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Copyright © 2016, The Honors Undergraduate Research Journal, University of Oklahoma. All rights revert to authors. ; Today's society, as many before it, views sugar as the embodiment of pleasure, luxury, and jubilance. Society's infatuation with sugar is seen in the figurative usage of the word sweet, the association of children with sweetness, the belief that sugar makes one giddy, and the necessary presence of sugar at joyous celebrations. What festivity would be complete without the consumption of sugary delights? Yet, the role sugar played in the project of empire and the long-standing effects of the sugar trade tell a bleaker tale of a commodity stained with the blood of humans and marked with the treachery of consumerism. Though numerous commodities, or more specifically cash crops, helped to shape society, sugar is unmatched in its effects on economies, cultures, politics, health, and the environment. The study of the sugar revolution reveals "the transformative power of a single commodity" that is best termed as "crop determinism" (Higman 213). The immense influence of sugar and the similar current cash crop domination expose the power of agriculture in our society and, ultimately, the power of consumers and their desires. The conditions that gave birth to the sugar revolution in the Caribbean and the consequences of commodity globalization display the unparalleled power of sugar in society then and now, as well as the lengths humans are willing to go in order to maintain a consumer-based economy. ; The Honors Undergraduate Research Journal (THURJ) is a publication of the Joe C. and Carole Kerr McClendon Honors College at the University of Oklahoma. The views expressed in THURJ are solely those of the contributors and should not be attributed to the Editorial Staff, the Honors College, or the University of Oklahoma. ; undergraduate

__Abstract__ Most recently, several countries on the European continent have admitted, or are discussing to admit, English as an optional court language. This article provides some information about the background of these recent initiatives, projects and reforms, clarifies the idea on which they are based and explores the purposes they pursue. It then identifies in a theoretical way the various possible degrees of admitting English as a court language and the surrounding questions of practical implementation. These general issues are followed by a presentation of the initiatives, projects and reforms in France, Switzerland and Germany. Not surprisingly, the idea of admitting English as a court language has not only found support, but has also been criticised in legal academia and beyond. Therefore, the article then attempts to give a structured overview of the debate, followed by some own thoughts on the arguments which are being put forward. It concludes with an appeal not to restrict the arguments in favour of admitting English as a court language to merely economic aspects, but also to give due weight to the fact that admitting English may facilitate access to justice and may result in bringing back cases to the public justice system.

Three types of strategies have been common for court reform programmes: the 'holistic', the 'tactical', and the 'strategic' approach. This Research and Policy Note discusses strategic court reform and its underlying ideas. Its main intention is to alert those involved in judicial reform to some of the pitfalls and choices connected to particular types of interventions. The concluding remarks will comment on the political nature of judicial reform and on a model to design a proper sequence of interventions for judicial reform.

CONTENT: U. S. District Courts, District of Arizona, Statement regarding depositing bail money by other than defendants, December 13, 1922. BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY: The Day Family were anglo Indian traders, on the Navajo Reservation in eastern Arizona. The collection includes the personal and business papers of Sam Day, Sr. (1845-1925) surveyor, Indian trader, legislator and United States Indian Commissioner; Anna Day, Sam Sr.'s wife (1872-1932); and of their children, Charles L. Day (1879-1918), Samuel Day, Jr. (1889-1944), United States deputy Marshall. The collection includes information on Navajo culture, stories and legends; the looting of Canyon del Muerta, and the Frank Dugan murder.

Capture—the notion that a federal agency can become controlled by the industry the agency is supposed to be regulating—is a fundamental concern for administrative law scholars. Surprisingly, however, no thorough treatment of how capture theory applies to the federal judiciary has been done. The few scholars who have attempted to apply the insights of capture theory to federal courts have generally concluded that the federal courts are insulated from capture concerns. This Article challenges the notion that the federal courts cannot be captured. It makes two primary arguments. As an initial matter, this Article makes the theoretical case that federal courts can be captured. Expanding upon the regulatory capture literature and what literature exists about the capture of courts, this Article demonstrates that the institutional safeguards often thought to shield judges from special interest influence (including political independence, lifetime tenure, and general jurisdiction) may, in some cases, break down, leaving courts exposed to capture in much the same way as agencies. Then, this Article turns to the application of the theoretical argument. It focuses on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the district that until recently received the most patent cases of any district court in the country. The Eastern District of Texas exhibits many classic signs of capture, including a revolving door between the federal bench and law firms, the region's economic dependence on litigation, and a mutually beneficial relationship between the plaintiffs' bar and the Eastern District judges. In conclusion, this Article urges Congress to tighten venue requirements and to mandate random assignment of judges. These proposals would better protect the U.S. federal courts from capture.

On July 4 2023, the Court of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) issued its advisory opinion in RS v Steuerverwaltung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein's Constitutional Court had already found in 2020 that a difference in tax rate on income for resident and non-resident employees was incompatible with the free movement of workers. Nonetheless, the Administrative Court of Liechtenstein found it necessary to refer the exact same issue to the EFTA Court, upon which the EFTA Court came to a similar conclusion as the Constitutional Court. The reason thereto? The Constitutional Court had suspended the annulment of the national law for reasons of legal certainty. The question consequently arose of how the national court should further proceed. Should it immediately give full effect to the law of the European Economic Area (EEA) by following the EFTA Court and disapplying the national legislation, or should it give priority to the findings of its own Constitutional Court and nonetheless apply the national legislation, even if that legislation breaches EEA law? How should the national court deal with this conflict of allegiance?

Political institutions are always works in progress. Their practical duties and aims as instruments of governance may not always match their constitutional blueprints or historical roles. Political offices might not always have the power to do what their constituent officers either need or want to do. A polity's assessment of whether the desired power is a need or a want may indeed mark a boundary between law and politics in the domain of institutional structure. The law gives, or is interpreted to give, political organs the tools they need to function effectively. They must fight for the rest.

The research problem this dissertation addresses is how judicial practices generate administrative justice in asylum determination procedures. Previous research on immigration policies argues that when asylum determinations are processed in courts, principles of administrative justice are ensured and immigrants' rights protected. In this dissertation, I challenge that argument by approaching administrative justice as an empirical phenomenon open for different types of interpretations. Instead of assuming that administrative justice characterizes courts, I assume that this concept acquires particular meanings through the practices of the courts. Empirically, this dissertation studies practices of assessing asylum claims at the Swedish migration courts. The migration courts are the result of a major reform of the Swedish asylum procedure that took place in 2006, with the motive to end inhumane rejections of asylum seekers by enhancing administrative justice in the asylum process. By interviewing and observing judges at the migration courts, litigators from the Migration Board and public counsels from different law firms, this interpretive and ethnographic study analyzes how administrative justice acquires meanings in the daily practices of assessing asylum claims at the migration courts. The main result is that a ceremonial version of administrative justice is generated at the migration courts. This version of administrative justice forefronts symbolic dimensions of justice. The asylum appeal procedure succeeds in communicating justice through rituals, building design and metaphors, which emphasize objectivity, impartiality and certainty on behalf of the judicial practices. However, these symbols of justice disguise several unfair aspects of the asylum appeal procedure, such as inequality in resources and trustworthiness between the state's representative and the asylum applicants as well as the uncertainty inherent in both the factual and the credibility assessment of asylum claims. The implications of these findings are that immigration policy research needs to reconsider the relationship between the courts and immigrants' rights by paying more attention to the everyday practices of ensuing administrative justice in courts than on the instances when courts oppose political attempts to restrict immigrants' rights.

In recent years, state courts have suffered serious funding reductions that have threatened their ability to resolve criminal and civil cases in a timely fashion. Proposals for addressing this state court funding crisis have emphasized public education and the creation of coalitions to influence state legislatures. These strategies are unlikely to succeed, however, and new institutional arrangements are necessary. Dedicated state trust funds using specific state revenue sources to fund courts offer the most promise for adequate and stable state court funding.

In recent years, state courts have suffered serious funding reductions that have threatened their ability to resolve criminal and civil cases in a timely fashion. Proposals for addressing this state court funding crisis have emphasized public education and the creation of coalitions to influence state legislatures. These strategies are unlikely to succeed, however, and new institutional arrangements are necessary. Dedicated state trust funds using specific state revenue sources to fund courts offer the most promise for adequate and stable state court funding.

Every Justice, save perhaps Justice Breyer, has recently subscribed to an opinion raising questions in one or another context about whether federal courts can appropriately exercise common law law-making functions that had, until these questions began to appear, been characteristic of all American courts. To invoke a special class of "federal tribunal" whose actions are not to be confused with those of common law courts suggests broader implications than the long-familiar debates about Erie RR. Co. v. Tompkins, or more recent contentions over when, if ever, it is appropriate to infer privately enforceable judicial remedies in aid of federal statutes; this seems to be about the nature of the institutions, not elements of their jurisdiction or prudential rules for the exercise of their powers. The paper, given as the Daniel Meador Lecture at Alabama Law School this fall, finds no historical or constitutional basis for these doubts, insofar as they concern interstitial law-making on subjects within Congress's legislative competence. Indeed, it argues, drawing on extensive analysis of several settings and cases, such functions have particular importance where state court common law judgments can impair the implementation of federal law. The doubts, it suggests, are more properly understood as reflecting a certain discomfort with the changing character of the judicial function in modern times. High court judges today choose the questions they will decide, in a framework that encourages them to favor the legal system's need for definition over party claims for justice as the basis for choice; and from an enormous volume of potential targets for decision that puts the discipline of common law processes in question. The discomfort is widespread, and it is perhaps more instinctual than intellectual, a realization that the ground has shifted without yet quite knowing what to do about it. In repeated arguments about precedent, and perhaps unexpected adherence to it, one can find expression of the tensions between the prior model of litigant-required judging, and the new powers of policy-directed choice. The certiorari function brings forward the law-making side of judging, and at the same time reflects a weakening of the possibilities for hierarchical control within the judiciary. Our common-law premises cannot explain either development. In groping for an understanding and accommodation, the Justices appear often enough to be behaving in the familiar, unconscious mode. In the unspoken battle between agenda-setting and judging, we should all hope judging wins.

The juvenile court has had several distinct phases in its seventy years of existence. The court was founded on a curious Victorian mixture of sentiment("child-saving"), seemingly sound political economy ("if we save the little rascals from their environment, it will be the end of vice, spiritous liquors,crime and degradation") and hard-headed reform.' Although it is not always obvious in the reform literature, which is rather tear-stained, the last named factor is the most important. The radical reformers of the nineteenth century had been working in what might be called the juvenile court movement for many years before the court was itself established. Hard-headed reform resulted in a century of saving children from the thief's gallows, the agonies of chimney-sweeping, or working in coal mines and factories, and the temptations of the gin palaces and other dens of vice.

This article suggests that Washington court rule controversies arise from the lack of a clear, constitutionally established apportionment of rulemaking powers between the legislative and judicial branches, and that there is a lack of procedures providing adequate internal safeguards and accountability. This article first reviews the classical separation of powers doctrine. The discussion then focuses on internal procedural safeguards that also serve within each power center to discourage arbitrary or ill-considered action. This article then reviews the history of court rulemaking in Washington and in other jurisdictions and suggests that from a logical view, the scope of sole judicial power over rulemaking should be limited to control of those rules necessary to the very existence and functioning of the courts. Finally, this article urges that court rules would be better drafted and better reflect competing institutional needs if they were regularly promulgated according to a fixed procedure by an independent Judicial Council rather than by the state supreme court.

Vols. for 1874/75-1876/77 have variant title: Report of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to the Legislative Assembly; other slight variations in title. ; Title from caption. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Promulgated: August 19, 2021." "This order is effective August 23, 2021 and shall remain in effect until further order of this Court." "This standing order shall replace Boston Municipal Court standing order 13-20 (issued December 1, 2020 and effective December 7, 2020) and District Court standing order 12-20 (issued November 19, 2020, effective November 23, 2020), which orders are rescinded on June 1, 2021 when Joint standing order 1-21 of the Boston Municipal Court Department and District Court Department became effective."