Suchergebnisse

The action of the 30 September Movement on 1 October 1965 in Indonesia is sometimes described as an abortive coup d'état. In fact it would be more in accordance with reality to call it a pseudo-coup. It is true that in line with the technique of launching a coup, the movement led by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung from the palace guard quickly occupied strategic and vital points in Jakarta, the capital, such.as the telecommunications centre and the central radio broadcast station. It is also true that Untung on 1 October issued a decree dismissing the Sukarno Cabinet, i.e. the government of the day, and establishing the Revolution Council as 'the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia'. In reality, however, no action was taken against President Sukarno and his Ministers (apart from the Minister for Defence and Security, General Nasution, and the Minister/Commander of the Army, General Yani) in the form of arrest or other ways of political neutralization. As expressed by the former commander of the air force, Omar Dani, during his trial for his alleged involvement in the 30 September Movement: 'Why did they (Untung and his associates) act as if they were not serious? There was no concrete takeover of power. The President was still in power, and so were his Ministers and his military commanders'.

Based on part of thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wash.

This essay argues that the so called "politic laicization" is inseparable of a State sacralization and that this is, at the beginning of the Modern Age, the political "mystery" in itself. To prove so, "Considérations politiques sur les coups d'État" (1639), by Gabriel Naudé, will be explored in the light of some of Ernst H. Kantorowicz's recitals. It will be shown that the political actions carried out in the name of the "Mysteries of State" are no more and no less than the Prince's coups d'État. These actions reveal the mysteries just by fulfilling them. State secret, or even better, the secrecy and mystery in the theological dimension of a modern "absolute State" is, in fact, the sacredness of the State. Accordingly, coup d'État as Naudé defines it – a genuine secret of State – expresses the sacred sphere of the "Mysteries of State". ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Prior research has not established a clear relationship between democracy and insulation from coups d'(&)#233;tat. I contend that the lack of attention paid to the conditional influences of democracy have resulted in these mixed findings. I posit that insulation from coups occurs at higher levels of economic development and judicial institutional strength in democracies. Further, the vulnerability at low levels of both economic development and judicial institutional strength is significantly greater in democracies than in autocracies. Empirical assessments of 165 states for the years 1950-2012 offer strong support for both arguments. Results from these studies first help to reconcile earlier research on coup risk in democracies. Second, I point to the conditionality of democratic coup risk by highlighting the roles of economic development and political institutions. Third, I underscore the vast differences in institutional arrangements within democracies, suggesting a more nuanced approach is needed in the study of democratic political institutions. In line with this research, I examine the propensity for democratization in the aftermath of irregular leader removal. Examining the actors and tactics associated with different removal types, I focus on the benefits and challenges posed to democratization in the aftermath of removals. In an empirical assessment of authoritarian states from 1950-2012, I find that only removals resulting from coups, in conjunction with economic development, have significantly higher rates of democratization compared with the null. The results of this study are twofold, finding that not all forms of irregular leadership removal result in similar rates of post-removal democratization and that coups have driven prior results finding an association between irregular leader removal, economic development, and democratization. ; 2018-12-01 ; Ph.D. ; Sciences, Political Science ; Doctoral ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

Although coups remain a pressing concern for rulers across the globe, the mechanisms through which common coup-prevention strategies operate have not been well theorized or rigorously tested. This article analyzes how "counterbalancing" the military with other security forces prevents coups. Using new cross-national time-series data on state security forces along with evidence from sixteen case studies, the article demonstrates that counterbalancing reduces the likelihood that coup attempts will succeed and that it does so primarily by creating incentives for some soldiers to resist the coup, rather than by creating barriers to coordination between forces. However, counterbalancing is not associated with fewer coup attempts. In fact, the creation of a new security force increases the odds of a coup attempt in the following year. These findings highlight potential costs associated with counterbalancing and explain why it is not more widespread.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- Chapter 1 Introduction: Military Coup D'état as a Two-Level Game -- Dancing on Two Fronts -- Motive vs. Opportunity -- Book Structure and Methodology -- A Survey of the Civil-Military Relations Field -- Domestic Factors -- Weak Politicians and Regimes -- External Factors -- The Cold War -- Post-Cold War -- References -- Chapter 2 External Support and Military Coups D'état During the Cold War -- The External Actor -- Parameters of US Foreign Policy -- Playing a Role in Three Stages -- Indicators of Support or Rejection -- Military, Political, and Economic Assistance -- Military-to-Military -- Cultivating Other Militaries -- Military Training and Socialization -- Professional Military Education -- International Organizations and Socialization -- Discussion -- References -- Chapter 3 Two Military Coups in Turkey and One Unwavering Supporter -- May 27 Coup and the US Role -- US Foreign Policy Toward Turkey -- The Road to the 1960 Coup d'état -- Transformation of the Military -- Turkey's First Coup D'état -- The External Dimension -- Pre-coup Care -- Post-coup Care -- Soviet Overtures Turned Down -- Commitment Proven -- Appointment of Foreign Minister -- The US Role -- Military-to-Military Proximity -- Political Support -- Military and Economic Assistance -- Discussion -- The 1980 Coup D'état in Turkey -- Turkish-American Relations in the 1970s -- The External Dimension -- Another Surprise Coup? -- Courting Western Assent -- Appointment of the Foreign Minister -- The Rogers Plan -- The US Reaction -- Political Support -- Military and Economic Assistance -- Discussion -- References -- Chapter 4 Pakistan: Two Coups, a Single Backer for the 'Most Allied-Ally'? -- Two Quick Coups -- US Foreign Policy Toward Pakistan -- Face-to-Face in Uniforms -- The Road to Coups D'état

"Greece: From Overt Military Activism to Democratic Normality" published on by Oxford University Press.

Canada's key role in supporting the 2009 coup d'état in Honduras is emblematic of a new Canadian imperialist positioning in world affairs. A close reading of Canadian state responses to the coup and the repression that followed points to the apparent contradiction in its being an outspoken supporter of a violent and antidemocratic regime despite rhetorical commitments to peace and security. The contradiction can be explained in terms of the extent of Canadian economic investment in Honduras and an understanding of Canada as a secondary imperial power committed to imposing and maintaining conditions in Honduras that will protect that investment. The promotion of hyper-neoliberalism in Honduras, then, is representative of Canada's larger projects for the Global South in a context in which Canadian capital is aggressively expanding its reach. Shipley (número abierto de septiembre) El rol clave de Canadá en apoyar el golpe de estado en Honduras es emblemático de un nuevo posicionamiento imperialista canadiense en los asuntos mundiales. Una lectura detallada de respuestas gubernamentales canadienses al golpe y la subsiguiente represión señala su aparente contradicción entre ser un abierto defensor de un régimen violento y antidemocrático a pesar de los compromisos retóricos con la paz y la seguridad. Se puede explicar la contradicción en términos del alcance de la inversión económica canadiense en Honduras y una percepción de Canadá como un poder imperial secundario comprometido con imponer y mantener condiciones en Honduras que protegerían esa inversión. Promover el hiper-neoliberalismo en Honduras es entonces representador de los proyectos mayores de Canadá para el Sur Global en un contexto donde el capital canadiense está ampliando su alcance de manera agresiva.