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"Counterbalancing and Coups d'État" published on by Oxford University Press.

Although coups remain a pressing concern for rulers across the globe, the mechanisms through which common coup-prevention strategies operate have not been well theorized or rigorously tested. This article analyzes how "counterbalancing" the military with other security forces prevents coups. Using new cross-national time-series data on state security forces along with evidence from sixteen case studies, the article demonstrates that counterbalancing reduces the likelihood that coup attempts will succeed and that it does so primarily by creating incentives for some soldiers to resist the coup, rather than by creating barriers to coordination between forces. However, counterbalancing is not associated with fewer coup attempts. In fact, the creation of a new security force increases the odds of a coup attempt in the following year. These findings highlight potential costs associated with counterbalancing and explain why it is not more widespread.

Previous studies identified several domestic factors that may influence a country's level of structural coup-proofing, i.e., counterbalancing strategies that shall prevent internal groups from seizing power via acoup d'état. We suggest that a country's level of counterbalancing is also affected by such policies in what we term countries' "peer groups." When deciding the appropriate level of counterbalancing, rulers may be affected by external information flows from a "peer group" with similar structural coup-risk characteristics (institutions) or a similar coup-risk experience (coup history). Using maximum likelihood spatial lag models and data in 1976–2005, we find that leaders learn from and emulate counterbalancing in other states, but rather only through an "experiential peer group."

Abstract
This article touches upon the problem of inequalities in academia resulting from neoliberal capitalism and existing publishing policy and discusses its possible consequences. Building on the author's own experiences as a researcher working on linguistic minorities and as an academic administrator, it explores how power relations work in parts of the scientific world situated on the peripheries of the Western "centre" – via the neoliberal economy, access to funding and international recognition. Publishing in high-status, English-language journals requires "non-centre" academics to adopt Western conventions of publishing, including in the style of reasoning, the structure of the text, and preferring references from the Anglo-American academic tradition. Only by complying can such researchers secure a place in academia and further their careers. However difficult it may be, the author argues, the hegemony of Western-model knowledge construction may only be questioned from inside, by the "centre" academics.

Includes supplemental material for the online appendix ; How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes' counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.

Introduction: Preventing Coups d'état -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'état Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival.

Economic individualism and market-based values dominate today's policymaking and public management circlesùoften at the expense of the common good. In his new book, Barry Bozeman demonstrates the continuing need for public interest theory in government. Public Values and Public Interest offers a direct theoretical challenge to the utility of economic individualism, the prevailing political theory in the western world. The book's arguments are steeped in a practical and practicable theory that advances public interest as a viable and important measure in any analysis of policy or public adminis