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Also published under title "The power of the judiciary over legislation." ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Mode of access: Internet. ; With this are bound its: Lei del procedimiento criminal; and Leyes organica militar

"The First Two Centuries": The first panel explored the provisions that the drafters made in the United States Constitution for federal judicial selection and traced the two-century history of the selection process following the constitution's adoption. The panel consisted of Charles Cooper, Esq. of Cooper & Kirk PLLC; Gary L. McDowell, Haynes Professor of Leadership Studies and Political Science at the University of Richmond's Jepson School of Leadership Studies; and Ms. Maeva Marcus, of the United States Supreme Court Historical Society. Rodney A. Smolla, the George E. Allen Chair in Law, served as program coordinator and moderator. "Modern Federal Judicial Selection": The second panel explored modern federal judicial selection, tracing the selection process over the last two decades and analyzing how it has grown increasingly contentious. The panel consisted of Theresa M. Beiner, of the William H. Bowen School of Law at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock; Sheldon Goldman, Department of Political Science University of Massachusetts; Judge Edith Jones, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; and William P. Marshall, the Kenan Professor of Law University of North Carolina School of Law. Carl W. Tobias, Williams Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law, served as moderator. "The Prospects of Reform": The third panel explored numerous suggestions for remedying or ameliorating the difficulties that pervade modern federal judicial selection and the prospects for these measures' success. The panel consisted of Terry Eastland, Publisher of The Weekly Standard; Michael Gerhardt, Hanson Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary; and Sanford V. Levinson, The W. St. John Garwood Centennial Chair in Law and Professor of Government at the University of Texas School of Law. Gary L. McDowell, the Haynes Professor of Leadership Studies and Political Science at the University of Richmond's Jepson School of Leadership Studies, served as moderator.

Despite of the negative consensus to the constitutional referendum, the Bolivian Plurinational Constitutional Court (or "Tribunal Plurinacional Constitucional") admitted the possibility of re-election for President Morales over the second presidential term and beyond the constitutional and legislative limit of ineligibility. According to the Court, any limit against the right to vote would violate the principles and the values of any constitutional democracy and of the conventional system of protection to human rights. The right to vote is considered as an important part of the so-called "constitutional bloc" (or "bloque constitucional"), not to be broken by the current electoral law and in order to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. The question is if there is a probable profile of abusive constitutionalism, with the risk of a fracture in the political insurance of the State. ; A pesar del consenso negativo al referéndum constitucional, el Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional boliviano admitió la posibilidad de la reelección del presidente Morales durante el segundo período presidencial y más allá del límite constitucional y legislativo de inelegibilidad. Según la Corte, cualquier límite contra el derecho de voto violaría los principios y los valores de cualquier democracia constitucional y del sistema convencional de protección de los derechos humanos. El derecho de voto se considera una parte importante del llamado «bloque constitucional», que no debe ser violado por la ley electoral actual y para proteger los derechos y libertades fundamentales. La pregunta es si existe un perfil probable de constitucionalismo abusivo, con el riesgo de una fractura en el seguro político del Estado.

Contitutional Court of Indonesia Through Decision Number 34/PUU-XI/2013 basically has opened th e space for Request Civil (PK) in Criminal Case is not just once. After that desicion,The Supreme Courtpublish the policy who contradicted with that decision through The Circular of Supreme Court of Indonesia (SEMA) Number. 7 Year 2014 on Reconsideration Request Civil (PK) In Criminal Case.This contradiction make confusion for the law enforcer and justice seekers. The Purpose of this paper is for knowing how legal standing of Constitutional Court of Indonesia Decision and legal standing SEMA in Indonesia Legal system and how the execution Constitutional Court of Indonesia decision number 34/PUU-XI/2013 after SEMA Number. 7 Year 2014 has published. The study in this paper begins with discussing about legal standing of constitusional review on law in indonesian legal system.Next this paper discussing about the circular as a policy rule (beleidsregel). The last ,as key of discussion is about execution of Constitutional Court of Indonesia Decision Number 34/PUU-XI/2013after SEMA Number 7 Year 2014 has published.The conclusions of this paper are : 1) Legal standing of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia decision in indonesia legal syetem can be said to have a degree equivalent to the law. 2) Legal Standing of circular letter is a form of policy rule and is not included in the scope of legislation as regulated in Law no. 12 Year 2011 on the Establishment of Laws and Regulations so that it's not Erga Omnes, but only intended for internal institutional self. 3)The existence of SEMA does not make the Constitutional Court of Indonesia decision to be nonexecutable. Thus Constitutional Court of Indonesia Decision Number 34 / PUU-XI / 2013 which was followed by the justice seeker and executed by the law enforcer.

Although the Lisbon Treaty maintained the general exclusion of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters from ECJ jurisdiction, it introduced a number of changes into this area, including an explicit statement that the Court is competent to review the legality of the Council decisions imposing restraining measures on persons. The article analyzes the nature and origin of those changes and considers the legal implications for the level of the protection of fundamental rights in the European Union. For this purpose the author firstly considers the context of the exclusion of CFSP matters from the ECJ jurisdiction, including discussions on the issue at the European Convention, and, secondly, takes a closer look at the separate heads of jurisdiction over which the Court is competent to act after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A conclusion is made that the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce significant changes to ECJ jurisdiction. Similarly to the pattern of previous amendment treaties, the Lisbon Treaty again gave recognition to the practice of the ECJ on relevant questions. Nonetheless, the amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty should be welcome for introducing more clarity into the legal regulation of the matter, thus boosting the legal certainty and protection of fundamental rights in the European Union.

Although the Lisbon Treaty maintained the general exclusion of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters from ECJ jurisdiction, it introduced a number of changes into this area, including an explicit statement that the Court is competent to review the legality of the Council decisions imposing restraining measures on persons. The article analyzes the nature and origin of those changes and considers the legal implications for the level of the protection of fundamental rights in the European Union. For this purpose the author firstly considers the context of the exclusion of CFSP matters from the ECJ jurisdiction, including discussions on the issue at the European Convention, and, secondly, takes a closer look at the separate heads of jurisdiction over which the Court is competent to act after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A conclusion is made that the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce significant changes to ECJ jurisdiction. Similarly to the pattern of previous amendment treaties, the Lisbon Treaty again gave recognition to the practice of the ECJ on relevant questions. Nonetheless, the amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty should be welcome for introducing more clarity into the legal regulation of the matter, thus boosting the legal certainty and protection of fundamental rights in the European Union.

The jurisdictional guarantee of fundamental rights in the EU has placed on its Court of Justice a 'special' responsibility throughout the process of European in-tegration. However, this particular responsibility has manifested itself in different ways over time. During the long period prior to the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, this special responsibility resulted in the task of attracting fundamental rights to the Community legal system rooted in a common European heritage. Since the Charter entered into force ten years ago, the Court of Justice has faced that responsibility in an entirely different context but equally demanding for its jurisdictional role. ; La garantía jurisdiccional de los derechos fundamentales en la UE ha hecho recaer en su Tribunal de Justicia una «especial» responsabilidad a lo largo del proceso de integración europeo. Esta particular responsabilidad se ha manifestado, sin embargo, de diferentes maneras a lo largo del tiempo. Durante el largo periodo precedente a la entrada en vigor de la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales esta responsabilidad se tradujo en la tarea de atraer al ordenamiento comunitario unos derechos fundamentales enraizados en un patrimonio europeo común. Desde que la Carta entrara en vigor hace diez años, el Tribunal de Justicia se ha enfrentado con esa responsabilidad en un contexto enteramente diferente pero igualmente exigente para su función jurisdiccional.

AbstractThe recent past has shown an ever-growing fragmentation of the international legal system where lawyers and judges are facing more and more the phenomenon of the same legal question being discussed in different fora. This is particularly the case in the field of human rights that entails the dispersal of responsibilities for interpretation of numerous instruments among various different judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, of both universal and regional nature. In order to secure coherence and legal certainty in the system, it is important to respect a set of principles and rules of general international law, in particular Articles 31–33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The first goal of this article is to analyse whether the Court applies the rules of the VCLT to the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Secondly, assuming that the VCLT fully applies, it will be analysed whether Article 31(1) VCLT is flexible enough to allow nevertheless some leeway for the development of specificities, especially as a result of the particular nature of the ECHR. Thirdly, it will be shown that the Court has indeed developed a set of specific methods of interpretation, aiming to render the rights enshrined in the ECHR effective. From the author's point of view, they can all be regarded as sub-forms (or partial aspects) of the teleological interpretation. He distinguishes between four dimensions of the principle of "effectiveness".

International integration today includes not only a political but also a legal aspect. With the help of various supranational tools, such as international commercial arbitration, international treaties and agreements, various organizations, including those formed on the basis of such agreements, global trends of law are formed. The convergence of legal systems is the key to the harmonious development of civil (private) relations. Defamation law is no exception. In order to better protect private life and freedom of speech, it is necessary to study carefully both the law prevailing in certain foreign countries and the practice of supranational structures. The European Court of Human Rights holds a special place among such structures. In its decisions, it introduced the most advanced legal constructions of protection against defamation, which are seen in American and German law. These structures are referred to as standards or principles of law enforcement developed by the European Court of Human Rights. The standards of the European Court of Human Rights are applied in all countries that are parties to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms dated 04.11.1950. To fully protect the rights of its citizens the Russian Federation should also not stand aside from the European Court of Human Rights positions. ; Международная интеграция включает в себя сегодня не только политический, но и правовой аспект. С помощью различных наднациональных инструментов, таких как международные коммерческие арбитражи, международные договоры и соглашения, различного рода организации, в том числе образованные на основании таких договоров, формируются мировые тенденции права. Сближение правовых систем является ключом к гармоничному развитию гражданских (частных) отношений. Диффамационное право не исключение. Для более эффективной защиты частной жизни и свободы слова необходимо тщательное изучение как права, сложившегося в отдельных зарубежных странах, так и практики наднациональных структур. Особое место среди таких структур занимает Европейский суд по правам человека. В свои решениях он внедрил самые современные юридические конструкции защиты от диффамации, которые сформировались в американском и немецком праве. Указанные конструкции именуются стандартами, или принципами правоприменения, разработанными Европейским судом по правам человека. Стандарты Европейского суда по правам человека применяются во всех странах, являющихся участниками Конвенция о защите прав человека и основных свобод от 04 ноября 1950 г. Российская Федерация для полноценной защиты прав своих граждан также не должна оставаться в стороне от сформированных Европейским судом по правам человека позиций.