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Am 26. Juli 2023 setzten Angehörige der nigrischen Präsidialgarde Präsident Mohamed Bazoum fest und verkündeten seine Absetzung. Gleichzeitig wurden die Landesgrenzen geschlossen, die Arbeit der staatlichen Institutionen ausgesetzt, eine Ausgangssperre verhängt und die Schaffung einer Militärjunta verkündet. Es war bereits der fünfte Militärputsch in dem Staat seit der Unabhängigkeit von der Kolonialmacht Frankreich im Jahr 1960. Niger war eines der letzten Länder der Sahelzone, das noch über eine demokratisch gewählte Regierung verfügte. Seit 2021 wurden in Staaten der Region wie in Guinea oder im Sudan die Zivilregierungen durch das Militär entmachtet. Die Zahl der Putsche ist so hoch, dass die Region inzwischen auch als "coup belt" bezeichnet wird. Ist die Demokratieschutzarchitektur der Afrikanischen Union (AU) für den Umgang mit solchen Ereignissen nicht ausreichend?

On May 27th the Republic of Turkey faced her first full-fledged Military takeover (Coup). As it is said, "A Coup is never just a Coup". This review article provides a summary of the atmosphere before and after the coup of 1960 and a critical analysis of the democratic promises it brought. This Paper analyzes different terms used to identify the event such as revolution, insurrection, intervention, and coup. It also discusses the tradition of regular military intervention in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Since the transition to democracy and the multiparty system was not natural this paper also indicates the absence of democratic culture in Turkish history. After 27th May, Turkey was led to the new constitutional structure of 1961. As it is said, the 1924 Constitution that established the first Republic of Turkey was wiped out with a coup and the 1961 Constitution and the Second Republic was established (Dursun, 2005:187). Since then until recent times the military could not separate itself from the political life of Turkey. The following discussions enclose; the origin of the 1960 Coup, the Aftermath, the Conspiracies, the Civilian Military relationship, Traditional and Historical views, Kemalist Principles, Government citizen dialogs, and Socio-economic backwardness. This critical analysis went through different interesting and easily misunderstood concepts (such as Revolt, Revolution, Military takeover, etc.).

The article discusses the relationship between the concepts of "legal security" and "coup d'état" on the basis of the evolution of these concepts over the centuries. The analysis of the terms which the author is interested in, adopted as the subject of this study, leads to the conclusion that, in particular, the concept of "coup d'état" is often mistakenly refereed to as a "revolution" or a "putsch". A political upheaval, one of the methods of which is a coup d' état, should be regarded, in the light of the research carried out, as deviating from the concept and character of a social up-heaval. In the case of a political upheaval, the legal security of the individual is usu-ally protected as before, and a possible lack of such security should only be treated as a result of the natural tendency of the individual to protect his or her legal status within a state organisation. It is only with changes of social (class) character, which may be an indirect consequence of a political upheaval, that the addresses of legal norms may have justified concerns about their legal safety. ; The article discusses the relationship between the concepts of "legal security" and "coup d'état" on the basis of the evolution of these concepts over the centuries. The analysis of the terms which the author is interested in, adopted as the subject of this study, leads to the conclusion that, in particular, the concept of "coup d'état" is often mistakenly refereed to as a "revolution" or a "putsch". A political upheaval, one of the methods of which is a coup d' état, should be regarded, in the light of the research carried out, as deviating from the concept and character of a social up-heaval. In the case of a political upheaval, the legal security of the individual is usu-ally protected as before, and a possible lack of such security should only be treated as a result of the natural tendency of the individual to protect his or her legal status within a state organisation. It is only with changes of social (class) character, which may be an indirect consequence of a political upheaval, that the addresses of legal norms may have justified concerns about their legal safety.

Intensive conversations with members of political parties, closely reading the press, talks with other foreign diplomats, analytical evaluations of many individual events and their contextualization in the wider picture of the situation in Greece allowed Yugoslav diplomats to accurately assess the situation in the country, identify the potential of the military junta and the centers of putschist support in Greece and abroad, follow their showdown with left-wing and democratic options, recognize the ambitions of the putschist regime and the nature of their dictatorship, have insight into the situation of the opposition, make out te contours of a possible state-political system, monitor relations with neighboring countries, closely follow the regime's position to the Macedonian minority, follow the moves of the monarch, assess the permanence of compromises, observe the pressure of the international public and the controversial behavior of the Great Powers, and offer prognoses of the course of events in the near future.Yugoslav diplomats collected some of the relevant information on the situation in Greece in other capitals (London, Ankara, Nicosia, Paris…). This information contributed to a wider evaluation of the existing circumstances and a sharper picture of the developments in Greece. The general opinion was that the Yugoslav diplomats were much better informed and more agile than their counterparts from other Eastern European counties, who were seen as "slow", "unsure", '"onfused", "contradictory" and so on. In the days and months following the coup, the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens was a center where many came to be informed, consult with their peers, verify their assessments and hear Belgrade's views. Besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, collected information was sent to Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Koča Popović, Mijalko Todorović, Marko Nikezić, Ivan Gošnjak, Petar Stambolić and Ivan Mišković.

Intensive conversations with members of political parties, closely reading the press, talks with other foreign diplomats, analytical evaluations of many individual events and their contextualization in the wider picture of the situation in Greece allowed Yugoslav diplomats to accurately assess the situation in the country, identify the potential of the military junta and the centers of putschist support in Greece and abroad, follow their showdown with left-wing and democratic options, recognize the ambitions of the putschist regime and the nature of their dictatorship, have insight into the situation of the opposition, make out te contours of a possible state-political system, monitor relations with neighboring countries, closely follow the regime's position to the Macedonian minority, follow the moves of the monarch, assess the permanence of compromises, observe the pressure of the international public and the controversial behavior of the Great Powers, and offer prognoses of the course of events in the near future.Yugoslav diplomats collected some of the relevant information on the situation in Greece in other capitals (London, Ankara, Nicosia, Paris…). This information contributed to a wider evaluation of the existing circumstances and a sharper picture of the developments in Greece. The general opinion was that the Yugoslav diplomats were much better informed and more agile than their counterparts from other Eastern European counties, who were seen as "slow", "unsure", '"onfused", "contradictory" and so on. In the days and months following the coup, the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Athens was a center where many came to be informed, consult with their peers, verify their assessments and hear Belgrade's views. Besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, collected information was sent to Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Koča Popović, Mijalko Todorović, Marko Nikezić, Ivan Gošnjak, Petar Stambolić and Ivan Mišković.

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d'état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d'état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d'état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d'état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.

ABSTRACTWilliam GirardEnacting Pentecostalism: Spirit-Filled Development and the Honduran Coup d'ÉtatThis dissertation explores how Pentecostal Christians in the small town of Copán Ruinas, Honduras strive to remake both individual subjectivities and the national body as part of a drive towards development and modernization. In the process, these Spirit-filled Christians, which today make up as much as 35% of the Honduran population, fuse what are conventionally regarded as distinct religious and secular formations. The resulting politically charged practices and imaginaries draw on, but also significantly transform, long-standing and interwoven regional discourses of nationalism, progress, and race/ethnicity. Those engaged in this Pentecostal project also work to draw to their pastors the trust that is more commonly given to the state or translocal non-governmental organizations to develop the nation. The dissertation argues that this Pentecostal program is part of a far broader project of neoliberal governance, and that it is brought into being through the two types of power Foucault described as constitutive of modern life: discipline and security.The hybrid and explicitly political nature of this Pentecostal project came into sharp focus after the June 28th 2009 Honduran coup, the first successful coup in Latin America since the end of the Cold War. In response to the coup, these Christians engaged in their own form of geopolitics, which aimed at defeating the deposed Leftist president, Manuel Zelaya, and the malicious demons they understood to be his allies. These efforts included praying to God to purify Honduras, imploring angels to defend the country's borders, carrying out "spiritual warfare," and currying favor with Israel, which they envision to be God's most beloved country.Investigating this secular/religious project required that I not explore Pentecostalism as a discrete entity or imagine it as a preestablished whole, but rather that I trace how a range of modalities (forms of knowledge production, practices, sensibilities, technologies, texts, objects, and discourses) come together within diverse "enactments" of Pentecostalism. This perspective allowed me to identify the ways in which Pentecostals transform ostensibly secular projects of governance as they bring together previously disparate entities.

This article reviews the first twelve months of the civil disobedience movement in Myanmar following the 1 February 2021 coup d'état and its many dynamics and manifestations. Myanmar's 'Spring Revolution' generated a shared sense of national unity—overcoming gender, ethnic, religious and class boundaries, but raising questions about the long-term sustainability of nonviolent civil resistance in a state where the military has for decades wielded political and economic power. Since the coup, Myanmar has been in turmoil, paralysed by instability which escalated after the military's deadly crackdown on pro-democracy activists. The article charts the growth of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), its multiple methods of strategic resistance and non-cooperation, and the radicalisation of the resistance agenda. It analyses the formation of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the creation of the interim National Unity Government (NUG), the founding of the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the inauguration of the People's Defence Force (PDF). It examines the implications for Myanmar when the crisis reached a more complex phase after the military's open use of force and terror on the broader civilian population prompted the NUG to declare war on the junta, and to urge ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and newly formed anti-junta civilian militias (PDF) to attack the State Administration Council (SAC) as a terrorist organisation. The NUG now opposes the military junta by strategic and peaceful non-cooperation, armed resistance, and international diplomacy. This paper considers whether the predominantly nonviolent civil resistance movement's struggle for federal democracy and inclusive governance is laying the foundations for eventual transition to a fully democratic future or whether the cycles of violence will continue as the military continues to control power by using intimidation and fear. It notes that the coup has destroyed the economy and expanded Myanmar's human rights and ...

Cet article, au carrefour entre communication et histoire, soutient que le coup d'État déclenché au Brésil le 31 mars 1964 doit être caractérisé empiriquement et conceptuellement comme médiatico-civil-militaire. En 2014, 50 ans après ce coup d'État qui a renversé le président João Goulart, le Brésil cherche encore à comprendre son passé, il prépare des élections présidentielles et organise une coupe du monde de football, sport qui a servi le régime militaire en 1970. ; From a point of intersection between communication and history, this article argues that the Brazilian coup on 31 March 1964 should be characterised empirically as driven by civilians and the military at once. In 2014, 50 years after the coup that brought down President João Goulart, Brazil is still trying to come to terms with its past as it prepares to hold presidential elections and to organise football's next World Cup, a sport that served the military regime well in 1970.

Askerî darbe, askerlik mesleğince benimsen emir-komuta zinciri zihniyetine tabi, eyleminde ve söyleminde şiddet barındıran, toplumsal ve siyasal alana müdahaledir. Bu müdahale toplumların demokratikleşme yolundaki adımlarını geriletir ve durdurur. Askerî darbelerin yaşandığı ülkelerde siyaset ve yönetim, darbe ihtimali ile her zaman kıskaç altındadır. Bu ihtimal bireylerin hafızalarının bir köşesinde saklanır. Darbenin etkisi, sadece hafızalarda değil, toplumsal alanı düzenleyen en önemli metinlerde, anayasalarda da saklıdır. Türkiye'de anayasaların oluşturulması, darbeler sonucunda olmuştur. Bu anayasalar, darbe mimarı askerî yenin kendi özerklik alanını toplum karşısında güçlendiren düzenlemelerini de bol miktarda içermektedir. Eğitim, sağlık, barınma, personel rejimi gibi pek çok açıdan farklı uygulamalara tabi olan askerî kesimin yaptığı ve yaptırdığı darbe ürünü anayasalar ayrıca askere özgü yargı kurumlarını da oluşturmuştur. Böylelikle devletin temeli olan yasama, yürütme ve yargı kuvvetlerinden diğerlerini denetleyebilme niteliğini haiz yargı kuvvetini kendisi için özerkleştirmiştir. Askerî bürokrasi, askerî yargı mevzuat ve kurumlarını, 1960 ve 1980 darbeler sonrası Anayasaları ile sivil yargı alanının karşısında üretmiştir. Bu çalışmada Türkiye'de 1960 darbesi, 1971 muhtırası, 1980 darbesi ve 2016 darbe girişimi sonrasında askerî yargı kurumlarının nasıl şekillendiği açıklanmıştır. Askerî n özellikle yargı alanında etkinliğini kuvvetlendirecek kurumlar oluşturarak, sivil bürokrasi aleyhine özerklik alanını genişlettiği gözlenmiştir. ; The military coup, subject to the mentality of the chain of command embraced by military profession, thus is violent in its act and the rhetoric, is an intervention to social and political arena. This intervention halts and reverses the process of democratization of societies. In the countries where military coups were experienced once, politics and government are under claws of possible coup d'etat. This possibility stored in the memories of the individuals: The effects ...

In this powerful and concentrated exam­ ination of army interventions in African politics, Ruth First produces a general theory of power for independent states which goes a long way towards explain­ ing why they are so vulnerable to military coups. She gives detailed accounts of the coups in Nigeria,the Sudan and Ghana, and includes material on the role of the army in Algeria and Egypt,showing the kinds of conflict which lead to the situation where the political machinery is short-circuited and guns do the leading. She makes use of interviews, conveying a vivid idea of what a coup means to those involved in it. 'I count myself an African', writes Ruth First,'and there is no cause I hold dearer.' And though she makes harsh judgement on Africa's independent leaderships. her purpose is not to confirm irrational European prejudice but to contribute to the continent's ultimate liberation.

This SADF Focus outlines the causal developments and offers an assessment of Sri Lanka's current constitutional and political crisis. With the unprecedented return of Mr Mahinda Rajapaksa, domestic and international observers are unsure about the future of Sri Lanka's national reconciliation, as well as the relationship between the Buddhist Sinhalese majority and the religious minorities. For some, Mr Rajapaksa brings back former patterns of authoritarianism and corruption in Sri Lankan politics, but for others, he is seen as the country's protector of the Sinhalese Buddhist heritage. The authors argue that the current debate of the legitimacy of ousting Prime Minister (PM) Ranil Wickramasinghe goes beyond the interpretation of the constitution. In fact, the legitimacy question points to the core problem of the power struggle between the institutions of the PM and the President. It will be concluded that Mr Rajapaksa's return to office could mean a hindrance for Sri Lanka's peace efforts. Recent violence and mass protests have given a grim projection of Sri Lanka's peace reconciliation trajectory.