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The evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty. We model crisis as a game of two-sided incomplete information. Players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities. We derive four hypotheses, testing them against crises in Europe between 1815 and 1970. We show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis, as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We answer five questions: (1) How do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence? (2) How do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence? (3) What do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises? (4) Under what conditions can deterrence succeed? (5) Under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis? (American Political Science Review / FUB)

The evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty. We model crises as a game of two-sided incomplete information. Players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities. We derive four hypotheses, testing them against crises in Europe between 1815 and 1970. We show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis, as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We answer five questions: (1) How do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence? (2) How do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence? (3) What do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises? (4) Under what conditions can deterrence succeed? (5) Under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis?

This article draws attention to the danger that deliberate escalation will transform into compulsory escalation. According to Clausewitz' philosophy, the use of violence is an instrument of policy. Nuclear deterrence would have brought an end to that philosophy, since the costs of nuclear war always exceed the benefits. However, Clausewitz also suggests the possibility that a war may escalate beyond the break-even point (where cost is equal to benefit) if a nation expects to lose unilaterally. In the nuclear era, the limited use of nuclear weapons may very easily escalate into absolute war because the target feels that its survival is at stake. This argument closely resembles Riezler's theory of bluff developed on the eve of World War I and the possibility that escalation may become uncontrollable in a Krieg aus Not (war from necessity). Just as in 1914, a third world war might break out not on the basis of a calculation that the benefits of warfare are greater than the costs, but as a consequence of compulsory escalation of a crisis or a limited war in which one side perceives that its existence is threatened. Since planning for limited nuclear war and deliberate escalation enhances the probability of compulsory escalation, a nuclear posture of minimum deterrence should be preferred.

The de-escalation of a nuclear crisis is one of the major issues facing humankind. This book examines how nations in crises might successfully move back from the brink of nuclear war and how confidence-building measures might help and hinder the de-escalatory process

Krisen zwischen Staaten werden als "Nervenkrieg" konzipiert. Zwei Merkmale sind vor allem zu bedenken: "First, at each moment a state can choose to attack, back down, or escalate the crisis further. Second, if a state backs down, its leaders suffer audience costs that increase as the crisis escalates. These costs arise from the action of domestic audiances concerned with whether the leadership is successful or unsuccessful at foreign policy." Die symbolisch-verbal, eventuell säbelrasselnden Auseinandersetzungen werden dadurch besonders riskant, daß keine Seite genaue Informationen darüber besitzt, bis an welche Grenze die andere Seite gehen will, und ob sie Gewalt einzusetzen bereit ist. In diesem Zusammenhang spielen Stimmungen und Wahrnehmungen der eigenen Bevölkerung eine möglicherweise ausschlaggebende Rolle. Das Ergebnis der spieltheoretisch angelegten empirischen Untersuchung lautet u.a.: "The results of my analysis suggest that domestic political structure may powerfully influence a state's ability to signal its intentions and to make credible commitments regarding foreign policy. If democratic leaders can more credibly jeopardize their tenure before domestic audiences than authoritarian leaders, they will be favored in this regard. For example, in the model examined here, high-audience-cost states require less military escalation in disputes to signal their preferences, and are better able to commit themselves to a course of action in a dispute. This observation provides a theoretical rationale that might help explain why the quality of international relations between democracies seems to differ from that between other sorts of states." (AuD-Nar)

We present a model suggesting that international conflicts escalate to violence when countries (a) express higher levels of power motive imagery, (b) exaggerate levels of perceived power motive imagery in communications and statements from the "other" side, and (c) express still higher levels of power motive imagery as a result of such exaggerated perceptions. The model is supported by three studies. In the first two, participants wrote replies to one of two versions of the same letter taken from a real crisis. The third study explored conditions that affect the exaggerated perception of power motive imagery of the other side by asking participants to highlight the important points of a letter from a real crisis, under neutral conditions and under conditions arousing power motivation. The role of psychological variables in the escalation of conflicts to violence is discussed.

International crises are modeled as a political "war of attrition" in which state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate. A leader who backs down suffersaudience coststhat increase as the public confrontation proceeds. Equilibrium analysis shows how audience costs enable leaders to learn an adversary's true preferences concerning settlement versus war and thus whether and when attack is rational. The model also generates strong comparative statics results, mainly on the question of which side is most likely to back down. Publicly observable measures of relative military capabilities and relative interests prove to have no direct effect once a crisis begins. Instead, relative audience costs matter: the side with a stronger domestic audience (e.g., a democracy) is always less likely to back down than the side less able to generate audience costs (a nondemocracy). More broadly, the analysis suggests that democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly and clearly than authoritarian states can, perhaps ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states.

Examines relationship between involvement of democracies in a crisis and subsequent escalation to military hostilities or resolution of conflict; uses a theoretical model.

Obwohl Vermittler sich einer ganzen Reihe von Arten des Konfliktmanagements bedienen, haben Wissenschaftler nur einige davon bisher zu bewerten versucht. Eine weitere vollständig empirische Analyse von Funktionen und Verfahrensweisen Dritter im interrnationalen Krisenmanagement kommt zum Ergebnis, daß vor allem zwei Ansätze als besonders effizient zu bezeichnen sind: die unmittelbare Vermittlerrolleund der Versuch, bestehende Kommuniationslinien zwischen den Konfliktparteien zu erhalten und neue zu eröffnen. Dabei ist es nötig, Konflikte als dynamischen evolutionären Prozeß zu begreifen, der aus verschiedenen Phasen besteht, die in ihrer Abfolge wiederum eine spezifische Ausgestaltung von Konfliktmanagementmethoden Dritter bewirken. Diese Methoden haben sich im Kalten Krieg bewährt. Sie werden im neuen post-bipolaren Umfeld möglicherweise zu ähnlichen Erfolgen führen. (SWP-zss)

Although agents employ a wide range of conflict management techniques in practice, scholars have evaluated only a few of these. A more complete empirical analysis of the spectrum of third-party procedures used to manage international crises reveals that two techniques in particular are most effective: mediation efforts and third-party activities to open or maintain lines of communication. The endpoints of preventing escalation and promoting peaceful settlement take into account the notion of conflict as a dynamic evolutionary process, consisting of several phases, which in turn affect the outcome of third-party management. Crisis management methods that have proved successful in a bipolar world may be similarly successful in the post-cold war environment, an issue future work must address.

Game-theoretic models of deterrence and escalation, based on Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma, are developed in which two players can initially choose any level of preemption in a crisis (Deterrence Game) or escalation in an arms race (Deescalation Game). The greater this level, the more likely an opponent will interpret this choice as a noncooperative action and retaliate. Given that both players make noncooperative choices in these games—either initially or in retaliation—a probability of winding down is postulated whereby the playes can escape either the mutually worst outcome in the Deterrence Game (which becomes the Winding-Down Game) or the mutually next-worst outcome in the Deescalation Game (which becomes the Arms-Reduction Game). In both games, as the probability of winding down increases, the threat of retaliation must also increase—and at an increasing rate—to preserve the stability of mutual deterrence and mutual deescalation. Implications of these findings, especially for encouraging mutual cooperation between the superpowers, via both deterrence and defense ("Star Wars"), are discussed.

His analysis suggests that certain explanations have not been sufficiently considered in previous works. For example, prior domestic strife can be linked to the escalation of foreign conflict in an impressive number of cases, a discovery which runs counter to the consensus which has emerged over the last two decades among political scientists. Prior research on causes of war has often lacked rigour. James has tried to remedy this through a long-term, comparative approach to the subject matter. While Crisis and War follows the tradition of aggregate research, statistical analysis is always connected to particular events through discussions of situations and leaders in both diplomatic history and contemporary world politics. James' comprehensive and original approach to past theories both clarifies and critiques them.

Much has been written about how the United States and the Soviet Union have managed crises since World War II, avoiding dangerous escalation and war; little on how the two superpowers haveavoidedconfrontations. In part scholarly neglect of the question of crisis avoidance reflects the acute suspicion and hostility of the cold war. When U.S.-Soviet rivalry was perceived as a struggle between incompatible ideologies and ways of life, it was unthinkable that the superpowers might have any common interests, much less that they could collaborate, even tacitly, to control the conflict in their relationship.

The passing of the cold war may have contributed to the US failure in the Persian Gulf crisis to achieve an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait through coercive diplomacy, to the unlimited nature of its objectives, & to its decision to intervene with force. The failure of the USSR to play its usual balancing role in the Middle East allowed the US the option of using force with no risk of escalation to nuclear war. The absence of this constraint contributed to US readiness to resort to force, thereby reducing its willingness to make concessions or to give Saddam Hussein a face-saving way out of the crisis. This "no negotiations" policy may in turn have contributed to Hussein's own resolve to stand firm. The relative absence of a constraint on the use of force also contributed to the unlimited nature of US objectives in the crisis by removing any compelling reason to prioritize its interests. AA