The G20 summit in London offers an opportunity for world leaders to prevent a continued slide towards protectionism. Yet the summit is already at risk of ending in failure as expectations run too high. The agenda is already far too wide and cover areas characterized by sharp differences of opinion rather than an emerging consensus. Individual members have also thrown in additional wishes for what the summit should achieve. Furthermore, G20 rhetoric is ingrained in global governance romanticism, but the naive hopes of building a new Bretton Woods system will meet the hard realities of global economic co-operation. This Policy Brief is concerned with what should be the relevant trade agenda for the G20. At the summit in Washington, D.C. last autumn, the G20 agreed that no country should impose new barriers to trade. G20 leaders also instructed their trade ministers to agree on a headline deal for Doha Round before the end of 2008. However, nothing has happened in the Doha Round since the last G20 summit, and it took only a few days until a G20 country had imposed new trade barriers. Since November last year, 17 of the G20 members have imposed protectionist measures. Governments have not responded to the economic crisis with massive protectionist measures. It is rather creeping protectionism that has characterized recent trade policies. However, as the crisis deepens countries are likely to increase protectionism. The chief task now is to prevent such a development, in particular the risk of escalating tit-for-tat protectionism. This Policy Brief sets out a six-point agenda to contain protectionist threats.
The BRIICS - Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa - are the largest developing countries in their respective regions. A snapshot of their trade policies shows they have already liberalised trade and foreign direct investment extensively, and thereby plugged themselves into globalisation. This has helped to deliver higher growth, poverty reduction and improvements in human welfare. But external liberalisation has stalled. Creeping protectionism has set in. It has accelerated in the wake of the global economic crisis, generally translating into behind-the-border regulatory barriers emerging from domestic "crisis interventions". The BRIICS should have the following trade-policy priorities. First, in the short-term, they should counter creeping, crisis-related protectionism by containing the expansion of government at home. Second, looking beyond the immediate crisis, they should couple further trade and FDI liberalisation with behind-the-border regulatory reforms to improve the domestic business climate. Third, second-generation reforms are overwhelmingly domestic in nature. They should be done unilaterally, with less reliance on trade negotiations through the WTO and FTAs - not to mention the G20 and other "global-governance" paraphernalia. Fourth, unilateral reforms should be locked in through stronger WTO commitments, which should emerge from a post-Doha rule-improving agenda. Fifth, the BRIICS should exercise caution with "trade-light" FTAs. And sixth, all BRIICS need more trade-policy transparency. "Transparency boards", inside and outside government, should conduct and disseminate detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of trade policies in order to facilitate better deliberation of policy choices.
Public employment services (PES) have undergone significant change since 2011, reshaping the roles of the market, state, and community sector within Ireland's mixed economy of welfare. The post-crisis years saw the replacement of FÁS with a new network of one-stop-shop Intreo activation services, and the procurement of new employment services for the long-term unemployed through competitive tendering and Payment-by-Results. This process of marketisation is now being extended to other PES currently delivered by community organisations under block grants, such as Local Employment Services and Job Clubs. We position Ireland's PES landscape as a strategic action field wherein various providers compete with one another for position, power and resources during episodes of contention. Applying this lens to the ongoing reform of activation policy and PES institutions, the paper considers how the recent trajectory of PES marketisation has remained politically contentious. It examines the strategies of various providers and policy actors in shaping the politics of reform, focusing especially on the position of community organisations within the field and the degree to which they have been able to strategically mobilise against marketisation. Lessons are drawn about the nature of Irish politics and policy reform.
This paper examines possible changes that the society expects in the near future. The changes are mainly in the economic and social spheres of our society. The article in its introductory passages and chapters outlines possible causes of society-wide transformation that it sees largely in the unrestricted application of neoliberal approaches intensified in the last 20-25 years in Europe, which undoubtedly leads to reducing the role of the strong state and a considerable asymmetry of the public and the private sectors, which certainly carries some potential risks. The article, however, attempts to present other ambitions as well - in the context of not only social, but also philosophical and ethical, point out deeper causes of the current much discussed and intractable imbalance. ; Nadějí do budoucnosti se zdá být sociálně šetrný stát rozvíjející se v mírové době vícepolárního světa a to vše při udržení ekologické stability krajiny a přírody. Žijeme ovšem v době, kdy řada expertů poukazuje právě na křehkost rovnováhy na všech úrovních i všech dimenzích. Z hlediska ekonomického se hovoří např. o výrazné asymetrii mezi politikou a ekonomikou, finanční a reálnou ekonomikou, kapitálem a prací, soukromým a veřejným sektorem; z hlediska sociálního jde o sociální disharmonii, rozevírání nůžek, ohrožení střední třídy; řada přírodovědců zase varuje před udržitelností přírodních ekosystémů, změnách globálního klimatu a i člověk jako jednotlivec často nevykazuje známky rovnováhy natož vývoje… Zdá se, že budoucí vývoj společnosti nebude tedy jen otázkou udržitelnosti, ale pravděpodobně zápasem i mezi sociálním a kulturním rozvojem či regresem – cestou dopředu anebo cestou zpět a to zřejmě jak ve světovém kontextu tak i naší společnosti.
In: Staupe-Delgado , R 2021 , ' Life in Anticipation of the COVID-19 Pandemic 'Peak' : Reflecting on 'Strategies' for and Variations in attempts at 'Flattening the Curve' and Managing the Crisis ' , Journal of Extreme Events , vol. 8 , no. 1 , 2150016 . https://doi.org/10.1142/S2345737621500160
On March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the emerging COVID-19 threat a pandemic following the global spread of the virus. As countries around the world implemented emergency measures in a concerted effort to handle the emerging pandemic, the nature and implications of the different kinds of precautionary measures adopted have remained contested. The majority of countries opted for efforts to slow the rate of infection, whilst critics have argued for stricter and milder measures, respectively. The living experience of the pandemic is inherently temporal as it is shaped by sentiments of living in anticipation of the envisioned pandemic peak(s) and aftermath, as vividly illustrated with references to the need for 'flattening the curve' so as to reduce the impact of the looming or creeping crisis. This paper sets out to critically discuss the notion of pandemic 'strategies', recognizing also that governments altered their strategic stances throughout the initial phase of the pandemic. It is likely that the aftermath of the crisis will trigger discussions of what kind of response should be considered as best practice. Thus, greater attention to the notion of 'strategies' in light of the COVID-19 pandemic is in order.
On March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the emerging COVID-19 threat a pandemic following the global spread of the virus. As countries around the world implemented emergency measures in a concerted effort to handle the emerging pandemic, the nature and implications of the different kinds of precautionary measures adopted have remained contested. The majority of countries opted for efforts to slow the rate of infection, whilst critics have argued for stricter and milder measures, respectively. The living experience of the pandemic is inherently temporal as it is shaped by sentiments of living in anticipation of the envisioned pandemic peak(s) and aftermath, as vividly illustrated with references to the need for 'flattening the curve' so as to reduce the impact of the looming or creeping crisis. This paper sets out to critically discuss the notion of pandemic 'strategies', recognizing also that governments altered their strategic stances throughout the initial phase of the pandemic. It is likely that the aftermath of the crisis will trigger discussions of what kind of response should be considered as best practice. Thus, greater attention to the notion of 'strategies' in light of the COVID-19 pandemic is in order.
Protectionism has returned, reversing an almost three-decade trend of trade liberalisation. 2009 was a crisis year for international trade, which suffered its steepest decline since the 1930s. Protectionism returned, reversing an almost three-decade trend of trade liberalisation. But, contrary to expectations, it has not returned with a vengeance, rather creeping to the surface in subtle ways. Time, therefore, to take stock of trade policy after the crisis, and consider its outlook at the beginning of this century's second decade.
1. Regulatory reasons for the crisis 2. Refinancing credit and Target balances 2.1 Target balances 2.2 Target balances and fiscal rescue credit 2.3 The lowering of collateral standards for refinancing credit 2.4 Indirect state financing via refinancing credit to commercial banks 3. ECB government bond purchases and official bail-out programmes 3.1 From indirect to direct state financing: the SMP 3.2 The intergovernmental rescue funds: EFSF, ESM & Co. 3.3 Monetary policy or fiscal policy: ESM, SMP and OMT 4. The risks and costs of the ECB policy 4.1 Potential exposure via the OMT programme 4.2 Risks related to refinancing credits 4.3 Target losses in the case of exit and bankruptcy, should the euro continue to exist 4.4 Target losses in the case of a euro break-up or a German exit 4.5 Shift in growth forces due to free insurance coverage 4.6 The path dependency of policy 4.7 The creeping confiscation of savings 5. Economic assessment of ECB policy 6. Policy measures against interest rate spreads: the ECB's justification 6.1 The economic importance of interest rate spreads 6.2 Discussion of the ECB's arguments 7. Summary of key points
In: Rejec, Jure and Dujovski, Nikola (2013) VARIATIONS OF STRATEGIC APPROACHES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF SLOW-BURN AND ACUTE CRISIS (AN EXAMPLE OF WILDFIRES IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA). In: INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE THE BALKANS BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: SECURITY, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION, 5-8, Ohrid.
Key aspects to be addressed within this discussion are related to the discipline of crisis management, a discipline that is relatively in its infancy and therefore related terminology abounds. Whilst the comprehensive study of crises can be traced back to the 1960s and 70s - mostly in areas such as psychology, sociology and disasters (Booth, 1993), it is the Tylenol poisoning disaster in the USA of 1982 and events such as Chernobyl, Bhopal and Challenger that gave rise in Europe to the discipline of crisis management (Mitroff, 2001; Falkheimer & Heide, 2006). The subsequent developments in this discipline have led to crisis management being described as a 'heavily applied field' where managers' interest/demand for tools they could use in the face of a crisis started to grow as well (Coombs, 2000: 77) Slow-burn crises (also referred to as low-intensity or creeping crises) are often related to likely effects stemming from global warming; i.e. droughts, heavy rain falls and related floods, famine etc., or epidemics like HIV/AIDS, rabies or others whose source might be diffuse - both in terms of space and time and the full consequences of which may not be fully apparent from the outset. On the other end of the spectrum are acute crises most commonly put into the category of major emergencies. These usually have an initiating event, identifiable boundaries and a clear time span between initial recognition and declaration of an end to the crisis is limited and fairly clear (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2006b). What this paper will examine are perspectives on conceptualizing the phenomenon of crisis and the coping mechanisms employed once a crisis occurs, or in other words once it is recognised that it is occurring. In so doing the key terms referred to in the title will be firstly looked upon. Putting 186 definitions on the table and exploring some related theories, the paper will then move to a case study of the situation surrounding wildfires in the Republic of Macedonia. As it will be shown even a dispersed situation like this can fall into the category of either slow-burn or/and an acute crisis, what implies that not only effects of seemingly remote situations should be regarded as a slow-burn crises. Rather, managerial efforts should be vastly applied to low-intensity events, the so called 'creepers' since it is these types of crises that at a first sight usually appear sudden or acute, but have actually been first a creeping crises not detected on time (Bernstein, 2011). Therefore, whilst a subtle division is sometimes made between different categories of crises, in the case of slow-burn and acute crises such divisions should be treated with caution as also a slow-burn crisis can result in an inherently acute shock if not treated on time. Consequently, albeit approaches between the two types of crises might differ in several aspects, the focus of strategy deployment should be based on an understanding that a slow-burn crisis presents a stage in the process of an acute one. For the purpose of this paper, the terms crisis and disaster are used interchangeably and approached in a context of required managerial action of a low-intensity situations. A crisis is referred to the stage where successful management may still lead to a successful outcome, and a disaster presenting an event where harmful effects already took place and damage needs to be limited (Institute of Lifelong Learning, 2006b). As strategic approach of dealing with such events is subject to this discussion, managers and/or decision makers are regarded as political officials, organisational leaders or other senior public officials that maintain executive powers, unless otherwise referred to in the text.
[Conclusion]: Five major outcomes and the way forward for the Kumul Scholar International (KSI) The following are the five major outcomes from the discussions that the participants felt were crucial for understanding the SAP as a program,its impacts in Papua New Guinea and what can be done by the KSI as the way forward. 1. Countries are developed by a core group of technocrats shielded by leadership. This enables home grown and owned reforms through this group. KSI should initiate and continue communication and dialogue with technocrats, politicians, private business, academics and graduate students both within Papua New Guinea and overseas through its activities such as KSI 2002 Conference the annual conference and a KSI alumnus organisation in Papua New Guinea. 2. Information is vital for development. Misinformation and lack of proper awareness is a recipe for disaster. KSI should establish a website to disseminate information and continue to organise and participate in public forums and conferences in Australia and Papua New Guinea. 3. Papua New Guinea's problems have been a creeping crisis— high debt to increasing debt to disaster (3 Ds). The international donor community led by the World Bank and IMF's intervention through SAPs in Papua New Guinea were reactions to requests from PNG during moments of crisis. It would be much better for Papua New Guinea to introduce such reforms voluntarily and intentionally during relatively stable periods. 4. Political economy matters as to who benefits and who loses from reforms. Thus reform is difficult, as power play is inevitable. Coalition governments are not conducive to structural reforms. National interests can be comprised through the pursuit of political interest and personal interests during the design and implementation of reform programs such as the SAP. The public's access to information is hampered by a high rate of illiteracy and poor channels of communication. Thus, greater use and abuse of power by the minority who have access to information makes transparency and accountability of reforms difficult in Papua New Guinea. 5. Appropriate and efficient institutional development. This included institutions for human resource development, property rights and contract enforcement. Human resources are important. Recent public sector reforms have shown the severity of the human resource and capacity difficulties facing the nation. While investing in human resources, institutions that define property rights and enforce contracts are needed. The PNG constitution provides the framework for development.
The article discusses the preconditions and origins of large-scale migration processes taking place in the territories of the European Union (EU) over the past decade and presents a study of the relationship between migration flows and modern hybrid wars, referring to the correlation of dissimilar warfare conditions. both military and non-military means of hybrid expansion of the Russian Federation. The description of the procedures representing the use of conventional and non-traditional means of influence of Russia, as well as its state and non-state actors, which are aimed at provoking instability, disorder of state-building processes in Ukraine and the European Union. The study is important for the regional security of Eastern European countries since on the one hand, hybrid threats from Russia are seen as fundamental to Ukraine's national security, and, on the other hand, as social tensions caused by refugee crises and related fears, which are major factors in political instability and social fragmentation around the world, and therefore the provocation of large-scale migration flows may be a new form of creeping hybrid expansion of the Russian Federation, carried out in order to achieve the latter's ambitious goals. ; В статье говорится о предпосылках и истоки масштабных миграционных процессов, происходящих на территориях государств Европейского Союза (ЕС) в течение последнего десятилетия, приведены исследования связи между миграционными потоками и современными гибридными войнами, ссылаясь на корреляцию непохожих условий ведения войны, которые отображают использование, как военных так и невоенных средств, гибридной экспансии Российской Федерации. Исследование является важным для обеспечения региональной безопасности стран Восточной Европы, поскольку с одной стороны гибридные угрозы со стороны России рассматриваются как основные для национальной безопасности Украины, а с другой стороны как социальная напряженность, вызванная кризисами беженства и связанными с ними страхами, которые являются одними из основных факторов политической нестабильности и социальной раздробленности во всем мире, а следовательно провокация возникновения масштабных миграционных потоков может быть новой формой ползучей гибридной экспансии Российской Федерации, которая проводится с целью достижения последней своих амбициозных целей. ; В статті йдеться про передумови і витоки масштабних міграційних процесів, що відбуваються на територіях держав Європейського Союзу (ЄС) впродовж останнього десятиліття та наведено дослідження зв'язку між міграційними потоками і сучасними гібридними війнами, посилаючись на кореляцію несхожих умов ведення війни, таких що відображають використання як військових так і невійськових засобів гібридної експансії Російської Федерації. Приведений опис процедур, що представляють застосування звичайних та нетрадиційних засобів впливу Росії, а також її державних і недержавних суб'єктів, які мають на меті спровокувати нестабільність, невпорядкованість державотворчих процесів в Україні та країнах Європейського Союзу.Метою даної статті є визначення передумов міграційних потоків, дослідження потенційного зв'язку між ними в Європі, а також інструментами сучасної гібридної війни в Україні і світі.Дослідження є важливим для забезпечення регіональної безпеки країн східної Європи, оскільки з однієї сторони гібридні загрози з боку Росії розглядаються як основні для національної безпеки України, а з іншої сторони як соціальна напруженість, спричинена біженськими кризами і пов'язаними з ними страхами, що є одними з основних факторів політичної нестабільності та соціальної роздробленості в усьому світі, а отже провокація виникнення масштабних міграційних потоків може бути новою формою повзучої гібридної експансії Російської Федерації, що проводиться з метою досягнення останньою своїх амбітних цілей.
The article discusses the preconditions and origins of large-scale migration processes taking place in the territories of the European Union (EU) over the past decade and presents a study of the relationship between migration flows and modern hybrid wars, referring to the correlation of dissimilar warfare conditions. both military and non-military means of hybrid expansion of the Russian Federation. The description of the procedures representing the use of conventional and non-traditional means of influence of Russia, as well as its state and non-state actors, which are aimed at provoking instability, disorder of state-building processes in Ukraine and the European Union. The study is important for the regional security of Eastern European countries since on the one hand, hybrid threats from Russia are seen as fundamental to Ukraine's national security, and, on the other hand, as social tensions caused by refugee crises and related fears, which are major factors in political instability and social fragmentation around the world, and therefore the provocation of large-scale migration flows may be a new form of creeping hybrid expansion of the Russian Federation, carried out in order to achieve the latter's ambitious goals. ; В статье говорится о предпосылках и истоки масштабных миграционных процессов, происходящих на территориях государств Европейского Союза (ЕС) в течение последнего десятилетия, приведены исследования связи между миграционными потоками и современными гибридными войнами, ссылаясь на корреляцию непохожих условий ведения войны, которые отображают использование, как военных так и невоенных средств, гибридной экспансии Российской Федерации. Исследование является важным для обеспечения региональной безопасности стран Восточной Европы, поскольку с одной стороны гибридные угрозы со стороны России рассматриваются как основные для национальной безопасности Украины, а с другой стороны как социальная напряженность, вызванная кризисами беженства и связанными с ними страхами, которые являются одними из основных факторов политической нестабильности и социальной раздробленности во всем мире, а следовательно провокация возникновения масштабных миграционных потоков может быть новой формой ползучей гибридной экспансии Российской Федерации, которая проводится с целью достижения последней своих амбициозных целей. ; В статті йдеться про передумови і витоки масштабних міграційних процесів, що відбуваються на територіях держав Європейського Союзу (ЄС) впродовж останнього десятиліття та наведено дослідження зв'язку між міграційними потоками і сучасними гібридними війнами, посилаючись на кореляцію несхожих умов ведення війни, таких що відображають використання як військових так і невійськових засобів гібридної експансії Російської Федерації. Приведений опис процедур, що представляють застосування звичайних та нетрадиційних засобів впливу Росії, а також її державних і недержавних суб'єктів, які мають на меті спровокувати нестабільність, невпорядкованість державотворчих процесів в Україні та країнах Європейського Союзу.Метою даної статті є визначення передумов міграційних потоків, дослідження потенційного зв'язку між ними в Європі, а також інструментами сучасної гібридної війни в Україні і світі.Дослідження є важливим для забезпечення регіональної безпеки країн східної Європи, оскільки з однієї сторони гібридні загрози з боку Росії розглядаються як основні для національної безпеки України, а з іншої сторони як соціальна напруженість, спричинена біженськими кризами і пов'язаними з ними страхами, що є одними з основних факторів політичної нестабільності та соціальної роздробленості в усьому світі, а отже провокація виникнення масштабних міграційних потоків може бути новою формою повзучої гібридної експансії Російської Федерації, що проводиться з метою досягнення останньою своїх амбітних цілей.
The current debate about 'Modell Deutschland' has been prompted by the global financial crisis that emerged in 2008 and the Hartz labour market reforms in Germany. Six contributions concerning labour market reform, production systems, vocational education and training, industrial relations, employment patterns, and social policy examine the pillars of the German Model. A central argument in all of the contributions is that the German Model is undergoing a process of recalibration accompanied by increased uncertainty, rather than institutional breakdown. The Model's institutional preconditions and sources of legitimacy are becoming weaker and more questioned than in the past. These processes unfold less via major crises and political interventions than through 'creeping' economic and social changes.
The pandemic caused by the novel Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) presents a national and global crisis. Government public health responses have impacted on the social and behavioural norms that shape daily interactions in Australia. The pandemic has been accompanied by the global spread of false and misleading information including conspiratorial narratives, resulting in an online environment described as an 'infodemic'. The situation has presented far right extremists with a unique opportunity to capitalise on societal anxieties and align their narratives with wider public discourse to recruit and mobilise. To better understand the impact of COVID-19 on Australian far right extremists, this report addressed three key questions. The creeping threat posed by far right extremist narratives in online Australian sentiment across a two-year time period from 8 January 2019 to 8 January 2021. How the COVID-19 pandemic and public health responses have been appropriated by far right extremists in Australia for purposes of recruitment, engagement, and mobilisation. The impact and effectiveness of social media moderation strategies on the presence and growth of far right extremists and conspiratorial narratives in the online environment. The report draws on two data sets. The creeping threat posed by far right extremist and conspiratorial narratives on mainstream public sentiment was explored using YouTube and Twitter data. In total, 21 YouTube channels were selected, generating 13+ million comments, and 1% of Australian tweets and retweets were collected generating 5.5+ million tweets. To explore how far right extremists have appropriated COVID-19 online, screenshots from Telegram and Instagram channels were collected from groups, individuals, and personalities associated with far right extremist and militant anti-lockdown movements. ; Acknowledgements: We would particularly like to acknowledge the advice and assistance of Dr. Peter Petocz, our statistician. His advice has allowed us to perform statistical analysis of ...
This is the 18. article in our series Trouble on the Far-Right. When it comes to change in social environments, a parable of philosopher Charles Handy gets pulled out quickly. If you drop a frog in boiling water, it jumps out immediately; but placed in cold water slowly warming up, it acclimates itself and falls to sleep, unaware of being boiled alive. The parable reminds us of the perceptional relativity of change: Within communities creeping developments cause habituation, abrupt breaks an arousing shock. In terms of social movements this truism becomes apparent in a double way: On the one hand, erupting crises may destabilize social orders and create the necessary space for dissident actors to gain momentum – while they would fail to mobilize outside the scenario of an anxious community gasping for a new guarantor of order. On the other hand, the rise of a dissident actor with unconventional performances may work as a shock triggering withdrawal reflexes in the broader society – while dissidents with relative habitual sentiments can find resonance in communities disappointed by the ruling order. Does this perspective offer a potential to explain the rise of far right movements in Europe? Let's examine it by the example of Germany where, in the last two years, far right actors have experienced a remarkable gain in political acceptance – on the streets, in the booths and in the talk shows. In this case, it could be argued that their success in protest and electoral mobilizations as well as their disproportionate high presence in the media rests on communication politics that effect a normalization of far right positions previously disreputed in public discourse. Through this creeping habituation by society, they are able to gain momentum in situations of crisis, producing themselves successfully as a legitimate agent of the "anxious citizens" disappointed by the government. To test this little argument, a finger exercise in frame analysis seems to be proper, a tool common in social movement studies to explain why certain ideas in certain contexts are potent to mobilize audiences – and are not in others.