Suchergebnisse

The purpose of this paper is neither to repeat nor to explain the rules of the Supreme Court of Montana, for they are freely available to everyone in printed form and are self-explanatory. My purpose is to suggest and consider some ideas which the general subject suggests, including some questions presented by the dual authority of judicial and legislative branches over court procedure, and finally to discuss the present court's attitude toward its rules.

Vol. 1. Recommendations for the reorganization of the structure of the courts of the State of New York and their administration -- v. 2. Second preliminary report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Tennessee has since 1827 maintained, in some degree, a separate court of equity, presided over by a chancellor. Though most states have abolished the procedural distinction between cases in law and suits in equity, Tennessee still retains this dichotomy in its court system. Prior to 1827 law and equity were dispensed in Tennessee by a single court of general jurisdiction, the Superior Court of Law. This practice grew out of the North Carolina Act of 1782 and the continuation of that Act by the First Territorial Legislature in 1794, both of which gave equity jurisdiction to the Superior Court of Law. All matters of fact in law or in equity in this court were triable by a jury as if at law. This was the practice when the Tennessee Constitution of 1796 was adopted. The Act of 1809 abolished the Superior Court and established the Circuit Court in its stead with all its jurisdiction in law and equity. Such unity was short-lived for the Act of 1819 provided that all chancery cases should be taken on deposition; the Circuit Court sitting in an equity cause was styled the Court of Chancery. Finally the Act of 1827 created two separate chancery courts and appointed a chancellor for each. Although prior to the Constitution of 1796 the statutory right to jury trial in equity was the same as at law, the courts limited the constitutional right of jury trial to those cases in which it existed as a common-law right in the North Carolina territory.

The 1949 Washington Legislature made it mandatory for every County in the State of Washington to set up a Family Court of Conciliation as a branch of the Superior Court. RCW 26.12.010 et seq [Rem. Supp. 1949 § 997-30 et seq]. Pursuant to that mandate such a court has been in operation in King County since February, 1950. By decision of the Superior Court Judges, the Juvenile and Family Court Departments have been combined into a single administrative unit under the supervision of Judge William G. Long.

Our theme is simple, overpowering: Justices of the Supreme Court, a number of whose predecessors destroyed the bulk or their correspondence, and who themselves may be tempted to do likewise, nonetheless quite evidently desire, and certainly deserve, faithful (if not quite full) reconstruction, both of their individual roles, and of the Court's, in our constitutional scheme. Much of this story, to quote the then Professor Frankfurter, is "largely irrecoverable,"' yet indispensable to an understanding of our institutions. Manifestly, something of a paradox is involved in our whole attitude toward judicial history. Much of the law, particularly judge-made public law, is a product of highly selective formulae designed to achieve solutions by selection, by simplification, and even by oversimplification. Yet do we not also simultaneously criticize historians and biographers for abridging an historical record, for forcing their refractory and incomplete materials to fit some preferred or presumed thesis or formula? Reconsideration, of course, at once dispels the paradox: judges are privileged but historians, biographers and legislators are not. Silence, ellipsis, are acknowledged tools of the judicial craft, sanctioned as the lesser evils, in return for getting the job done, the decision made. Therefore reasons are offered, and expected, as matters of grace, not of right. This is elemental. The historian, on the other hand, really is stuck. He must document fully and fairly; he is liable for the full record. He must be "judicial" even when he suspects that counsel and judges were not. He must probe and assess, judge and clarify, not only the opinion and the mountainous record, but also the motives and motivations even when these are obscure, feigned, or denied.

To be kept up to date by pocket supplements. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The United States Court of Military Appeals has been referred to as the "most vital element" in the reformation and unification of military criminal law brought about by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It represents a further extension of civilian control over the military--a concept long deemed vital to the American framework of democratic government. The Court is not faced with an easy task, and no one is more aware of this than the judges themselves. Like all institutions established as a result of reform movements, its activities are subject to close public scrutiny. The work of the Court is being analyzed on the one hand by segments of the civilian bar who have acquired a distrust of the military courts-martial system; it is being carefully watched on the other by those of the military who were apprehensive of its existence from the beginning. It is almost axiomatic that what pleases one group will almost certainly not please the other. It should not be concluded, however, that everyone interested in the Court's work can be classified as being basically motivated either for or against the Court. There are, I am sure, many who feel that its establishment was a necessary step in the improvement of the scheme of military justice, but who will base their final judgment upon its work unswayed by preconceived prejudices. It is my hope that the legal journals will be numbered among this group and that they will do for our Court what they have long done for the American judiciary--provide an interested but critical forum for analysis of its work. Everyone, I am sure, realizes that the proper operation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice does not depend solely upon this Court. The cases considered here constitute but a small fraction of the total. The most that we can do is mark out the boundaries and build the framework around the foundation provided by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Although America prides itself on its government by laws, not men, the laws are of little avail if they ...

"This report has been prepared by the Governmental Research Bureau, Park College, Parkville, Missouri." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The purpose of this essay is to consider the response of the Supreme Court of the United States to two general aspects of racial discrimination: first, discrimination as restrictive of political freedom and, second,discrimination as restrictive of the enjoyment of such social advantages as the acquisition and occupancy of real estate, transportation and education.

The Constitution of the Confederate States of America, unanimously adopted on March 11, 1861, by the as- sembled delegates of the original seceding states and on June 19, 1861, by the state of Virginia, was for all practical purposes a copy of the Constitution of the United States. Its judicial provisions begin in Article III with the familiar-sounding phrase "The judicial powers of the Confederate States shall be vested in one supreme court and. . . ." There is no reason to believe that this phraseology was a blind copy of the older document, and that it was not the intention of the framers of the Confederate -Constitution to include the provisions for supreme judicial review in the chart that was to guide the newborn nation. Nearly sixty years had passed since John Marshall had brilliantly expounded the necessity for supreme judicial autho-rity over the acts of the various legislative and executive bodies that comprised the nation and the years had only confirmed the wisdom of his decision. Surely the forty-four delegates who signed the Constitution of the Confederate States were aware of this necessity when they retained a provision for a supreme court within the confederation. Otherwise it would have been a simple matter to expunge such a requi

The origin of habeas corpus is lost in the mists of history. The leading idea, deliverance by summary legal process from illegal confinement, was present in the laws of countries in existence prior to the beginning of the English law and in other countries which derived none of their principles of jurisprudence or rules of procedure from English law. It was known to Roman law and to old Spanish law. It was recognized by the Magna Charta in 1215, although such recognition was probably not a primary purpose of the barons in forcing King John to sign that document. The writ itself originated in the common law of England, where it developed from a procedural writ to one of protection of the individual. In 1679, Parliament passed the famous Habeas Corpus Act, which, however, did not change the nature of the existing common law practice, and excepted treason and felony from its provisions.

The career of Mr. Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge on the Supreme Court of the United States came to an end on September 10, 1949. His passing signified the end of a man's work--and the end of an era. As Rutledge's last opinion became a part of American constitutional history, the Roosevelt Court disappeared and a new alignment of majority and minority was born. The influence of Rutledge in this important period of constitutional development will be difficult to measure until the broader outlines of contemporary social, political, economic, and legal trends are more firmly sketched in the future. A justice's total impact on the law is actually, as Attorney General McGrath stated in 1950, an "intangible heritage" which "constitutes his truly enduring monument" and is incapable of assessment.

Underscoring so much while leaving so much unsaid, this book is a powerful plea for post-1937 trends and constructions--not merely in the Supreme Court, but now in Congress. How does the nation, the Court, the Congress, make good a lost century? Chief Justice Waite's triumph--decidedly more modest in my estimation than in Dr. Magrath's--was that he dared, tried, succeeded--at least by half. The country's failure was that it so long did not--has not yet--even by half. Twenty years and three constitutional amendments after emancipation too many of our forebears, including all members of this Court except the former Union colonel and converted slaveholder, Mr. Justice Harlan, let themselves be persuaded, as too many others have since, that American governments still lacked the mandate and the power to do, after emancipation and amendment, in behalf of"liberty," what those same governments originally, for three quarters of a century, had been able to do, and had done, against "liberty,"in defense of slavery and slave "property." No mandate and no power to protect the "li(ves), liberty and property" of "persons" at last free, nor of those newly-made "Citizens of the United States" for whose double, triple, above all, equal protection, these three overlapping guarantees and clauses again had been employed, both affirmatively and negatively, as they had been employed incessantly for two generations. No mandate and no power to protect as free "persons," and as"Citizens of the United States," those whom this antislavery generation at least, believed governments had the power and the duty to protect even as enslaved "persons."Two years short of the fourteenth amendment centennial, let us speak no more of the "failures" and of the "miserable draftsmanship"of that Joint Committee of Fifteen. John A. Bingham and his colleagues did very well indeed. The date, remember, was 1866.

It is all very well, indeed it is very good, to bear down on the fact that the author of the Constitution was, and still is, "We the People of the United States." But there is more sentiment than explanation in it. We think too much about who is the author of the Constitution. Of course it was not the Convention of 1789, nor the First Congress which wrote the Bill of Rights, nor the Thirty-Ninth which wrote the Fourteenth Amendment. It was We the People, but even when we have recognized this, all we have done is recognize that it is an ambulatory document. We the People did not drop out of the picture in 1789, or in 1791, or in 1868 when We ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. We kept pace with what We had said. But the important question to ask has nothing to do with the author. The important question is, To whom are We speaking? When I turn to the Constitution, I am not really turning to a single document, except typographically. For the Constitution is addressed to a number of persons. In some places, to the Supreme Court itself; for instance, in the Third Article on the judicial power. It is speaking to Congress in the important section eight of the First Article where Congress' legislative powers are set down; and also in section nine, which prohibits Congress to pass bills of attainder, export duties and other things. Throughout the document we find that different parts are addressed to different persons and institutions, and the point I make is that they may interpret the words very differently. Even the same word may mean different things when they are addressed to different people. The person addressed determines the meaning quite as much as the context, since it is he who will first give meaning to the word or phrase on any particular occasion. In the interpretation of the Constitution, this is of paramount importance, because here the courts must pay the person addressed the respect due to an organ of government of equal rank and dignity.

The M. H. Ross Papers contain information pertaining to labor, politics, social issues of the twentieth century, coal mining and its resulting lifestyle, as well as photographs and audio materials. The collection is made up of five different accessions; L2001-05, which is contained in boxes one through 104, L2002-09 in boxes 106 through 120, L2006-16 in boxes 105 and 120, L2001-01 in boxes 120-121, and L2012-20 in boxes 122-125. The campaign materials consist of items from the 1940 and 1948 political campaigns in which Ross participated. These items include campaign cards, posters, speech transcripts, news clippings, rally materials, letters to voters, and fliers. Organizing and arbitration materials covers labor organizing events from "Operation Dixie" in Georgia, the furniture workers in North Carolina, and the Mine-Mill workers in the Western United States. Organizing materials include fliers, correspondence, news articles, radio transcripts, and some related photos. Arbitration files consist of agreements, decisions, and agreement booklets. The social and political research files cover a wide time period (1930's to the late 1970's/early 1980's). The topics include mainly the Ku Klux Klan, racism, Communism, Red Scare, red baiting, United States history, and literature. These files consist mostly of news and journal articles. Ross interacted with coal miners while doing work for the United Mine Workers Association (UMWA) and while working at the Fairmont Clinic in West Virginia. Included in these related files are books, news articles, journals, UMWA reports, and coal miner oral histories conducted by Ross. Tying in to all of the activities Ross participated in during his life were his research and manuscript files. He wrote numerous newspaper and journal articles on history and labor. Later, as he worked for the UMWA and at the Fairmont Clinic, he wrote more in-depth articles about coal miners, their lifestyle, and medical problems they faced (while the Southern Labor Archives has many of Ross's coal mining and lifestyle articles, it does not have any of his medical articles). Along with these articles are the research files Ross collected to write them, which consist of notes, books, and newspaper and journal articles. In additional to his professional career, Ross was adamant about documenting his and his wife's family history in the oral history format. Of particular interest are the recordings of his interviews with his wife's family - they were workers, musicians, and singers of labor and folk songs. Finally, in this collection are a number of photographs and slides, which include images of organizing, coal mining (from the late 19th through 20th centuries), and Appalachia. Of note is a small photo album from the 1930s which contains images from the Summer School for Workers, and more labor organizing. A few audio items are available as well, such as Ross political speeches and an oral history in which Ross was interviewed by his daughter, Jane Ross Davis in 1986. All photographic and audio-visual materials are at the end of their respective series. ; Myron Howard "Mike" Ross was born November 9, 1919 in New York City. He dropped out of school when he was seventeen and moved to Texas, where he worked on a farm. From 1936 until 1939, Ross worked in a bakery in North Carolina. In the summer of 1938, he attended the Southern School for Workers in Asheville, North Carolina. During the fall of 1938, Ross would attend the first Southern Conference on Human Welfare in Birmingham, Alabama. He would attend this conference again in 1940 in Chattanooga, Tennessee. From 1939 to 1940, Ross worked for the United Mine Workers Non-Partisan League in North Carolina, working under John L. Lewis. He was hired as a union organizer by the United Mine Workers of America, and sent to Saltville, Virginia and Rockwood, Tennessee. In 1940, Ross ran for a seat on city council on the People's Platform in Charlotte, North Carolina. During this time, he also married Anne "Buddie" West of Kennesaw, Georgia. From 1941 until 1945, Ross served as an infantryman for the United States Army. He sustained injuries near the Battle of the Bulge in the winter of 1944. From 1945 until 1949, Ross worked for the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, then part of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), as a union organizer. He was sent to Macon, Georgia, Savannah, Georgia and to Winston-Salem, North Carolina, where he worked with the United Furniture Workers Union. He began handling arbitration for the unions. In 1948, Ross ran for United States Congress on the Progressive Party ticket in North Carolina. He also served as the secretary for the North Carolina Progressive Party. Ross attended the University of North Carolina law school from 1949 to 1952. He graduated with honors but was denied the bar on the grounds of "character." From 1952 until 1955, he worked for the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers as a union organizer, first in New Mexico (potash mines) and then in Arizona (copper mines). From 1955 to 1957, Ross attended the Columbia University School of Public Health. He worked for the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund from 1957 to 1958, where he represented the union in expenditure of health care for mining workers. By 1958, Ross began plans for what would become the Fairmont Clinic, a prepaid group practice in Fairmont, West Virginia, which had the mission of providing high quality medical care for miners and their families. From 1958 until 1978, Ross served as administrator of the Fairmont Clinic. As a result of this work, Ross began researching coal mining, especially coal mining lifestyle, heritage and history of coal mining and disasters. He would interview over one hundred miners (coal miners). Eventually, Ross began writing a manuscript about the history of coal mining. Working for the Rural Practice Program of the University of North Carolina from 1980 until 1987, Ross taught in the medical school. M. H. Ross died on January 31, 1987 in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. ; Digitization of the M. H. Ross Papers was funded by the National Historical Publications and Records Commission.