år efter Den Kolde Krig med amerikansk hegemoni og EU's normative magt har de nordiske lande måttet erfare en indsnævring af deres handlefrihed. Det er ikke længere muligt, uden betydelige omkostninger, at kritisere stormagter baseret på universelle værdier. Generelt er det selvsagt vigtigt for beslutningstagere at respektere statens eksterne handlefrihed. Men på den anden side må de ikke være overforsigtige og undlade at prøve grænser af, bl.a. af hensyn til den hjemlige arena. 'Bastioner' må etableres og forsvares med troværdighed. Handlefrihedens grænser er svære at identificere, men prøveballoner, paralleladfærd med beslægtede lande eller måske brug af 'historiens lære' kan være gangbare metoder.
Abstract in English:Limits to Action Space: Scandinavians in Bbilateral DiplomacyBilateral diplomacy is not a Scandinavian favourite sport, but it has become increasingly important in today's world. A number of cases are analysed, in which Scandinavian countries have been "disciplined" bilaterally by great powers (Russia, China, India and the US). Compared to the first 15 years, roughly, after the Cold War, with American unipolarity and EU normative power, the Scandinavians have seen a narrowing of their freedom of manoeuvre (action space). It is no longer possible, without significant costs, to criticise great powers based on universal values. In general, it is crucial for decision-makers not to overstep their state's freedom of manoeuvre. But on the other hand, they should not be docile and desist from occasionally challenging its limits, also considering their domestic arena. "Bastions" should be credibly construed and defended. The limits of action space are difficult to discern, but trial balloons, parallel action with related countries, or "lessons of the past" could be helpful.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.