Suchergebnisse

According to the legislation of Finland, the crimes connected with terrorism, are understood as crimes with intention to make the act of terrorism doing serious harm to the state or the international organization.

The terrorist threat has increased in importance over the last decade and Western governments have implemented a multitude of measures to address it. Their numbers and the significant financial cost they involve have, however, not been matched with an adequate evaluation of effectiveness. We can therefore only make limited statements on whether or not counterterrorism policy has been effective. Three conclusions with policy implications can nevertheless be drawn from our analysis: the dependency on the local context; the ineffectiveness of measures entailing the use of force; and the need for more evaluation research on protective measures.

The European migration crisis beginning in 2014 served as a turning point in Hungarian politics where immigration issues effectively altered the nation's security environment. The migratory routes as a pathway for illegal border crossings positioned Hungary on the frontline as a transit country for migrants seeking asylum in Western Europe. A critical analysis of Orbán's rhetoric and Hungary's behavior in the realm of immigration and counterterrorism (CT) policy during and after the immigration crisis is relevant in understanding the state's security environment. Anti-immigrant sentiments reflected in the population and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's rhetoric aims to tie refugee migration to terrorist acitvity. Migrants were targeted as a risk to the traditional European identity and survival of the state with a specific emphasis on Muslim migration from the Middle East and North Africa. This study seeks to understand Hungary's regional and global security role and how CT activity is used by the government to legitimize government actions, particularly on immigration via securitization theory from the Copenhagen School.Hungary has heightened its role on the international stage through transnational CT cooperation and capitalized on anti-immigrant sentiments through speech acts to further exercise its influence in border control and the international fight against global terrorism.By examining a total of 36 speeches presented by Orbán from 2015 to 2020, the study is able to examine how immigration issues were securitized to develop pathways for extraordinary actions and authoritarian reforms performed by securitizing actors.

It is widely thought that the international community, taken as a whole, is required to take action to prevent terrorism. Yet, what each state is required to do in this project is unclear and contested. This article examines a number of bases on which we might assign responsibilities to conduct counterterrorist operations to states. I argue that the ways in which other sorts of responsibilities have been assigned to states by political philosophers will face significant limitations when used to assign the necessary costs of preventing terrorism. I go on to suggest that appealing to the principle of fairness—which assigns obligations on the basis of benefits received from cooperative endeavours—may be used to make up the shortfall, despite this principle having received relatively little attention in existing normative accounts of states' responsibilities.

About 8 years ago and during the revolution in Tunisia, I witnessed drastic change in the society mainly in relation to religion in public sphere from radicalism to counterradicalism. So, I've always wanted to understand and research counterterrorism strategies of the Tunisian government and its allies. Many actors were involved in the process of de-radicalization in Tunisia; western countries and international civil society, and this allowed the birth of many local civil societies and non-governmental organizations. As this activism is new in Tunisia, it needed to be investigated carefully in relation to fighting terrorism. Albeit there were numerous studies on the topic, there was no single paper that researched de-radicalization process in Tunisia theoretically. For that reason, this paper applied de-radicalization theory to understand and evaluate its impact in Tunisia. Through historical research method, this document attempted to recapture and collect events in the past in order to give significance to history. ; M-IR

After US Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and Special Operations Forces [SOF] counterterrorism [CT] operations routed al Qaeda and the Taliban regime, planning for the next phase was underway. It was determined that security and stability operations or counterinsurgency [COIN] operations would be necessary to stabilize the country. Soon after transitioning from CT to COIN operations, COIN operations stalled. Several factors have played a part in the unsuccessful attempts at COIN. First, the Global War on Terror [GWOT] campaign was designed to address a narrow set of goals including destroying, dismantling, and disrupting al Qaeda and its affiliates. Second, US leaders have consistently undermanned the effort with a light military footprint. Next, the various forces continuing CT operations have remained uncoordinated from Joint Forces pursuing the COIN operation. Presently, US financial and political support for the conflict is rapidly declining. With US leaders already beginning troop withdrawals, it is imperative that the US adjust its strategy. Narrowing the focus back to a CT campaign will maximize the available resources and cut back on associated costs. Finally, a CT strategy will keep terror networks off balance, buying time to allow US forces to build Afghan security forces necessary for long-term stability.

The European Union security and counter-terrorism strategy adopted after 11 September 2001 has not been effective, instead resulted in the increase of Islamist terrorist incidents. Europe has been hit by a wave of terrorist attacks, which demonstrates the limits of the Security and Defence Policy. The EU short-term strategy, tending only to hit terrorist organisations, has not produced the expected effects: attacks in Europe, rather than decreasing, have increased. Little or nothing has been done to develop a successful preventive strategy. After the early 2000s, there is hardly registered Islamic attack within the EU, due to the change in the Al-Qaeda strategy. The recrudescence recorded after 2014 coincides with the rise of ISIS.

The European Union security and counter-terrorism strategy adopted after 11 September 2001 has not been effective, instead resulted in the increase of Islamist terrorist incidents. Europe has been hit by a wave of terrorist attacks, which demonstrates the limits of the Security and Defence Policy. The EU short-term strategy, tending only to hit terrorist organisations, has not produced the expected effects: attacks in Europe, rather than decreasing, have increased. Little or nothing has been done to develop a successful preventive strategy. After the early 2000s, there is hardly registered Islamic attack within the EU, due to the change in the Al-Qaeda strategy. The recrudescence recorded after 2014 coincides with the rise of ISIS. The EU shortsighted strategy adopted so far to combat Islamic terrorism has proved ineffective. Attacks within the EU, rather than decreasing, have increased. The high number of terrorist incidents and casualties within the EU demonstrates that terrorism can not be stopped only with criminal provisions, freezing of assets and financial resources, blocking immigration and strengthening of border controls. Only a long-term cultural strategy, adequately funded, can be effective to counter terrorism. ; Poster presented at Encontro Ciência 2017 (National Cience Summit 2017), the Science and Technology Summit in Portugal, held at Lisbon Congress Centre, Lisboa, Portugal, 3-5 July 2017 Seminal research has been presented at the international conference Europe as a Global Actor (EGA) 2016 in Lisbon on 24 May 2016. See: "A Critical Assessment of the European Cultural Approach to Counter Terrorism" (DOI:10.5281/zenodo.810533)

This Research paper tries to bring to the causes of the current terrorist threats in Jordan in the chaotic region and the methods of combating terrorism. It focuses mainly on the Jordanian policy and strategy for combating terrorism including legal, diplomatic, and security efforts. The impact of the Syrian crisis on this poor resources country causing undeniable political, economic, social, and security threats. The article shows the efforts of Jordan to fight terrorism through national and international strategy by joining the International Alliance against ISIS. Jordan holds a significant role in this battle on multi-dimensions.

This paper is an effort to critically evaluate Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy, based on both military and non-military means. The paper argues that the counterterrorism strategy of Pakistan has proved ineffective and counter-productive to combat the homegrown threat of terrorism, unleashed by militant sectarian groups, following the Takfiri ideology. Although Pakistan's Military claims that the latest on-going security operations, Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan and Khyber-II in Khyber Agency, have succeeded in clearing most of the area, however, the matter of fact is that the security operations have not considerably damaged the ability of terrorists, particularly the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to plan and execute terrorist attacks. The terrorists' network, their strength and structure have until now remained intact. The key to longterm prevention of terrorism, beyond security operations for clearing any area of the militants, is to discontinue the supply chain of terrorists. This requires the creation of a new counter-extremism religious narrative, which will help re-formulate a concrete and effective counter-terrorism strategy of Pakistan to ensure domestic peace and security.

The departure of substantial numbers of 'foreign fighters' and the occurrence of terrorist attacks on European soil have prompted renewed interest in citizenship deprivation as a policy measure. This article aims to contribute to the debate on its utility as a counterterrorism measure by examining recent developments in citizenship deprivation legislation and its use in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK; discussing the wide array of possible scenarios that may follow after an individual is deprived of citizenship; and analysing to what extent the various outcomes are instrumental in countering terrorism. It concludes that most of the outcomes are problematic from a human rights perspective, or counterproductive in the fight against terrorism as they may cause further marginalisation and radicalisation and can play into the hands of terrorist groups, may cause people to disappear from the radar, and may undermine crucial international cooperation.

In the following research, I investigate whether hard offensive counterterrorism results in the failure or success of a counterterrorism strategy. In the second chapter, the academic literature of counterterrorism strategies is examined. Next, a hypothesis is put forth that if a hard offensive counterterrorism strategy is utilized, indicators such as high troop levels, more civilian casualties, more negative public opinion, and an increased rate of terrorism, will point to a failed counterterrorism strategy. Then, I put forth a methodology to test the hypothesis while introducing troop level databases, various public opinion polling sources, and terrorist attack databases to investigate the given variables. In the third chapter, a case study of the Iraq War is utilized, in which the initial invasion from 2003-2006 and the Surge/Withdrawal eras from 2007-2011 are examined. Both time periods are compared to see if hard offensive counterterrorism used in 2003-2006 resulted in a less effective counterterrorism campaign than the softer counterinsurgency strategies from 2007-2011. Data from the Brookings Iraq Index, Iraq Body Count, and Global Terrorism Database are then analyzed to investigate the variables of casualties, public opinion, and rate of terrorism during each era in Iraq. In the fourth chapter, the war in Afghanistan is presented as a case study. I then evaluate whether hard offensive counterterrorism used from 2001-2008 resulted in less terrorism than the counterinsurgency strategies of Surge and withdrawal used from 2009-2016. Data from the Congressional Research Service, UNAMA, Physicians for Social Responsibility, the BBC, the Asia Foundation, and the Global Terrorism Database are then utilized to assess each variable. Finally, I present my findings and conclude that evaluating a strategy primarily using hard offensive counterterrorism strategies is rather complex and then present ideas for future research in counterterrorism strategy.

We present a model of transnational terrorism where two countries, home and foreign, face a terrorist threat based in the foreign country. The home country chooses how much to invest in defending itself or in reducing terrorist resources either indirectly by subsidising the foreign country or by directly by intervening itself. We use backward induction to solve a multiple stage game where the home country first commits to its policy decisions, then the foreign country chooses the effort it expends on reducing terrorist capability and finally, the terrorists decide their effort in attacking in the home or foreign country. In a numerical solution of the calibrated model, direct intervention only arises in equilibrium if foreign and home efforts are not close substitutes in the technology used to reduce the resources of the terrorist group. Greater relative military efficiency in the home country makes intervention more likely.

Since 9/11, counterterrorism policies have been one of the crucial policy issues facing the United States. After the attacks on the United States, counterterrorism in this country transformed. Fifteen years later, counterterrorism is typically organized as a one-size fits all approach. This approach generalizes all terrorist threats, trying to target terrorism as a whole. This thesis explains how this is an improper approach to counterterrorism. Instead, policies should be case-specific and created in regards to the specific characteristics embodied by each terrorist organization. These characteristics include history and ideology, organizational and leadership structure, finances, and tactics and targets. These characteristics have been proven to comprise the composition of a one-of-a-kind terrorist organization. Each group expresses these characteristics differently, even if they share the same geographical location or religious background. Through research utilizing academic journal articles, current events, government publications, and published books, it is discovered how the unique characteristics displayed by Islamic Fundamentalist groups have counterterrorism policy implications. In order to portray this, this thesis analyzed characteristics of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban. Through these case-studies, it was shown how distinct these groups are from one another and how these differences should be accounted for in counterterrorism policies. Once these differences are implemented into individualist counterterrorism policies, the United States can provide effective policies that target specific aspects of each terrorist organization instead of trying to combat terrorism as a whole. ; 2016-12-01 ; B.A. ; College of Sciences, Political Science ; Bachelors ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

Published online: 03 January 2022 ; This article examines how repression is being wielded by the Russian Federation in Crimea against Muslim Tatar communities under the guise of countering terrorism and violent extremism, and how non-violent resistance and grassroots resilience is being fostered as a means of countering securitisation. The case demonstrates how language developed within a Western security context are co-opted by authoritarian actors, how Islamic activist groups engage in activities that can be framed as 'resilience-building' through the language of human rights, freedom of press and democracy, and the issues raised by applying the term 'resilience' within a counterterrorism context—both in illiberal and liberal settings. The article finds that techniques comparable to concepts of resilience-building are being conducted in an illiberal setting by communities in response to, and as a counter against highly repressive articulations of counterterrorism. It also suggests that the term 'resilience' is problematic in this context, failing to adequately account for—and often actively obscuring—organisational activism of communities and their interaction with the political context. This offers an understanding of community-led responses against counterterrorism and counter-extremism as a tool of repression as well as examining the credibility of terms such as 'resilience' within CVE in Crimea and elsewhere.